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South Asia’s minorities – religious, ethnic, linguistic and gender are among the 
poorest and most vulnerable sections in the region; they are also victims of most 
conflicts and violence and atrocities by state and non-state actors. And yet, 
there is no South Asia regional instrument for minority rights’ protection, and no 
effective forum for peaceful dialogue on minority rights between countries.
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016: Mapping the Terrain seeks to 
provide a regional overview on minority rights’ precepts and practices in the 
region, offering a set of country-specific and region-wide recommendations. The 
report presents six country chapters – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka (dealing with Bhutan and Maldives in the Introduction) 
reporting on the condition of minorities, profiles of select marginalized groups and 
good practice case studies to profile successful campaigns and interventions for 
rights’ protection and promotion. 
The South Asia State of Minorities Report is planned as a tool for advocacy. It 
is hoped that the periodic reports on outcomes for minorities and the quality of 
state provisioning for them, will spur public debate on the subject in the region 
and create the conditions for state parties and the SAARC to agree to give serious 
consideration to issues of minorities and how to deliver for them. The purpose 
of the project is really about promoting citizenship, a central challenge of the 
‘deepening democracy’ agenda in the region.
The idea of Report was born with the South Asia State of Minorities Report 
Collective, a small group of minority and human rights researchers and activists 
from across South Asia, deciding to come together to produce a periodic people’s 
report, to systematically document and track the condition of minorities in the 
region and their access to rights guaranteed by international minority and human 
rights instruments. The Collective hopes to carry on the work, drawing more 
allies in, to expand the circle seeking to promote peace and justice in South Asia.
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vForeword
South Asia, the most populous region in the world, is home to large numbers 
of minorities. Across the region, many of the religious, ethnic, linguistic and indig-
enous minorities, particularly women and the poor, face marginalization and suffer 
the worst forms of exclusion. These abuses are not just limited to discrimination in 
the socio-economic sphere, but also the denial of the most basic human rights. The 
denial of rights to minorities in South Asia along religious, ethnic, caste or gender 
lines, is increasingly a factor behind much of the internal and external conflicts in 
the region and a barometer not only of the wider situation of human rights, but of 
the prospects for peace and security in the region. 
This inaugural 2016 report is a first-of-its-kind effort to bring together research 
and advocacy groups from various countries in the region to form a “South Asia 
Collective” that will periodically track and document the situation of minority rights, 
country by country. The report utilizes a common UN minority rights framework 
that looks at various indicators such as identity, culture, discrimination, partici-
pation in public life, and access to socio-economic rights to assess the situation of 
minority rights in the region. The current report covers six countries: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It is my hope that future editions 
will include Bhutan and the Maldives, as well as Myanmar, which has long-standing 
historical cultural connections to the South Asia region.
The findings of the report are sobering: violence against minorities, both by the 
state and private actors, is commonplace, with communities often deprived of their 
rights to life, liberty, and identity. Discrimination, in both law and practice, results 
in the political disenfranchisement of minority communities and their social and 
economic marginalization. Other rights, including freedom of religion or belief, are 
also under attack as governments seek to impose conservative religious ideologies 
in an effort to homogenise culture in a pluralistic region with a strong history of 
tolerance and coexistence. These findings suggest that the road to the realization of 
human rights for minorities in the region will be a long and winding one.
According to the report’s findings, the absence of regional instruments or 
mechanisms in place for minority rights protection and promotion in South Asia, 
combined with weak policy commitments by the region’s governments, increase 
the likelihood that these communities will be targeted for abuse. In light of these 
challenges, the report’s authors highlight the increasingly critical role that domestic 
civil society groups play in protecting and realizing the rights of minorities in both 
law and practice. In many countries these civil society groups act as the last, and 
sometimes the only, stakeholder documenting human rights violations, monitoring 
the government’s implementation of national and international instruments, and 
holding officials to account for rights violations against minority groups. 
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The story of minority rights in South Asia is not all doom and gloom. There 
are inspiring and hopeful examples too, ranging from government efforts to bolster 
the environment for greater inclusivity and pluralism, to stories of human rights 
defenders putting their lives on the line to protect and advance the minority rights 
in their respective countries. What is clear, however, is that without further engage-
ment between governments and civil society groups in the region who are directly 
working with local communities, mobilising them to demand and obtain rights as 
citizens, and providing services that minority groups are otherwise unable to access, 
the situation of minority rights in the region will remain dire. 
It is the hope of the South Asia Collective to raise awareness regarding the 
neglected yet crucial issue of minority rights in the region, and encourage public 
debate aimed at addressing the root causes of discrimination and violence suffered 
by minority populations. I believe with this inaugural report they have taken an 
important step in this direction. 
Ahmed Shaheed 
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief
3 November 2016
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Executive Summary
1. Introduction: This is a report on the condition of minorities in South Asia, 
put together by a group of minority and human rights researchers and activ-
ists from the region, deciding to come together to produce periodic people’s 
reports, to systematically document and track the condition of South Asia’s 
minorities and their access to rights as citizens. The objective is to contrib-
ute to advocacy for establishing South Asia-wide minority and human rights 
standards and mechanisms - through building a body of evidence, stimulating 
public debate, and galvanising regional civil society – in an effort to improve 
outcomes. 
2. Scope: The volume provides an examination of both the theory and practices 
affecting minorities in each South Asian state, using as framework, the United 
Nations Minorities Declaration 1992 -  its four-fold right to life and securi-
ty; identity and culture; socio-economic rights; and effective participation. 
Presentation is in form of country overviews – covering all eight SAARC mem-
ber states (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka) - supported by profiles of severely marginalized minority groups 
and surveys of community-led good practices on minority rights protection. 
Being the first edition, this volume provides a baseline to map the terrain of 
minority rights regimes and outcomes in each country, for future editions to 
build upon. 
3. Research and data sources: The report seeks to document both ‘outcomes’ for 
minorities, as well as state ‘efforts’ at delivering for them. This required the 
research to collate and summarise findings from a range of data sources, most-
ly secondary, adapting them to the four-fold minority rights framework, but 
also undertaking some primary data analysis. Country reports follow a com-
mon narrative framework, based on three levels of analyses: Firstly, health 
checking the ‘theory’ on minority rights in the particular country, looking at 
constitutional provisions, also contextualizing it within contemporary political 
history of the country. Secondly, assessing implementation of the laws, using 
a range of data sources - media reports, published scholarly work, and where 
available, official data, case studies and programme reports. Thirdly, outcomes 
for minorities at macro level, mostly on socio-economic rights – collating data 
available in disaggregated form, by minority groups, and against national 
averages. Availability of data disaggregated by groups and available regularly, 
turned out to be the biggest barrier to reporting conditions. 
4. Findings: The findings of the report are sobering. South Asia accounting for 
a fifth of the world’s population, is one of its poorest parts. It is also where 
civil and political rights are severely restricted, with frequent reports of human 
rights violations from across the region. Religious, ethnic, linguistic and 
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indigenous minorities, particularly women, are among the poorest and most 
vulnerable sections in the region. Where these markers intersect – such as 
for women and dalits from amongst religious minorities -  they also suffer the 
worst exclusions and discrimination. Whilst most minority groups are recog-
nized as such, and possess some protection in law, there is a large population 
everywhere, of those not recognized as citizens, existing in a state of limbo, and 
effectively stateless, that do not even have the assurance of the law. 
5. Life and security: All countries provide a guarantee of life and security to all 
their citizens, including minorities. Yet there is widespread physical violence 
and denial of right to life, disproportionately of minorities. In the absence of 
systematic count, suffice it to say that the numbers are staggering. Violence 
against minorities is facilitated by a combination of factors: (i) law enforce-
ment’s inability to protect minority groups from violence by private parties, 
and law courts unable to hold perpetrators to account, thus a case of the 
state failing in its foremost duty to protect; (ii) weak rule of law, specially the 
selective application of laws by agencies of the state, including collusion with 
anti-minority groups, denying minority groups’ protection under the law and 
access to justice; and (iii) state itself denying the right to life of members of 
minority groups, through widespread application of extra-ordinary laws, 
resulting in largescale human rights violations.  
6. Identity and culture: Most states provide some sort of freedom of identity, 
but the general trend is to promote majoritarian identity and culture, towards 
integrating diversities into a homogenized conception of the nation. Freedom 
of religion and belief is in short supply, with extremist religious ideologies on 
the ascendance, everywhere. Language policies and practices overwhelming-
ly favour the majority, at the expense of minorities. In effect, the identity of 
minority groups in South Asia, is under serious threat.
7. Socio-economic rights: Across the region, laws promise equal access to all in 
basic services and opportunities. Yet minorities make up disproportionate 
numbers of the poor and excluded, pointing to the widespread discrimination 
against minority groups in South Asian societies, and the concentrated forms 
of exclusions that perpetuate, both at frontline delivery level, as well as at pol-
icy.  There is also little effort, in the form of targeted programmes, ring fenced 
budgets, dedicated structures, and indeed monitoring mechanisms, to address 
minority exclusions. Whilst it is true that there is a wide spectrum here, with 
some countries not even having a system of decennial headcount census and 
others quite advanced on data gathering and crunching, to take just one exam-
ple, overall state efforts to provide for minorities, even in the best case scenar-
ios, is conservative and inadequate.  
8. Effective participation: Most South Asian constitutions profess equality and 
non-discrimination. Yet, minorities’ exclusion from participation in public 
life, including through representation in governing institutions, is widespread. 
This has a wider impact on the realization of all other citizenship rights. The 
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worst cases are those where minorities may be legally denied participation, 
for example, in accessing public office, and there are many examples of this 
from the region. But even where the law is equal, minorities are denied effec-
tive participation – a result of various structural barriers, and little robust 
action to undo those.  
9.  Conclusion: Underlying poor outcomes for minorities in the region, is weak 
policy commitment, everywhere, to deliver for them. This failure is itself driv-
en by the region’s strong majoritarian atmosphere. Fueling majoritarianism in 
South Asia, at least partly, is competing nationalisms, across borders, that is 
also antagonistic, harking back to the region’s recent conflictual history. In this 
context, any talk of minority rights is seen by majoritarian groups and state 
actors as challenging the state, and hence quickly delegitimized. 
10.  Recommendations  
i. Improving minority outcomes will require breaking this vicious circle in 
the region, of competing majoritarian nationalisms and poor minority 
outcomes. A regional approach – that emphasizes citizenship right of all, 
including minorities – we think, might be the way out, as it shifts the 
debate away from particularistic considerations. Yet, South Asia is the 
only region, without any regional minority rights instrument or mech-
anism. SAARC’s minority, indeed human rights and democracy promo-
tion mandate, is very thin. 
ii. Poor rights for minorities have implications for conflicts too. Behind 
many of the ethnic conflicts in the region, within and between states, are 
minorities and their perceived sense of grievances. Ffforts at minority 
rights protection and promotion could potentially be steps towards con-
flict prevention too. This is another reason to prefer a regional approach.
iii.  But given poor official efforts towards robust minority rights, including 
regionally, it is important to work with civil society – local, national, and 
specially regional - to prepare the ground for greater respect for minori-
ty and human rights, and to demand action on those by state parties. 
Foremost, it is crucial that traction on minority outcomes overall, not be 
made contingent on state-led efforts. 
iv.  With those general points, some specific recommendations follow: 
 - Establish systems for collecting and reporting disaggregated data 
on relevant indicators; that on insights on the processes of denial 
of minority rights; as well as on documenting performance of states 
on obligations under international charters. Start off with research 
and advocacy centres across the region, sharing experiences and 
insights on data collection and analysis.
 - Encourage establishment of region-wide civil society plat-
forms on minority rights to act as regional champions, enabling 
Executive Summary
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experience-sharing and advocacy at national and regional levels, 
for improved minority outcomes. 
-  Focus the attention of this regional activism on systemic prob-
lems that result in minority rights’ violations across arenas, among 
them, lack of transparency; poor accountability of state actors; dis-
crimination in application of laws and provision of services; and 
homogenizing policies and practices.  
-  Alongside, the regional effort must pay attention to strengthening 
safeguards for minorities, in law and in practice. At national level, 
these could potentially be actions for human rights’ sensitization; 
enabling targeted programmes, directed investments and dedicat-
ed structures for minorities; and building representative bureau-
cracy and robust grievance redressal systems. 
-  Once some traction has been achieved locally, and a regional con-
stituency mobilized, useful to start to push the envelop on region-
al mechanisms – a South Asia charter of minority and human 
rights, along with an associated set of institutions to oversee its 
enforcement.
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1Despite many years of sustained growth and development interventions 
in South Asia, development indicators for the region remain dismal. The 
region, accounting for a fifth of the world’s population, is one of its poorest 
parts (see Table 1). It is also where civil and political rights are severely 
restricted, with frequent reports of human rights violations across the 
region (Chakma, 2006:1; the World Bank 2009: 93).
Media reports, civil society programme reports, research studies and the 
odd official report, however limited, point to South Asia’s minorities – reli-
gious, ethnic, linguistic and gender  - being among the poorest and most 
vulnerable sections in the region; they are also victims of most conflicts and 
violence and atrocities by state and non-state actors. South Asia’s minorities 
thus suffer doubly: 
South Asia is characterized by its large population, growing poverty, weak gov-
ernance structures and feeble democratic institutions, increasing militariza-
tion and sectarianism.... Governments in South Asia have pursued national 
security through destructive military apparatuses, rather than (seeking) secu-
rity for citizens by actualizing their creative potential….  Most important, the 
nations of South Asia are still in search of a social contract that can satisfy their 
people, regardless of gender, faith, ethnicity or religion (Nepali, 2009:4).
Along with some of the oldest civilizations in the world, South Asia includes 
some of its poorest countries. Civil war, ethnic tension, religious persecution 
and terrorism are but some of the ailments of this region, as are the abuse of 
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1. ‘any country whose government engages in or tolerates particularly severe violations of 
religious freedom that are systematic, ongoing and egregious’ (CPC: 5).
 2. ‘includes countries where the violations engaged in or tolerated by the government are 
serious and are characterized by at least one of the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, 
and egregious” standard, but do not fully meet the CPC standard’ (CPC: 5).
government power, censorship, and human rights violations. Disappearances, 
torture, police abuse... these are common practices in the nations of South Asia 
(the World Bank, 2009:93).
It is evident that the condition of minority communities in South Asia is 
grim. K.N. Panikkar (2005: 1) summarizes the situation as:  
The increasing infringement of the rights of minorities in the countries of 
South Asia ... has been a matter of considerable concern. ...In fact, the his-
tory of minorities in South Asia is a history of increasing discrimination and 
deprivation….. 
Questions about the rights of minorities (as citizens deserving equal 
treatment and as minority groups deserving special rights for the protection 
of their identity) and the safeguards necessary to ensure them, are central 
here (see Box 1). 
Let us look at some recent evidence on the conditions of South Asia’s 
minorities. In the absence of any authoritative and standardized reports on 
the situation of minorities  in the region we have to rely on the evidence 
that is available. The United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (US Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2015) 
reports on foreign governments with serious abuses of religious freedom. 
Its 2015 report included five  of the eight  countries in South Asia as demon-
strating serious concerns, either perpetrating or tolerating abuse of religious 
freedom. Pakistan was categorized as Tier 1 (most serious) recommended 
country of particular concern (CPC),1 one of the 17 countries that according 
to the report meet this level. India and Afghanistan were both Tier 2,2 two of 
the eight so identified by the report. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were among 
the other six countries studied by the 2015 report, signifying concerns with 
regard to religious freedom there. 
The Minority Rights Group publishes its annual Peoples Under Threat 
Index - a global ranking of countries most at risk of genocide and mass kill-
ings based on a set of indicators that are a combination of risks suffered 
by minority groups and the safeguards available to check mass violence 
(Minority Rights Group, 2016a). Its 2016 report lists two South Asian 
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Box 1. Why are minority rights important? 
There are two aspects to minority rights: Firstly, minority rights are  central 
to the democratization project; secondly, and following from that, minority 
rights are a tool of inclusive development. 
a. Minority rights as central to the democratization project
‘An important dimension to promoting an equitable, just and inclusive dem-
ocratic ethos and fashioning institutions and practices intended to entrench 
it, is the protection and promotion of minority rights’ (Salter, 2011: 5). As a 
corollary, it has  also proved to be a tool for conflict prevention. The post-
Cold War eruption of ethnic conflicts across Europe, Africa and Asia reflected 
in many ways the failures of states to tackle minority demands, concerns and 
grievances. This resulted in heightened attention to minority rights’ protec-
tion and promotion – most advanced in Europe where over the past 20 years 
multilateral structures, notably the Council of Europe and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE’s) High Commissioner 
for Minority Rights, have assumed a leading role both in developing new 
regional instruments for promoting the protection of minority rights and in 
monitoring their implementation on the ground.1 According to the Council 
of Europe (1995: 2), the grounds for devising a minority rights charter were 
an understanding based on upheavals of European history that ‘the protec-
tion of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and 
peace in this continent.’ It was hoped that the climate of tolerance and dia-
logue that these measures would enable would result in a situation where, 
‘cultural diversity is seen to be a source and a factor, not of division, but 
of enrichment for each society.’ In other words, the ability of minorities to 
express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identities is a hallmark of a genuinely plural and democratic society (Council 
of Europe, 1995).  
These arguments are as valid today as they were in the past. As the Minority 
Rights Group (MRG) (2013: 3) notes, ‘levels of inter-community and reli-
gious tensions are again rising fast. The resurgence of ethnic and religious 
nationalism, fractures associated with the “war on terror” and a backlash 
at growing levels of migration have all placed minority communities under 
renewed threat.’ There is much that South Asian societies can learn from the 
past in terms of use of minority rights as they seek to prevent conflicts and 
for deepening democracy. 
1. A key example in this respect is OSCE’s 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Partici-
pation of National Minorities in Public Life (see http://www.osce.org/hcnm/32240. The Lund 
Recommendations have since become a central reference document for law and policymakers in 
the OSCE region and a widely cited model for how to develop policy in this area in other parts of 
the world.
... contd. ...
5b. Minority rights as instrument of inclusive development 
Minority rights also have a more direct role to play in promoting inclusiv-
ity. Research is showing that ‘a large and growing proportion of those com-
munities left behind in the race to meet the millennium development goals 
(MDGs) are in fact minorities and indigenous peoples, with poverty rates 
typically double, the national’(Minority Rights Group, 2013:3). According 
to Rita Izak, UN’s Special Rapporteur on Minority Rights , ‘inequality, dis-
crimination and poverty, disproportionately impact persons belonging to 
minorities who constitute hundreds of millions of the most economically 
and socially disadvantaged globally’(United Nations, 2014). 
There are specific reasons for this. Minority communities – who represent 
excluded and marginalized sections – are unable to challenge systemic 
patterns of discrimination and disadvantage that keep people in poverty 
because being minorities they ‘….often lack the power, social or legal stand-
ing, or access to decision- making required to challenge their disadvantaged 
status….’ (Mepham, 2014). 
This brings us to the MDGs, the principle framework of the global fight 
against poverty. MDGs have achieved a great deal in directing attention and 
resources towards the fight for social and economic rights. But the criticism 
has been that because they prioritized social and economic rights (literacy, 
health, sanitation and so on) to the exclusion of civil and political rights 
(democratic participation and/or political freedom specifically); defined 
goals in technical terms that could be easily achieved and measured; and 
focused on aggregate whole-country/unit level improvements, MDGs have 
had little impact on the most disadvantaged sections of society. Aggregate 
outcomes may have improved (on health, education, incomes) but many 
sections have been left behind resulting in unequal development. This is 
truer of South Asia than other regions. Minorities make up large sections of 
those who have been left behind in the region even though sustained growth 
and development efforts might have helped society as a whole in improving 
their conditions. Izsak’s point made in general terms applies especially to 
the region: ‘One of the reasons states failed to reach their development tar-
gets was because the MDGs did not sufficiently take into account persons 
belonging to minorities’ (United Nations, 2014). 
The post-2015 development agenda seeks to chart a new course planning 
to focus attention on addressing inequalities through targeted interventions 
to bring hard to reach sections out of poverty and also focusing attention 
on civic and political rights to address the root cause of poverty so as to 
challenge discrimination and exclusion. Minority communities are a core 
constituency for this work. Hence, this is a good time to be talking about 
minority rights of equality, non-discrimination and effective participation, 
among others, in South Asia.
...Box 1 continuied ...
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countries - Afghanistan and Pakistan - having serious threat, and Sri Lanka 
as posing a middle level threat (Minority Rights Group, 2016b). Notably, 
safeguards against ‘threats’ that include voice and accountability, political 
stability and rule of law, were weak or non-existent all across the region. The 
Minorities at Risk project also reports on conditions of minorities under 
severe threat. A long list of ethnic and religious groups from South Asia find 
mention in the project’s reports, all at risk of violence and violations of basic 
rights of minority groups.3  
Negative outcomes for minority groups in South Asia represent fail-
ures of national instruments for minority rights (constitutional guaran-
tees of equality and non-discrimination among others) as well as of poor 
3.  Minorities at Risk Project – mostly ethnic conflicts, armed conflict, hence Kashmiris, 
Nagas, Mizos, Assamese in India; Balochs in Pakistan; Pashtuns in Afghanistan; Tamils 
in Sri Lanka; and indigenous tribals in Bangladesh.
1 2 3 4
International Conven-
tion on the Prevention 
and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide 
(1948)
International Convention 
on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965)
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966)
Afghanistan 3 3 3
Bangladesh  3 3 3
Bhutan 3
India 3 3 3
Maldives 3 3 #
Nepal 3 3 #
Pakistan 3 3 3
Sri Lanka 3 3 #
Table 2.  Status of ratification of major relevant international 
instruments
Source: Tabulated by the author from the Minority Rights Group (2014: 226-228).  
Note: 3 : Ratified; *: Signature not yet followed by ratification;  
#: Ratification of ICCPR and the Optional Protocol
7enforcement of international treaties and agreements, instruments that 
most South Asian nations are signatories to (see Table 2). Rule of law is 
flouted with regularity – there is only selective application of laws – and 
citizenship rights are not yet available fully equally to all, as minorities are 
often denied these, fully or partially. The issue at hand is ‘democracy deficit’ 
which calls for a new approach to delivering minority rights. 
Beyond the weaknesses of minority rights’ protection and promotion 
regimes, common to states in South Asia, is another unique feature of 
minority rights in the region -  its regional dimension. Many ethnic groups 
and communities are divided across national borders, themselves often arti-
ficial and arbitrary and mostly recently created, dividing long-established 
communities. Then there have also been significant intra-regional migra-
tions historically. Some migration streams  are on-going. These regional 
dynamics contribute to creating majorities and minorities, also contributing 
to a feature of the region where a majority community in one country could 
be a minority in another. This under-grids the issue of ‘reciprocity’ where 
the treatment of a minority in one country is contingent on how minorities 
5 6 7 8 9
International 
Covenant  on 
Economic 
Social andCultur-
al Rights (1966)
Convention on 
the Elimination 
of all Forms of 
Discrimination 
Against Women 
(1979)
Convention 
on the Rights 
of the Child 
(1989)
ILO 111
Discrimination 
(Employment 
and 
Occupation) 
Convention 
(1958)
ILO169
Convention 
Concerning 
Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples 
in Independent 
Countries 
(1989)
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
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are treated in another, or subject to bilateral relations between two coun-
tries. All these have implications for the condition of South Asia’s minorities 
and the rights available to them. 
The regional dynamics of minorities in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
(given their common experience of the Partition in  1947 and the creation 
of Bangladesh in 1972) and how it affects respective minorities – Muslims 
in India, Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan and Hindus and ‘Urdu speakers’ in 
Bangladesh - is well-known. A similar dynamic exists between India and 
Sri Lanka too impacting largely the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka; between 
India and Nepal, affecting Madhesis in Nepal and Nepalis in India; between 
Nepal and Bhutan, affecting Bhutan’s largest minority, Ngalungs; and 
finally between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Pashtun minority in Pakistan 
being the main one affected. Clearly minority rights in South Asia is also a 
trans-border issue.  
And yet, there is no South Asia regional instrument for minority rights’ 
protection, though regional and sub-regional instruments are common 
elsewhere (see Boxes 2, 3 and 4 for a list of the International instruments 
and mechanisms for minority rights protection). The absence of an effec-
tive forum for peaceful dialogue on minority rights results in accusations 
and counter accusations between countries and lack of traction on redress 
leading to endemic violations of minority rights. There is also little system-
atic tracking and reporting at country and regional levels, of the state of 
minorities and the violation of their rights in the region. 
There are also very few studies on minority rights – academic or schol-
arly - that either compare or at least use a regional lens. And civil society 
space for advocacy, region-wide, is limited. Together, this means that the 
opportunities for spurring public debate in the region on the subject are lost 
and there is little push on states to improve rights’ precepts and practices. 
Today the justifications for using a regional lens to look at minorities, even 
comparing and contrasting their conditions, is compelling. 
Given the regional dynamic of minority rights violations in South Asia 
it is our contention that a regional, multilateral approach to constructing 
and entrenching minority rights’ safeguards might be better suited to pro-
tect minorities, than national or international approaches that are clearly 
failing. A regional lens shifts the nature of the debate from the ethnic/reli-
gious character of a group (and its implications for the group’s demands on 
the nation-state) to one of democratic rights and citizenship, equality and 
9non-discrimination – something that all South Asian states claim to provide. 
And a regional agenda on minority rights (with its positive implications for 
addressing cross-border ‘reciprocity’) is also potentially less threatening for 
South Asian states than the human rights agenda which is seen by states in 
the region as a foreign western imposition. 
There are other arguments too for a regional approach. Minority rights 
today are understood to be no longer the sole preserve of the nation-state. 
Regional and international instruments and mechanisms for minority 
rights along with human rights are now legitimate platforms for discussions 
and problem solving. In the context of South Asia’s minorities, with their 
strong regional dimensions, resorting to such a supra-national approach is 
all the more urgent. In any case, this is not the first time that national bor-
ders have been transcended in the region in finding solutions to minorities’ 
plight. Various bilateral agreements (between South Asian nations) on the 
question of minorities speak to this history (see Box 5). 
There is also much learning to be imbibed using a regional approach. 
The world over, regional mechanisms have been the principle pathways 
building on UN mechanisms for establishing and monitoring minority 
rights’ standards and practices – a good example being Europe. South Asia 
lacks such a mechanism. 
The principal official platform in the region is the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985 when seven  South 
Asian nations signed the SAARC Charter. Afghanistan joined a little later. 
Commentators note that in its early years SAARC avoided any reference to 
‘contentious’ issues - protection of human rights is not even mentioned in 
the SAARC Charter (Khan and Rahman, 1999: 93). 
The Minority Rights Group (2016c) notes:
SAARC has not adopted any human rights convention or charter. It has not 
agreed to create any regional institution or mechanism to monitor adherence 
to, and implementation of, the various UN human rights conventions already 
signed by its member countries. Although member states have introduced 
‘human rights’ into their official discourse in relation to the Charter, it has been 
limited to the right to development.
Overall, SAARC has established a number of conventions though none 
of them specifically mentions minorities or minority rights. Of the six 
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Box 3. International instruments for minority rights protection
1. Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide  
Adopted in 1948, this was the first international attempt to affirm the rights 
of minorities to exist ‘...by outlawing the physical or biological destruction 
of national, ethnic, religious or racial group,  this instrument formally rec-
ognized the right of minority groups to exist as group, which surely must be 
considered as the most fundamental of all cultural rights.’
2. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD).
Adopted in 1965, CERD is best known for prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of ‘race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin,’ and provides 
for special measures for the advancement of racial or ethnic groups – an 
implicit acknowledgment of minority rights.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966. Article 27 of this 
legally binding instrument is the first international norm that universalizes 
the concept of minority rights: 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (2003)
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)
American Convention on Human Rights (1969)
Additional protocol, re economic social and cultural rights (1988)
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992)
European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minori-
ties (1995)
ASEAN Charter (2007) 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2009)
Arab Charter on Human Rights, 2008
Arab Human Rights Committee
Box 2. Regional instruments on minority rights
Source: Tabulated by the author from the Minority Rights Group (2014:222-233) and United 
Nations (2012:87-88).
... contd. ...
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In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own cul-
ture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
But the rights guaranteed under this provision must be asserted individu-
ally. 
Other provisions in ICCPR that have considerable relevance in protecting 
the rights of minority groups include, inter alia, the principle of non-dis-
crimination (Article 2); freedom of thought, conscience and expression 
(Article 18); freedom of expression (Article 19); prohibition against any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility and violence (Article 20[2]); freedom of association 
(Article 22); right to equal suffrage and equal access to public service (Article 
25); and equality before the law (Article 26). 
4. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
Among the core human rights treaties with universal scope only CRC con-
tains a provision (apart from Article 27 of ICCPR) specifically addressing the 
rights of minorities. Its Article 30 reads:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons 
of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is 
indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members 
of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise 
his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.
5. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNDM) 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992, UNDM is the first instrument 
devoted exclusively to minority concerns. It is inspired by Article 27 of ICCPR, 
but goes on to elaborate and add to the rights. Although a non-binding instru-
ment, UNDM carries considerable moral authority. It is a comprehensive doc-
ument, setting out both rights of persons (Article 2) and duties of the states 
(Articles 1, 4 and 5). Whilst rights are set out as rights of individuals, duties of 
states are formulated, in part, as duties towards minority groups. 
...Box 3 continued ...
Introduction
Rough Road to Citizenship
12
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
conventions, two are directly related to suppression of terrorism, one is 
on narcotic drugs and another is on criminal matters. In 2002, two human 
rights instruments were included: promotion of child welfare and prevent-
ing and combating trafficking in women and children for prostitution. In 
2004, the SAARC Social Charter was signed with 21 objectives. They mostly 
relate to cultural, social and economic issues; there are none on political or 
human rights although some have a bearing on minority rights. Notably, 
and reflective of SAARC’s effectiveness, there is little traction on imple-
mentation of even the current regional agreements (Khan and Rahman, 
1999:93-94).
To be fair, SAARC has been credited with having encouraged peo-
ple-to-people contact in the region especially the growth of multiple stake-
holders groups although it has been criticized for allowing very little official 
and sustained contact on the part of civil society actors. But its failures with 
state parties are  more disabling. There has been little traction from state 
parties or the media on the SAARC agenda. SAARC also lacks the imple-
mentation ability to convert agreements into roadmaps for action working 
multilaterally. SAARC also lacks a mechanism to settle disputes within its 
organization, something that has hindered the development of a regional 
South Asian concept of peace and security (Minority Rights Group, 2016c). 
What of civil society efforts towards strengthening rights’ frameworks 
in the region? The first serious effort by civil society bodies from the region 
in this direction came with the organizing of the South Asian Forum for 
Human Rights (SAFHR) in Kathmandu in 1998. The conclave that had par-
ticipants from all SAARC countries, urged states to:  
- create an office of a special rapporteur for monitoring minority rights 
- adopt a South Asian Charter for Human Rights
- establish a South Asian Human Rights Commission 
- establish a forum for monitoring and preparing a people’s report on the 
status of the condition of minorities    
These have remained mere wish lists. Little headway has been made by 
civil society groups to successfully lobby member states and SAARC to adopt 
these issues for official engagement and to implement the recommendations. 
Another notable attempt in this direction was the drafting of a 
Statement of Principles on Minority and Group Rights in South Asia  by the 
13
Box 4. International mechanisms for minority rights protection
1. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
The CHR is the highest ranking UN forum dedicated to human rights; it was 
set up in 1946 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as one of its 
subsidiary bodies. CHR’s initial terms of reference included submission of 
proposals, recommendations and reports to ECOSOC concerning the protec-
tion of minorities. CHR was abolished in 2006 and converted to the Human 
Rights Council (HRC), a subsidiary body of the General Assembly.
2. Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(till 2007) and the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee (since 
2007)
Both these bodies are made up of experts. 
3. Working Group on Minorities (till 2007) and Forum on Minority 
Issues (since 2007).
The only minority specific UN body. 
4. Independent Expert on Minority Issues (IEMI) in 2005. 
IEMI is the first procedure mandate for minority issues.  In its early works, 
it has focused on three broad strategic objectives:
increasing the focus on minority communities in the context of poverty alle-
viation, development and MDGs;
increasing an understanding of minority issues in the context of promoting 
social inclusion and ensuring stable societies; and
mainstreaming the consideration of minority issues within the work of the 
UN and other important multilateral forums.
IEMI functions under the auspice of the Human Rights Council. 
5. Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
The following are committees of particular relevance for the implementation 
of minority rights: 
Human Rights Committee (overseeing implementation of ICCPR); 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (overseeing implemen-
tation of ICESCR); 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (overseeing imple-
mentation of CERD);  and
Committee on the Rights of the Child (overseeing implementation of CRC).
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Box 5: Bilateral treaties affecting South Asia’s minorities  
India-Pakistan 
The Liaqat-Nehru Pact (1950) 
Also called the Delhi Pact, this was bilateral treaty between India and 
Pakistan ‘whereby refugees were allowed to return unmolested to dispose 
of their property, abducted women and looted property were to be returned, 
forced conversions were unrecognized, and minority rights were confirmed.’ 
Its provisions read like a ‘bill of rights’ for the minorities of South Asia, with 
the aims of alleviating the fears of religious minorities, elevating communal 
peace and creating an atmosphere for the two countries to resolve their other 
differences. An underlying driver for the pact was avoiding a war between 
the two countries.  According to the agreement, governments of India and 
Pakistan agreed to ensure to their minorities, ‘complete equality of citizen-
ship, irrespective of religion; a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, 
property, dignity; guaranteed fundamental human rights of the minorities, 
and participation in the public life of their country, to hold political or other 
offices and to serve in their country’s civil and armed forces’ 
India-Bangladesh
The India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (1974)
Meant to resolve territorial disputes between India and Bangladesh through 
the exchange of 162 enclaves between the two countries affecting some 
50,000 persons in all. Given effect in 2015. 
India-Sri Lanka 
The Bandaranaike (Srimavo)-Shastri Pact (1964)
On the status of Indian Origin Tamils (IOTs), paved the way for citizenship 
rights to Indian Tamils living in Sri Lanka. It apportioned IOTs between Sri 
Lanka and India – 600,000 Tamils were to be repatriated to India, whilst 
375,000 were to be granted citizenship of Sri Lanka. The pact was followed 
with a goodwill Bandaranaike-Gandhi Pact in 1974 that had left 150,000 
IOTs out of it ambit. 
... contd. ...
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The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (1987)
Also called the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord, this treaty was signed between 
the two countries to ambitiously decide the political future of Sri Lanka’s 
Tamil minorities. Though reduced to the status of a memorandum of under-
standing later on, the accord was to have paved the way for greater recog-
nition of the rights of the Tamil minority with the accord being a significant 
recognition by the Government of Sri Lanka of the northern and eastern 
regions of the country as areas of historical habitation of the Tamil people in 
the country as well as repatriation of Sri Lankan and Indian Origin Tamils. 
Pakistan-Bangladesh 
Agreement on ‘stranded Pakistanis’
The New Delhi Agreement (1973) between India and Pakistan for a three-way 
repatriation of refugees and prisoners of war, specifically Bangladeshis in 
Pakistan, Pakistanis (non-Bengalis) in Bangladesh and Pakistani prisoners 
of war. This was followed up by the Tripartite Agreement between Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India in 1974 to further the three-way repatriation. Pakistan 
agreed to take back Urdu-speaking non-Bengalis from Bangladesh, although 
limited to 147,000, mostly those originally domiciled in West Pakistan or 
belonging to the central government or of divided families.  Over time this 
has facilitated the repatriation of some 170,000 ‘stranded Pakistanis’ to 
Pakistan and since 2008 notably, citizenship rights for those who chose to 
make Bangladesh their home in Bangladesh.  
India–Nepal 
The Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950)
The treaty allows free movement of people between the two nations and 
gives mutual privileges to citizens of the two countries to travel, work, settle, 
buy property and do business.
Nepal-Bhutan
The 1993 agreement between Nepal and Bhutan for verification of Bhutanese 
refugees in camps in Nepal to facilitate their repatriation to Bhutan.  In 
2000, the process of joint verification promised by the 1993 agreement was 
initiated after much delay but has since failed to make any headway. 
...Box 5 continued ...
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International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES). In 2008, this was developed 
into the South Asian Charter on Minority and Group Rights. The charter, 
instead of formulating new norms for the protection of minority and group 
rights, built on existing instruments such as the SAARC Social Charter, 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD and CEDAW and adapted them to the specific con-
text of South Asia. Yet again, in the absence of a set of binding instruments 
and implementation mechanisms, the charter has remained unfulfilled 
(Khan and Rahman, 1999: 95). Recently, there has been some movement 
in civil society circles to form a ‘People’s SAARC’ as a forum for regional 
civil society to engage SAARC and state parties, including on the issue of 
minority rights through its Working Group on Minority Rights. But the 
challenge of getting state parties to take notice is not new. In sum, no civil 
society effort has been able to make much traction with respective state par-
ties or even SAARC towards taking on board minority rights as an issue for 
multilateral regional engagement, let alone crafting a regional instrument 
for minority rights. Getting states to agree to a set of good practices and 
grievance redressal procedures protecting minority and human rights has 
remained a pipe dream. 
As a way around this problem and to build a people’s movement to advo-
cate and push for a regional mechanism on minority rights, a group of civil 
society organizations made up of minority rights activists and researchers 
from across the region came together in 2015 on a platform – the South Asia 
State of Minorities Report Collective -  to systematically document the con-
dition of minorities in the region and use the report, planned to be produced 
periodically, as an advocacy tool for change. This trans-regional platform 
made up of research bodies and human rights and activist group working in 
the spirit of volunteerism seeks to push the agenda on minority rights in the 
region, to document and track performance, hold state parties to account and 
build local and regional advocacy and related capacity on the subject. The 
current South Asia State of Minorities Report (2016) (and its future editions) 
is planned as the collective’s principal tool for advocacy. It is hoped that the 
periodic reports on the outcomes for minorities and the quality of state pro-
visioning for them (that is locally led, well researched and grounded in facts 
using international benchmarks and sustained to build a body of evidence), 
will spur public debate on the subject in the region and create the conditions 
for state parties and SAARC to agree to give serious consideration to issues of 
minorities and how to deliver for them.  
17
4.  South Asia State of Minorities Report Collective (henceforth the South Asia Collective) 
made up of the following individuals and organizations, arranged alphabetically: Law 
and Society Trust, Colombo; Misaal-Centre for Equity Studies, New Delhi; Nagorik 
Udyog, Dhaka; National Commission for Justice and Peace – Women in Struggle for 
Empowerment, Lahore; Omer Sadr, Kabul; and Social Science Baha, Kathmandu. 
Studying citizenship and 
minorities in South Asia
The South Asia State of Minorities Report has been planned as a peo-
ple’s report on the condition of South Asia’s minorities put together by a 
multi-national collective of civil society organizations from the region – 
research, advocacy and activist groups with interest in minority and human 
rights.4  The objective is to document and track the conditions of minorities 
in South Asia and the quality of state provisioning for them, benchmarking 
international standards and covenants that member states are signatories 
to in order to show breaches (where they exist) both in the laws and in their 
implementation. The wider objective of the report and the collective is to 
create public awareness on the subject of minority and human rights in the 
region and locally so as to act to improve the practice of minority rights’ 
protection and promotion. Given its region-wide scope, besides document-
ing how minorities in each country perform, the focus of the report is also 
strongly on issues that have a regional and trans-border import and appeal.
The report aspires to be objective in its reporting and grounded in facts 
to build a body of evidence on outcomes for minorities and state provision-
ing that is well researched and uses robust methodologies and sources. It 
is hoped that this focus on facts and aspiring to be seen to be objective 
will help turn the debate on and around minority rights in the region from 
one of ethnic identity affiliation and accommodation that often mars any 
discussions of minority rights to that of citizenship rights – in essence, 
equality and non-discrimination - regardless of identity affiliations. In 
the context of South Asia’s fraught post-colonial history, often centred on 
majority-minority relationships we think that it is important to transcend 
identity contestations and look at the subject of minority rights in terms 
of its rights, safeguards and non-discrimination core. This is really about 
promoting citizenship, a central challenge of the ‘deepening democracy’ 
agenda in the region.
We hope that in the long run public debates and discussions on ques-
tions of minority rights that the report will help engender will result in 
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individual South Asian states taking steps to create and strengthen national 
as well as regional instruments, structures and mechanisms for minority 
rights’ protection and promotion. But for that to happen we will have to sus-
tain the pressure so to speak – produce reports at short yearly or biennial 
intervals – to be able to build for the collective and create a profile in the 
media and among relevant policy circles besides the wider public as a cred-
ible source of information and insight on minority rights regionally.  The 
collective is determined to do this and produce report cards periodically to 
lobby stakeholders for improved minority rights’ outcomes.  
Given this long term vision, the present first edition of the report 
(2016) seeks to establish a baseline on minority groups and minority rights’ 
regimes, mechanisms and practices across country contexts in the region by 
mapping the terrain. Subsequent reports will build on this to assess country 
performance on minority rights based on events in the past year (country 
overviews) whilst also providing thematic analyses of a subject of topical 
interest for the region as a whole using a regional lens. 
This report has many limitations, not least the absence of disaggregated 
data by minorities, especially official data. This varies significantly across 
countries (also by minorities within the same country). With so little disag-
gregated data available, our claim to provide hard evidence on minority rights 
has been tested. Mostly there is little hard evidence available especially from 
official sources and we had to rely on a mix of micro-case studies, sample sur-
veys and programme reports of civil society groups besides media reports to 
base many of our arguments on. Secondly, given the voluntary nature of the 
present enterprise we have not had the resources to conduct research of our 
own to fill the big gaps in data. Almost all our data is sourced from secondary 
sources and these anyways are limited. Consequently, the evidentiary basis 
of much of our findings and arguments might appear to be weak. However, 
what working on the report has done is to help us map the state of data avail-
ability by thematic areas and countries so that we are in a good position now 
to be able to identify gaps in data for any robust evidence building exercise. In 
our subsequent reports we look forward to taking further steps in partnership 
with our partner groups to fill the data gaps. This is a large agenda and time 
taking but desirable, given our long-term objectives.  
This introductory chapter lays out the research agenda of the report, sum-
marizes its findings and seeks to provide a regional overview using a regional 
lens to tease out key patterns and trends in minority rights’ precepts and prac-
tices in the region, concluding with a set of region-wide recommendations. 
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The introduction is followed by six country chapters reporting on the 
condition of minorities (except for Bhutan and Maldives) following a com-
mon structure and providing as a conclusion country level recommenda-
tions.  Country chapters also contain profiles of select marginalized groups 
and good practice case studies to showcase how minorities suffer disabilities 
and how they cope and to profile successful campaigns and interventions 
by and for minority groups for rights’ protection and promotion to provide 
lessons for others to follow.  
Research objectives, 
scope and data collection
Research objectives
The South Asia State of Minorities Report is envisioned as a people’s report 
on the conditions of minorities in South Asia and their access to rights guar-
anteed by international minority and human rights instruments. The peri-
odic report seeks to track and report the status of minorities by country on 
a range of internationally guaranteed rights while also providing regional 
insights and perspectives on the success and denial of rights and their 
possible solutions. 
The goal is to contribute to advocacy for establishing South Asia-wide 
minority rights standards and instruments through building a body of evi-
dence and spurring public debates and discussions including in and through 
the media.  The focus is on collecting facts on enforcement (or denial) of 
minority rights; accounts of the processes of those denials; and the resul-
tant conditions of minority groups, individually and collectively. Through 
this process we hope to bring facts to the notice of national, regional and 
international actors; advocate for better disaggregated data gathering 
and strengthened national level tracking and reporting of the condition 
of minorities; and develop regional perspectives and a constituency for 
solutions for minorities.  
Linked to the last aspiration is an associated objective of the periodic 
reporting - to mobilize civil society across the region around minority rights’ 
protection and promotion and aid in their advocacy work. We hope to sup-
port minority rights’ networks - grassroots as well as policy groups – to doc-
ument, report and raise their voices for minority rights. The report thought 
of as a periodic document aims to give voice to minority groups and civil 
society entities working on minority rights including to those working to 
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develop models for effective delivery of minority rights’ programmes. The 
attempt  is also to foreground minorities’ voices and concerns along with 
deploying cold facts and hard evidence of how minority rights are provided 
or denied and how minority groups and their members cope.   
Scope of the report and plan
The report provides a descriptive examination of both the theory and prac-
tice (laws and policies and their implementation) of minority rights’ pro-
tection in respective countries in South Asia, specifically within the SAARC 
region, looking at a range of rights guaranteed by international minority 
rights instruments particularly the United Nations Minorities Declaration 
1992 (United Nations, 1992) the four rights to life and security; equality and 
non-discrimination; participation; and identity and culture. 
We cover all eight SAARC member countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) although practical 
concerns meant that we could not cover Bhutan and Maldives in our detailed 
country reporting.5 The report also makes comparisons on outcomes across 
countries to draw out regional patterns, strengths and weaknesses to better 
understand the dynamics and to propose nuanced recommendations. The 
country reports cover a range of minority groups – determined by religion, 
ethnicity, language and caste, as the case may be - to evaluate how a partic-
ular country’s laws and practices impact on them. Here, given the salience 
of inter-sectionality we seek especially to focus on groups that suffer aggra-
vated exclusions as a result of their minority status on multiple counts - reli-
gion and caste; caste and ethnicity; and religion and gender, among others. 
We provide country overviews about the conditions of minorities 
supported by data tables on a range of minority rights, on a year on year 
basis, based on events of past years.  We also profile severely marginalized 
minority groups to provide a rich account of the lived experiences of very 
excluded minority groups to demonstrate how denial of rights impacts the 
lives of vulnerable groups and how they cope. And lastly, we survey and 
report on good practices in minority rights protection, especially communi-
ty-led efforts by minority groups and by other civil society entities to point 
ways to change. 
5. In Bhutan’s case at least, this also represents the degree to which minority voices are ab-
sent from political, development or minority discourses in the country Despite repeated 
attempts  we were not able to identify minority rights’ partners in the country to work 
together on the report.
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Given the significant challenges involved in reporting on the state of 
minority rights, year on year, due in part to less than robust availability of 
most relevant data in the most appropriate form we devote the first report 
(2016) to mapping the terrain to establish a baseline in terms of minority 
groups in a country and their rights’ concerns; the structures of minority 
rights protection available in a country (laws, institutions, policies and 
mechanisms); the institutional environment (the political economy of 
minority rights’ policymaking and implementation); rapid assessment of the 
working of laws and mechanisms using secondary data; and the availability 
of data in different sectors. This account takes a historical approach. With 
the baseline  established, it will be easier to produce subsequent reports and 
also plan for efforts to create evidence and generate ‘data’, where availability 
is a problem. In the process of this mapping we also hope to build partner-
ships with stakeholders to help facilitate generation of new knowledge and 
evidence establishing alliances for minority rights advocacy.   
Subsequent annual reports will assess performance on ‘minority rights’ 
by country based on events of the particular year using data and case studies 
to provide a snapshot of how the country performed. This country reporting 
will be preceded by an analysis of a thematic subject, a new one every year, 
on how different countries in the region performed on the subject using an 
explicit regional lens. This combination of cross-country regional and coun-
try-specific local perspectives and in-depth analyses of a thematic area and 
a broad-brush checking out of the performance on a range of minority rights 
based on events of a particular year should provide us a good balance of 
reporting and analyses of minority rights which will be useful for our larger 
advocacy work. 
Methodology, data collection and sources
The current report, ‘Mapping the Terrain’ of minority rights protection in 
South Asia, entails three levels of analyses: 
i. Firstly, assessing constitutional provisions and legal frameworks (the 
theory) determining minority rights protection in a particular country 
and checking them for compliance against international instruments 
for range, scope and depth. This analysis examines national laws and 
statutes against UNDM and other international instruments.  Here we 
also look, although briefly, at the history of the development of the legal 
framework in a country to put the country’s minority rights framework 
in a historical perspective. The aim is to provide a sense of movement 
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on whether the minority space has widened or narrowed and the factors 
influencing those changes. This section is based on a detailed review of 
literature. 
ii. Secondly, checking out how national instruments (laws, policies and 
programmes in place) for minorities are being implemented across a 
range of minority rights (life and security; identity and culture; equal-
ity and non-discrimination; and effective participation) to determine 
the effectiveness of enforcement and how it measures up to the intent 
of international instruments.  This analysis is based on an examina-
tion of public data (where available) disaggregated by minority groups; 
accounts of the working of agencies and programmes of the state as they 
relate to minority communities; case study research and programme 
reports of non-governmental organizations; and media reports and 
published works by national and international research and advocacy 
groups. 
iii. Thirdly, we also attempt to determine how the working of laws, and pol-
icies and practices are impacting outcomes for minorities at macro level 
– school dropouts, infant mortality, poverty incidence and employment 
–  against national averages. Given that the availability of disaggregated 
data on various well-being indicators is so severely limited this analysis 
mostly uses case studies and media reports to make the connection. But 
as we come out with more reports over time the attempt will be to try 
to strengthen our disaggregated data capturing and analysis capacity to 
make this aspect of the reporting more systematic. Ultimately, this anal-
ysis will be data intensive putting together standardized statistical tables 
on a range of well-being outcomes using datasets on various measures 
of well-being to compare outcomes across countries (and sub-national 
entities) and temporally by year. 
Our ‘profiles’ of severely marginalized minority groups embedded in the 
chapters are designed to provide a window to understanding minorities’ life 
stories and how the working of minority rights’ regimes impact the groups 
to provide an account of the human impact of the quality of provisioning 
for minorities and how the groups cope.   These accounts use multiple qual-
itative approaches and tools – ethnographic, as well as case study design 
– sourced largely from research and media reports and the working of the 
civil society/NGO sector to foreground minority voices and the case stories 
of their struggles for improved outcomes.
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The ‘good practice case studies’ of minority rights’ mobilization and 
advocacy use the case study method to provide a rich account of commu-
nity-led efforts for minority rights to draw out lessons for replicating their 
success in comparable situations. These are based solely on programme 
reports of minority rights’ NGOs and community organizations and inter-
views with programme staff, supported where available by media reports. 
Overall, we rely wholly on secondary sources for our reports – official 
and non-official datasets; case studies; official and non-official evaluations 
and reports; media reports; NGO programme documents; and published 
works. The biggest challenge in this context is availability of disaggregated 
data (and insights) on the condition of minorities and the working of laws 
and programmes for them.  This is an outcome we hope to encourage as we 
work across multiple countries and partners.  
Who are South Asia’s minorities?
Before we delve into a survey of the condition of minorities in South Asia, 
let us understand who they are. There is great variation in terms of distin-
guishing their ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics reflecting the 
diversity in the region. But as with other situations, it is a particular group’s 
self-identification as a group and its numerical inferiority and ultimately 
non-dominant position that determines its minority status (see Box 6). 
This naturally relates to who the majority is in a particular country, a 
dynamic with connections to how national identities are constructed and 
defined. This is not to say that minorities are in any way monolithic catego-
ries or that they are fixed – there are many differences within groups and 
the categories can also be dynamic with changing identities. Table 3 gives a 
list of the principal minority groups by country. 
Let us quickly review the situation of who the minorities are, by country. 
Afghanistan
The Afghan Constitution (of 2004) does not define minorities, but it does 
identify 14 ethnic groups and nationalities. Ethnicity (based on language) 
determines the construction of much of Afghanistan’s identity although 
religion too has played an important role. Pashtuns and Tajiks are the main 
6. Whilst Pashtuns are politically dominant, Tajiks could be said to dominate in the realm 
of socio-cultural life and in people to people interactions. Persian/Dari/Farsi - the lan-
guage spoken by Tajiks and Hazaras -  is the lingua franca for all groups.
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ethnic groups, with Pashtuns being dominant.6  In the absence of a national 
Census, it is difficult to say what their exact numbers are but estimates put 
the Tajik population at 35  per cent (Pashtuns by the same reckoning are 
anywhere between 40-45  per cent of the population). There are a large 
number of ethnic minorities. As for religious minorities, these are mostly 
small groups with Sikhs and Hindus being the principal ones as also Baha’is. 
Shias (Hazaras mostly, but also Qizilbashs) are also seen as religious 
minorities. 
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s Constitution makes Islam the state religion. However it pro-
tects the rights of all citizens. Article 28 (1) states ‘The State shall not dis-
criminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth.’ Bangladesh’s national identity has been influenced by Bengali 
Box 6. Minorities - a definition
There is no universally accepted legally binding definition of 
minority and minority rights. According to the Minority Rights 
Group (2015: 267), minorities are ‘disadvantaged ethnic, national, 
religious, linguistic or cultural groups who are smaller in number 
than the rest of the population and who may wish to maintain and 
develop their identity.’
The most well accepted definition of minorities, that by the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities is: 
a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of 
a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being 
nationals of the state - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the popu-
lation and maintain, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion 
or language (Capotorti, 1991:98).   
As Khan and Rahman note (1999:3), this definition implies that 
the factors that must be taken into account in identifying minori-
ties are:
i. Numerical inferiority: Minorities are almost always imagined 
as numerically inferior although this is determined by refer-
ence to the size of ‘the rest of the population of a state’. 
... contd. ...
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language and culture, with the former playing a central role. More recently, 
religion – Islam in this case – has been increasingly becoming a central 
element of national imagination so much so that commentators talk of a 
change in national imagination from ‘Bengali’ nationalism to ‘Bangladeshi’ 
(Bhardwaj, 2010:3). Non-Bengali speakers – indigenous groups and Urdu 
speakers – are the principal linguistic minorities, and Hindus and Buddhists 
are the main religious ones.    
Bhutan
Bhutan does not have a written Constitution but its national identity under 
the monarchy is constructed around Buddhism and the dominant Dzongkha 
linguistic identity. Interestingly and bucking the trend of numerical domi-
nance marking majorities, Ngalungs, the dominant group in the kingdom 
ii. Non-dominant position: At the core, ‘minority’ is a political and 
sociological reality and is not merely numerical. The determining 
factor is the degree of political participation and social inclusion. 
‘In fact, minorities are possibly undermined not so much by their 
weaknesses in numbers, but by their exclusion from power’ (Khan 
and Rahman, 1999:16).
iii. Distinguishing ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics: Only 
those groups within a population are considered minorities who 
differ from the rest of the population of the state in which they 
exist by reference to ethnicity, religion or language. In Article 1, 
the United Nations Minorities Declaration refers to minorities as 
based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic iden-
tity.
iv. Nationality: Minorities are citizens of the state that they live in. 
They generally exclude refugees, foreigners and migrant work-
ers, although some formulations are more inclusive and also in-
clude non-citizens (see United Nations 2010:4-5 on this).
When applied to South Asia, this definition means disadvantaged reli-
gious, linguistic and ethnic groups are minorities as are Dalits (literally 
‘broken people’ or ‘crushed’); as well as indigenous people, variously 
called Adivasi.
...Box 6 continued ...
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– living in the north-west, who profess Buddhism and speak Dzongkha  – 
make up only 15 per cent of the population and are thus really a minority 
ruling elite. Sharchops (who are Buddhists but speak a minority language, 
and inhabit the north-east) are demographically the dominant group. They 
make up 50  per cent of the population and are the principal minority. But 
it is the Lhotsampas (the southerners professing Hinduism and speaking 
Nepali), making up 30-35 per cent of the population at last count, who are 
minorities in the true sense.  (see Box 7)
India 
India’s Constitution defines minorities as religious and linguistic, and these 
besides  ethnicity, are the main markers of minorities in the country. The 
Constitution defines itself as secular in religious terms, with Hindi language 
and taking the pre-eminent, although not the sole position. But increas-
ingly, the national identity is being sought to be redefined in Hindu religious 
terms. Muslims (14 per cent of the population, 2011 Census), Christians (2.3 
per cent), Sikhs (1.72  per cent) and Buddhists (0.7  per cent) are the main 
religious minorities, there also being a large number of linguistic and eth-
nic minorities. Although not officially defined as such, Dalits and Adivasis 
(included largely within the Hindu fold, but a significant section also pro-
fessing minority faiths) form the largest section of the ‘minority’ population 
with a small upper caste elite dominating power and influence. 
Maldives
Maldives defines itself as an Islamic state. And despite the apparent homo-
geneity of a largely Muslim population there is significant ethnic and lin-
guistic diversity – Sinhalese, Dravidians and Arabs with overlays of respec-
tive languages. These are also the lines along which minorities are defined. 
(See Box 8)
Nepal
Nepal’s new Constitution (2015) defines the country as ‘a nation of minori-
ties’ given that no single group in the new dispensation is overwhelmingly 
dominant. The old order, recently pulled down, saw Nepal largely as a nation 
of Hindu hill-castes. The new Constitution recognizes minorities and bases 
this on multiple axes of caste, geography, ethnicity, language and religion in 
an effort to include them all.  In that sense, Nepal’s is a case of an expanded 
concept of national identity and of the definition of minorities.   
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Box 7. Minorities in Bhutan
The Bhutan Constitution deems Buddhism as the state’s ‘spiritual 
heritage’ and aims to develop a society ‘rooted in Buddhist ethos.’ 
There is forced participation of children and government employees 
in Buddhist prayer meetings and restrictions are put on activities of 
groups that are not Buddhist. In any case, there is the imposition of 
Ngalung language/and dress code overall.  
Bhutan is a unique case, with a minority elite (the Ngalungs mak-
ing up 15 per cent of the population) being the dominant power in 
what is essentially a three-way ethnic make-up (Buddhist Ngalungs 
in the north-west: Buddhist Sherchops in the north-east; and Nepali 
speaking, Hindu Lhotsampas in the south). Sharchops (who speak a 
minority language) are demographically the dominant group mak-
ing up 50  per cent of the population. They are the principal minori-
ty. But it is the Lhotsampas (the southerners, professing Hinduism 
and speaking Nepali), making up 30-35 per cent of the population at 
last count, who are minorities in the true sense. 
Language and Buddhism form the bedrocks of the Ngalung state that 
seeks a homogenized society around  Dzongkha language, dress code 
and Buddhist religion. 
The homogenizing trend is so strong that in the late 1980s, a sixth of 
the population of the Nepali speaking Lhotsampas were stripped of 
their citizenship, paving the way for their expulsion in 1991-92. The 
backdrop to this was discrimination against Lhotsampas increasing 
from the late 1980s in the context of Bhutanese elite’s fears of Ne-
pali domination and of political/armed movements in the region. 
This resulted in land and jobs being taken away and the Lhotsam-
pas being disenfranchised. More than 100,000 Lhotsampas turned 
stateless as a result of the disenfranchisement and were forced to 
take refuge in UN refugee camps in Nepal. This was one of largest 
forced migrations in history. Not one refugee has still been allowed 
to return. Some 60,000 have relocated to western countries includ-
ing US and Canada. But with the media not covering the plight of the 
remaining Lhotsampas in Bhutan, the  movement of international 
visitors being restricted in the south and those in Bhutan not wishing 
to share information on their conditions by phone or mail for fear of 
retribution, it is difficult to say what the situation of Lhotsampas in 
Bhutan is today. Other minorities too suffer disabilities particularly 
religious minorities barring Hindus who are prevented from freely 
practising their faith.
Source:  US Commission on International Religious Freedom (2015);  Mishra (2013).
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Pakistan
Pakistan’s Constitution defines Pakistan as an Islamic republic and recog-
nizes minorities – religious and ethnic. The former are principally Hindus, 
Christians and Sikhs, and the latter Baluchs, Sindhis, Pakhtuns and 
Mohajirs. The national identity is centred around Islam – Pakistan’s self-im-
age of being the land of Muslims -  with Punjabi language (and ethnicity) 
providing the glue. Defining national identity purely in religious terms has 
however not helped Pakistan bridge its ethnic and religious divides and cru-
cially is now leading to contestations around religion too with Sunni iden-
tity taking precedence to the exclusion of other Islamic sects, Ahmadis and 
Shias most prominently. These communities increasingly find themselves 
in a state of limbo neither included in dominant imaginations of the nation, 
nor clearly defined as minorities with clear rights. 
Box 8. Minorities in Maldives
Despite the apparent homogeneity of a largely Muslim population 
in the Maldives there is significant ethnic and linguistic diversity – 
Sinhalese, Dravidians and Arabs with overlays of respective languag-
es. Maldives’ indigenous population of some 393,595 (2011 count) is 
overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim with a Constitution that recognizes 
only Islam. This restricts freedom of religion and conscience. The 
law prohibits citizens from practicing any religion other than Islam 
and Islam itself can only be practised in the government version of 
Sunni Islam. The public practice of any other faith including other 
varieties of Islam is banned. And propagation of any religion other 
than Islam is a criminal offence. The government controls all reli-
gious matters including the practice of Islam. Recently the Parlia-
ment enacted a law on religious unity centralizing the control of all 
mosques and prayer houses taking powers away  from local councils. 
Of late, the absence of religious freedom provisions has been further 
reinforced (US Commission for International Religious Freedom, 
2014:4). The government is beginning to monitor and restrict any 
act deemed by it to be unIslamic or anti-Islamic including blogs and 
Facebook pages. The Constitution stipulates that non-Muslims can-
not become citizens. All public offices such as the president, min-
isters, judges and Members of Parliament are reserved solely for 
followers of the Sunni school of Islam. The US Commission for In-
ternational Religious Freedom notes: ‘There were reports of societal 
abuses and discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or 
practice, particularly incidents against those who did not conform to 
a strict, conservative interpretation of Islam.’
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Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, national identity is an amalgam of Buddhist and ethnic 
Sinhalese elements. The Constitution defines itself as secular, but gives 
foremost place to Buddhism. The Tamil speaking population –mostly 
Hindus, inhabiting the country’s north-east – is the principal minority that 
has felt largely excluded, the outcome of which and also the cause of con-
tinuing exclusion being the long standing armed ethnic movement that the 
Sri Lankan state has recently crushed militarily. Other minorities that have 
also felt wronged, more so recently, are Muslims dispersed across the coun-
try as well as Christians. 
De-jure and De-facto Status of minorities 
in South Asia
Some conclusions can be draw from the previous section based on what the 
national identities are, how these influence the definition of minorities – 
de-jure and de-facto - and what that means for minorities and their ability 
to access citizenship rights: 
i. In most cases, national constitutions define the communities, hence that 
is a good starting point to identify minority communities to focus on 
and assess their conditions. However, at other places identification is 
itself problematic. The Ahmadis’ case in Pakistan is a peculiar one where 
a group is forcibly and officially turned into a de-facto minority and 
refused identification within the larger and dominant Muslim identity. 
They suffer a double jeopardy when they are neither officially declared 
a minority – thus accepting them as citizens entitled to basic rights – 
nor being able to access those rights without denouncing their religious 
beliefs. 
ii. Similar is the case of Bhutan where Nepali speaking Lhotsampas have 
been declared non-citizens and large sections have been forced out of 
the country effectively making them stateless. In Bangladesh, Urdu-
speakers, otherwise called ‘stranded-Pakistanis’ and in Sri Lanka, 
‘Indian’ or ‘estate’ Tamils, have similarly been disenfranchised denying 
them the basic rights of citizens – most are ‘stateless’ - not to talk of any 
special protective measures. Likewise, large sections of Muslim Bengali 
speakers in the Indian state of Assam are often labelled  ‘Bangladeshi’, 
implying illegal migrants questioning their citizenship. This is taken to 
its extreme in the case of Maldives where all non-Muslims are non-cit-
izens.  There are other albeit less fraught cases too: In India, although 
Jews and Baha’is are clearly religious minorities they are not declared so 
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officially whereas smaller groups with similar socioeconomic conditions 
(such as Jains, considered a branch of Hinduism) have been categorized 
as a minority. This, within India’s regime of minority rights has implica-
tions for protective and promotional rights for the groups such as ‘per-
sonal laws’ that govern family law matters as well as rights to manage 
their own educational institutions. 
How do minorities in South Asia fare?
In this section we provide a broad-brush survey of the conditions of minori-
ties in the region, summarizing the findings of the country surveys on 
minority rights treating the material analytically to try and draw out pat-
terns and trends across the region,  using a regional rather than a country 
lens. Like the country reports to come, this survey too uses as its frame-
work the UN Minorities Declaration 1992 and its four-fold categorisation of 
minority rights of life and security, identity and culture, participation and 
non-discrimination in the socioeconomic sphere (see Box 9). 
Life and security
All countries in the region provide a guarantee of life and security to all their 
citizens. This includes minorities. Yet there is widespread physical violence 
and denial of right to life disproportionately of members of minority com-
munities across the region. Minorities also suffer disproportionately when 
they are denied civil and political rights.  We notice three broad trends here: 
i. Violence against minorities is, in essence, about state failure, that is, the 
state’s inability to protect minority groups from violence by private par-
ties. This is an aspect of state failure given that the police is unable to 
protect vulnerable minorities from attacks by non-state parties (mostly 
militant arms of fundamentalist groups movements and individual and 
group acts of violence), and that law courts are unable to hold the perpe-
trators to account, thus failing in the state’s foremost duty to protect. In 
these situations state agencies are either overwhelmed by non-state actors 
or have weak capacity to protect minority citizens to begin with. Examples 
here include the violence by Afghan Taliban on Hazaras and women and 
other minorities in Afghanistan; by groups such as the Ansarullah Bangla 
Team and the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) on minorities 
and progressive bloggers in Bangladesh; by Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena and 
other Hindu right wing groups affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh against Muslims and Christians in India; by militant Islamist 
31
Box 9: Categories of Minority Rights 
There are principally four ‘minority rights’. Taken together, these are 
established rights under international law; they are inter-related and 
built on the framework of individual human rights. 
i. Protection of life and security  
Genocide Convention 1948, the United Nations Declaration on 
Minorities (UNMD) 1992 and the Durban World Conference Against 
Racism (WCAR) 20012 attempt to operationalize the right to survival 
and existence. 
Article 1 of the UN declaration states: ‘States shall protect the exis-
tence….of minorities, within their respective territories….’ (United 
Nations, 1992). 
The guidance for implementation on UN minorities declaration 
states: 
‘Protection of minorities should focus primarily on the protection of 
the physical existence of persons belonging to minorities, including 
protecting them from genocide and crimes against humanity’ (Unit-
ed Nations, 2010:7).
The 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) 
affirms that: 
‘…..minorities, where they exist, must be protected and that persons 
belonging to such minorities should be treated equally and enjoy 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimi-
nation of any kind’ (para 66, p.13). It calls on states to protect the 
physical existence of minorities, including from genocide and crimes 
against humanity. 
ii. Protection and promotion of identity and culture 
UNDM (1992) recognizes that persons belonging to national or eth-
nic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion and to use 
their own language in private and in public freely and without inter-
ference or any form of discrimination. These provisions are further 
strengthened by DDPA (2001) affirming that ‘the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of minorities, where they exist, must 
be protected and that persons belonging to such minorities should 
be treated equally and enjoy their human rights and fundamental 
... contd. ...
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groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Pakistan Taliban 
against Shias, Hazaras and other minorities in Pakistan; and in Sri Lanka 
in recent years against Muslims and Tamils by Buddhist nationalist 
groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena and Sinhala Ravaya. 
ii. Besides poor state capacity, violence against minorities also represents 
weak rule of law, specifically the selective application of laws by agen-
cies of the state denying minority groups’ protection under the law and 
access to justice. Poor efforts by the police and security forces to pre-
vent anti-minority violence (either directed at individuals or the entire 
community) from breaking out, and once it has, weak efforts to con-
tain it, is one aspect of this weak rule of law. Equally, other aspects of 
the criminal justice system including recording of crimes, investigating 
them and prosecuting perpetrators are all fraught, especially when it 
affects minority groups, in effect denying members of minority groups 
the right to equal protection under law. This selective application of the 
law is much more than weak capacity to protect; in most cases it rep-
resents collusion between state actors and anti-minority groups result-
ing in  systematic erosion of the rights of minorities to equal citizenship. 
These take many forms – state actors being influenced by majoritarian 
anti-minority ideologies and biases in discharging their responsibilities 
at best, to state actors abdicating their responsibilities allowing anti-mi-
nority groups to overwhelm state institutions and using those against 
minorities in its worst form. Biased policing and delivery of justice, 
much normalized across South Asia, is a good example of the former 
and genocides and pogroms not uncommon in the post-colonial history 
of the region that of the latter.  
iii. In some cases, it is not so much the weak application of the laws that 
is problematic, but the laws themselves contain the seeds of violence 
against minority groups. Blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws in Pakistan, 
Vested Property regulations in Bangladesh and laws against cow slaugh-
ter and conversions in India are examples of regulations that provide 
opportunities (in how they are applied) for biased state actors colluding 
with private anti-minority groups to perpetrate violence against vulner-
able members of minority groups. 
iv. Finally, cases where the state directly denies the right to life to members 
of minority groups. Illegal detentions, torture, custodial deaths, extra-ju-
dicial killings and fake encounters and enforced disappearances are all 
human rights violations that occur with regularity in the region with 
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freedoms without discrimination of any kind’ (para 66). DDPA en-
joins upon states ‘to prevent forced assimilation and the loss of cul-
tures, religions and languages’ and encouraging conditions for the 
promotion of national, ethnical, cultural, religious and linguistic 
identities of such minorities and for diversity and plural identities to 
be protected and respected (United Nations, 2010:7).
iii. Equality and non-discrimination in the socioeconomic sphere
UNDM (1992) provides that persons belonging to minorities may ex-
ercise their rights individually as well as in a community with other 
members of their group without any discrimination. Non-discrimi-
nation and equality before the law are the basic principles guiding 
human rights. Discrimination can take many forms – formal and 
substantive discrimination; direct and indirect forms of differen-
tial treatment; de-facto and de-jure; and discrimination in the pri-
vate and public spheres (United Nations, 1992:11). For minorities 
to enjoy non-discrimination there should be formal freedoms and 
equality (such as equal access to social services and employment in 
the public and private sectors) and programmes for empowerment 
of those who in the past have been the subject of discrimination or 
who suffer persistent discrimination. This might call for differential 
treatment of such groups such as through ‘affirmative action’. The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination allows for ‘special measures’ as does the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(‘temporary special measures’) and  the Human Rights Committee 
that enjoins states to take affirmative actions to diminish or elimi-
nate conditions that are discriminatory (United Nations, 1992:10).
iv. Effective and meaningful participation 
UNDM (1992) affirms that persons belonging to minorities have the 
right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, econom-
ic and public life. Herein, the right to participate in ‘public life’ in-
cludes, among other rights, those relating to elections and to being 
elected, the holding of public office and other political and adminis-
trative domains. Also the right to participate effectively in decisions 
on the national, and where appropriate regional level, concerning 
the minority to which they belong or the region in which they live. 
This right, according to UNDM is ‘in fact essential to preserving 
minorities’ identity and combat social exclusion’ (United Nations, 
1992:12). 
...Box 9: Categories of Minority Rights continuied ...
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minority groups disproportionately affected. Much of this takes place 
in the context of nationalistic conflicts – in Kashmir and the North East 
in India, Baluchistan, Karachi and NWFP in Pakistan, against Tamils in 
Sri Lanka (and in the past in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, 
besides against Maoists in Nepal). The global ‘war against terror’ has 
provided another setting for subversion of justice with national security 
providing a cover for large-scale violations of the right to life, minorities 
again suffering the most. In both contexts, harsh ‘extra-ordinary laws’, 
devised by the state to counter ‘anti-state’ violence provide the basis for 
systematic violations.  The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958, 1990, 
the (J&K) Public Safety Act 1978 and the Unlawful Activities Prevention 
Act 2004 in India; Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 and its 
amendment, the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations 2011 and 
Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 including its many amendments in Pakistan; 
Public Security Ordinance 1947,Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979 and 
Emergency Regulations, 2000, 2005 in Sri Lanka; and the Nepal Public 
Security Act 1989 and the Anti-State Crimes and Penalties Act 1989 in 
Nepal are instruments used by South Asian states against their peoples, 
mostly minorities. Besides violating due process, state impunity is a key 
factor here with law and the criminal justice system aiding impunity of 
state actors (to violate rights) and the systematic denial of justice, either 
juridical or compensatory. 
Identity and culture
Right to identity, culture and conscience, is a key minority right. It is partic-
ularly important for multi-ethnic societies and in helping promote diversity 
ensuring  that these rights are available equally to all, including minorities. 
Overall, South Asia fares poorly on the right to identity and culture. Most 
states provide some sort of freedom of identity, but the general trend is to 
promote the identity and culture of the majority community towards inte-
grating the various diversities into a homogenized conception of the nation. 
Majoritarian ideas and imaginations, themselves the outcome of the pecu-
liar history of the region, are behind much of this push for assimilation. 
These result in severe restrictions placed on minorities. Let us look at the 
different arenas closely.
i. Religious freedom is a key marker of right to identity and culture. There 
exists a wide spectrum here with Maldives disallowing in law any prac-
tice that is non-Islamic; poor in Bhutan  where registration require-
ments mean that only Buddhist and to some extent Hindu groups are 
allowed freedom of religious practice; poor again in Pakistan against 
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Ahmadis who are prevented from practicing their faith; to availability 
of formal religious freedoms in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri 
Lanka (and Pakistan for religious minorities) but practical restrictions 
on freedom of religion there, given the atmosphere of fear and intimida-
tion against religious minorities in all these countries. 
ii. Language affiliations and freedoms is another key right to identity. It is 
also mixed up deeply with issues of ethnicity and in the context of South 
Asian history, has been an important trigger of conflicts. Bangladesh’s 
is the most famous case with the Liberation War (1971-72) waged by 
Bengali nationalists against, among others, the linguistic assimilationist 
policies of the Pakistan state. Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka too had 
its roots in the linguistic policies of the Sri Lankan state restricting Tamil 
language. Other prominent ethnic movements in the region – Kashmir 
and those in north-eastern India for instance - draw sustenance from 
perceived assimilationist policies and practices of the national govern-
ment. In non-conflict contexts too language and ethnicity continue to 
be  sites of discrimination and denial for minorities. This is reflected 
in language homogeneity and domination against minority languages. 
Urdu and other non-Bengali languages in Bangladesh; Baluchi in 
Pakistan; Nepali-speaking Lhotsampas in Bhutan; and minor languages 
These provisions imply that mechanisms are required to ensure that 
the diversity of society with regard to minority groups is reflected in 
public institutions such as national parliaments, the civil service sec-
tor, including the police and the judiciary and that persons belong-
ing to minorities are adequately represented, consulted and have a 
voice in decisions which affect them or the territories and regions in 
which they live. 
Participation must be meaningful and not merely symbolic and 
recognize, for instance, that minorities are commonly under-rep-
resented and that their concerns may not be adequately addressed. 
The participation of women belonging to minorities is of particular 
concern. What is needed is not just their formal representation in 
governing institutions but effective participation in decision mak-
ing so as to promote among minority communities the ownership of 
decisions.
...Box 9: Categories of Minority Rights continuied ...
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in Afghanistan are examples of this. India has shown the way in accom-
modating linguistic demands and autonomy through administrative 
decentralization and by creating linguistic/ethnic provinces but the fate 
of dispersed minority languages, especially Urdu, has been harsh wors-
ening with the growing hegemony of Hindi, the dominant language.  
Socioeconomic rights
Non-discrimination in accessing services and opportunities is a key minority 
right. This has implications for the socioeconomic condition of minorities 
and their well-being. Across the region, laws promise equal access and 
non-discrimination to all in public services and opportunities. And yet 
minorities make up disproportionate sections of the poor and excluded in 
all countries. Hindus and Christians in Pakistan, Muslims (besides Dalits 
and Adivasis) in India, Dalits and Muslims in Nepal and Dalits and indig-
enous groups in Bangladesh suffer the worst socioeconomic drawbacks. 
Their access to services such as health and nutrition, sanitation and educa-
tion, as well as to opportunities such as remunerative employment, credit 
and markets, is limited. Discrimination is at the heart of exclusion with 
minorities denied equal access to services and opportunities that the rest of 
the population expects as a matter of right. Discrimination works at multi-
ple levels – local, where services are provided, but also at the policy level, 
where absence of a mechanism to identify and check discrimination enables 
discrimination to play out unfettered.    
Across the region there is a dearth of efforts to address the depriva-
tions faced by minority groups in the socioeconomic sphere. It is  possible 
to deal with the situation through targeted programmes aimed at the spe-
cific disabilities and discriminations that minority groups face. India has 
an elaborate programme of support for Dalits and Adivasis  including bet-
ter access to services, housing, employment and education. In comparison, 
recent support programmes for minorities seem to be very modest in their 
design. Their implementation leaves much to be desired. Across the region 
there is little policy focus on addressing minority disabilities including poor 
documentation, tracking and reporting of data disaggregated by minority 
groups and little attention to cast the spotlight on how universal anti-pov-
erty programmes and services work especially for minority groups. Overall, 
minorities and minority well-being are not a policy priority. This is a serious 
weakness.  
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Effective participation
Participation in public life including adequate representation and role in 
decision making in governing institutions is a key determinant of minori-
ties’ realization of equality and well-being. Most South Asian constitutions 
profess equality and non-discrimination to all citizens, including minori-
ties. Yet, minorities’ exclusion from participation in public life including in 
governing institutions is widespread. This has a wider impact on the real-
ization of all other minority rights. Here we focus on the representational 
dimension of participation, looking at: 
- political representation in elected bodies at the national and lower levels 
- representation in civil services 
There are broadly two trends here: 
i. Legally denied, where the law itself discriminates between groups and 
minorities are denied equal treatment, for example, in accessing public 
office. Pakistan does not allow a person of any other faith but Islam to 
stand for office as President. In the case of the Prime Minister though 
the law does not prevent non-Muslims, restrictions kick in in terms 
of preventing non-Muslims from taking  oath of office thus effectively 
keeping this position out of reach of minorities. Ahmadis, given that 
they are deemed non-Muslims, too are denied this right of standing for 
office. Their exclusion in participation runs deeper as they are denied 
even the right to vote in elections. And whilst the Constitution puts in 
place mechanisms for protection of minority representation in national 
and provincial assemblies through separate quotas these are not robust 
enough to ensure either proportionate or meaningful representation of 
religious (and ethnic) minorities in these houses. Similarly Maldives, 
Bhutan and Afghanistan discriminate against minorities when they 
restrict their access to political office. 
ii. Denied in practice: India does not discriminate formally against minori-
ties in access to political and public office including the highest ones. 
And yet minorities, especially Muslims, are very poorly represented in 
elected assembles at national, state and local levels effectively blocking 
them off both from decision making and from a sense of being wedded 
to national processes. Critics have pointed to the design of the electoral 
system  that encourages majoritarian outcomes  combined with the 
absence of any proactive efforts to bring minorities, especially religious 
Introduction
Rough Road to Citizenship
38
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
minorities, into governing institutions as being the cause of much of this 
poor representation. 
iii. Nepal is charting a new course in the region in terms of crafting an inclu-
sive regime of political representation and participation for minority 
groups. It seeks to do this through devising an electoral  system that 
seeks not only to keep the doors to political representation open to all 
(through the first-past-the-post system) but combines that with mea-
sures for positive support to traditionally marginalized groups (Dalits, 
religious minorities and women among others) to be better represented 
in Parliament and newly devolved provincial assemblies through a com-
bination of ‘proportional representation’ and ‘quotas’ for marginalized 
groups. The new arrangement is already showing results with a marked 
increase in the representation of Dalits, women and minorities. This is 
still an evolving system but one that holds promise for a region where 
the norm is for minorities to be kept out of political power. 
Civil services and the public sector in general are equally unrepresen-
tative in the region mirroring the barriers that minorities face to political 
representation. There seems little effort by states to encourage greater 
minority engagement through programmes such as quotas. India, with 
an elaborate system of ‘reservations’ for Dalits (Scheduled Castes) and 
Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes) and other ‘backward’ groups in Parliament and 
state assemblies fails to provide anything similar for religious minorities. 
The handful of countries that do reserve quotas among other measures to 
encourage minority representation seem not to be able to show many results 
of those policies - quotas for religious minorities in Pakistan in the army and 
civil services and for adibashis in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, 
have not resulted in great improvements in their representativeness. 
Scope of the Issue of Minority 
Rights in South Asia
Several conclusions can be made drawing on the analysis presented in this 
introduction: 
i. The poor condition of minorities in the region effectively means denial 
of basic rights to vast numbers of people (mostly on account of the dis-
crimination that minority groups face). These are rights that most states 
provide in their constitutions and that which they are committed to pro-
viding (through international covenants that they are signatories to). 
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In sheer numbers alone we are talking hundreds of millions of citizens 
who  are denied basic rights to life, security, identity and culture, socio-
economic well-being and participation. The vast scale of the denials  also 
contributes to the poor ability of South Asian countries to meet their 
national development and well-being goals.   
ii. Poor rights for minorities have implications for conflicts. Behind many 
of the ethnic conflicts in the region – those fighting for greater auton-
omy within nation-states as well as movements for self-determination 
seeking independent states for themselves – are minorities and their 
perceived sense of grievances. Most negotiated solutions to these chal-
lenges – the Mizo Peace Accord, and that for linguistic accommodation 
in India; the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in Bangladesh; and 
the Comprehensive Peace Accord in Nepal, for example – have been 
about agreements on arrangements that purport to provide better for 
minorities. Clearly, efforts at minority rights’ protection and promotion 
are steps towards conflict prevention too.    
iii. Underlying this poor show of minority rights are weak policy commit-
ments to delivering for minorities with little resort to robust institutional 
mechanisms for minorities or to targeted programmes and projects 
and poor attention to reviewing outcomes including through collecting 
and reporting data disaggregated by minority groups. In other words, 
minority rights, indeed human rights, are not a policy priority for most 
South Asian states. 
iv. Part of the reason for the weak policy priority for minority rights by 
South Asian states is the region’s strong majoritarian atmosphere. 
Nationalistic mobilization, both ethnic and religious, seeks to create 
homogenous societies and the first victims of this dynamic are usu-
ally minority groups. In recent times, majoritarian mobilization has 
intensified across the region. As the Minority Rights Group (2010:110) 
notes, ‘a growing trend of radical, sometimes militant, nationalism and 
religious extremism throughout the region, is posing a major threat to 
religious minorities.’ Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Afghanistan, the Hindu right wing in India and Buddhists in Sri Lanka, 
all seek to move towards hegemony of one religion and culture at great 
cost to the countries’ minorities. In this context, any talk of minority 
rights is seen by majoritarian groups and state actors as challenging the 
state and hence it is quickly delegitimized.  
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Majoritarianism and minority rights in South Asia
Majoritarian impulse is inherent in nation-states. In the case of South 
Asian states, historical legacies strengthen the majoritarian trend. These 
are about the region’s colonial encounter (including anti-colonial struggles) 
politicizing ethnic and religious identities. But more important as a factor 
was the creation of the post-colonial states through partition of much of 
the subcontinent splitting up ethnic groups across new and arbitrary bor-
ders and fears of the political elites all-around of further disintegration of 
successor states. Given this history the trend across the region has been for 
antagonistic nationalism (between successor states) with frequent conflicts 
(inter-state as well as against minorities)  all with adverse consequences 
for minorities. As a result, denial of minority rights in practice even though 
guaranteed in law carries on with impunity.  
There are other factors too which contribute to the rising trend of major-
itarian nationalism in the region: 
i. Institutional design: Parliamentary democracy with the first-past-the-
post electoral design which is common to most South Asian nations 
favours ‘majority take all’ outcomes and ‘ethnic outbidding’ with con-
testants pandering to majority votes even at the cost of marginalizing 
minorities. It is no wonder then that elections and electioneering in the 
region are the sites of much minority bashing.  
ii. Clash between elites for control over the state – related to the above 
is the tendency of elites in their contests over control of state institu-
tions to pander to majority interests and sentiments even at the cost of 
minorities. Elite contests with their narrow interests have a tendency to 
structure national debates along ideological lines that then end up ben-
efiting majorities at the cost of minorities. 
iii. The media across the region is a reflection of and a driver of populist 
sentiments. The media– print and electronic - fuels jingoistic national-
ism again ending up working adversely for minorities.
iv. Finally a word about democracy in the region and the place of minority 
rights in it. South Asia has had a mixed experience with democracy. 
Some states have had long experiences with democracy although mostly 
in its formal sense (of holding elections and periodically changing gov-
ernments). Others have had a more chequered history where even for-
mal democracy is only a recent phenomenon. The poor condition of 
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minorities across the region then is a reflection of South Asia’s ‘democ-
racy deficit’, with the idea and practices of citizenship and equal rights 
not having taken roots and access to rights, justice and opportunities 
contingent on peoples’ ascriptive identities (Manchanda, 2010: 12). 
Given these adversities, the protection and promotion of minority rights 
then is going to be about deepening democracy. In the current context that 
would imply developing the state to treat all groups equally by putting in 
place systems to check differential treatment such as anti-discrimination 
laws and mechanisms and affirmative action policies to help marginalized 
groups overcome exclusions and disabilities. Central to this venture must 
be creating and entrenching safeguards including minority rights’ protec-
tion regimes, strong mechanisms for protecting human rights, establishing 
the rule of law, entrenching an independent judiciary, establishing non-dis-
crimination policies and mechanisms, providing affirmative action policies 
and promoting diversity and multi-culturalism.       
Recommendations
Given that national laws that impinge on minority rights are vastly different 
between countries and the ground realities for minority and human rights 
are so challenging it will be important for any meaningful regional endeav-
our for improved minority outcomes to start small and build on the gains. 
What will also aid this process is if traction on outcomes overall is not made 
contingent on state-led efforts.  
i. Working to document and shine a light on minority rights’ outcomes 
and the processes that lead to denial in each country should be a helpful 
starting point. This will require efforts towards establishing systems and 
processes for collecting disaggregated data on a range of relevant indi-
cators as well as on insights on the processes through which minority 
rights are delivered or denied. Also helpful would be systematically 
documenting and reporting countries’ performance on relevant interna-
tional instruments and getting a conversation going on them. Given the 
wide variation in data availability by domain across countries with some 
countries quite advanced in specific domains and others without much 
of a system for data collection, collation, analysis and reporting, it will 
help to share experiences and insights on data collection and analysis 
across countries as a first step towards building a regional partnership 
that can also facilitate systematic documentation and reporting. 
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ii. Effective documentation and tracking of outcomes and provisioning 
around minority rights can also contribute to raising awareness on the 
subject, especially when used with effective media strategies to educate 
people within individual countries and across on issues impinging on 
minority rights that have a regional and/or cross-cutting import. We 
noticed earlier how polarized public opinion is reflecting the jingoism 
prevalent in the media as well as society. Finding an entry point then 
to creating public opinion conducive to finding a common cause across 
borders on issues relevant to minority rights that are cross-cutting will 
be a necessity. 
iii. There are currently no regional forums specifically working on minority 
rights, especially those to undertake sustained practical work and advo-
cacy with stakeholders. A number of loose civil society platforms and 
campaign networks exist mostly around human rights and regional 
peace. However,  in the absence of sustained and programmatic work 
and the capacity for advocacy, their gains are minimal and fragmented 
There is clearly need for region-wide platforms with a clear focus on 
minority rights to act as regional champions to enable systematic expe-
rience-sharing and collective brain-storming on minority and human 
rights’ issues at the regional level, building consensus, lobbying  with 
policy networks, preparing the ground and pushing the envelope on 
minority rights’ issues with multiple stakeholders. 
iv. Equally, there is need for regional programmes supporting grassroots 
organizations of minorities to build community capacity and empow-
ering minority groups to organize and raise their voice for their rights. 
There is a rich portfolio of grassroots activism throughout the region 
and many opportunities for experience sharing and learning from each 
other. A regional programme supporting community capacity build-
ing region-wide will contribute to enhanced outcomes for minorities at 
the grassroots level given the commonalities in the issues confronting 
minorities. 
v. This ground work for enabling minority rights’ protection and promo-
tion should pave the way for more concerted regional efforts for creating 
conditions for improved outcomes. These should start with actions on 
generic problems that result in minority rights’ violations in the region 
using existing national laws and international and regional frameworks 
before moving on to creating new ones. Among these generic prob-
lems are impunity of state actors in cases of rights’ violations; lack of 
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transparency across state sectors facilitating arbitrary state actions; dis-
crimination in application of laws, provision of services and in enabling 
opportunities; and homogenizing policies and practices that restrict 
diversity and promote cultural homogeneity. Effective work on these 
issues will entail sustained and systematic civil society activism for bet-
ter documentation of these pathologies (cases of impunity, discrimina-
tion and the like) to create a body of evidence to use as advocacy mate-
rial for engaging with state actors to redress them using national laws 
and international conventions; and then public education and alliance 
building, to keep up the pressure on state parties for changed behaviour, 
improving results for minorities.  
vi. In parallel, and given the challenges involved in minority rights’ deliv-
ery, it will be necessary to strengthen safeguards for minorities where 
they exist and create new ones where they do not, at the national level. 
These are potentially about human rights’ sensitization and training; 
targeted programmes for minority well-being; directed investments for 
these programmes; institutional mechanisms catering to minorities; a 
representative bureaucracy; and grievance redressal mechanisms. At 
the regional level this could take the form of a South Asia charter of 
minority and human rights, defining a basic minimum programme for 
minority rights protection and promotion along with an associated set of 
institutions to adjudicate and oversee the enforcement of the charter. 
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Introduction
Afghanistan has had outstanding achievements as far as the promotion 
and protection of human rights is concerned in its new phase of life after 
the Bonn agreement in 2001. After experiencing the worst forms of human 
rights violations, Afghanistan entered a new democratic life with a firm 
commitment to observing human rights. 
However, despite these achievements, minorities have remained vulner-
able to different aspects. The assimilationist policies of the nation-state have 
systematically attempted to integrate minorities into the dominant identity 
and culture thus homogenizing the country. The centralized structure of the 
state has marginalized the minorities from the decision-making process, 
and the representation of minorities in the government has remained low. 
Minorities in the country were the main targets/victims of the recent 
inter-factional war in Afghanistan. They have faced rampant violations of 
fundamental and group rights as a result their existence as a community has 
been threatened. Religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities have faced tar-
geted killings and massacres. They were prosecuted and were forced to con-
vert their beliefs, languages, cultures and customs. Under threat to life and 
fear of death, they emigrated; their properties were confiscated or occupied.
This chapter analyses the condition of minorities characterized by 
their own national, ethnic, linguistic or religious identity in Afghanistan. It 
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focuses on the status of minorities with regard to recognition of their iden-
tity and cultural rights, political participation and representation, economic 
opportunities and security. 
The chapter draws on available primary and secondary sources to de-
scribe more broadly the working of the national legal system, specifically 
the position of minorities under the constitutional law. It also explains how 
deficiencies in a pervasive definition of minorities and lack of recognition 
of group rights have challenged the promotion and protection of minority 
rights, and how not imposing effective sanctions through a defined proce-
dure has caused insouciance of the state. After discussing the challenges of 
defining minorities, it looks at the condition of minorities from four differ-
ent aspects – culture and identity, political participation and representa-
tion, non-discrimination and equality and life and security.
Relevance and challenges of research
It should be acknowledged right in the beginning that there is no compre-
hensive report on the status of minorities in Afghanistan. Finding data on 
different political, social and economic indicators related to minorities in 
Afghanistan is a challenging task. The government and international agen-
cies’ data, statistics and reports are not disaggregated in terms of ethnic 
and religious groups. This makes the task of analysing the conditions and 
status of minorities tough. The current chapter relied on available reports 
by governmental and international organizations to the extent available; it 
also draws on media reports and newsletters and secondary sources to fill 
the gaps in primary documents. 
During the civil war (1992-96) and the national resistance against reli-
gious fundamentalist—the Taliban movement (1996-2001) – Amnesty In-
ternational and Human Rights Watch published some reports on the status 
of minorities in Afghanistan (Amnesty International, 1999; Human Rights 
Watch, 2001).
The status of minorities has been covered by the annual reports of the 
US government and think tanks. The US Department of State publishes reg-
ular reports on human rights practices. The US Commission on Interna-
tional Religious Freedom publishes annual reports on religious freedom in 
which it discusses the religious minorities of Afghanistan. However, these 
reports do not give a comprehensive picture of minorities in Afghanistan. 
There is exclusive emphasis on religious freedom, particularly Christianity.
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1.  Hamida Barmaki, one of AIHRC’s commissioners was killed in a suicide attack in January 
2011, three other commissioners were dismissed by President Karzai in December 2011 
and one was removed by the AIHRC board in October 2012.
At the national level, there have been few human rights or civil society 
organizations in Afghanistan which have been consistently active on the is-
sue of minority rights. The Afghan Professional Alliance for Minority Rights 
(APAMR) is a civil society organization which is advocating for minority 
rights since 2001 when it was established in-exile in Pakistan. The organi-
zation represented Afghanistan at the 10th session of the United Nations 
Working Group on Minorities, the Sub-commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and the Commission on Human Rights, United 
Nations (United Nations Human Rights. nd).
The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) 
is a national body for the protection and promotion of human rights. The 
commission is composed of nine commissioners, each of whom covers a 
particular human rights area. The commission has distinct units for wom-
en’s rights, children’s rights and the rights of persons with disabilities, but 
it does not have a particular unit or commissioner on minority rights. While 
the commission is praised by international agencies, there have been sys-
temic lacunae which affect human rights in general and minority rights in 
particular. Between January 2011 and June 2013 five commissioners’ posts 
were vacant as President Karzai delayed filling the posts (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014; Kouvo, 2012). Besides, President Karzai did not release the 
800-page AIHRC report on mapping war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity in Afghanistan from the communist administration (1978) to 2001 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015). Postponing the release of the report has rein-
forced a climate of impunity that affects minorities. 
Minorities have two types of rights: One is collective rights that pro-
tect minority groups vis-à-vis the dominant population. Minorities deserve 
these rights as a group. These include right to language, recognition of iden-
tity, cultural codes and customs, right to self-determination and right to po-
litical participation. Second are the rights that a minority may exercise not 
as a group but as an individual. Right to work, right to property, right to vote 
and many more come under this category. However, it is an open secret that 
minorities are facing consistent discrimination based on linguistic, ethnic 
or religious affiliations at both individual and group levels and they are de-
prived of their fundamental human rights in Afghanistan. AIHRC’s annual 
reports on human rights in Afghanistan do not cover minorities’ conditions 
as a separate category as they cover those for women and children. These 
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reports provide a perspective on different social, economic and political 
rights with respect to an individual but not for groups. While the reports 
provide an analysis of human rights based on age and gender they do not 
say anything about religious and ethnic minorities. The reports under-esti-
mate the minorities when it comes to fundamental human rights. Beyond 
fundamental human rights the reports blindly ignore the group rights of 
minorities in the country. There have only been three cases where the 2014 
AIHRC report touched upon the group rights of minorities. However, these 
were also approached not as collective rights but as individual rights. The 
first case is the collective deprivation of Jugi  people from citizenship rights. 
The report does not discuss who the Jugi people are, why they are deprived 
of their rights or whether they have any right to citizenship or right to 
self-determination. The second case is targeted killing of 14 Hazara passen-
gers in the Ghor province by Taliban. The report discusses this case when it 
talks about right to free movement and passage. The third case is about the 
strike by Hazara students of the Faculty of Social Science in Kabul Universi-
ty against their administration and the education law. The students claimed 
that they were discriminated against based on ethnicity by the faculty and 
administration of the Faculty of Social Science (AIHRC, 2014). The report 
analyses the case from the individual rights’ perspective as the right to strike 
and protest. It fails to take the case further and see it from the minorities’ 
perspective.
The Government of Afghanistan does not produce regular annual re-
ports on the status and condition of minorities. The Ministry of Justice pre-
pared a report on the implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minori-
ties in Afghanistan in 2012. The report provides an overview of laws, poli-
cies and achievements of Afghanistan with respect to minorities. However, 
it is not comprehensive enough to cover multiple dimensions of the status 
of minorities in the country. As the report states, it is based on an unrepre-
sentative sampling of Uzbeks and Hindus.
Overall, there is no comprehensive literature on most of the minorities 
in Afghanistan. While some minorities such as Hazaras have been able to 
catch international media attention, many others have remained unknown 
and undiscovered. No substantial attention is paid to mini-minorities such 
2.  The Jugi or Ja’t, minority group lives in northern Afghanistan and is ethnically Tajik. Ap-
parently due to several interventions by AIHRC the issue of citizenship for Jugis has been 
solved. They can now apply for citizenship and hence benefit from all entitlements stated 
under the Constitution (Moin, 2015).
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as Balochs, Pashais, Nuristanis, Turkmens, Qizilbashs and Kyrgyzs in Af-
ghanistan. 
Lack of comprehensive and all-encompassing research and literature on 
minorities highlights the necessity and relevance of research on the topic. 
This chapter serves to shed light on the different aspects and dimensions 
of minorities in Afghanistan and bring forth the conditions and challenges 
that people face as minorities. 
Mapping of minorities
Muhammad Tahir Badakhshi was the first person in Afghanistan to raise 
his voice for minority rights in the 1960s. Badakhshi claimed that being a 
multinational country, the main national problem in Afghanistan was the 
systematic discrimination of minority ethnic groups by the ruling group. 
The oppression and discrimination kept the minority ethnic groups in a 
disadvantaged position and the ruling group systematically exploited them. 
This led to what he called ‘National Oppression’. Contradicting his fellow 
leftist colleagues in the 1960s when the anxiety for leftist ideas was high, he 
said that the problem in Afghanistan was not class exploitation of the poor 
by the rich but was the dominance of one ethnic group over the other which 
led to national exploitation and oppression and consequently to a national 
clash. The national clash was intensified by the ruling ethnic group through 
a ‘divide and rule policy’. 
The ruling group mobilized its fellow ethnic group by indoctrinating 
it with a supremacist chauvinistic ideology. This supremacist chauvinistic 
ideology created a narrow nationalism that went on to define the nation 
based on the ruling ethnic group’s identity and culture. Badakhshi called for 
a ‘Just and Democratic Solution of National Question’. According to him a 
‘Just and Democratic Solution of National Question’ contained affirmation 
of national oppression on oppressed ethnic groups and recognition of equal 
rights for all ethnic groups. Each ethnic group shall have right to self-deter-
mination. Accordingly, no identity, language and culture shall be subjected 
to an assimilationist policy (Ghairat, 1990; Maihan, 1990; Zohori, 1989). 
The question of who is a minority and who is a majority has been contro-
versial in Afghanistan. With no national-wide official census (Balland, 2015; 
Karimi, 2014), the issue of majority and minority has become politicized. 
The claim of ‘majority status’ was to downgrade the other communities’ po-
litical and economic gains. It was also the source of legitimacy for ruling 
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the country and monopolizing power. The ruling ethnic group marginalized 
minorities from political participation and national politics and justified the 
framing of national identity based on racial and ethnic characteristics. Ba-
sically, ‘minority’ as a category was created and manufactured by the ruling 
elite to justify its authority. 
Since the ruling elite was linked to the Pashtu speaking community, the 
concept of majority-minority was developed around the notion of ethnicity. 
Pashtun nationalists claimed that they were an absolute majority in Afghan-
istan. However, statistics provided by different Pashtun nationalists differed 
in numbers and percentages from 40 per cent to 60 per cent of the popula-
tion. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady (1995) claimed that Pashtuns were 50-55 per cent 
while Rostar Taraki (2011) argued that they were more than 60 per cent. 
This perception of Pashtun nationalists and the ruling elite does not re-
flect the quality of population in Afghanistan. They are false and flawed. 
Moreover, Pashtuns’ assumed majority status becomes incorrect if we look 
at linguistic and religious categories. From a linguistic perspective, Persian 
(Dari) is a widely spoken language, spoken by around 50 to 55 per cent of 
the population. It has not only been the native language of many ethnic 
groups such as Tajiks, Hazaras and Qizilbashs, but it has also been func-
tioning as the lingua franca of the country for many centuries. The CIA Fact-
book indicates Persian (50 per cent), Pashto (35 per cent), Turk (Uzbeki and 
Turkmeni) (11 per cent) and 30 minor languages (Balochi and Pashai) (4 per 
cent) (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2015). From a religious perspec-
tive 84-89 per cent of the population is Sunni Muslims, 10-15 per cent is 
Shia Muslims and 0.3 per cent is small religious groups (Hindus, Sikhs and 
a few Christians) (CIA, 2015). 
Looking from the ethnic perspective, all the ethnic groups in Afghani-
stan are less than 50 per cent of the entire population. The Asia Founda-
tion (2012) survey showed Pashtuns at 40 per cent, Tajiks at 33 per cent, 
Hazaras at 11 per cent, Uzbeks at 9 per cent, Turkmens at 2 per cent and 
Balochs, Nuristanis, Aimaq and Pashais at 1 per cent each (the Asia Foun-
dation, 2012) and the 2014 survey showed Pashtuns at 40 per cent, Tajiks at 
36 per cent, Hazaras at 10 per cent, Uzbeks at 8 per cent, Turkmens at 2 per 
cent, Balochs, Nuristanis, Aimaqs and Pashais at 1 per cent each, Qizilbashs 
at < 0.5 per cent and Safis at < 0.5 per cent (the Asia Foundation, 2014). 
As the oppressed ethno-linguistic groups understand the majority-mi-
nority politics, none of them accept the inferior position drawn for them 
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by the ruling ethnic group. A counter-argument by the subjugated ethnic 
groups has been that Afghanistan is numerically a country of minorities. 
Each ethnic group in Afghanistan is less than 50 per cent of the total pop-
ulation. 
Majority-minority politics brings us to the point where majority and 
minority do not remain just numbers and quantitative strengths or weak-
nesses and become an issue of socio-political subjugation and oppression. 
Defining a minority as a community with a small number of people is mis-
leading and incomprehensive. It was because of such circumstances that 
Francesco Capotorti, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities defined minorities 
based on both their numerical quality and socio-political condition in his 
study for the UN Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities: 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members being nationals of the states – possess 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of 
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed toward 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language (Capotorti, 1991: 98). 
The term ‘non-dominance’ in this definition indicates the socio-political 
condition of a group. Based on this understanding scholars consider the sit-
uation of a group in terms of its power relations to the rest of the population. 
K.N. Panikkar argues that numerical inferiority is not a sufficient condition 
for being a minority, rather it is the consciousness of being discriminated by 
other groups and the existence of actual disadvantaged positions vis-à-vis 
the other groups. He argues ‘the constitution of a minority is primarily con-
tingent upon two factors. First, the self perception of the group as a minority 
in relation to other groups in society on the basis of certain experienced 
disadvantages and second, discriminatory or hostile treatment meted out 
by the majority’ (Panikkar, 2005: para 4).
Consequently, this chapter does not discuss Pashtuns, the dominant 
group, despite being numerically less than 50 per cent of the population. 
However, it considers Persian language because despite being numerically 
the majority language, sociologically it is a non-dominant and discriminat-
ed language. Similarly, the chapter considers Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turk-
mens, Balochs, Nuristanis, Brahwuis, Aimaqs, Pashais, Qizilbashs, Kyrgyzs 
and Shias as they are discriminated and disadvantaged ethnic and religious 
communities. 
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A Survey of Constitutional Law
Afghanistan is committed to international human rights norms based on 
Article 7 of the 2004 Constitution: ‘[t]he state shall observe the United 
Nations Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties 
to which Afghanistan has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.’ The Constitution obliges the state to establish a society based on the 
preservation of human rights, equality among all the ethnic groups and bal-
anced development of all the regions of the country (Article 6). To monitor, 
foster and protect human rights at the national level the state is mandated 
to establish the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan. 
The commission is supposed to receive complaints, monitor human rights 
conditions and inform the authorities about the status of human rights in 
the country (Article 58).
Although the Constitution does not define the minorities in Afghanistan, 
it does refer to 14 ethnic groups, which according to it, constitute the na-
tion of Afghanistan: Balochs, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Turkmens, 
Pachais, Nuristanis, Aimaqs, Arabs, Qirghizs, Qizilbashs, Gujurs and Brah-
wuis (Article 6). The Constitution draws rights based on the liberal principle 
of citizenship. It states that all those who have citizenship of Afghanistan 
are called nationals of Afghanistan. It further stipulates that no member 
of the nation will be deprived of citizenship (Article 4), all the citizens have 
equal rights and duties and discrimination under the law is prohibited 
(Article 22). 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution mentions the Fundamental Rights of cit-
izens which can be categorized in three clusters of political, economic and 
civil and social rights. Right to national sovereignty (Article 4), right to vote 
and the right to (nominate) be elected (Article 33), right to establish and be 
a member of a political party (Article 35) and right to demonstration (Arti-
cle 36) are citizens’ political rights. Yet, the Constitution deprives Sikh and 
Hindu citizens of Afghanistan of the right to be elected as president. The 
Constitution sets the condition of ‘being Muslim’ as a criterion for nominat-
ing oneself as the President of the country (Article 62). However, this condi-
tion is not there in case of ministers and members of the national Shura (the 
issue of representation is discussed in detail in a separate section). 
A citizen’s economic rights are right to property (Article 40), right to 
work and employment (Article 48), right to free preventive healthcare and 
treatment (Article 52) and right to pension for retirees and financial aid to 
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survivors of martyrs, missing persons, elders, women without caretakers 
and disabled and handicapped persons (Article 53). A number of rights can 
be categorized as civil rights. These are right to express thoughts or freedom 
of expression (Article 34), right to form associations (Article 35), right to 
communication (Article 37), right to education (Articles 43, 44, 45, 46) and 
right to access to information (Article 5). 
The Constitution does not refer to any group rights/collective rights or 
minority rights as a separate category. Group rights are those rights that 
are meant for cultural communities in order to protect their culture and 
identity and ensure their presence and participation in public affairs. These 
are exempt from existing laws, symbolic claims, right to representation, as-
sistance for minorities and marginalized groups and recognition (Kymlicka, 
1995; Mahajan, 2002; Parekh, 2000).
There are certain provisions with regard to assistance in three cases: 
language, education and nomads’ livelihoods. The Constitution treats no-
mads as a disadvantaged group and hence obliges the state to provide them 
assistance. It says, ‘[t]he state…shall design and implement effective pro-
grams to develop the nomads’ livelihood’ (Article 14) and their education 
(Article 44). Similarly, in the case of languages, it says that the state shall 
design policies and programmes to develop all the languages of the country 
(Article 16) and prepare teaching material in the native/mother tongue of 
all the communities (Article 43). 
The Constitution recognizes two cultural practices. First, language: the 
Constitution recognizes six regional minor languages (Uzbeki, Turkmani, 
Pachai, Nuristani, Balochi and Pamiri besides Persian and Pashtu at the na-
tional level) as the third official language in their respective regions (Article 
16), and second, Shia jurisprudence: ‘[t]he courts shall apply the Shia juris-
prudence in cases involving personal matters of followers of the Shia sect in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. In other cases, if there is no clar-
ification in this Constitution and other existing laws, the courts shall rule 
according to laws of this sect’ (Article 131). With regard to other religious 
minorities, the Constitution does not say anything. The criminal code dis-
criminates against religious minorities by exclusively applying Hanafi juris-
prudence in matters for which the criminal law does not have provisions. 
Shia Muslims and non-Muslim Sikhs and Hindus are not exempt 
from those provisions of law that are based on Hanafi jurisprudence. 
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The Constitution has some repugnancy clauses. While it recognizes Islam 
as the religion of the state, it allows the followers of other faiths to practice 
their religions within the bounds of law (Article 2). A number of provisions 
and articles of the Constitution contradict Article 2 that provides freedom 
for other believers to exercise their faith. For instance, Article 3 states that 
no law can be in contradiction to Islam and Article 130 allows the court 
system to apply Hanafi jurisprudence in matters on which the law is silent 
or for which there is no provision and Article 149 prohibits amendments to 
principles related to Islam in the Constitution. 
Lastly, the Constitution does not consider minorities as far as the issue 
of symbolic claims and representation are concerned. Inclusion and exclu-
sion of minorities in cultural and political symbols of the state such as the 
national anthem, national holidays, national language and the name of the 
state and the flag is an important point. The national anthem is exclusively 
in Pashtu language (Article 20), though the Constitution recognizes Persian 
and six regional languages. Islam is represented in the national anthem, 
in the coat of arms and the national insignia in the national flag (Article 
19) and the name of the state. Despite having so many lacunae, the current 
Constitution of Afghanistan is much more progressive as compared to its 
earlier constitutions.
One of the huge challenges in implementing the provisions of the Con-
stitution has been violation of the Constitution by the state apparatus itself. 
Afghanistan Freedom House has declared that the state violated the Consti-
tution 92 times in the last few years. The report, which also covers President 
Karzai’s term, states that the President took the Constitution hostage as he 
violated it so many times (BBC, 2016). 
Cultural rights
The question of identity
Dominant literature about national identity in Afghanistan has taken the 
term ‘Afghan’ as a solid, natural and uncontested identity. It is assumed that 
Afghan as an identity has long historical roots and it is uniformly adopted by 
all the people of Afghanistan. The point, which has been repeatedly raised, 
is that there has not been any secessionist movement in Afghanistan. This 
has been taken for granted to prove the homogeneity of the country under 
one common identity. Besides, people’s struggle against the British colonial 
invasion in the 19th century and the jihad against the Soviet are seen as 
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3. Before modern Afghanistan was established in the late-19th century as a modern state, the 
region was called by different names such as Bactria, Khurasan, Sistan and Kabul.
consolidating points in the nation building process in Afghanistan. Com-
mon knowledge in Afghanistan also maintains that all foreign invasions 
unified different people against a common enemy. 
While these arguments are true to some extent, the truth in much more 
complicated. The point whether historically and objectively the people of 
Afghanistan have a shared identity has been contested by many scholars. 
Social and political conditions and circumstances have shaped in a manner 
that the people do not feel as though they have the same identity. The sense 
of being discriminated against intensifies the crisis of identity. 
To understand the nature of identity politics in Afghanistan two things 
should be distinguished at the beginning: a sense of belonging to the land/
country and a feeling of shared identity. There is a strong sense of attach-
ment to the country when it comes to the patriotism of the people of Afghan-
istan. The roots of this claim go to two points. First, different ethnic groups 
have lived over a long period of time in the country. Different dynasties 
have made empires and built cultures based on a common Persian-Islamic 
civilization. The Persian-Islamic civilization provided a common platform 
for all diverse groups to form their polity. Richard Eaton calls it Persian 
Cosmopolis and Frederic Starr calls it the Persianate world. This common 
background provided a context for peaceful coexistence of different eth-
no-linguistic groups. The current ethnic groups in Afghanistan draw their 
lineages to different ancient and middle age empires in medieval Khurasan, 
Sistan, Bactria and Kabulistan.3 These lineages strengthen the feeling of be-
longing to a common history. Tajiks claim the Bactrian civilization, Safarid, 
Samanid, Ghorid and Kurt dynasties. Turks claim Gaznavid, Seljuks and 
Timorid dynasties. And Pashtuns claim the recent Durrani and Barakzai 
dynasties. Each ethnic group considers itself a barrier to the old heritage of 
current Afghanistan.
Second, geographically the two major ethnic groups, Pashtuns and 
Tajiks are dispersed across the whole country. While Tajiks are mainly con-
centrated in the north, northeast and west, there are pockets of Tajiks in 
the south and southeast as well. Pashtuns’ traditional homeland was south 
and southeast Afghanistan, however, different Pashtun tribes settled in the 
west, southwest and the north under Safavid, Durrani and Barakzai dynas-
ties. The most systematic settlement of Pashtuns started under Amir Abdur 
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Rahman (1880-1901) and continued under Shah Amanullah (1919-29) and 
Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim (1929-46) (Bleuer, 2012). Dispersion 
of the two large ethnicities has blocked attempts at secessionism by all other 
minor ethnic groups. 
While all the people of Afghanistan have a sense of attachment to the 
land, there is contention over the acceptance of a common identity. The 
identity ‘Afghan’ was recently adopted for all the citizens of Afghanistan. 
The 1923 Constitution referred to the people of Afghanistan as ‘Afghans’ 
(Kingdom of Afghanistan, 1923: Article 8). Historically ‘Afghan’ was a syn-
onym of Pashtun or Pathan. For instance, Henry Walter Bellew in his piece 
‘Introductory Remarks to An Inquiry into The Ethnography of Afghanistan’ 
refers to Afghans as Pashtuns (Bellew, 1891). He uses Tajik, Uzbek and Haz-
ara parallel to Afghan. Throughout his ethnographic study he does not find 
any historical reference to Afghans. The same is with Elphinston (1819) in 
his book An Account of The Kingdom of Cabul.
With the decline of the Durrani dynasty after Zaman Shah Durrani in 
1800, the vast territory of the empire was divided among different vassals, 
khans and sardars into fiefdoms. The northern region Balkh and Bada-
khshan, the western region Herat and the central region were out of the con-
trol of Darul Saltana-e Kabul after Zaman Shah. It was at this time that the 
British empire came in contact with the eastern borders of the last Durrani 
empire. The political disintegration of the region on the one hand and lack 
of the British empire’s contact with non-Pashtuns on the other made Brit-
ish diplomatic emissaries, political agents and travellers generalize ‘Afghan’ 
and ‘Afghanistan’ to all the people of Khurasan, Sistan and Kabul. 
The issue of national identity, the name of the country and the name of the 
currency was raised in the constitutional assembly in 2003. The term ‘Afghan’ 
as national identity, ‘Afghanistan’ as the name of the country and ‘Afghani’ 
as the currency have been contested by minorities as they refer exclusively to 
Pashtuns and do not represent the ancient and historical identity of the coun-
try (Rubin, 2004:17). It was argued that the names Aryana or Khurasan were 
not only inclusive but also connected the country with its past. 
The approved Constitution mentions 14 ethnic groups but calls every 
citizen of the country Afghan (Article 4). Unlike the previous governments’ 
practices and unlike the 2004 Constitution, the post-Bonn government is-
sued national IDs without mentioning the ethnic groups’ identities. In 2011, 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority: 
The Kyrgyz community
The Kyrgyz community of Afghanistan frequented the Pamir region 
for at least two centuries. However, by the beginning of the 20th 
century they had transformed this high-lying region into their per-
manent abode because of political developments. The ancestors of 
today’s Kyrgyz community fled their winter quarters in Central Asia 
(particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and China (mainly Xinji-
ang) in the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik and 1949 Chinese revolu-
tions. Subsequently they took refuge in the Wakhan corridor. Many 
commentators have concluded that the Kyrgyz community primarily 
escaped communist-enforced collectivization to safeguard their no-
madic and traditional way of life (Kazemi, 2012: 2). In 1978, fearing 
the new communist regime in Afghanistan, many Pamir Kyrgyzs 
took refuge in Pakistan and later in eastern Turkey. After the Soviet 
invasion, many Kyrgyz people, who had taken shelter in the Pamir 
region of Afghanistan could not relocate either to the lower part of 
the country or to Kirghizstan. Thus, they were left in a peculiar situa-
tion, to say the least, in which they found themselves to be stateless. 
The life of the Kyrgyz community was very difficult and they had to 
face all odds to sustain their lives in Afghanistan. The communi-
ty, lives at an altitude as high as 4,000 metres in the Big and Little 
Pamir mountains of Afghanistan’s Wakhan district in Badakhshan 
province. The Kyrgyzs living in the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan 
live in one of the most challenging environments in the contempo-
rary world. Most of the Wakhan-Pamir area (approximately 82.9 per 
cent according to one estimate) is spread at high altitudes between 
3,000 and 4,000 metres and this has been the home of around 2,000 
Kyrgyzs. The exceptional cold and rough winter weather stretches 
for long periods, sometimes even for eight-nine months. The tem-
perature sometimes goes down to -50o C. Because of its high altitude 
and the hardships that living here brings, the area is known as bam-e 
donya in the local language, meaning ‘the roof of the world’. The 
Kyrgyzs inhabiting the Pamir region are known as ‘vertical nomads’. 
Owing to the difficult cold climate, they annually move from low-ly-
ing winter quarters (qeshlaq) to higher summer pastures (ailaq). 
When commenting on the migration patterns of the Kyrgyzs, Ted 
Callahan notes the following: 
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the government announced a plan for issuing national electronic ID cards. 
The cards were designed exclusively in Pashtu language, despite Persian 
and Pashtu both having the status of official languages. This issue became 
controversial in the national Shura while discussing the Population Regis-
tration Act. Besides, the issue of nationality was also a point of contention. 
While a majority of the Pashtuns favoured specifying the term Afghan for all 
the citizens, other ethnic groups such as Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks argued 
specifying each particular ethnicity on the card. For the proponents of Af-
ghan identity, the term Afghan is a matter of national unity and prevention 
of the state’s disintegration. For Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks other minor 
ethnic groups, Afghan does not capture their sense of identity, as it is an-
other word for Pashtun. They also assume that not mentioning a particular 
ethnic identity is an effort by Pashtun nationalists to obscure the non-dom-
inance of Pashtuns (Bezhan, 2013; Stern, 2014).
The debate over this issue reached a stalemate in the national Shura 
between the pros and cons of ‘Afghan’ in December 2013. Society became 
polarized on this issue around two opposing poles. Pashtun nationalists in-
sulted all Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks other minor groups and claimed that 
they did not accept Afghan as their national identity. In a political debate on 
Zwandon television, Abdul Wahid Taqat, a retired military officer said all 
non-Pashtun ethnic groups would be ‘bastards’ if they did not accept Afghan 
and said they should be kicked out of the country (Zhwarleedona, 2013). 
This incident intensified the crisis of identity in Afghanistan. People from 
both sides staged demonstrations.
Finally, the national Shura approved the bill by specifying a particular 
ethnicity on identity cards. The law went to President Karzai for ratification. 
However, under pressure from Pashtun nationalists he did not sign the law 
till the end of his term. Although President Ashraf Ghani initially made a 
commitment to ratify the law he later delayed the ratification of the Pop-
ulation Registration Act till 1 December 2014. While the act mandates the 
government to issue national IDs for citizens mentioning their ethnic identi-
ty, it has not taken practical steps to start the process because of opposition 
by nationalists. In April 2016, the Law Committee of the Cabinet changed 
the controversial article of the act and added both nationality and ethnicity 
on the ID cards. The proposal for this change should go for ratification by 
the national Shura (Southasiamedia, 2016). 
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The Kyrgyz follow a short (usually less than 20 km), pendular migra-
tion cycle, moving from their summer camps (jailoo) on north-fac-
ing slopes (terskey) to winter camps (keshtow) on south-facing 
slopes (kongey). The migrations typically occur in October (jailoo to 
keshtow) and June (keshtow to jailoo). 
However, data on the total number of the people in this community 
is debatable. In the absence of any concrete data on the number of 
Kyrgyzs, on the basis of his observations Callahan has calculated that 
their total number is 1,500 individuals living in 250 households. In 
terms of their religious practices, the community could be considered 
as Sunni Muslims. The community does not engage in agricultural 
production, partially due to the nomadic nature of their habitation 
and also to some extent owing to the higher level of their ecologi-
cal surroundings. But the lush pasturage of the Wakhan district has 
been the home of the nomadic Kyrgyz community for many years. In 
a striking passage, Marco Polo noted that ‘when you have got to this 
height you find a fine river running through a plain clothed with the 
finest pasture in the world’ (Callahan: 1). The case of green and rich 
pastures also finds a mention in more recent travellers’ accounts. In 
the absence of agricultural production, the Kyrgyz community de-
pends exclusively on livestock. The community’s primary economic 
activity is semi-nomadic pastoralism. They derive most of their sub-
sistence from secondary pastoral products (dung fuel, milk products, 
wool). The nomadic Kyrgyz community tends sheep, goats and yaks. 
Sorting wool from the animals constitutes one of the primary sourc-
es of income for the community. The members engage in trading 
wool, meat and milk with customers from Afghanistan’s lowlands. A 
class difference within community members is also noticeable. It is 
usually the poorer families that tend the sheep and goats owned by 
the richer tribe members. In the absence of any modern storage fa-
cilities, various milk products produced from livestock farming like 
cheese and curd are usually stored in yurts (round felt tents). The 
Kyrgyz nomads can, however, afford some luxury items like radios, 
watches and sewing machines as they trade in animal products in 
lower Afghanistan. Their closest neighbours, the Ismaili Shia Mus-
lim Wakhis community is concentrated one level below them in the 
Wakhan Corridor, at 2,000–3,000 metres; this community engages 
in agriculture. The Wakhis and the Kyrgyzs are engaged in economic 
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Education of minorities
Education is mentioned as one of the fundamental rights of citizens in Af-
ghanistan in the chapter that deals with the fundamental rights and duties 
of citizen in the 2004 Constitution. The state is obliged to provide free edu-
cation to all citizens up to the bachelor level. To protect minorities’ identity 
and culture, it is stipulated in Article 43 that the state is responsible for 
providing education based on the native language and mother tongue of 
citizens. The Constitution also emphasizes education for nomadic commu-
nities (Article 44). However, Article 45 underlines a monolithic and unified 
education syllabi and curricula for all the people of Afghanistan. Article 45 
states, ‘the state shall devise and implement a unified educational curricula 
based on the tenets of the sacred religion of Islam, national culture as well 
as academic principles, and develop religious subjects curricula for schools 
on the basis of existing Islamic sects in Afghanistan.’ 
While Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-religion country, estab-
lishing curricula based on a unified national culture and one particular re-
ligion for all citizens is against the principles of cultural diversity, multicul-
turalism and minority rights. This point does not suggest that education 
curricula should not be based on religious teachings of Islam for Muslims 
who constitute an absolute majority in the country, but since Hindus and 
Sikhs are also the citizens of Afghanistan they too should have the oppor-
tunity to have curricula based on their own religious teachings. While the 
Government of Afghanistan claims that it ‘has established four school (two 
in Kabul, one in Ghazni and one in Jalalabad), one new school will be built 
in Kunduz province for the Hindu minority (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
Hindus and Sikhs state that two primary private schools were established 
on their own initiative in Kabul and Jalalabad in 2012 (Nim-Rukh, 2014). 
They also complain about societal discrimination in public schools because 
of their religious beliefs.
History textbooks in schools are not without prejudices and cultural bi-
ases. These prejudices are evident in three cases. The first case is the depic-
tion of Amir Habibullah Kalakani. Kalakani, a Tajik Amir in the modern his-
tory of Afghanistan, is defamed and projected in a humiliating way. Instead 
of calling him Amir/Shah (king), the textbook calls him Bacha-e Saqau (son 
of a water carrier) in an insulting manner. The 12th Grade history textbook 
does not talk about his reign but it considers his revolt against Amanul-
lah and calls him an outlaw and rebellious (Ministry of Education, 2011). 
Kalakani’s portrayal as an outlaw is rooted in ethnocentric Afghan 
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ties based mainly on bartering (of livestock and agricultural prod-
ucts). Apart from milk products, some manufactured goods are in 
great demand in the lowland. Women are usually engaged in weav-
ing carpets in the Pamir region. Carpets woven here are sold to trad-
ers in the city of Van. The nomadic population in the lower Pamir 
region also trades with bordering countries like Pakistan. They en-
gage in barter and prices for goods are determined in terms of sheep. 
Usually traders from Afghanistan’s lowland come to the Kyrgyz com-
munity (Callahan: 5-6). But there are also many instances of Kyrgyzs 
transcending the boundaries to trade at either Goz Khan (road head 
for Big Pamir) or Sarhad-e Boroghil (road head for Little Pamir). 
There is evidence that some Afghan Kyrgyzs in the Pamir mountains 
sell livestock in places like Kabul and lower Afghanistan. 
Social life of the Kyrgyz community
In the recent documentary film, Ancient Nomads by Ayanfilm, 
Osmon Ajy (an elderly man living in High Pamir) comments: ‘We 
came here hundred years ago, but we don’t know where we come 
from. We have all customs of our fathers.’ These Kyrgyzs do not in-
dulge in social relationships with other people in the region – the 
Tajiks of Badakhshan. For instance, there are no inter-marriages 
between Kyrgyz and Tajiks of Badakhshan. Osmon Ajy notes the 
strict community custom on the issue of inter-community marriag-
es: ‘We do not receive girl from others and we do not give girl to 
others.’ Although the community is connected to others through 
their economic affairs, the social exclusion of the community, like 
most other ‘backward’ nomadic communities, appears to be of much 
significance. Exclusion from developmental activity can also be wit-
nessed in the apathy of different political and institutional outfits in 
the country. For instance, there was no school for the community in 
High Pamir till 2009. It was at the constant insistence of the commu-
nity that the government established a school for them. The nomadic 
culture and extreme climatic conditions make it virtually impossible 
to run the school throughout the year. However, the school teaches 
children from the community for four and half month in a year in 
Persian (Dari) medium. At present there are 64 students studying 
in the school. A look at the school shows the conservative character 
of the community as girls do not attend the school. The film Ancient 
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nationalism. While the modern history of Afghanistan, especially 19th cen-
tury history is full of chaos and inter-familial wars between the Durrani 
and Barakzai dynasties, the textbook does not characterize any Durrani or 
Barakzai khans and sardars as outlaws and rebels. 
Degradation of a Tajik king in official narrations and textbooks is per-
ceived to be discriminatory and biased for Tajiks. Tajiks see this as their 
humiliation in general. In recent years there has been a movement for reha-
bilitating Kalakani’s image in official narrations and textbooks. As Amir Ka-
lakani was buried after being hanged in an unknown place, a people-centric 
commission called the ‘Commission for Aggrandizement and Interment of 
Amir Habibullah Kalakani’ was formed to find out the unknown grave of the 
king and re-burying him with due respect (Mutarif, 2016). The commission 
advocated the cause for six months among the people and political leaders 
and asked the government to accomplish this task officially. Finally, on 21 
July 2016, the commission provided a 10-day deadline to the President to 
issue an official decree for aggrandizement and interment of Amir Kalakani. 
However, Ashraf Ghani refused to issue the decree. After the negative re-
sponse from the government the commission took on the responsibility of 
performing the task.
The second case is of abnegation of ethnic massacres and slavery un-
der Amir Abdur Rahman. Amir Abdur Rahman, the Iron Amir, established 
a centralized state at the expense of the massacres and slavery of ethnic 
groups. Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Ghalzais were massacred and slavery 
became legalized under his reign. While the textbooks are silent on these 
dimensions of his reign, they do not acknowledge abolition of slavery under 
Shah Amanullah as well. Hazaras state that massacres, slavery, suffering 
and losses of the Hazara ethnic group under Abdur Rahman’s discrimina-
tory policies and authoritarian rule should have been acknowledged in text-
books.
There has been progress in the last few years with regard to the right 
of minorities to education in their mother tongue. However, the progress 
has been slow. Besides two official languages of the state at the national 
level, the 2004 Constitution also recognizes six minor languages, Uzbeki, 
Turkmeni, Pachai, Nuristani, Balochi and Pamiri, as third official languages 
in their localities. The Education Law states, ‘In the areas where spoken lan-
guage of the majority of the people is the third official language in the coun-
try…in addition to teach Pashto and Dari [Persian] languages, opportunities 
for teaching of the third language as a teaching subject shall be prepared. 
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Nomads features Sapya, a girl from the community, who says that 
studying in the school is considered shameful for girls. But a more 
thorough study is required to see if the community is conservative. 
Most of the community members cannot afford modern medical fa-
cilities. There is no doctor and no medical centre for the community 
in the High Pamir region. The government has provided it with a bus 
that has medical facilities, but lack of oil and a driver mean it is a 
mere show case. As a consequence of lack of medical facilities at this 
rough and high altitude, the Wakhan-Pamir area has some of the 
world’s highest rates of maternal and child mortality. In the absence 
of any official government data, a recent survey indicates that the 
maternal mortality rate (MMR) among the Kyrgyzs of the Big Pamir 
was likely to be ‘more than 4,000 per 100,000 live births’. A Kyrgyz 
woman’s lifetime risk of maternal death is nearly one in three. Child 
mortality figures among the Kyrgyzs are also alarmingly high. In the 
Big Pamir area, more than half the children die before the age of five  
(Callahan: 7). Ancient Nomads shows the lack of medical facilities 
and rough environmental conditions, which in turn are responsible 
for high child mortality rates. For instance, the film points out that 
Rayaullo’s four children have died and now he does not have any 
child. It cannot be denied that the lack of, or in some cases complete 
absence of, modern developmental projects is because of the remote-
ness of the Pamir region. In addition, there have been no state spon-
sored efforts to impart training/skills to the community that is best 
suited for living a dignified life at that high altitude. 
Caught in the Pamir region, this pastoralist ethnic Kyrgyz commu-
nity which has been living in the harsh environment for centuries is 
excluded from the larger international political discourse. As part 
of the national discourse, Kyrgyzstan has periodically voiced the ex-
cluded nature of the Kyrgyz community living in the Pamir region 
of Afghanistan, citing their miserable living conditions. But the 
post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan has done little to ensure the return of their 
‘brethren’ Kyrgyz community to their homeland. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, discussions between the Afghan Kyrgyzs and 
the Kyrgyzstani government began in 1996 for their repatriation 
and in 1999 a formal petition was made to the then President Akaev 
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In order to teach the third official languages of the country, the ministry of 
education in the field of teachers training, textbooks, teaching materials, shall 
provide and apply effective programs’ (Education Law 2008, Article 32[3]). 
The Ministry of Education has established the Department of Ethnic 
Languages to promote and develop syllabi for minority languages. Howev-
er, full schooling is not available in the mother tongues of all the minorities. 
A government report claims that it has included minority languages accord-
ing to their respective population as ‘Uzbek language in 11 north provinces 
where Uzbeki are spoken, Turkmeni in 4 provinces, Nuristani in one prov-
ince, Pachai in 6 provinces, Balochi in one province, Gujari in 6 provinces 
and Shegnani in one province in to education curriculum as third languages 
of the country’ (Ministry of Justice, 2012).
 School textbooks are not published in many minority languages for 
all the 12 grades. Lack of teaching staff has also been one of the prob-
lems for minorities. Many of the minority languages in Afghanistan 
do not have a script or written form. Pashai did not have script till July 
2003 (Yun, 2003). Textbooks in Pashai have been published up to 12th 
Grade but teaching has not yet begun (Hanifullah Shahab Pashai, Head 
of Pashai Youth United Association, personal communication). Teach-
ing in Turkmeni is just up to Grade 2 and in Gujari it is till Grade 5 and 
in Uzbeki it is up to the Grade 9 (DW, 2011). The first Uzbeki dictionary 
in Afghanistan’s Uzbeki dialect and scripture was published in 2008 
by Noorullah Altai, Professor of Uzbeki language at Balkh University 
(BBC, 2008a). Similarly, for the first time the Quran was translated to 
Uzbeki Afghanistan script in 2015 (MWF, 2015). Nuristani medium text-
books till the 6th Grade are under publication (BBC, 2008b). Textbooks 
have been written in Balochi up to the 8th Grade by Abdul Sattar Purdely, 
Professor of Balochi language. There are three Balochi medium schools for 
Balochs in Nimroz, Afghanistan. A chair of Balochi language has also been 
established in Kandahar University with the efforts of Hassan Janan and 
Purdely (Zurutuza, 2014). 
Participation and representation 
Since the Bonn agreement, there is a form of unstated and informal power 
sharing among the ethnic groups in the government. Some of the reports 
argue that all ethnic groups are represented at different levels of governance 
(Katzman, 2015: 2). However, this contestation is naïve and baseless. Since 
the political system is highly centralized, the prime focus of power sharing 
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for the repatriation of the Kyrgyz community living in Afghanistan. 
However, a lack of funds for the repatriation appears to be an issue 
in the integration of the Kyrgyz community in Afghanistan. Given 
this background the future for Afghan Kyrgyzs is not particularly 
promising. Political leadership in the entire region is weak and this 
limits the possibility of collective action for the benefit of the Kyrgyz 
community. Thus, the emergence of a different modern nation-state 
in the area after the Soviet collapse has not brought about any funda-
mental change in the life of the Kyrgyz community of Pamir region. 
There is general ignorance about the ethnic Kyrgyz community liv-
ing on the roof of the world in both Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Several Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) interlocutors in the 
Afghan Ministry of Border, Ethnic and Tribal Affairs conceded that 
they knew or had heard very little about the Kyrgyz community in 
the Pamir. Thus, for instance, it is striking to note that the six pe-
riodicals published by the ministry contain no news or information 
about the Kyrgyzs in Afghanistan. Moreover, there have been no 
public textbooks in Kyrgyz language in Afghanistan. It is clear that 
the community continues to be a subject that needs to be thoroughly 
explored. In fact, this inadequacy of data/studies on the part of state 
institutions suggests a general environment of exclusion of the eth-
nic Kyrgyz community of Afghanistan.
has been in capital Kabul and the political participation at the provincial 
level has been overlooked. The local people have no role in the election of 
local governors and administrators. In most of the provinces, the governor 
does not belong to the province. For instance, while a majority of the resi-
dents in Laghman province is Pashia minority, the governor is not Pashai. 
The same is true for almost all the provinces. 
This section looks at the question of political participation in three 
institutions – the executive, the national Shura and the Afghanistan 
National Army.
Executive
The National Unity Government came out of a political agreement be-
tween the two leading candidates, Abdullah Abduallah and Ashraf Ghani 
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4.  In April 2016, General Taj Mohammad Jahid, a Tajik was approved as Minister of Interior 
Affairs (Tolonews, 2016).
in the 2014 elections. Pashtuns got key security sector ministries such 
as the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior Affairs4 and the National 
Directorate of Security, National Security Council and key economic sec-
tor bodies such as the Ministry of Finance and National Bank (Clark, 2015; 
Rahel, 2014). Overall Pashtuns form around 48 per cent of the ministries 
and executive bodies. ‘During Karzai’s presidency, [National Security 
Council] was heavily populated by ethnic Pashtuns’ (Katzman, 2015: 6). 
Under President Ghani, the National Security Council continues to be dom-
inated by Pashtuns. 
There is no census or any statistics on the political participation of 
citizens in the bureaucracy and civil services and other government posi-
tions segregated by ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. However, 
some reports indicate over-representation of Pashtuns through arbitrary 
appointments by President Ghani. These appointments have challenged 
and side-lined the formal bureaucratic functioning of the state such as the 
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission which 
has the authority to appoint civil servants. Despite the international com-
munity’s trust and hope in President Ghani to tackle the issue of corruption 
and the patronage system, appointments in the President’s Office of Admin-
istrative Affairs (OAA) are predominantly Ghilzai Pashtuns. 
It is said ‘the ethnic composition of senior appointments made with-
in the OAA betrays a clear favoring of technocratic Pashtuns: 75 per cent 
(21 appointees) are Pashtun while 14 per cent (four appointees) are Tajik. 
Ghani’s list of advisors is also made up mostly of people of eastern Pashtun 
origin: 69 per cent (22 appointees) Pashtun against 19 per cent (six appoin-
tees) Tajik. Ethnic-Hazaras and Uzbeks each hold less than 3 per cent of 
the appointments’ (Sharan and Boss, 2015). Another report also claims that 
out of 26 high ranking positions in OAA, Pashtuns have absolute majori-
ty. There are only two Tajiks and one Hazara and Uzbek each in the lower 
ranks. The number of positions and bureaucratic offices has increased to 
a large extent as compared to the previous administration. This could be 
characterized as bureaucratic inflation. For instance, there are three differ-
ent offices for policymaking under different names in OAA. The number of 
directorates has increased from 19 to 27 (Samim, 2015). These unneces-
sary expansions of the bureaucratic structure were to get in more of Ghani’s 
co-ethnic Pashtuns. 
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The Pashai language 
development programme
In this case study we try to understand the initiative taken by the 
Pashai Community Development Project (CDP) to enhance the pos-
sibility of the Pashai language programme becoming a success in Af-
ghanistan. Pashai is spoken by the Pashai ethnic group, located in 
the north-east corner of Afghanistan. It is interesting to note that the 
term ‘Pashai’ is used to refer to a ‘specific language, to the speakers 
of that language, and to the area that some of the Pashai speakers in-
habit’ (Everyculture, 2016). There are different theories on the origin 
of the Pashai community in the East pocket of Afghanistan. One the-
ory suggests that the ‘Pashai were members of the classic Gandhara 
culture and that they were pushed out of their original homeland 
in the lowlands by an invasion of Pashto-speaking Afghans from 
the Sulaiman Mountains. The Pashai then found refuge in the high 
mountain valleys of the Hindu Kush, where their descendants live 
today.’ The second school of thought draws its sources from ethno-
graphic research and claims that it is possible that all the groups, 
living in the mountain areas including the Pashai, share a common 
historical root that might predate the rise of the Gandharan civiliza-
tion (Everyculture, 2016). 
The Pashai literacy project is an important component of the larger 
Pashai CDP that aims to bring about change in the life and culture 
of the Pashai people. In other words, the broad aim of the Pashai 
CDP, which also includes developing the Pashai language and adult 
literacy project, is to empower Pashai community members with the 
fundamental skills and knowledge required to participate in activ-
ities that improve their livelihood. Not much data is available on 
this unique initiative though. The project was started in 1999 by the 
charity SERVE in response to community members’ request for an 
adult literacy programme. In 2006, with support from the provincial 
government the project expanded to include Pashai language litera-
cy classes for girls. Simultaneously, the project started the process of 
creating a Pashai and Pashto bilingual education programme within 
the formal education system. The project is also known as Eastern 
Region Literacy Project of SERVE Afghanistan (http://portal.une-
sco.org/education/en/ev.php-RL_ID=59427&URL_DO=DO_TOP-
IC&URL_SECTION=201.html). 
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Minority groups have been marginalized in President Ghani’s appoint-
ments which has intensified their grievances (Parsa, 2015). Amrullah 
Shaleh, former Tajik director of the National Directorate of Security has said 
that Ghani monopolizes the power in his person and patronage (Azadira-
dio, 2015). Ismail Khan, a former Tajik governor of Herat, has also claimed 
that Ghani is making appointments without consulting the people. ‘Ghani’s 
moves were distancing him from the people and focusing power in his own 
ethnic Pashtun community, neglecting other ethnicities’ (O’donnell, 2015). 
Besides, no ministry is inclusive of Baloch, Pachai, Nuristani, Kyrgyz, 
Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui, Hindu and Sikh ethnic groups. On 28 March 
2015, the Open Society Daily published a report in which it criticized the 
under-representation of Hazaras and Uzbeks in the Ministry of Economy. 
There is no Hazara or Uzbek in the two deputy ministers and 16 director-
ates, the report indicates. Out of 500 staff members in the ministry, only 18 
are Hazaras who are working at the low ranks and do not have any role in 
either framing policy or in decision making. The role of other minor ethnic 
groups is completely invisible (Kalili, 2015). 
National Army
In the past there was an informal understanding on the share of ethnic 
groups in the Afghanistan National Army (ANA). In 2006, the Minister 
of Defence declared in a decree that appointments in the ministry will be 
based on ethnic quota – 44 per cent Pashtuns, 25 per cent Tajiks, 10 per 
cent Hazaras, 8 per cent Uzbeks and 13 per cent other ethnic groups. The 
order was criticized by Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and other minor ethnic groups 
as unjust. They argued that while there was no national-wide census based 
on ethnicity in Afghanistan, the quota determined by the Minister of De-
fence under-represented non-Pashtuns (Amaj, 2012). In 2011, as a result 
of the quota system in ANA and the Ministry of Defence, ‘the 26 top posi-
tions were occupied by 11 Pashtuns (42 per cent), 9 Tajiks (35 per cent), 4 
Hazaras (15 per cent), 1 Nuristani and 1 Uzbek (4 per cent each)’ (Guistozzi 
and Quentin, 2014: 34). However, ethnic discrimination is rampant in re-
cruitments, appointments, getting leave and many other issues in the army 
(Alarabiya, 2011). 
National Shura (Legislative)
The electoral system in Afghanistan is based on a single non-transferable 
vote (SNTV) system. Civil society and people’s efforts to ratify the propor-
tional representation electoral system have failed so far. President Hamid 
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To understand the significance of the programme we must take a 
brief but necessary historical detour. After the establishment of the 
Khalqi government in 1978, seven national languages were select-
ed: Dari, Pashto, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Nuristani, Balochi and Pashai. 
From 1986, under Najibullah’s rule, Dari and Pashto were given 
preference in practice. Under the Taliban regime, which started from 
1996, there was no official language policy. But Pashto became the 
de facto official language of the government. Many commentators 
also opined that the Taliban regime did not encourage and promote 
speakers of minority languages in Afghanistan’s multi-lingual set-
tings (Ju-Hong Yun, 2003). Along with this, apart from religious 
teachings, any other mode of teaching was discouraged or not al-
lowed. One has to read the significance of the project against this 
background where different linguistic communities were not en-
couraged to practice their own language. 
Approximately 500,000 people living in eastern Afghanistan speak 
Pashai language. The Pashai ethnic community lives in extreme mis-
ery and is mostly concentrated in the eastern zone of Afghanistan 
that features isolated, mountainous and heavily populated valleys in 
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kapisa, Nuristan and Kunar provinces. The 
altitude is high (between 1,000 and 4,000 metres). They were tradi-
tionally agriculturalists by profession. Dealing with animal husband-
ry and agriculture were the two most important occupations for the 
community. Twenty years of war destroyed traditional livelihoods, 
and land was made untenable for vegetable production, a situation 
compounded by over seven years of drought. Miserable conditions of 
community members, living in a most distressed situation, were not 
only confined to their economic affairs and livelihood as the Pashai 
people could not find any cultural acceptance for their language. The 
spoken form of the language has been there for roughly 2,000 years, 
but the written form started only in 2003. More than 80 per cent 
speakers of the language (which includes about 98 per cent of the 
women), are illiterate (Ju-Hong Yun, 2003). 
On the other hand, Pashto is the language of politics, economics and 
education in the region. It was in this backdrop that the Pashai pro-
gramme was initiated. After the Taliban regime ended in 2001, peo-
ple could again speak and use their own language. New schools were 
established. But most of the Pashai adults were unable to take ad-
vantage of the new educational opportunities offered after the war, 
partly because it had been so long since they had had any opportuni-
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Karzai adopted the SNTV system without considering the concerns of the 
people (Suhrke, 2007). Based on this system there is no separate represen-
tation right for ethnic and religious groups. The electorate is according to 
the provinces.
However, the Constitution gives nomads (Kuchis) a separate represen-
tation right and determines the whole country as their electorate area. No-
mads have been allocated 10 seats (seven men, three women) in the Lower 
House and two seats through a presidential decree in the House of Elders 
(Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, Article 84[3]). There are two main 
problems in separate representation rights for Kuchis. First, allocation of 
10 seats for the nomadic community is unjust as it results in over-repre-
sentation of Pashtu speaking people. While different ethnic groups such as 
Balochs, Kyrgyzs, Turkmens and Pashtuns have nomadic populations, these 
seats are exclusively utilized by Pashtun nomads. The report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also indicates that this cate-
gory benefits Pashtuns as it gives them a higher percentage of seats (Human 
Rights Council, 2009). Second, the nomadic communities have declined 
sharply in recent years because of two reasons: (1) The government has set-
tled the communities in the plains on the north of the Hindu Kush5 and 
around the Helmand Valley (irrigation) project; and (2) the inter-factional 
war has disturbed migratory patterns of nomads and resulted in a change 
in their lifestyle (Petrov, 2014). Hence, most of the nomads are settled com-
munities now. A majority of the Kuchi representatives in the national Shura 
are not nomads, rather they are settlers. The Afghanistan Freedom House 
has also stated that allocating a separate quota for Kuchis is a kind of pre-
rogative for them which puts them in a privileged position as compared to 
the rest of the citizens (BBC, 2016).
In 2013, the issue of separate electorate for Hindu and Sikh minorities 
became controversial. To ensure representation in the national Shura, the 
Hindu and Sikh communities lobbied for a quota. During deliberations on 
the electoral law, the Upper House proposed to add a seat particularly for 
Hindu and Sikh communities in the Lower House that increased the num-
ber of seats from 249 to 250 but the Lower House disagreed. A joint com-
mission of both the Lower and Upper Houses was mandated to discuss the 
issue and solve the disagreement. The commission dropped the proposal 
from the election law’s draft. But on 3 September 2013, one seat was added 
5. In north Afghanistan, the government had given fertile land of Tajiks and Uzbeks to Pash-
tun nomads. This issue led to communal violence in the region in later years.
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ty to study in Pashai language as the medium of instruction till then 
was Pashto. In the post-war period, all the new schools focussed on 
the children and Pashai adults felt it was inappropriate for them to 
study alongside children. Specific adult literacy projects for Pashai 
adults were not available. Pashai adults in some areas had no ac-
cess to adult education and women and girls were denied formal and 
non-formal education of any kind. It is in this context that the Pashai 
language development programme was started in 1999 by the char-
ity SERVE, as part of its response to community members’ request 
for an adult literacy programme. On the request of the local com-
munity members in 1999 the project leaders surveyed the area and 
initiated the project in the post-war period. To meet the challenges, 
a distinct Pashai language development and literacy programme, a 
part of the larger Pashai CDP was taken up to encourage those whose 
mother tongue is Pashai.
SERVE
SERVE Afghanistan was established in 1972 in response to a fam-
ine in Ghor province. Till the end of the Soviet invasion, it did not 
take up different issues on the ground very frequently. It was only in 
1991, after the Soviet occupation had ended that SERVE returned to 
Afghanistan and started the SHIP school for the deaf. Later, SERVE 
Afghanistan started projects in different regions of Afghanistan, 
and today it is engaged in various community developmental pro-
grammes. The Pashai language development programme is an im-
portant part of the larger projects of the organization. 
The programme’s goal
This community-owned initiative is aimed at delivering literacy and 
enabling the Pashai people to find means of earning a livelihood. 
It is not merely a language development programme, but a litera-
cy for livelihood programme. Issues like public health and nutrition 
and education have occupied centre stage of the entire programme. 
The programme’s target is empowering around 1,000 Pashai men 
and women every year. The purposes of the project can be divid-
ed into three broad themes: 1) to help tribal people maintain their 
ethnic identity by recording their history and cultures in writing in 
the Pashai language, 2) to enable community members to partici-
pate in activities aimed at improving their material living conditions 
by imparting them the knowledge/skills needed to foster and build 
self-reliance, 3) to integrate the Pashai people, excluded politically 
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to the Lower House for Hindu and Sikh communities through a presidential 
decree (Foschini, 2013a). However, the Lower House rejected the presiden-
tial decree. The representatives argued that adding a quota for one commu-
nity and ignoring the others would not be just. As the house had allocated a 
seat for Hindus and Sikhs, it should do the same for other minorities as well. 
Further, it was said that the community is so tiny that it could not qualify for 
a seat in the Lower House considering its electoral constituency (Foschini, 
2013b).
Non-discrimination and equality
Livelihood, income and employment
There is no report on the income, employment and livelihood status of the 
people of Afghanistan based on national or ethnic, linguistic or religious 
communities. The statistics and numbers hide the realities between the 
majority and the minority. The Government of Afghanistan publishes a na-
tion-wide survey called the National Risk Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 
that covers different aspects such as demography, livelihood, income, em-
ployment, labour force, food security, health and agriculture. NRVA (2014) 
claims that it provides the most comprehensive statistical information on 
Afghanistan (Central Statistics Organization, 2014). While the report does 
not give a break-up of ethnic and religious communities, it acknowledges 
that national statistics conceal the differences within the population. 
Further, the Ministry of Economy along with the World Blank has pub-
lished the Poverty Status of Afghanistan based on NRVA 2007-08. The 
report provides profiles and magnitude of poverty, employment, labour 
force and access to social services in Afghanistan (Ministry of Economy, 
2010). Like NRVA, the Poverty Status of Afghanistan examines the status 
of minorities with regard to mentioned indicators. The report provides fig-
ures and statistics on different areas disaggregated by gender, geograph-
ical region and socioeconomic characteristics. However, it is silent when 
it comes to minorities. The report of the UN High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights emphasizes the importance of disaggregated data by ethnic and 
5. In 2005, Anarkali Honaryar, a Sikh woman, was elected from Kabul to the Lower House 
and Ganga Ram, a senior Hindu from Kandahar was appointed from Kandahar to the 
Upper House. In the next election, none of the Hindus and Sikhs were able to succeed in 
the elections to the Lower House. The President appointed Honaryar as a member of the 
Upper House.
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and socially till the Taliban regime, with the majority population by 
enabling them with the skills and knowledge that are essential for 
survival in the modern world and which bring them dignity. Thus, 
the project is not only confined to the narrower circle of literacy. In-
stead its aim is to go beyond the typical literacy project and thus 
make a difference in the larger socio-economic-cultural struggle of 
an ethnic community whose life and language were on the verge of 
decay. 
Activities
Although the oral form of Pashai language has been in use for about 
2,000 years, the language was unwritten until 2003. The project 
was introduced to elders in the community, who chose members to 
form a Pashai Language Committee. This committee is responsible 
for developing and overseeing activities aimed at the development 
of the Pashai language. The Pashai Language Committee initiated 
planning for the Pashai literacy and language development pro-
gramme and is responsible for collecting and updating the written 
form of Pashai language. Writing and reviewing textbooks for print-
ing have been one of the major concerns of the committee. Hence in 
July 2003 the project leaders organized a two-day seminar that fo-
cussed on developing a Pashai alphabet. Most village elders, who are 
Pashai language speakers participated in the seminar. The delegates 
also included literacy teachers and delegates from local schools. Al-
though an expert linguist led the seminar, decisions relating to the 
development of the alphabet were made by the Language Committee 
members. From 2006, special emphasis was given to a girls literacy 
programme (Ju-Hong Yun, 2003). 
After the development of Pashai language script, the Language Com-
mittee, with help from different teachers started organizing Pashai 
language classes in 2006. The local government also extended help 
and in August 2006, the Language Committee obtained permission 
for Pashai programmes from the local government. The journey then 
continued and as per 2003 estimates, 58 adult classes had been held 
in 43 different villages which catered to the needs of 1,450 partici-
pants. 
Taking the thread of the original Pashai language development pro-
gramme forward, a recent and encouraging development is now no-
ticed. The Pashai Youth United Association was established in 2013. 
Initially it was established as an unofficial body in the four provinces of 
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tribal groups (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010). 
It is crucial to highlight that the Government of Afghanistan and research 
communities should take this point into consideration and provide data and 
statistics on minorities.
Land
Land and property has been a subject of dispute in Afghanistan as a re-
sult of continuous conflict in the country. However, like in the other areas 
data on this has not been documented according to ethnic, linguistic and 
religious groups. The Afghanistan Freedom House (2016) report indicates 
that in the last 13 years most of the public and private properties have been 
usurped by local chiefs, power brokers, ex-warlords and politicians. The 
report claims usurpation of almost 2 million acres of land by 15,800 indi-
viduals in 18 provinces that made President Karzai use the term ‘the Black 
Season of Land Grabbing’. The report does not provide a full picture of land 
disputes and usurpations with regard to minority groups as it only covers 
the condition of Hindus and Sikhs. The report indicates that more than 90 
per cent of Hindu and Sikh properties have been usurped in Kabul, Khost, 
Nangarhar, Qandahar, Ghazni and Helmand provinces in the last few years. 
In some of the provinces, their temples and cremation grounds have also 
been grabbed. As a result 99 per cent of the Hindus and Sikhs have left the 
country (Roye, 2016).
Case studies on land disputes
Confiscation and Occupation of Tajik Land in Bamyan Province 
Tajiks are native residents of Bamyan as they are of the rest of the country. 
They mainly live in Bamyan city and its three districts of Sayghan, Kohmard 
and Shibar. About 100 years ago, Faiz Mohammad Katib named Bamyan as 
a Tajik residence (Katib, 1994: 138-139). The Tajik population in Bamyan 
has been under-represented in official documents and in common knowl-
edge because of the lack of a unified census. Tajiks of Bamyan claim that 
they comprise 40 per cent of Bamyan province (Bamikapress, 2016a). 
The civil war in the 1990s led to the weakening of the state and as a conse-
quence the country was divided into fiefdoms. Located in the central region of 
Afghanistan, Bamyan was controlled by the Hizb-e-wahdat party, which was 
mainly a Hazara party during the civil war. The war in Bamyan resulted in the 
displacement of Tajiks and Pashtuns into neighbouring provinces and cities. 
As a result, the population of Tajiks in Bamyan declined sharply. According 
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Laghman, Kunar, Nengarhar and Nuristan. In 2015, it was registered 
as an association in the Ministry of Justice and it expanded its activi-
ties to Kabul and Kapisa provinces. Since the time of its establishment, 
the association has been doing advocacy for the Pashai people’s rights, 
political participation and unity. It aims at creating cohesion among 
and solidarity for Pashai people. It has attempted to connect different 
segments of the Pashai people and raise awareness on Pashai identity 
and rights (Personal interview with the head of the Pashai Youth Unit-
ed Association Hanifullah Shahab Pashai, 2016).
Hanifullah Shahab Pashai says that till date no civil society organiza-
tion has worked for the Pashai people. He adds that the association 
that he represents is the first one that was established by the Pashai 
people for advocacy of Pashai rights. According to him the main 
concern of the association is the fact that there is no institutional 
support for Pashai language speakers. While a majority of the Lagh-
man province’s population is Pashai people they are under threat 
of assimilation. Governmental affairs are in Pashto and students 
are trained in Pashto language rather than their mother tongue and 
there is no department of Pashai language at the university level. 
The association organized a six-day workshop for standardization of 
Pashai language in Lagman province for 60 teachers. On 19 May 2015, 
the association organized a gathering to bring cohesion and solidarity 
among Pashai people. The Pashai people are scattered in 10 provinc-
es but they are under-represented in the National Unity government. 
The association also criticized the National Unity government for not 
considering the demands and needs of the Pashai people. 
Project approach
The project follows a holistic approach for developing the commu-
nity. The project has started vocational training. It believes that in 
Afghanistan, adult literacy and education should teach life-skills as 
well as literacy skills and should help people gain access to and use 
new information in order to raise their income-earning potential 
and hence their standard of living. Involvement of the local people 
is very important for the project and hence it is community-based. 
Project leaders work together with the Shura, local elders and local 
authorities who provide the classrooms, select adult students from 
the community and encourage them to attend classes. Supervisors 
and teachers are from the villages in which the classes are held. Proj-
ect leaders use large community meetings to share their ideas and 
generate inputs and suggestions relating to different aspects of the 
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to Mahiudeen Ashu Farahmand, a Tajik civil activist, there are 3,000 inter-
nally displaced families in Kabul, 1,500 families in Balkh, 1,000 families in 
Baghlan and 500 families in Kunduz provinces (Farahmand, Representative 
of Bamyan Tajiks Movement for Justice, personal communication). In the 
post-Bonn settlement, Tajiks claim that there has been a systematic and orga-
nized omission of Tajiks from the economic, political and geographical space 
in Bamyan in the last 10 years. Their land has been confiscated by the provin-
cial administration or occupied by local goons affiliated with Karim Khalili, 
ex-Vice President in Hamid Karzai’s administration (Mitranews, 2016). The 
occupied land in Bamyan city is located in Zahak, Surkhdar, Tupchi, Petab-e 
Laghman, Tabaq-e Sari, Jagrakhil, Zargaran, Safi town, Pesht-e Khuja khar, 
Surkh Qul, Qul-e Sayied Kamaluddeen, Sang-e Chaspan, Tap-e Jalal and 
Bedak, Regshad.
Being victims of ethnic discrimination for a long time, on 1 May 2015 the 
Tajiks of Bamyan organized a conference in Kabul. The participants protested 
against systematic and organized discrimination of Tajiks in Bamyan. Accord-
ing to them, Tajiks are facing political marginalization, economic discrimination 
and deprivation, ethnic cleansing and the occupation of their land in Bamyan. 
They also raised a question regarding unbalanced development in Tajik areas. To 
give voice to Tajik victims and do advocacy for them, the conference established 
a movement called the Bamyan Tajiks Movement for Justice (Farahmand, Rep-
resentative of Bamyan Tajiks Movement for Justice, personal communication). 
On 30 November 2015, the movement organized a demonstration in Kabul pro-
testing against ethnic discrimination, marginalization and ethnic cleansing of 
Tajiks in Bamyan (Mastosaighani1, 2015). The major points of the demonstra-
tion were:
1. The old Bamyan city (which was mainly inhabited by Tajiks) has been 
destroyed and the new city is built on the occupied land of Tajiks. How-
ever, Tajiks do not have any share in the 2,000 shops and stores of the 
new market built on their land; 
2. In last few years, the local government and the Bamyan municipality 
have been targeting Tajiks and specifically destroying their houses and 
have not been allowing new construction for Tajiks under the fake policy 
of the cultural red and green belts. However, such policies are not ap-
plied to non-Tajiks;
3. The protesters said that those who were responsible for occupying 
Tajik land in different areas from Zahak to Surkhdar in Bamyan city like 
Tupchi, Petab-e Laghman, Tabaq-e Sari, Jagrakhil, Zargaran, Safi town, 
Pesht-e Khuja khar, Surkh Qul, Qul-e Sayied Kamaluddeen, Sang-e 
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programme. This on-going process helps promote communication 
with the community. It also facilitates the involvement of the wid-
er community and increases ownership of the project’s activities in 
general. Regular meetings with community leaders, elders and Shura 
members are effective in identifying the needs of the target group. As a 
result of this deep and prolonged engagement, community elders and 
Shura members encourage the people to provide facilities for women’s 
literacy classes and also to participate in different project activities. 
Pashai community elders and local village Shuras select literacy teach-
ers and supervisors. Literacy teachers are also selected from among 
community members, after they go through thorough training. In-
volvement of local leaders in the process of training a number of local 
people (men and women) every year to be literacy teachers and super-
visors is another important aspect of the programme. The project fo-
cuses on building the community’s ability to take responsibility for the 
project and sustaining it. Building the capacity of the community to be 
self-employed is one major aim of the project. In order to achieve this 
the project has initiated an animal husbandry programme that till late 
2003 had distributed around 350 cows and 130 goats to vulnerable 
people such as war widows, orphans, disabled people and extremely 
poor people (Ju-Hong Yun, 2003). 
Learning from the case study
Despite the country’s current conflict situation, the project has man-
aged to retain its emphasis on education. It is also encouraging to 
note the project’s focus on bringing in women and girls in the educa-
tion fold. Participants learn to use written material both in their local 
language and in Pashto. Thus, one can conclude that the project has 
been trying to empower the community primarily by drawing on the 
most foundational aspect of life, education. 
 
It is possible to imagine that literate individuals, both men and wom-
en will in future make use of print literature in their own language 
and in Pashto to access and share ideas and information. The im-
parting of knowledge and skills alongside education might give com-
munity members a chance at productive employment. 
The programme is community-based. The project leader has good 
relationships with local political and religious leaders, significant 
sections of which take on the responsibility for CDP. This bottom-up 
approach seems to have played the most important role in its suc-
cess, a process which needs to be a learning lesson for all other civil 
society organizations.
...Good practice case study continued ...
Afghanistan 
The Vulnerabilities of Minorities
80
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
Chaspan, Tap-e Jalal and Bedak, Regshad should be put on a fair trial 
for justice;
4. The local administration has avoided major development projects in 
Tajik cities and districts. This has caused unbalanced development in 
Bamyan province. Hence, they proposed that Ajar Valley in Kuhmard 
Shall be declared a national park and a dam be constructed in Syghan 
district; and 
5. The central government should provide just, equitable and inclusive de-
velopment for all the citizens of Bamyan. 
On 15 December 2015, the central government appointed a Fact Finding 
Commission under Obidullah Barkzai, a member of the Lower House, to in-
vestigate the complaints. The commission consisted of representatives from 
the Ministry of Urban Developing Affairs and Housing, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Information and Culture, the General Attorney’s Office and the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance. The commission met 11,000 
people, received more than 700 complaints from Tajiks and Pashtuns of 
Bamyan and collected more than 21 documentary clips. The commission 
presented its decision on 5 January 2016 to the national Shura. The find-
ings of the commission affirmed discrimination against Tajiks and Pashtuns 
of Bamyan and affirmed that there had been systemic marginalization and 
omission of these ethnicities. Tajik and Pashtun land was not expropriated 
based on law but their land had been confiscated illegally under different 
excuses such as expansion of a green belt or a red cultural belt. In some 
cases, official departments of the local administration had been built on the 
occupied land. There were many cases of illegal occupation of Tajik land by 
powerful groups who were supported by the Karim Kalili party wherein they 
built residential towns or hotels (Bamikapress, 2016b; Farsi, 2016).
On 14 March 2016, the Tajiks of Bamyan had another demonstration 
and claimed that the state had not taken into consideration the reports and 
findings of the commission. They called on the central government to end 
ethnic cleansing and the annihilation policy against the Tajiks of Bamyan 
(Tajikanbamyan, 2016).
Conflict over pastoral land between Kuchis and Hazaras 
The state traditionally favoured Kuchis through expropriation of land and 
other institutional support for them. This led to a series of conflicts be-
tween transhumant pastoralist Pashtun Kuchis and Hazaras in the central 
provinces over pastureland and water resources. Both sides of the conflict 
claim ownership over the land. The Kuchis claim that the state has provided 
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them pastoral rights in the central regions of Afghanistan because as a cus-
tom each year they follow a routine coming from the Pakistan border, cross-
ing the central region going to the north. The root of the conflict goes back 
to the late-19th century when the state pursued a policy of annihilation of 
Hazara, Tajik and a number of Ghalzai tribes during Amir Abdu Rahman’s 
reign. As a result of the unification and centralization of the state, the king 
killed, exiled or displaced those Hazaras who revolted against the state and 
declined to pay taxes. Their land was distributed among government agents 
or army officers. The king’s firmans (royal decrees) granted Kuchis access 
to summer pastoral land in the central region of the country. During the 
civil war and the war of resistance in the 1990s, the Hazaras got control of 
these areas. After the peace settlement in 2001, the Kuchis returned to Be-
hsud in 2002 and claimed that their right to access pastoral land had been 
violated by Hazara encroachments. On the other side, the Hazaras argued 
that the firmans were issued by a despotic king that was not acceptable now. 
Secondly, Kuchis who were coming for pastoralism were no longer real no-
mads. And lastly, as the population had grown the ecological resources were 
not enough for the sedentary population. 
The conflict became violent as Kuchis armed themselves and came again 
each year thereafter to the two districts of Behsud and Daymirdad in Ward-
ak province. The conflict has not been documented and mapped systemat-
ically as yet. There is no reliable data on the conflicts which occurred each 
year between both the sides. However, some data collected from different 
web pages (Heraviyan, 2014; Hazarapress, 2010; Milich, 2009; Ziaee, 2014) 
gives the following details: 
• In July 2002, a conflict between armed Kuchis and sedentary Hazaras in 
Qulba-Namak, Behsud killed one woman;
• In July 2003, a conflict between armed Kuchis and sedentary Hazaras in 
Tezak, Behsud killed one man;
• In July 2004, a conflict between armed Kuchis and sedentary Hazaras in 
Upper Kajab, Behsud killed one man;
• In July 2005, a conflict between armed Kuchis and sedentary Hazaras in 
Lower Kajab, Behsud killed one man;
• In June 2007, 21 Hazaras were killed in a conflict in Bishud;
• In June 2008, 30 Kuchis and 24 Hazaras were killed in a conflict in 
Bishud;
• In July 2010, 70 villages were burnt, five Hazaras including children 
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were killed and over 4,000 families were displaced in Behsud and Daim-
irdad (Hazara.net, 2011); 
• In June 2011, a conflict occurred in Nawor district in Ghazni province 
which led to the deaths of some people and burning of several houses 
(Foschini, 2011); and
• In July 2015, an armed conflict between both the sides killed eight peo-
ple from both the sides (Etilaatroz, 2015). 
On 30 March 2008, people participated in a demonstration in Kabul 
and asked the government not to allow the Kuchis to enter their localities 
and kill people. Representatives of both the sides signed an agreement in 
Kabul in May 2011 that denounced all kinds of violence, recognized passage 
rights for Kuchis and affirmed the safety of sedentary people (Afghanista-
nanalysis, 2011). In June 2015, the National Unity Government formed a 
56-member commission with Sebjatullah Mujadidi as its head to explore 
the issues and solve them (The Daily Afghanistan, 2015). 
Life and security: Violence on minorities
Although the situation of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities has im-
proved after the fall of Taliban but they remain insecure in Afghanistan. 
Article 347 of the Penal Code of Afghanistan provides protection for minori-
ties through implementation of sanctions such as imprisonment and com-
pensation for those who disturb minorities’ religious activities and damage 
or demolish any religion’s worship sites such as shrines (Penal Code, 1976). 
The Penal Code prescribes punishment for a person who attacks—verbal-
ly, orally, physically or through any other public means such as in writ-
ing—the follower of any religion or someone performing religious rituals 
(Article 348).
While there has not been any large-scale detention and torture by the 
government, but the state has continuously failed to provide security to 
these communities. Some reports indicate lack of security for Christians 
and Baha’is. There are around 400 Baha’is in Afghanistan (USCIRF, 2009). 
The community went underground after the General Directorate of Fetwa 
and Accounts declared Baha’i faith blasphemous and its followers apos-
tates (USCIRF, 2015). Similarly, there are also a few Christian converts who 
have been under pressure and cannot practice their faith publicly (USCIRF, 
2012, 2015). 
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There is no unified and agreed data on Hindus and Sikhs. The Afghani-
stan Freedom House (2016) report indicates that there were 200,000 Hin-
dus and Sikhs, comprising 40,000 families living in Afghanistan before 
1992. However, currently this number has reduced to 120 families, includ-
ing 40 families in Nangarhar, six in Helmand and only one family in Qan-
dahar. Usurpation of Hindu and Sikh property by local chiefs and power 
brokers has made 99 per cent of Afghanistan’s Hindus and Sikhs leave the 
country (Roye, 2016). Another report gives different statistics: Facing a re-
duction in their population after emigration during the civil war, there are 
800 Hindu and Sikh families currently in Afghanistan (Foschini, 2013a). 
This comes to about 4,900 Sikhs and 1,100 Hindus (USCIRF, 2009). These 
figures are based on self-estimates by the groups and hence may not be re-
liable. The communities do have their places of worship and are allowed to 
practice their religion freely. There are two Sikh gurdwaras in Kabul and 
six Hindu temples in the country (USCIRF, 2009). However, the commu-
nities are insecure and experience discrimination (Nim-Rikh, 2014). They 
face difficulties in cremating and performing funeral rights for the deceased.
While at the societal level all the communities are living in peace and 
tolerance with each other, for instance, the Shias organize Ashura public 
processions every year, terrorist networks and organizations such as the 
Taliban have remained a primary threat to minorities. They are engaged in 
political killings, abductions, torture and coercion for social and religious 
conformity. In December 2011, Taliban targeted a Shia shrine in Kabul as a 
result of which 56 people were killed (USCIRF, 2012). Since 2014, 11 cases 
of abduction and killing of people have been reported including Shia Haz-
aras, Shia Balochs and Tajiks. A report by the Afghanistan Analyst Network 
(AAN) mentions eight cases of Hazara abductions and indicates that except 
in a few cases, the media and social activists’ reports were incorrect and 
based on false assumptions. The report also says that there is no systematic 
targeting of Hazaras. However, the fear that this wave of violence may turn 
into an ‘ethnic motivated targeting’ is getting stronger (NPR, 2015; Suru-
osh, 2015).
• In July 2014, 14 Shi’ite Hazaras were massacred by Taliban (USCIRF, 
2015);
• On 24 February 2015, 32 passengers were kidnapped on the Kabul-Kan-
dahar highway. Among them, seven passengers, including a 9-year-old 
child, were beheaded on 8 November 2015 (BBC, 2015). While media 
reports stated the deliberate targeting of Hazaras, the motivation, goals 
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and identities of the kidnappers remained unclear. Furthermore, not 
all of the abductees were Hazaras. One of the passengers who was be-
headed in the early days was a Tajik soldier in the Afghanistan National 
Army. And there was a Tajik family among the protesters who gathered 
in Zarnegar park in Kabul, protesting against the government’s failure 
to respond and claiming that their son was a hostage. The kidnappers 
did not seem to have an ethnic motive behind this incident; rather, they 
demanded swapping the hostages with prisoners (Suruosh, 2015); 
• On 15 March 2015, 10 Hazara passengers were kidnapped on the Jago-
ri-Ghazni highway by the Taliban. They released all of them after one 
hour of interrogation. They warned the women passengers to observe 
proper Islamic attire.
• On 17 March 2015, six people were kidnapped on the Herat-Farah high-
way. The ethnicity of the passengers and the motivation behind the ab-
duction remained unclear in this case as well. Initially, the local media re-
ported that all the abductees were Hazaras but later officials stated that it 
was army soldiers who were missing. Kidnapping and abduction of army 
soldiers by Taliban is also a common phenomenon. An AAN report does 
not verify if the case is one of Hazara targeting (Suruosh, 2015);
• On 25 March 2015, 20 passengers were abducted in Daikundi province. 
While it was found that the abductees were Shia Balochs instead of Haz-
aras, the false information increased anxiety among Hazaras; 
• On 30 March 2015, five Shia Hazaras were abducted in Balkh. The kid-
nappers were a group of local militia who abducted the people for eco-
nomic reasons and not for political or economic motives. They asked for 
ransom as the abductees were coal merchants; 
• On 1 April 2015, 13 Shia Hazaras were abducted in Sar-e Pul. Interest-
ingly, the kidnapper was himself a Hazara and a Taliban shadow gover-
nor of Sar-e Pul; 
• On 16 April 2015, four passengers were abducted and killed in Ghazni 
province. While media reports, for instance, The New York Times stat-
ed that the abductees were beheaded the families of the abductees de-
nied this and said that they were only shot and the bodies had not been 
harmed. As in the earlier case, the kidnappers demanded swapping of 
prisoners for the abductees. This nullifies the assumed ethnic motive 
behind the case; 
• On 6-8 November 2015, seven Hazara passengers were beheaded by 
a group claiming loyalty to Islamic State. These passengers had been 
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abducted about a month earlier in Arghandab, Zabul province. This led 
to a mass protest against the government demanding security and jus-
tice on 11 November 2016 (Naim, 2015);
• On 1 June 2016, the Taliban kidnapped around 200 Tajik and Uzbek 
passengers on a highway to the north of the country. Reports differ on 
the number of passengers killed by Taliban ranging from 10 to 17 people 
(Ians, 2016). A big rally was organized in Kabul on 18 June 2016 to con-
demn the failure of the government to protect its citizens; and
• On 23 July 2016, suicide bombers who claimed an affiliation with Is-
lamic state targeted a peaceful demonstration in Kabul (a majority of 
the participants were Hazaras). As a result, 80 people were killed and 
around 300 were wounded (Stanglin, 2016). The protesters were de-
manding re-routing the power transmission line called TUTA through 
the central provinces of Afghanistan. 
This list of cases shows that except for a few the goals and motives of the 
kidnappers were not ethnic. 
Conclusion
The international intervention and the ouster of Taliban produced a eu-
phoric atmosphere. The people of Afghanistan in general and the minorities 
in particular welcomed the change and built their hopes that the human 
rights and status of minorities would improve. However, the minorities re-
mained vulnerable to different aspects. It has become clear that, to a large 
extent, the promises of the international community and the Government 
of Afghanistan have remained at the level of rhetoric and have not been 
translated into actual and tangible outcomes when it comes to minorities’ 
rights and conditions. 
Recommendations
• While the Constitution of Afghanistan is very democratic in terms of 
Fundamental Rights, it should provide support and recognition to 
‘group rights’ as well. Lack of constitutional mechanisms for recognition 
and protection of group rights is one of the fundamental challenges for 
minorities.
• Lack of a demographic census and segregated data based on ethnic, lin-
guistic and religious groups conceals the wide range of problems and 
challenges with regard to minorities. A census is crucial for understand-
ing the social, cultural, economic and political status of minorities and 
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designing and drafting relevant policies and programmes. The Govern-
ment of Afghanistan should conduct a national-wide census without 
leaving out ethnic, religious and linguistic indicators.
• The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission should es-
tablish a particular section for minorities and provide regular reports on 
the status of minority rights in the country.
• The Government of Afghanistan should provide segregated data based 
on ethnic, religious and linguistic groups with regard to income, liveli-
hood, employment, land, security threats, education and political par-
ticipation and representation of citizens.
• President Ashraf Ghani should order the implementation of the ‘Popula-
tion Registration Act’ and issuing of electronic national ID cards as per 
the ratified law. Issuing national ID cards which mention ethnic identity 
will not only help in preserving the identity of ethnic groups, but also 
facilitate democratic processes and governance in the country.
• Minorities are under-represented in governmental bodies and the state 
machinery. The Government of Afghanistan has the responsibility of en-
suring proportional representation and political participation of minori-
ties at different levels of the government.
• The rising level of violence is alarming for the security of minorities. The 
Government of Afghanistan has the responsibility to provide full securi-
ty to ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities.
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The focus of this chapter is minority groups in Bangladesh – their life and 
security, socioeconomic conditions, political participation and culture and 
identity. It also discusses the three main categories of minorities - religious, 
ethnic and linguistic. 
The chapter provides a brief demographic and other data on the small 
numbers of Shia Muslims, Bahais and Ahmadi Muslims in the country. The 
report also covers ethnic minorities who make up 1.5 per cent of the total 
population; they are also called indigenous people or Adivasis living in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and various districts in the plains. The lin-
guistic minorities in Bangladesh are mostly Urdu speaking and are often 
referred to as Biharis. They migrated to what was then East Pakistan during 
the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. About 3,00,000 Urdu-speakers 
live in ‘camps’ in overcrowded and cramped living conditions.1 The report 
also discusses available data on Dalits. 
Another focus of the chapter is the protection and promotion of minority 
rights in Bangladesh. It examines the constitutional provisions to protect 
and promote minority rights, particularly the provisions of equality and 
non-discrimination envisioned in the Fundamental Rights. It discusses the 
statutory provisions for protecting and promoting minority rights. 
Paving the Way 
to Liberation
Afsana Amin, Muhammad Al Amin 
 and Zakir Hossain
Chapter 2 
Bangladesh
1. As reported by Namita: Innovation in Legal Empowerement.  Retrieved from: https://
namati.org/ourwork/citizenship/
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Background
Bangladesh is a secular, pluralistic parliamentary democracy; its Constitu-
tion and other laws protect religious freedom and ensure equal status and 
equal rights to people of all religious faiths – Hindus, Buddhists, Christians 
and others. There is no indication that the state actively engages in per-
secuting people on account of their religion. However, political parties do 
use religiously divisive language and, on occasion, act in ways that exacer-
bate rather than diminish religious and communal tensions (UKHO, 2016). 
Though Bangladesh has ratified all major international human rights trea-
ties and conventions and is legally bound to comply with them it does not do 
so in so far as the minorities are concerned.
The 2011 census report shows that Bangladesh is a country of 149.77 
million people (BBS, 2015) and it is predominantly a Muslim country. Pop-
ulation data updated by the BBS for 2004 through the Sample Vital Regis-
tration System (SVRS), an annual attempt to collect, compile and publish 
demographic data to meet the inter censual data needs showed that 89.52 
per cent of the country’s population was Muslim with the remaining 10.48 
per cent consisting of religious and ethnic minorities. Of the minorities, the 
Hindus were the largest group with 9.58 per cent of the population. The 
Buddhists were the third largest group with 0.46 per cent while Christians 
formed the fourth largest group with only 0.27 per cent of the population. 
Others would include several small factions within the Muslim population 
– Biharis, Ahmadis, Ismailis, Shias and Memons. (see Table 1) There were 
about 100,00 Ahmadis. (SAHR, 2011) 
Historical context
After the victory of the Awami League (AL) in Pakistan’s elections in 1970, 
the Pakistani Army suppressed the aspirations of the Bengali people in East 
Pakistan, innumerable atrocities occurred, many women were raped and 
upwards of 3 million people were left dead. Tens of millions of people were 
forced into squalid refugee camps in India.
Soon after its birth, the political history and politics of Bangladesh had 
to deal with the twists and turns of majoritarian politics. Bangladesh’s birth 
was premised on a secular and democratic ethos. The Preamble of the first 
Constitution of Bangladesh, which was adopted on 4 November 1972, ac-
cepted ‘nationalism’, ‘socialism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘secularism’ as state 
principles; Article 8 Clause 1 reiterated these. Secularism in the context of 
Bangladesh did not imply the absence of religion, as is often interpreted by 
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its opponents. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation, made this 
quite explicit when he said:
Secularism does not mean absence of religion. Hindus will observe their reli-
gion; Muslims will observe their religion; Christians will observe their religion. 
No one will be allowed to interfere in others’ religions – the people of Bengal 
do not want any interference in religious matters. Religion cannot be used for 
political ends.2 
In order to implement this, Article 12 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh states:
Secularism and freedom of religion
12. The principle of secularism shall be realised by the elimination of -
a) communalism in all its forms;
b) the granting by the State of political status in favour of any reli-
gion;
c) the abuse of religion for political purposes;
d) any discrimination against, or persecution of, persons practicing 
a particular religion.
While the Constitution did provide the basis for creating a non-commu-
nal state in the religious sphere, it is argued that it was not a non-he-
gemonic Constitution. Article 1 Part 1 declared Bangladesh to be a uni-
tary state. Through Article 3 Part 1, Bengali was adopted as the state 
Religion National Rural Urban
Muslim 89.52 89.15 91.12
Hindu 9.58 9.86 8.37
Buddhist 0.46 0.51 0.23
Christian 0.27 0.29 0.18
Others 0.14 0.16 0.07
Table 1. Religion in Bangladesh as population percentage 
as on 2004
Source : Sample Vital Registration System 2004, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
2. Parliamentary Debates as cited by Amena Mohsin, ‘Secularism as Religious Tolerance’ in 
Guhatakhurata, Meghna and Willem van Schendel (2013) The Bangladesh Reader: 
History, Culture, Politics.  London and Durham, Duke University Press, p.  334-335.
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language and Article 6 Part 1 declared that the citizens of Bangladesh 
were to be known as Bengalis.
Article 9 defines Bengali nationalism. According to the Constitution, 
this was premised on the unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which 
derived its identity from its language and culture. Clauses in the Constitu-
tion denied recognition to the varied cultural communities in Bangladesh 
who were culturally and linguistically non-Bengali. Bangladesh is home 
to around 45 ethnic communities. Bangladesh at its birth reproduced the 
politics of majoritarianism/domination that it sought to fight during the 
Pakistan period.
One may argue that these principles in the Constitution were a logical 
outcome of the spirit of the liberation war of Bangladesh, which was pre-
mised on Bengali nationalism. However, some others maintain that through 
these clauses a nation born out of genocide and a history of democratic 
movements failed to move forward with a vision of libertarian principles 
(SAHR, 2010).
Although an Awami League-led government annulled the Vested Prop-
erty Act (VPA) and passed the Vested Property Return Act (VPRA) in 2001 
to restore property to Hindu minorities, the government amended VPRA in 
the following year. This gave the government unlimited time to return the 
vested property to its Hindu owners and instead passed control of the prop-
erty, including the right to lease it to local government employees. In 2007 
and 2008, the government did not take any measures to implement VPRA 
(US Department of State, 2009) and failed to prepare a list of properties to 
be restituted. (IDMC, 2009:9) However in later years the government has 
taken steps to safeguard the property rights of Hindu minorities. The latest 
amendment was made on 10 October 2013. 
In September 2015 Association of Land Reform and Development 
(ALRD) organised a meeting on this issue in Dhaka. Shamsul Huda, of 
ALRD in his keynote paper, spoke about the persecution of the minority 
community members as they tried to get their properties back that once 
were branded enemy properties under the enemy property act. He said 
there were thousands of cases pending before the tribunal for resolution 
under the Vested Property Return (Amendment) Act but the disposal rate 
was frustrating. Although a few people had obtained orders in their favour, 
the local deputy commissioners were, however, not applying the tribunal’s 
orders, he alleged. (ALRD, 2015)
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Religious minorities
Societal abuse and discrimination based on religious affiliations, beliefs or 
practices continue today. Occasionally clashes between religious groups 
have occurred. In all cases the minority status of the victims played a role, 
although it should be noted that religious minorities are often at the bot-
tom of the social hierarchy and, therefore, have the least political recourse. 
Hindu, Christian and Buddhist minorities experienced discrimination and 
sometimes violence at the hands of the Muslim majority; even Ahmadis were 
harassed. Fundamentalist Islamic groups have demanded that Ahmadis be 
officially declared kafirs (infidels) (Rahman, 2005).
In 2015, four prominent secular bloggers were killed with machetes. 
The four had appeared on a list of 84 ‘atheist bloggers’ drawn up by Islamic 
groups in 2013; the list had been widely circulated (BBC, 2016). Activists 
and atheist bloggers are leaving Bangladesh fearing threats to their lives 
(Daily Mail Online, 2015; The Daily Star, 2015; Times of India, 2015). Sever-
al bloggers and their publishers were hacked to death by Islamist militants 
in 2015 for promoting secularism. Ansar Al Islam, an insurgent group linked 
to al-Qaeda claimed responsibility and threatened further attacks. Although 
Sheikh Hasina promised to take action against the attacks, she also warned 
the bloggers against ‘hurting people’s religious sentiments’ (HRW, 2016).
Earlier, in 2011, 183 people belonging to religious minorities were vic-
tims of injuries, assaults, grabbing, attacks and rapes (see Table 2). The 
police was ineffective in upholding law and order and sometimes was slow 
in assisting religious minorities. This attitude promoted an atmosphere of 
impunity for acts of violence against minorities.
In 2013 there was a particularly brutal wave of attacks on Hindu hous-
es, temples and businesses. (see Table 3) In a district-wide assault, ancient 
places of worship spanning centuries were vandalised. As per the various 
investigations conducted by the Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) the attacks were 
Injured Assaulted
Grabbing Attack
Looted Rape Misc. TotalLand House Property Temple 
Attack
107 02 06 02 21 25 13 03 04 183
Table 2. Incidents of violence against religious minorities (2011)
Source: SAHR (2011: 2).
Bangladesh 
Paving the Way to Liberation
98
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
systematically conducted in order to terrorize the people and their commu-
nities. Instead of stealing goods, personal belongings such as motorcycles, 
computers, televisions and household items were broken. Windows, walls 
and fences were vandalised. The attacks were triggered by the verdict of 
the International Crimes Tribunal sentencing Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, the 
Vice President of the Jamaat-e-Islami to death on 28 February 2013 for 
crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War. There was one round 
of attacks in the spring while the second round started in the pre-election 
period during hartals (strikes) and blockades called by the opposition party 
when the government decided to hold the elections without the opposition. 
ASK maintains that the failure of the administration to bring the situation 
under control was obvious. (ASK, 2013)
There are great differences in terms of communal violence from year to 
year. In 2013, 278 houses were attacked, burnt or destroyed; while next year 
this figure went up to 761. However, in 2015 there was a significant decrease 
in the number of reported cases at 104.
Based on available numbers it is clear that there are serious human 
rights violations that need to be addressed. Local human rights organiza-
tions like ASK work hard to gather information and data that can be pre-
sented to the general public and organizations on a national and/or inter-
national level while also advocating for improvements in the human rights 
situation (GHRD, 2016).
In the recently concluded controversial elections in January 2014, 
hundreds were killed and injured in violent attacks. Before and after the 
elections, attackers also vandalized homes and shops owned by members of 
Bangladesh’s Hindu and Christian communities. (HRW, 2015)
There were reports of societal abuse, intimidation, harassment and 
discrimination, attacks on sites of worship and communal violence on ac-
count of religious affiliations, sometimes resulting in deaths, injuries, rape, 
forced displacements and alleged forced conversion to Islam. However, the 
evidence does not support the finding that in general there is a real risk of 
persecution, serious harm or other breach of fundamental human rights of 
members of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and Ahmadi minorities. There 
is a need to assess each case on individual merit. (UKHO, 2016)
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Table 3. Incidents of violence against religious 
minorities (2013-15)
Source: Global Human Rights Defence (January 2016), “A look back at the Human Rights situation in 
Bangladesh”. Retrieved from: http://ghrdblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-look-back-at-human-rights-
situation.html.
Also: * http://www.thedailystar.net/rights-situation-was-alarming-in-2013-4883.
 **http://www.thedailystar.net/state-of-human-rights-alarming-57975.
 ***http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2016/jan/02/bangladesh-human-rights- 
  situation-worsened-2015.
Type of violent incident 2013 2014 2015
Houses attacked 278 761 104
Business attacked 208 193 N/A
Temples attacked 495* 247** 213***
Indigenous communities
Relative to the total population, Bangladesh has a fairly small Adivasi or 
indigenous population. According to some estimates, more than 3 million 
Adivasis live in several districts (Sylhet, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Mymensingh, 
Rangpur, Bogra, Natore, Khulna, Tangail, Jamalpur, Sherpur, Netrokona, 
Sunamganj and three hill districts). About two third of the Adivasis live 
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which are made of the three hill districts – 
Khagrachori, Bandarban and Rangamati.
The Adivasis are mainly Buddhists (43.7 per cent), Hindus (24.1 per 
cent), Christians (13.2 per cent), and with other religions constituting 19 per 
cent. In 1991 official estimates of the population of ethnic communities in 
1991 was only 27 per cent, other estimates put the population of ethnic com-
munities to more than 45. Dr Mohammad Rafi, faculty at BRAC University 
and author of Counting the Hills: Assessing Development in Chittagong 
Hill Tracts (2001) identified 73 small ethnic groups. Philip Gain editor of 
Survival of the Fringe: Adivasis of Bangladesh (2011), estimates the number 
of ethnic groups at around 90, who live in both the plains and in hill areas. 
(as quoted in SAHR, 2011)
The authorities failed to settle indigenous people’s claims to land that 
had been seized from them during the internal armed conflict (1975-97), or 
claims of recently occupied land by increasing numbers of Bengali settlers. 
Tension between the two communities and the failure of the security forces 
to protect local indigenous people against attacks by Bengali settlers led to 
several clashes and injuries on both sides. At least 20 people were injured 
in a clash between indigenous people and Bengali settlers in Rangamati on 
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22 September 2013. Local people said security forces came to the scene but 
failed to stop the violence (Amnesty International, 2013:2).
Incidents of human rights violations including torture, killings and 
harassment of Buddhist monks, sexual violence against women and chil-
dren and the dispossession of indigenous people’s land by Bengali settlers 
and military personnel have been regularly reported in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT) region. The indigenous communities in Bangladesh are the 
most deprived of economic, social, cultural and political rights mainly due 
to their ethnic status. The major problem for all minority communities is 
land grabbing by influential people from the mainstream population. There 
are no adequate policies to protect the land of indigenous people. The tra-
ditional land rights of indigenous people are ignored. Incidents of forcible 
land grabbing by Bengali land grabbers and eviction of indigenous people 
from their ancestral land were also common in 2011 (see Table 4).
News reports highlighted that in 2011 at least 40 people belonging to 
ethnic minority groups were killed, 94 were injured, 17 abducted, 18 raped 
and 40 families had their houses destroyed. The incidents took place in 
Khagrachari, Rangamati, Dinajpur and Rajshahi. Further, Bengali settlers 
in grabbed at least 7,118 acres of land, belonging to indigenous Jumma peo-
ple in the area in 2011. Several attempts were also made by Bengali settlers 
to occupy Jumma land.
Religious persecution of indigenous people has been continuing, partic-
ularly in CHT. This includes destruction of a Buddhist temple with the aim 
of occupying the temple’s land, harassment of Buddhist monks, destruction 
of Buddha’s statues and preventing the construction and repairing of Bud-
dhist temples.
The biggest concern is rape and other violence against indigenous wom-
en and their lack of access to justice by the victims and the absolute impu-
nity that the perpetrators enjoy. In 2011, five indigenous women, three from 
CHT and two from the plains were killed after being raped while 11 indige-
nous women were raped. In addition, attempts were also made to rape eight 
indigenous women. Almost all violence against indigenous Jumma women 
in CHT was allegedly committed by Bengali settlers. One incident of at-
tempted rape was allegedly committed by security personnel. Lack of access 
to quality education is a major factor contributing to social marginalization, 
poverty and dispossession of indigenous people.
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Killed Injured Abducted Property damage Rape Total
40 94 17 40 18 209
Table 4. Incidents of violence against ethnic minorities (2011)
Source: SAHR, 2011.
Ignoring strong demands of the indigenous people and civic groups from 
the mainstream population, the present government denied the constitu-
tional recognition to the fundamental rights of indigenous people in the 15th 
amendment to the Constitution in 2011.
Even after 14 years after signing the CHT Accord, the peace accord has 
not been implemented. Except for the re-constitution of some commit-
tees and appointments to some posts, the government has not taken any 
effective measures for implementing the accord although it was a priority 
commitment of the majority party in its election manifesto. Hence, dissatis-
faction and grievances have been mounting among the Jumma people and 
permanent Bengali residents in CHT over the years. On 13 April 2010 the 
High Court affirmed the validity of the CHT Peace Accord signed between 
the government and the erstwhile Shanti Bahini in 1997, but it declared the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council Act 1998 as unconstitutional. After 
the judgment, the Additional Attorney General asked for a stay and for a 
certificate under Article 103 (2)(a) so that the government could appeal to 
the Appellate Division against the HC judgment. The court then issued a 
stay order on 15April 2010 till the problem was resolved. There was no sig-
nificant progress in this regard till December 2011. 
Above all, significant discrimination has been observed in budgetary 
allocations between the indigenous and the mainstream Bengali people. 
About 2 per cent of the country’s population is indigenous, but the alloca-
tion for them is below 0.5 per cent of the total budgetary allocations (SAHR 
2011: 4-5).
Violence against female ethnic minorities
In March 2016 the Kapaeeng Foundation, a human rights organization 
working for the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peo-
ples in Bangladesh published a report entitled: Human Rights Report 2015 
on Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh. The report stated that 85 indige-
nous women and girls fell victim to sexual and physical violence in 2015. 
(see Table 5) Among them, 44 victims were from the CHT, while 41 were 
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from the plains. A total of 69 cases of violence against indigenous women 
and girls in Bangladesh were documented in 2015. Of the 69 cases, 38 cases 
were reported from and documented in the CHT, while the remaining 31 
cases were from the plains. The victims were found to be in the age group 
between 4 to 50 years. Cases were filed with the police with regard to 46 
incidents. The data shows that 78% of the perpetrators were non-indige-
nous, while 15% of them were indigenous, and 6% of the violators could not 
be identified, while the law enforcement and security personnel accounts 
for 1%.
Most human rights violation involving the indigenous peoples in Ban-
gladesh were centered on land. The land grabbers used the heinous ploy 
to sexually and physically violate indigenous women and girls in order to 
terrorize the community to unsettle them, and thus create opportunities for 
them to occupy the lands belonged to indigenous peoples. The report stated 
that amongst the cases of violence committed against indigenous women 
and girls across the country in the recent past included not a single case of 
instance to prove that the victim secured justice. Rather in most cases, the 
perpetrator got out of bail and skipped punishment due to corruption in 
the justice system, which often tended to be bias towards the perpetrators. 
(Kapeeng Foundation, 2015).
Dalits and other oppressed caste groups
In 2011, violence and discrimination of Dalits and other oppressed caste 
communities by dominant Hindu castes and members of influential 
Muslim communities increased as compared to previous years. News sourc-
es reported that there were 20 incidents during the year, including murder, 
rape, denying access to public places (temples, restaurants, police stations, 
cremation grounds, markets and social services), physical torture, land 
grabbing, forced conversions, attacks and looting of Dalit houses and dis-
crimination in schools. Dalits are also discriminated in getting jobs. Though 
in 2012, the Office of the Prime Minister circulated a special directive for 
reservation of 80 per cent for the post of Sweepers/Cleaners for Dalits. But, 
this directive is not followed properly. Dalit communities in Bangladesh are 
resisting discrimination and violation of their rights and are gradually get-
ting united across the country. Dalit groups have also established strong 
linkages with regional and international groups working to fight against 
caste and other forms of discrimination.
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Year Number of Female Victims
2007 9
2008 4
2009 16
2010 25
2011 31
2012 75
2013 67
2014 122
2015 85
Table 5. Violence against women from ethnic minorities
Source: The Daily Star, March 24, 2016. As retrieved from:  http://www.thedailystar.net/city/ 
violence-against-ethnic-minorities-increasing-1198804
Gender and sexual minorities
Same-sex sexual behaviour is criminalized in Bangladeshi society. Lesbi-
an, gay, bisexual and transgender rights’ groups have reported continuing 
threats, particularly after homophobic public comments by Islamic leaders. 
In 2013, the cabinet issued a circular indicating legal recognition of a third 
gender, hijras, a traditional cultural identity for transgender people who, 
born male at birth, do not identify as being men. The third gender status 
came with no official definition but could ostensibly accord hijras educa-
tion, health and housing rights. However, the decree did not indicate any 
process by which legal recognition was to be conferred to this group. In De-
cember 2014, a group of 12 hijras were selected for a government employ-
ment scheme and in early 2015 they were subjected to invasive and abusive 
exams as part of the hiring process. The hijras said that they were asked 
humiliating questions about their bodies and some reported that the phy-
sicians in charge of the exams called them ‘disgusting’ and then instructed 
hospital janitors and security guards to conduct physical exams, which in-
cluded touching their genitals. Shortly after the medical exams, the hijras’ 
names were revealed in a newspaper article that declared them impostors 
because they were ‘really men’. The 12 were denied employment and they 
reported increased harassment by neighbours (HRW, 2016).
The hijra community, consisting of eunuchs, inter-sex and transgen-
der people, is much more visible than the rest of the lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender (LGBT) group. The hijras have enjoyed a rich tradition in 
South Asian culture for thousands of years. Due to cultural and religious 
beliefs, they are recognized as semi-sacred individuals who can bestow 
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fertility, prosperity and health on a newborn and his or her family. Unfor-
tunately, this status has an insidious aspect: it dehumanizes hijras by re-
moving all other aspects of their identity, leading to their being subjected 
to violence, discrimination and inequalities. They are treated as outcasts 
and are often targets of human rights violations. Many do not have access 
to a proper source of income and cannot hold mainstream jobs due to social 
stigma and lack of access to education (GHRD, 2014: 8).
Bangladesh’s LGBTs feel insecure about their gender identity and sexual 
orientation for a number of reasons, including the criminalization of same-
sex relations, persisting stigmatization and societal denial of their existence 
and the validity of such thinking. The socio-cultural and religious taboos in 
Bangladesh make LGBTs vulnerable to discrimination and violence. There 
is also lack of confidence among members of the LGBT community stem-
ming from societal pressure, as they are forced to live with a non-existent 
sexual orientation and gender identity. Most LGBTs in Bangladesh are in-
visible. In April 2016, Xulhaz Mannan - a top gay rights activist and editor 
of the country’s only LGBT magazine and his friend and co-worker at the 
magazine Tanay Mojumder were hacked to death. BBC Bengali Service ed-
itor Sabir Mustafa said that staff members of Roopbaan, a magazine and 
activist group for LGBTs that had not been condemned by the government 
and received some support from foreign embassies, had been careful in pro-
tecting their identities and had not believed that their lives were at risk. 
(BBC, 2016).
Odhikar, a human rights organization working for upholding the civil 
and political rights of the people since 1994, however, argues that the pos-
sibility of extremism affecting the country became a matter of concern as 
soon as the freedom of expression was curtailed, controlled and persecut-
ed by the government. Since 2013, bloggers and foreign citizens have been 
attacked and even killed in Bangladesh. So far, seven bloggers and online 
activists and two foreigners, one teacher and the editor of a LGBT magazine, 
have been killed. The killings were claimed by an extremist group. (Odhikar, 
2016: 5)
A Question of definitions and data
There is no universally accepted definition of minorities but one that has 
received wide circulation was provided in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, Spe-
cial Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 
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….a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in 
a non-dominant ‘….whose members – being nationals of the state – pos-
sess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those 
of the rest of the population and maintain, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion 
or language’ (OHCHR, 2010).
As this UN document the criteria for being a national of a country to 
be counted as a minority has been disputed, but the requirement to be 
non-dominant is paramount. Although the 2015 Bangladesh Constitution 
defines minorities in narrow numerical terms, for the purposes of this chap-
ter the definition provided by the Rapporteur as well as the UN are used to 
consider the country’s ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities (Hindus, 
Christians and Muslims) who are in a non-dominant position.
The data/information presented in the report are primarily derived 
from national level surveys such as the various population censuses, the 
National Living Standards Survey, the Demographic and Health Survey, the 
Labour Force Survey and the Human Development Report to get the most 
recent available data on the economic, human development and political 
status of each group (see Table 6). 
In analysing the status of different groups, the study also takes note 
of the intersectional discrimination that certain groups like Hindu Dalits 
within the larger groupings are faced with. Likewise, the analysis also seeks 
to underscore some of the challenges that Bangladesh faces in accommo-
dating the demands of the various groups in a political and social context 
that is marked by diversity and pluralism. The paper, however, focuses on 
religious minorities while analysing ethnic minorities. 
The paper also draws from available secondary sources such as the In-
ternet and published books. Newspaper reports were also scanned. Human 
rights’ activists and members of minority communities were interviewed. 
The lack of disaggregated data and explicit policies made it extremely dif-
ficult to come up with policy statements. The paper therefore is largely 
dependent on secondary sources and the personal opinions of the inter-
viewees. Efforts, however, were made to retain objectivity by constantly re-
ferring to numbers, statements and laws where available.
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Constitution and the Law
Constitutional Evolution
Nationalist zeal continued in the polity of Bangladesh after the indepen-
dence. The constitution of 1972 ensured equal rights to all citizens of the 
country. The very idea of nationalism (Bengali), socialism, secularism and 
democracy were the basic foundations of the constitution. The first Consti-
tution passed on November 4, 1972, seemed to have separated two prom-
inent institutions called politics and religion. In doing that, the leaders of 
the country did not allow communalism to grow. The concentrated effort 
to abolish: 
a) political recognition of religion by the state, 
b) exploitation of religion for political purpose and 
c) discrimination on religious ground (Article 2 of the Bangladesh Consti-
tution) were some of the significant achievements of the new state.
The very preamble of the Constitution emphasised secularism as one of 
the fundamental principles of state policy. It is obvious that Islam, or for 
that matter, any other religion, as an individual belief system was not inter-
fered with, but its political use and or abuse was barred. (Sammad, 1998) 
The very idea of secularism, as promoted in the constitution of the coun-
try, came under review of the rulers in the course of time, as one looks at 
different amendments that took place. Secularism, as one of the four funda-
mental principles stated in Article 8 of the Constitution, was amended. The 
Fifth Amendment of the constitution of 1979 was particularly significant in 
this regard as it legitimized the introduction of martial law after 1975. Under 
the rule of General Zia ur Rahman, parliament passed an amendment to the 
constitution that radically altered the position of secularism. This import-
ant change with special reference to secularism etc. was made during the 
time of the military rule of General Zia ur Rahman, founder of the Bangla-
desh Nationalist Party (BNP). With regard to the role of Islam, it was during 
this martial law period that secularism was removed from the Constitution 
as a fundamental principle. (Shahid, 2013) Right at the beginning of the 
constitution, even before the preamble, the amendment added the text “In 
the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful”. And in the preamble, the 
amendment replaced the word “secularism” with the words “absolute faith 
and trust in almighty Allah”. (Bergman, 2016) Thus, in short, religious 
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Rights Type Source Availability
Life and 
Security 
Hate motivated (mass or 
single) violence 
Qualitative research studies Available for 
minorities 
Rape/crimes against women - -
Crimes against Dalits/tribals - -
Socioeconomic 
rights  
Outcomes on education, 
health, employment, poverty, 
urbanization (poor land-
holdings, higher migration, 
etc., leading to higher pace 
of urbanization among 
religious minorities)    
- Some available for 
religious minorities 
Provisioning: budgets, 
programmes  
Govt. of Bangladesh. Some reports avail-
able for minorities 
Participation Representation in governing 
institutions by gender and 
caste
Parliament, assemblies, 
media.
Some available by 
religious minorities 
Electoral participation Available by religion 
Effective participation in 
decision making 
Parliament and assembly 
debates 
Some available for 
minorities 
Identity & 
Culture  
Implementation of freedom 
laws
Qualitative studies, media 
reports, some tracking by 
civil society 
Available for 
minorities 
Working of personal laws, 
particularly for women 
Qualitative studies and 
reports, media reports 
Available For 
minorities 
Implementation of 
safeguards for linguistic 
minorities
Available By state
Table 6. Summary survey of data on minority rights
neutrality and non-communal principles, prerequisite for any secular coun-
try, of Bangladesh constitution were abandoned through the Fifth Amend-
ment. Military ruler Zia ur Rahman was assassinated in 1981. In 1982, 
another military ruler called Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad 
Ershad came to power. It was only in 1988, Ershad-controlled parliament 
passed the Eight Amendment in an apparent attempt to declare Islam as the 
state-religion. Introduction of Section 2A to the constitution now stated: 
“The state religion of the republic is Islam, but other religions may be prac-
ticed in peace and harmony in the Republic.” (Bergman, 2013)
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Bangladesh’s constitutions and international 
standards
This section examines the sources of human rights, the rights of individuals, 
the duties of the state and the mechanisms of protection.
Life and security
Constitutional and legal provisions
‘The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of re-
ligion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Nothing in this article shall prevent 
the State from making special provision in favour of women and children 
or for the advancement of any backward section of citizen,’(Articles 28[1]& 
28[4], the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.
The Bangladesh Penal Code 1860 prescribed punishment for the follow-
ing offences against women: 
• kidnapping or abducting any woman with intent that she may be com-
pelled to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be 
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse (Section 366); 
• inducing any minor girl under the age of eighteen years to go from any 
place or to do any act with intent that such girl may be forced or seduced 
to illicit intercourse with another person (Section 366A); 
• importing into Bangladesh from any country outside Bangladesh any 
girl under the age of twenty-one years with intent that she may be forced 
or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person (Section 366B); 
• selling, letting to hire, buying or hiring any person under the age of 
(Benchmark, 30) eighteen years with intent that such person shall at 
any age be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution of illicit 
intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral purpose 
(Section. 372 and373); and committing rape (Section 376).
The Domestic Violenc (Prevention and Protection) Act 2010 was passed 
for establishing equal rights for women and children and for ensuring pro-
tection of women and children from family violence.
The Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act 2012 pre-
scribes measures to prevent trafficking of women and children. No mention 
is made of caste or Dalit women in the act.
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The Mobile Court Act 2009 gave the executive magistrate the power 
to take steps by linking Section 509 of the Bangladesh Penal Code in the 
schedule of Mobile Court Act to resist and prevent eve teasing and sexual 
harassment of girls and women.
Everyone has the right to enjoy the protection of the law and to be treat-
ed in accordance with law and only in accordance with law. In particular, 
no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any 
person shall be taken except in accordance with law (Article 31, Constitution 
of Bangladesh).
Status of implementation of rights
The formal justice system in Bangladesh is characteristically pro-rich, bu-
reaucratic and hard to access. Law enforcement agencies are also not easily 
accessible to poor and marginalized people. For example, a 12-year-old Dal-
it girl was raped and murdered on 28 June 2013 in Pirojpur Sadar district. 
The victim’s family filed a case in the local police station but the police did 
not take action against the accused. One of the suspects was arrested ten 
months after the incident; he was released on bail. No charges were filed 
against the accused for a year. Moreover, the victim’s family is under con-
tinuous threats by the accused since the perpetrators are relatives of an in-
fluential local political leader.
Farzana and Nasir (2008) conducted a study on the Dalits in Dhaka city. 
In their report, they state that almost all the respondents (52 women were 
interviewed under the study) alleged that they had not received fair judg-
ments in any salish (mediation) session. Mediators are generally from the 
dominant middle class Bengali community who, they alleged, never play an 
objective or neutral role. Dalits do not see the possibility of a fair judgment 
when the allegation is against a Bengali. This is why many Dalit victims do 
not complain against the wrongs done to them by dominant Bengali people. 
The mediators are non-Dalits and they often take bribes from the offenders 
to pronounce judgments in unfair ways.
Whilst there is a functioning criminal justice system, the effectiveness 
and conduct of the police varies. In some instances the local police and en-
forcement agencies have failed to effectively protect religious minorities 
from communal violence. Whilst legal protections for religious freedom are 
generally enforced, prosecutions are brought for violations of religious free-
dom and legal protections exist to address discrimination or persecution by 
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private individuals, authorities implemented some restrictive laws and did 
not always efficiently or effectively prosecute those who attacked religious 
minorities. Effective state protection is in general available for members of 
religious minority groups. However, decision makers must assess whether 
effective protection is available in relation to the particular circumstances 
and profile of the person. Any past persecution and past lack of effective 
protection may indicate that effective protection would not be available in 
the future for that individual in that particular locality (UKHO, 2016).
Threats to minorities
There are many instances of minorities being suppressed in Bangladesh. In-
stances of societal discrimination, harassment, intimidation and occasional 
violence against religious communities persist although many government 
and civil society leaders claim that these acts have political or economic mo-
tivations and should not be attributed wholly to religious beliefs or affilia-
tions (UKHO, 2016). Armed conflict and human rights violations including 
forced evictions and government policies discriminating against religious 
minorities have displaced tens of thousands of people in Bangladesh. The 
armed conflict in CHT in South-east Bangladesh broke out in 1973 when 
the central government rejected demands by indigenous groups for con-
stitutional protection and recognition as a separate community within the 
new state of Bangladesh (IDMC, 2009). The relocation of 400,000 Bengali 
settlers from the plains to CHT also fuelled the conflict. In 2000 at least 
60,000 indigenous people were estimated to have been internally displaced 
during the conflict, while around 60,000 fled to India. In the same year 
the government estimated that 500,000 indigenous people and settlers had 
been displaced. The conflict ended officially through a peace accord in 1997, 
but many of its causes have persisted: the accord has never been fully im-
plemented and many of the displaced remain without a durable solution. 
Bengali settlement in CHT has continued though on a smaller scale, and 
indigenous people continue to be forcibly displaced from their land due to 
evictions by authorities, or by settlers with the knowledge or direct support 
of the army (IDMC, 2009).
Religious minorities outside CHT have also been displaced as a result 
of discrimination or communal violence (IDMC, 2009). Incidents of land 
grabbing, intimidation, extortion and various kinds of illegal activities, in-
cluding attacks on members of religious minority communities and also on 
their places of worship continue. Such incidents occur because no justice 
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was given in similar incidents in the past and also due to the politicization 
of these incidents. For instance, in the early morning of 3 March 2016 un-
identified criminals vandalized an effigy of Radha-Krishna by entering the 
Dasbari Sree Sree Hari Mandir (Hindu temple) after breaking its locks in 
Titarkandi village under Maltab Upazila in Chandpur district (The Daily 
Prothom Alo, 2016). On 11 March 2016, about 50 men led by Shourav, the 
son of an Awami League-nominated UP Chairman candidate Abul Kalam 
Azad, vandalized and set fire to electoral camps of his rival candidate Nurul 
Islam Jewel in Patra village in Chakundia Union under Khalijuari Upazila 
in Netrokona district as he was contesting as a rebel candidate of the Awa-
mi League. In retaliation, supportres of Nurul Islam Jewel, who is also the 
Upazila unit Awami League’s Organizing Secretary, attacked Hindu homes 
belonging to Sotesh Sarkar, Deepak Sarkar, Debal Sarkar and Sanchalata 
Debi in Patravillage. The attackers also vandalized the Hindu temple, Kali 
Mandir (The Daily Naya Diganta, 2016; Odhikar 2016a: 14-15).
At a press conference on 22 April 2016, the Hindu-Buddha-Christian 
Oikya Parishad (The Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council) alleged that 
the human rights situation for citizens belonging to minority communities 
was deplorable. The organization stated that incidents of violence against 
minority communities had tripled in the first three months of 2016 as com-
pared to the whole of 2015 (The Daily Manabzamin, 2016). On 14 May 2016, 
the body of 70-year old Buddhist monk Dhamma Wasa was recovered from 
a monastery in Chakpara village in Baishbari Union, under Naikkhongch-
hori Upazila in Bandarban district. Criminals had stabbed him to death with 
sharp weapons (The Daily Naya Diganta, 2016). The police arrested Hlam-
ong Chak of the Chak community and two Rohingya refugees for the murder 
(The Daily Jugantor, 2016). Human rights body Odhikar which condemned 
the incident also expressed grave concern over incidents of land grabbing, 
intimidation, extortion and attacks on members of religious minority com-
munities and on their places of worship (Odhikar, 2016c: 21-22).
Structural Conditions That Impact Minority Rights
The state’s indifference towards the violence committed against minorities 
is making things worse in Bangladesh. There has been no action on newspa-
per reports published against incumbent ministers, members of Parliament, 
representatives of the people or their sidekicks; instead the victims have 
been harassed. Irrespective of the political party in power, there is visible 
inaction in all the parties on the issue of violence perpetrated against the 
minorities (Porishod Barta, 2001: 5).
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In more than 40 electoral constituencies in Bangladesh minority vot-
ers can influence the elections. It was reported that workers of a four-par-
ty right wing alliance attacked the minorities, especially Hindus to prevent 
them from casting their votes in the last general elections in 2014. The gen-
eral perception is that the minorities generally cast their votes in favour of a 
party that seems to uphold secular values.
Issues of security and peace among the minorities
In the very early years of Bangladesh’s independence, policymakers tried to 
construct a secular country. So they kept secularism as one of the four main 
pillars in the Constitution. However, the rulers changed the Constitution 
and turned its non-communal ideology into a more communal strain. As 
a result, the minorities became vulnerable. Although Bangladesh’s Consti-
tution gives every citizen equal treatment before the law and ensures their 
protection under Article 27, and the country is also party to the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which ensures freedom of religion, 
violent assaults on religious minorities are often not investigated or prose-
cuted (IRIN News, 2014).
Socioeconomic deprivations and 
the question of discrimination
Constitutional provisions and programmes
Article 29 (1 and 2) of the Constitution states that ‘there shall be equality of 
opportunity for all citizens in respect of employment or office in the service 
of the Republic. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex 
or place of birth, be ineligible for or discriminated against in respect of, any 
employment or office in the service of the Republic.’
While the Government of Bangladesh does not make specific reference 
to the situation of Dalits in its National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Re-
duction (NSAPR) 2009-2011, prepared by the Planning Commission it rec-
ognizes the pattern of discrimination against occupational groups related to 
caste systems. The strategy indicates the need to understand the situation 
of these groups and to promote targeted policies aimed at improving their 
living conditions. It also mentions the promotion of decent employment. 
It admits that the government needs to develop a comprehensive policy 
agenda for these groups but due to lack of information and segregated data 
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no specific policy measures have been taken in addressing their problems. 
(Planning Commission, 2008)
The Bangladesh government does not actively promote any scheme or 
policy aimed at ensuring equality in employment in general, nor specific 
employment schemes and programmes for the most marginalized and ex-
cluded people. NSAPR-2009-11 talks about promoting decent employment, 
but there it does not mention any arrangement for alternative occupations.
Article 15(b) of the Constitution of Bangladesh states, ‘It shall be a fun-
damental responsibility of the State to attain, through planned economic 
growth, a constant increase of productive forces and a steady improvement 
in the material and cultural standard of living of the people, with a view 
to securing to its citizens the right to work, that is the right to guaranteed 
employment at a reasonable wage having regard to the quantity and quality 
of work.’
Article 20 states, ‘Work is a right, a duty and a matter of honour for ev-
ery citizen who is capable of working and everyone shall be paid for her/ his 
work on the basis of the principle “from each according to her/his abilities, 
to each according to her/his work”. The State shall endeavour to create con-
ditions in which, as a general principle, persons shall not be able to enjoy 
unearned incomes, and in which human labour in every form, intellectual 
and physical, shall become a fuller expression of creative endeavour and of 
the human personality.’
Article 40 states, ‘Subject to any restrictions imposed by law, every cit-
izen possessing such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law in 
relation to his profession, occupation, trade or business shall have the right 
to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any law-
ful trade or business.’
Article 15(a) says, ‘It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to 
attain, through planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive 
forces and a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of 
living of the people with a view to securing to its citizens the provision of 
the basic necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education and 
medical care.’
Article 28(1): ‘The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.’
Bangladesh 
Paving the Way to Liberation
114
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
Article 42(1):‘Subject to any restrictions imposed by law, every citizen 
shall have the right to acquire, hold, transfer or otherwise dispose of proper-
ty, and no property shall be compulsorily acquired, nationalized or requisi-
tioned save by authority of law.’
The Vested Property Act 1965 (then Enemy Property Act) made own-
ership of land by Hindu minorities in the country, including Dalits, more 
complicated. It gave the government the right to administer land formerly 
known as ‘enemy property’, which was confiscated from Hindus after the 
formation of East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) in 1947. This act was 
repealed in 2001 and now the Vested Properties Return Act 2001 is in force, 
under which Hindus can seek the return of land confiscated from them by 
the government or by individuals.
Article 28 (3):‘No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, 
sex or place of birth be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or 
condition with regard to access to any place of public entertainment or re-
sort, or admission to any educational institute.’
Article 17(a):‘The State shall adopt effective measures for the purpose 
of establishing a uniform, mass-oriented and universal system of education 
and extending free and compulsory education to all children to such stage as 
may be determined by law.’
Article 17:‘The State shall adopt effective measures for the purpose of 
establishing a uniform, mass-oriented and universal system of education 
and extending free and compulsory education to all children to such stage 
as may be determined by law; developing education that is consistent with 
the needs of society and to create a citizenry, educated and motivated to 
fulfill those needs; and eliminating illiteracy within a timetable determined 
by law.’
Status of implementation of rights
In Bangladesh there has never been any law that specifically refers to ‘caste 
based discrimination’ or to ‘caste segregation’ in employment. Caste affect-
ed communities in Bangladesh have been going through a serious transition 
in recent years as they neither have guaranteed scope for work in relation 
to their ‘customary’ occupations, nor are they able to access the formal la-
bour market. On the one hand, since traditional caste-based occupations are 
mostly informal in nature, they do not receive the benefits of existing laws 
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and acts formulated with regard to formal jobs. On the other hand, they 
are not treated as fully ‘formal’ employees even when they are employed as 
sweepers and cleaners in city/ municipal corporations or other autonomous 
bodies. In most cases they do not have any collective association or union to 
negotiate their rights and claims. They are also not aware of their legal en-
titlements. Employers take advantage of Dalits’ ignorance and disorganiza-
tion and exploit them with low wages or no wages. The workplace environ-
ment and occupational safety related problems cause immense suffering for 
Dalit workers in diverse, yet unacknowledged, ways. For instance, Dalit tea 
garden workers are deprived of work entitlements that different laws have 
given them from time to time. They are subject to both direct and indirect 
deprivations, and continue to work in poor working and living conditions. 
Despite efforts on the part of human rights activists and campaigners, man-
ual scavenging is yet to be legally stopped. Other unhealthy working condi-
tions continue to persist despite Bangladesh being a signatory to relevant 
international conventions.
Poverty
Generally, the dwellings of Hindu and Muslim Dalits in Bangladesh are seg-
regated and there are instances of discrimination when trying to rent rooms 
or houses outside these exclusive areas. In rural areas Dalit communities 
live in groups in paras or colonies that are remote and secluded from main-
stream communities. In urban areas Dalits usually live in so called ‘colonies’ 
which are slum-like tenancies without adequate provision of water, electric-
ity or sanitation. In such colonies, 8 to 12 family members belonging to three 
generations live together in one tiny room without any regard to hygiene or 
sanitation issues.
Discrimination also surfaces while Dalits try to access special ponds or 
lakes in villages. Another acute problem that Dalits across the country face 
is that they live with ‘food insecurity’. Both Hindu and Muslim Dalits report 
discrimination to different degrees from non-Dalits while sharing food/tea 
in the same plates/cups/utensils with them. Since these groups are seen as 
‘dirty’, the perception also is that their touch also makes things ‘dirty’ and as 
a result, they need to wash whatever they use to make it ‘pure’.
Education
Minorities within a modern state are constantly subject to attempts by 
the state machinery to homogenize the population via language, culture 
and education. This not only reduces, distorts and thereby marginalizes 
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minority communities but it also creates the ‘other’, the subjugated subor-
dinate minority. In this endeavour, culture, language and education come to 
play hegemonic roles.
During the Pakistan period Islamiyat or religious education was made 
a compulsory subject in the primary and middle stages (Classes6 to 8). Af-
ter independence the Education Ministry continued with the same policy. 
The Mujib government, however, set up an Education Commission in 1972, 
which submitted its interim report in May 1973. The commission recom-
mended the separation of religion from education. Public opinion on the 
subject was sought through questionnaires. The answers showed that sec-
ular education was acceptable to about 21 per cent of the most educated 
section of Bangladesh, while 74.69 per cent said that religious education 
should be an integral part of general education. The commission’s recom-
mendations could not be implemented. 
Following Mujib’s assassination, education acquired an overt Islamic 
orientation. Islamiyat was introduced in Classes 1 to 8 as a compulsory pa-
per for Muslim students only and in Classes 9 and 10 as an elective subject. 
Apart from Islamiyat, children from other religious communities were given 
the right to be taught their own religion. However, some of them alleged 
that many government-employed religious teachers for minority religious 
groups were neither members of the religion they taught nor qualified to 
teach it. The government also introduced an Imam (Muslim religious teach-
er) Training programme in 1979. Zia emphasized the need for religious 
education when he said: ‘... A Muslim has to live his/her personal, social, 
economic and international life in accordance with Islam from childhood to 
death’ (Talukdar, 1990: 70).
The regime of H.M. Ershad (Army Chief of Staff who assumed power 
in a bloodless coup in 1982) furthered this process. In 1983 he wanted to 
introduce Arabic as a compulsory subject but failed due to opposition from 
students and political parties. He, however, succeeded in encouraging ma-
drassa (Islamic school) education and put it on par with the corresponding 
level of general education. Today, there are an estimated 64,000 madras-
sas in Bangladesh, divided into two categories: The Aliya madrassas are 
run with government support and control. The Government of Bangladesh 
pays 80 per cent of the salaries of their teachers and administrators as well 
as a considerable portion of their development expenditure. The 2000–
01 budget, for example, allocated taka 4.91 billion for salary support to 
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non-government madrassas. The government also allocated considerable 
funds for the construction of 1,741 new madrassas in the private sector. 
Successive governments have encouraged the growth of madrassa ed-
ucation in the country. Over the last two decades, revenue expenditure per 
madrassa student was much more than for the students in secondary high 
schools. The number of madrassas in Bangladesh is increasing at a fast 
pace and so is the number of students. According to government published 
sources Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics 
(BANBEIS), during 1980-2000, the number of registered junior and high 
madrassas increased by 271 per cent compared to a 185 per cent growth 
in secondary schools. During the same period, the number of students in 
junior and high madrassas increased by 818 per cent compared to an only 
317 per cent growth in secondary school students. Today, 30 per cent of all 
secondary level students are from madrassas and they are catching up fast. 
These statistics do not include thousands of unregistered Qawmi 
madrassas all over the country.
Aliya students study for 15-16 years and are taught Arabic, religious the-
ory and other Islamic subjects as well as English, mathematics, science and 
history. They prepare themselves for employment in government service, 
or for jobs in the private sector like any other college or university student. 
‘A recent survey found that 32 per cent of Bangladesh university teachers 
in the humanities and social sciences were graduates of Aliya madrassas.’ 
However, the Qawmi madrassas remain outside the purview of the Bangla-
desh Madrassa Education Board (Ahmad). There are three basic character-
istics of Qawmi madrassas: 
1. They follow the dars-I Nizami system or a modified version of it, 
2. They use a subject-based system rather than a grade-based system and 
therefore there is no clear ‘time-sequence’ attached to the education, 
and 
3. Since Qawmi madrassas are privately owned, there is a tendency to de-
pend on local charity, commercial ventures, the Bangladeshi diaspora 
and Muslim foundations based in the Middle East for funding. 
The impact of these characteristics is critical as the students of Qawmi 
madrassas end up acquiring an education with a minimum level of quality 
and almost zero prospects in the job market.
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While singling out the madrassas would be as wrong as putting the 
blame on unemployed Muslims for terrorism, it should be noted that edu-
cation in Bangladesh (in madrassas), particularly for Muslims has become 
a breeding ground for Islamic militancy and fundamentalism. Students 
coming from all shades of education - modern secular, Aliya madrassas or 
Qawmi madrassas- have fallen prey to fundamentalist ideologies and some 
are involved in violent activities, possibly with some difference in the num-
ber and degree of participation. But that ‘Islamic’ militancy in Bangladesh 
is informed by a precise, if not distorted, understanding of Islam remains 
apparent from the targets of bomb attacks. These targets include religious 
shrines, public gatherings mainly for entertainment and non-Sunni Ahmad-
is. One cannot also rule out the Wahabi connection in reproducing militan-
cy in Bangladesh. One report indicates that some of the Islamic militant 
groups aided by Indian, Pakistani and Afghan Muslims, also received funds 
from the Middle East including Saudi Arabia, to carry out their activities. 
This provides a direct linkage between the Wahabization of Bangladesh and 
the concurrent reproduction of intolerance.
Higher educational institutions do not have separate departments cater-
ing to the religions of minority communities but in the University of Dhaka 
subjects like Islamic Studies & History of Islam are taught. 
The other area of bias in education is the curriculum. For instance, the 
Department of World Religions in Dhaka University has a course on History 
of Islam whereas the histories of other religions are not included. Similarly, 
if we see the number of students and teachers of religious minorities in the 
top universities in Bangladesh, the scenario is quite pitiable (see Table 7).
Recently Education Minister Nurul Islam Nahid said that the govern-
ment would formulate the National Education Policy (NEP) based on the 
Qudrat-e-Khuda Education Commission’s report of 1974 so that a secular 
and science-based education system can be introduced; the report of the 
Qudrat-e-Khuda Commission will be slightly modified to make the poli-
cy appropriate for the country’s existing education system. In view of an 
increase in religio-centred militancy and the allegations that these insti-
tutions are associated with it the government constituted a committee to 
recommend reforms in their curricula so as to make it job-oriented and also 
to monitor their activities. [SAHR, 2010: Page 26, paragraph 1) The Qudrat-
e-Khuda Education Commission was formed in 1972 and was headed by 
leading educationist and scientist Dr Qudrat-e-Khuda. The commission 
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University Non-Muslim 
Students
Total 
students
Non-Muslim 
Teachers
Total 
Teachers
Dhaka University 2,498 50,713 76
(Arts faculty total-45, 
Science faculty-8, 
Law faculty-1, 
Business faculty-110, 
Social science 
faculty-5, Bio- 
science faculty-9)
1,245
(Arts faculty total-326, 
Science faculty-161, Law 
faculty-37, Business fac-
ulty-174, Social science 
faculty-269, Bio-science 
faculty-278)
Jahangirnagar 
University
722
(Hindu-673, 
Buddhist- 32
Christian-17)
- 28
(Hindu-26, Christian 
-2)
(Arts & Humanities-4, 
Mathematics & 
Physical Science-16, 
Social Science-5, 
Biological Science-3)
472
Bangladesh Univer-
sity of Engineering 
and Technology 
(BUET)
- - 34 429
Table 7. Number of non-Muslim teachers and students 
in higher studies
submitted its report to the then Sheikh Mujib government in May 1974. The 
commission suggested some major changes in the primary, secondary and 
higher secondary education levels.
There has been only one Hindu Vice Chancellor in the history of Ban-
gladesh.3 Apart from the Vice Chancellor, the government also appoints the 
Pro-Vice Chancellor of a university. Not a single Hindu has been appointed 
to this position although there are many distinguished Hindu academics. 
However, the present AL government has appointed Professor Pran Gopal, 
a member of the Hindu community, as a Vice Chancellor of Bangaband-
hu Sheikh Mujib Medical University (BSSMU). There are allegations of 
3. Based on interviews of medical college students.  These interviews were done over a num-
ber of years, beginning in early 2000 till 2007 as part of the author’s research on politics.  
Students alleged that they were asked odd questions about their religion in viva boards.  
Authorities however refuted the allegations and suggested that there were channels to 
complain but the students felt that the teachers were very powerful and there was no point 
in complaining as they do not expect any justice.
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discrimination in awarding scholarships and enrolments against Hindus 
in medical institutions. In a survey carried out in December 2008 among 
1,400 members of the Hindu community on discrimination in academic in-
stitutions on account of their religious identities, 37.2 per cent answered in 
the affirmative while 33.8 per cent said that at times they had felt discrimi-
nation. (SAHR, 2010: page 26)
Employment
It has been observed earlier that a system of silent discrimination is 
prevalent in the service sector. A major reason for this is the lack of in-
ter-community trust, which again is not only a consequence of historical 
factors but also of the twists and turns of state politics. A survey carried out 
among 1,447 members of the Hindu community in December 2008 found 
that 75 per cent of the participants were not confident about undertaking 
large investments in the country; 48.6 per cent responded that they faced 
problems in their businesses because of their minority status. More alarm-
ingly, 45.2 per cent said that because of their religious identity they faced 
problems in procuring loans for business purposes on a regular basis and 
31.2 per cent said that they faced this problem occasionally.
Insecurity among religious minorities prevents them from undertaking 
investment ventures. Investments are confined to the majority communi-
ty. This hinders upward economic mobility of religious minorities; conse-
quently, they remain marginalized and dependent. Difficulties in getting 
loans just on the basis of one’s religious identity makes mockery of the con-
cept of democracy and the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitu-
tion (SAHR, 2010: page 27).
Right to Land and Property
The Home Ministry issued a circular to banks during the Bangladesh Na-
tionalist Party (BNP) regime in the early 1990s cautioning them against 
providing loans to Hindus on the ground that they might leave the coun-
try and settle in India after acquiring the loans. The Hindu community has 
been denied the right to property, which is a fundamental right guaranteed 
in the Constitution. This is the most significant source of their discrimina-
tion and insecurity in Bangladesh. Pakistan had formulated some specif-
ic laws that marginalized the Hindus in a systemic way and was a major 
source of their insecurity. Ironically these laws were later inherited and re-
tained by Bangladesh. Consequently, the Hindu community in Bangladesh 
feels economically and politically marginalized.
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Profile of a vulnerable minority:  
Tea estate workers         
One of the few industries that Bangladesh as a country can be proud 
of is her tea industry. The Bangladesh tea industry contributes 2 per 
cent to the world’s tea production and accounts for around 3 per 
cent of the world’s tea exports (Sabur et al., 2000). A significant sec-
tion of about 4 lakh people live on the plantations in Bangladesh. 
This sector accounts for nearly 3.3 per cent of the total industrial 
employment in the country. In 2012, Bangladesh recorded its high-
est production of tea at 63.85 million kilograms. But the pathetic 
conditions of the workers in the Bangladesh tea industry continue 
to be a point of discussion among civil society, tea workers’ unions 
and academicians. 
Historical background
Tea, as a cash crop and subsequently as an industry, became part 
of today’s Bangladesh during the time of the colonial government. 
Work on a tea plantation was arduous and needed manual labour. 
However, a majority of the colonial Bengal’s labour force was en-
gaged in agriculture. To meet the new demand of tea plantations the 
colonial British government deployed indentured immigrants. Tea 
plantation workers were brought primarily from the backward and 
tribal areas of central India and the states of Bengal, Bihar, Odisha 
and Madhya Pradesh. The current workforce in the tea plantation 
industry in Bangladesh is the fourth generation of those tribal and 
Dalit immigrants. Unfortunately, the workers on these tea estates 
continue to be treated much like slaves. Dhaka Tribune (2014) ob-
served the following: 
These people are basically trapped into the social stigma which they in-
herited from their ancestors and living an inhumane life which is no less 
than an animal. Even their basic necessities are not properly ensured 
although they are living within the territory of Bangladesh. Very sadly, 
these poor people lack their basic rights. 
The social discrimination between the officers and managers on the 
one hand and the workers on the other appears to be suggestive of 
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A separate act was passed to vest property with the government under 
the Enemy Property Act. Known as the Vested Property Act (VPA), this is 
the main cause of economic marginalization of the Hindu community. It 
has its origins in a number of laws and by-laws promulgated by Pakistani 
authorities. These originated in the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of 
Property Act (Act XIII of 1948). After independence in 1947 the then pro-
vincial government was faced with an abrupt and acute problem of accom-
modation for the numerous government offices and public servants. Under 
these circumstances the act was passed for a period of three years and gave 
the government the power to acquire either on a temporary or a permanent 
basis any property that it considered needful for the administration of the 
state (Barkat and Shafiquzzaman, 1997; Nahar, 1994).
Hindu members of the East Bengal Assembly opposed the bill on the 
grounds that it would make the properties of the Hindu community more 
prone to acquisition. Their apprehensions turned out to be true. The pro-
ceedings of the East Bengal Assembly of 1951 show, that the VPA was widely 
used against religious minorities.
VPA has been one of the major sources of economic insecurity for Hin-
dus. Due to the joint ownership property concept of the Hindus many of 
them have been dispossessed of their property; the Hindus regarded it as a 
‘Black’ law, which not only marginalized them economically, but also turned 
them into second-class citizens. It was considered a major cause of their 
migration. The estimated size of such migration during 1964-91 was 5.3 mil-
lion, or 538 persons each day with as high as 703 persons per day during 
1964-71.
It has been alleged that VPA discouraged the minority community from 
acquiring new land and it was also compelled to sell off property at cheap 
prices. The procedure of declaring minority-owned land as enemy or aban-
doned property was also carried out through fraudulent practices. Govern-
ment documents also substantiate these allegations. According to one es-
timate one million acres of land belonging to the minority community out 
of a total arable land of 21 million was transferred from minority owners to 
dominant sections of society. A study has estimated the violations of Hindu 
property rights due to the Vested Property Act as:
• Approximately a million Hindu households (40 per cent) were deprived 
of over 1.64 million acres of landed property, which is 53 per cent of the 
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the larger question of power and rights. Francis Rolt, a British writ-
ing in 1991, commented ‘the tea gardens are managed as an extreme 
hierarchy: the managers live like gods, distant, unapproachable, and 
incomprehensible. Some even begin to believe that they are gods, 
that they can do exactly what they like.’ In another vivid description, 
British human rights activist Dan Jones observed in 1986 that the 
‘Managers have anything up to a dozen laborers as their personal, 
domestic servants. They are made to tie the managers shoe lace, to 
remind them that they are under managerial control and that they 
are bound to do whatever they are asked’ (The Daily Star, 2009). 
 There are a little more than 163 tea estates in Bangladesh. Interest-
ingly, because of its geographical position, the north-eastern region 
of the country is home to a majority of the tea estates. Tea planta-
tions in Bangladesh are concentrated in the hilly zones that include 
places like Sylhet, Maulovibazar, Habiganj, Brahmanbaria and Chit-
tagong. Like other third world countries, the tea estates in Bangla-
desh are owned by a host of both foreign and local companies. All the 
163 tea estates are managed by different companies including Ster-
ling Companies, the National Tea Company, Bangladesh Tea Board, 
Bangladeshi Private Limited Companies, Bangladeshi Proprietors, 
James Finlay, Duncan Brothers, Deundi Tea Company and the New 
Sylhet Tea Estate. While four Sterling companies own 27 estates (a 
little more than 20 per cent of the gardens), Bangladeshi companies 
and individual entrepreneurs own the rest of the tea gardens.  
It is unfortunate that tea plantation workers have a life of hard la-
bour and most of the time their labour does not bring them a life of 
satisfaction and comfort. Illiterate and unaware of their rights, the 
workers suffer for generations. Poor housing conditions, abysmally 
low wages, strikingly long working hours and social discrimination 
deprive them of many basic human needs and rights (Newage, 2014). 
A recent study shows that the average monthly income of a worker 
in the tea industry in Sylhet was around 1,340 takas (Ahmad et al., 
2015). This amount is not sufficient for a worker’s family to live a 
decent life in contemporary Bangladesh. Another report shows that 
it was only in 2008 that the wage was increased to 69 takas from 30 
takas. After that in 2014, tea garden workers in Sylhet district called 
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land owned by Hindu households. This included 81.7 per cent agricul-
tural land, 10 per cent homestead land, 1.74 per cent garden land, 2.4 per 
cent ponds, 0.68 per cent fallow land and the rest was 3.4 per cent.
• About 60 per cent of the total incidents of dispossession and 75 per cent 
of the total land lost took place between 1965 and 1971. The intensity of 
dispossession increased after the military takeover in 1975.
• In 56 per cent of the affected families, at least one of the successors had 
either died or migrated.
• None of those who had appropriated property at that time belonged to 
the poorer class.
• Approximately 44 per cent of the persons who had appropriated prop-
erty of the minority community belonged to the Muslim League, 20 per 
cent to BNP, 17 per cent to the AL, 5 per cent to the Jatiyo Party and 1 per 
cent to JeI. In 1995, 72 and 11 per cent of those who appropriated Hindu 
property belonged to BNP and AL respectively; while in 1997 an equal 
number (44 per cent each) from AL and right wing parties were involved 
in appropriating Hindu property.
In this respect the collusion of interests (though otherwise totally absent 
on core national issues) between the political parties – and more specifically 
the two major ones – is remarkable.
ASK’s 2007 Human Rights report states that in 2006 Muslim individu-
als seized 54 Hindu-owned land pockets and there were 43 attacks on Hindu 
temples by Muslims. VPA’s implicit presumption that Hindus do not really 
belong in Bangladesh contributes to the perception that Hindu-owned prop-
erty can be seized with impunity. By using this act, interest groups from the 
political party in power and others continue to confiscate properties belong-
ing to the minority Hindu community, and often do so with the complicity 
of the authorities and influential persons. VPA represents a major source 
of insecurity for Hindus and is a source of violation of their human rights.
In a move to resolve the issue of land loss, in 2008 the government 
drafted a new law ‘Vested Property Examination and Resolution Amend-
ment Bill’. Subsequently, an amendment was made to it in 2013. Since most 
vesting is with the active collusion of the Upazila and other land offices, the 
officials concerned need proper orientation to deal with the issue.
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for a four-month strike demanding a hike in minimum wages which 
government agencies and private players (owners of the tea gar-
dens), did not agree to. Instead, the authorities and the management 
showed complete apathy towards the workers. In the absence of any 
government support or intervention to help increase the minimum 
wages it is surprising that the owners wanted increased productivi-
ty from the labour. Thus, 45-year-old tea worker Fazr Ali lamented: 
‘How can the owners and management increase production without 
improve the lives of the workers?’ Dissatisfaction over the issue of 
wages was extensive in the labour lines in tea producing districts in 
Bangladesh. On another occasion, 43-year-old Annoda Baraik of Ka-
lagool tea garden commented: ‘How can we survive with a daily wage 
of Taka 69 at a time of inflation?’ 
The struggle, led by different tea workers’ unions, has come under 
tremendous state repression. Workers and officials of the Burjan Tea 
Estates referred to 20 such cases which were filed against protesting 
leaders of Sylhet’s Bangladesh Trade Union Sangha in an attempt to 
launch a blatant assault on the movement (Newage, 2014). 
Ray of hope
However, in the middle of these depressing stories, there are reasons 
to be hopeful. The continuous struggle of the workers had paid off, 
as the daily wages of the tea estate workers were increased in 2015 
from taka 69 to taka 85. Although far from adequate to maintain a 
decent life, but the increase is a positive development. Now several 
thousand tea workers in Maulovibazar are engaged in another move-
ment to demand the realization of increased payments (The Daily 
Star, 2016).  
Illiteracy and poverty seem to go hand in hand in the labour lines 
on tea estates. The workers are illiterate and this has been the case 
for generations. One of the reasons for this is the lack of well-main-
tained schools in the area. Further, the impoverished conditions 
of the workers make life for their children even more difficult. As a 
consequence, workers’ children start earning early. In the end, it is 
seen that the children of tea plantation workers become the same 
as their parents. Any state sponsored effort to promote vocational 
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Effective participation
Status of implementation of rights
Public Representation of Minorities
For the purpose of this chapter the public domain is inclusive not only of 
the legislature but also the government administrative sector. These are do-
mains of major exclusions and inclusions. It is important to note that policy 
guidelines may not be reflective of the actual situation. It is well-known that 
policies are often couched in the most equitable terms; what is critical is ex-
amining the system and the politics of the system to see if these provide the 
space for the stated policies to be translated into practice. 
The Bangladesh Constitution provides equal rights to all citizens irre-
spective of religion, sex, caste or place of birth. But the system itself allows 
for inequities to creep in. For instance, the institution of majoritarian de-
mocracy does not leave much voice for the religious minorities in the na-
tional Parliament, the emblem of people’s power and representation. It is 
understandable that within the present parameters of the Bangladesh elec-
toral system and the state of polarized politics, in the absence of any affir-
mative action there is hardly any scope for a meaningful representation of 
the minorities in Parliament. The Parliament is a 300-member body. To en-
sure women’s representation in Parliament the 1972 Constitution reserved 
15 seats for ten years to be nominated by elected members of Parliament. In 
the second Parliament in 1979 the reserved seats for women was increased 
from 15 to 30. This provision expired in 1991. Later the number of reserved 
seats for women was increased to 45 (see Table 8).
Among the women nominated members in 1973 there was only one 
woman from the minorities nominated by AL; in 1986 one minority wom-
an member was nominated by the Jatiyo Party; in1991 the BNP nominated 
one minority woman; in 1996 AL nominated two minority women while the 
BNP nominated one; in 2008 AL nominated one minority woman. These 
numbers are dismal even within the nominated category, which itself is a 
minority category and the provision is there as affirmative action. Securi-
ty and equality of minority communities does not depend only on the ma-
jority community’s goodwill and safeguards ensured in the Constitution. 
Adequate representation of minority communities with their voices being 
effectively heard in the highest law making body of the country is one of the 
critical paths for confidence building among religious communities.
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training for the children of labour lines is unknown. In the absence of 
any such facility, the children grow up knowing only one trade which 
is related to tea gardens and includes skills like weeding, cleaning, 
plucking, pruning and processing in a tea factory. 
Ahmad et al.’s (2015) study on tea estate workers shows that most of 
the respondents were illiterate. Commenting on the lack of educa-
tional facilities, one respondent said: ‘We are here for working and 
not for education, the authority was against educating us.’ However, 
there is lack of educational facilities but not the complete absence of 
educational institutions. In fact, small sections of the people living 
in the labour lines have recently shown an interest in sending their 
children to nearby schools, the study indicates. But their educational 
status is abysmally low as most of the people do not study beyond 
class five and dropout rates continue to be a problem that the state 
and civil society are yet to address. 
As a tea worker a Bangladeshi citizen is ideally free to live anywhere 
in the country. But it is unfortunate that many of the tea workers 
are yet to come out of the tea gardens. Invisible social and econom-
ic chains tie them with the tea gardens/industry. Lack of any oth-
er skills might be a cause for their captive conditions within the tea 
industry. They face great difficulties in exploring livelihood options 
outside tea gardens. They also have limited scope to integrate with 
the people of the majority/other communities.
Poor housing
The wretched housing conditions in the labour line are a serious 
problem; they are also a source of many diseases among the workers. 
A study by Mahfuzul Haque (2013) found that the workers lived in 
dilapidated conditions: ‘Houses are without repair for months. Big 
holes in the sun grass roof made their lives miserable during the 
monsoon.’ It is the responsibility of a garden’s authorities to provide 
housing for the workers in the labour line. However, many perma-
nent workers do not have housing. In some cases, they live under the 
same roof with domestic cattle. While describing the living condi-
tions in labour lines, one of the workers said: ‘We live in place worse 
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Year of election Total Members in 
the Parliament
Minority members Remarks
1st Parliament, 1973 300 +15 12 (3.8 per cent)
2nd Parliament, 1979 300 +30 8 (2.48 per cent)
3rd Parliament, 1986 300 +30 7 (2.18 per cent)
4th Parliament, 1988 300 +30 4 (1.28 per cent)
5th Parliament, 1991 300 +30 11 (3.38 per cent)
6th Parliament, 1996 
(15th February)
300 +30 In this election no major 
political party except the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
participated
7th Parliament, 1996 300 +30 14 (4.28 per cent)
8th Parliament, 2001 300 8 (2.67 per cent)
9th Parliament, 2008 300+45 14 (4.67 per cent) All (Hindus) were elected 
from the AL
Table 8. Elected Religious Minority Representatives 
in Parliament
Source: http://www.ecs.gov.bdenglish/elec_par.php.
Minority representation in the various cabinets also echoes this. Here 
1991 is taken as the baseline as Bangladesh has been holding parliamentary 
elections on a regular basis since then. In the 1991 cabinet formed by BNP, 
out of a 48-member cabinet only one member was from the minority com-
munity. In 1996 the AL regime had three minority members out of a cabinet 
of 51; in 2001 BNP had two minority members in a cabinet of 63.The 2009 
AL cabinet of 35 members had three members from minority communities.
In the government service sector the situation is equally bad. Allegedly 
silent discrimination prevails there. Lock-offs start at the entry levels. Mi-
norities complain that after passing civil service written examinations they 
are often dropped from consideration once their religious identity becomes 
known. The 24th Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) Examination, 2005 is a 
good instance of this. BCS examinations are the entry point for individuals 
seeking government jobs. This is the executive body of the state. Selection 
boards for government services often lack minority representation. It has 
been alleged that non-Muslim candidates face uncomfortable questions 
and rude behaviour from board members of the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) in the viva voce. It has also been alleged that candidates who belong to 
the ‘H Group’ (Hindus) often hear remarks that they will ultimately settle in 
India so there was no point in selecting them. These remarks question their 
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than that of the officers’ pets (at the estates). Many of us have only 
a thin jute mattress to sleep on’ (Rasheeka, 2009). The tea workers 
do not have even basic sanitation facilities in their houses. A larger 
section of them go to the field for defecation.   
No medical facilities
Tea plantation workers living on the margins of the social and eco-
nomic hierarchy also do not receive proper medical treatment. No 
proper medical facilities exist in most of the gardens. In some gar-
dens there are only paramedics. Women workers, who constitute 
around half the workforce are the worst affected. They enjoy mater-
nity leave but the clinics lack proper facilities for deliveries. There 
are no scientific and modern delivery systems in many of the tea 
gardens. The workers also suffer from endemic dysentery, diarrhoea 
and hookworms, diseases caused by polluted water. Tuberculosis, 
leprosy and malaria are also common among tea plantation workers. 
Many newspaper articles have pointed out the issue of alcoholism, 
particularly among men. A locally brewed drink known as haria is 
often consumed by both adult and young workers, who are oblivious 
of its adverse effects on their health. 
Hand pumps are the most common source of water supply in tea 
gardens. Generally, on average there is one hand pump for four to 
five families (Ahmad et al., 2013), which is a much higher ratio com-
pared to the norms followed by the water supply programmes of the 
Government of Bangladesh. Further, the tea gardens mostly have 
shallow hand pumps. A study by Ahmad et al. (2015) showed that 
the tea workers were not aware of the need of using safe water. In 
another study, Haque (2013) saw a few tube wells some of which had 
been out of order for months. In such a situation, the workers were 
compelled to fetch water from the nearby chhara (canals), which is a 
source of water-borne diseases like dysentery, diarrhoea and worms. 
A section of the scholars also report on the poor implementation of 
the Labour Act 2006, which contains special provisions for tea estate 
workers.  Thus, lack of initiatives by the government and tea gar-
den authorities for dealing with basic social issues related to decent 
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Table 9. Representation of religious minorities in the 27th Bangladesh 
Civil Services Examinations
personal integrity and sense of patriotism. More importantly they demon-
strate the identity and form that the state is acquiring. According to a recent 
study the number of non-Muslim appointments (Hindus, Buddhists and 
Christians) in different public services was about 3,197 (10.45 per cent in-
cluding 5 per cent tribal quota) (SAHR, 2010: page 17).
In the 27th BCS in 2008, out of the general cadre of 940, 68 individ-
uals from religious minorities were selected (65 Hindus and three Bud-
dhists); and in the health cadre out of 1,477, 90 members from religious 
communities were selected (81 Hindus, three Christians and six Buddhists) 
(see Table 9).
Other allegations include not giving assignments considered to be sen-
sitive from a security point of view to those from minority communities. 
In the Foreign Service, there were only two members from the minority 
community who are now stationed in the Dhaka Headquarters. In the Ban-
gladesh Army, there are a few non-Muslim commissioned officers, three 
of whom are of the rank of Major Generals: two Hindus and one Chakma. 
There are two to three Brigadier Generals in the Army Medical Corps and 
Army Education Corps. The Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, a para-military force 
formed by AL in the early 1970s and later disbanded after 1975 had a sub-
stantial number of soldiers from the Hindu community. They were later 
merged with the different units of the Bangladesh Army. It may be men-
tioned that the passing out oaths taken by the officers and soldiers are read 
out according to the religious scriptures of the individual concerned. In the 
absence of disaggregated data and extreme sensitivity of the issue it was 
not possible to collect information about their location and size within the 
armed forces.
In the public sector, one notable exception is the government-owned 
Bangladesh Bank, which employed approximately 10 per cent non-Muslims 
General cadre Health cadre
Hindu candidates 6.91% 5.48%
Buddhist candidates 0.32% 0.41%
Christian candidates - 0.20%
Candidates from religious minorities 7.23% 6.09%
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health facilities on tea estates, minimum educational opportunities 
and poor liveable housing conditions, have meant that millions of tea 
estate workers continue to suffer. Philip Gain, the Director of Society 
for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), commented: 
The key questions to ponder: How longer will the tea communities stay 
confined to the labour lines? Will they continue to live as people without 
choice and entitlement to a land they have tilled for four generations? 
The employers probably want the status quo maintained for a steady 
supply of cheap labourers. But the tea communities, little more con-
scious now than before, want justice done to them. They want strategic 
services from the State and NGOs in the areas of education, nutrition 
and health, food security, water and sanitation, etc. They also want to 
see their languages, culture, and social identity protected (The Daily 
 Star, 2009). 
What is even more alarming is that the Bangladesh government, 
in its run-up to a typical post-colonial developmental agenda, is 
planning to set up a special economic zone (SEZ) on the rice farm 
of Habiganj tea estates. This land is important for the workers of 
the tea estate. One of the workers reported (The Daily Star, 2015): 
‘Our wage is so low that the food we get from the land helps us sur-
vive.’ Ramesh Rajbanshi continued: ‘If it is taken from us, we have 
nothing.’ As a result of the proposed SEZ, about 16,000 tea work-
ers on three tea estates in Habiganj face an uncertain future. De-
cember 2015 saw some spontaneous movement among the workers 
demanding the rolling back of the SEZ. The workers protested by 
chanting slogans like ‘Amar Mati Amar Ma, Kerey Nitey Dibona’ 
(My land, my mother, we shall not let them snatch it away) (The Dai-
ly Star, 2015). Habiganj district authorities have already taken over 
about 512 acres in the Chandpur tea garden, thus delivering another 
blow to the workers. Thus, instead of saving the lives and security of 
tea garden workers, the state is promoting development that entails 
large-scale violence with displacement of the most deprived commu-
nities as its natural outcome.
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in its upper ranks. Employees are not required to disclose their religion, 
but this can generally can be determined by a person’s name (SAHR, 2010: 
pages 15-18).
Electoral procedure and election-centred violence
The electoral system which was supposed to pave the way for a representa-
tive system where individuals irrespective of their ethnic or religious identi-
ties could exercise their rights as active citizens has ironically turned into a 
source of persecution of religious minorities. Democracy, a much laudable 
ideal and principle has in effect turned into an instrument of oppression of 
the minorities. Based on the principle of majority rule, politics has turned 
into a game of numbers. Individuals and communities instead of being 
viewed as human beings are looked upon as ‘vote banks’ by political parties. 
Violence is inflicted upon them by political parties and their supporters in 
a bid to either ‘win’ over the ‘vote banks’ or stop them from exercising their 
voting rights through coercion and violence. 
It has been argued that political behaviour and community size are high-
ly significant in election results. In a first-past-the post British style parlia-
mentary system, 30-35 per cent of the votes are enough to win a seat in a 
multi-cornered contest and 40 per cent votes can easily translate into 50-60 
per cent legislative seats. Minorities constitute a little more than 11 per cent 
of the electorate in Bangladesh. In other words, they constitute more than 
20 per cent of the electorate in 50 of the 300 parliamentary constituencies 
in the country. Moreover, in 197 constituencies minorities constitute 10-50 
per cent of the electorate and in another six more than 50 per cent. 
According to conventional wisdom the majority community does not 
vote as a bloc, but the minority does. This voting behaviour makes minori-
ties an important factor in determining election results in nearly 20 per cent 
of the parliamentary constituencies. Purely in an electoral sense, the po-
litical system in Bangladesh gravitates towards the minorities to a certain 
extent. Therefore, its demographic composition is important. The higher 
the number of minorities in a constituency the greater will be the stake of 
political parties in the minority constituency.
The minorities, especially Hindus, became victims of majoritarian vi-
olence during the October 2001 parliamentary elections. The reasons for 
this violence were not limited to communal factors; there were also other 
related factors like political and structural. The Hindus are regarded as AL’s 
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vote bank so they were targeted by BNP supporters and its alliance partners. 
In some instances, AL supporters had also attacked them thinking that the 
local Hindus did not vote for them as was expected of them. In some in-
stances, terrorists took advantage of the situation and indulged in extortion 
and looting of property.
The violence started 15 days prior to the elections on 1 October and 
continued till about 27 October, which had an impact on Durga Puja, the 
most important religious festival of the Hindu community in Bengal. From 
a scanning of ten dailies (ProthomAlo, Jonokontho, Jugantor, Sangbad, 
Banglabazar, Inqilab, Dinkal, TheDaily Star, Ittefaq and BhorerKagoj) it 
can be observed that between 15 September to 27 October, 2001, about 330 
reports of violence against the Hindu community were reported in these 
newspapers. These included cases of rape, killings, physical torture, plun-
der, damage to property, bomb throwing, arson and extortion.
After the 8th Parliamentary elections, AI reported in December 2001: 
‘Hindus in Bangladesh have tended to vote for the Awami League. They 
have therefore been the target of a political backlash by supporters of par-
ties opposing the Awami League.’ An Amnesty report added: ‘Human rights 
organizations in Bangladesh believe over 100 women have been subjected 
to rape. Reports persistently allege that the perpetrators have been mainly 
members of the BNP and its coalition partner Jamaat-e-Islami.’
The intimidation of minorities, which had started before the elections 
became worse afterwards. The ASK petition of 2001 stated that ‘since an-
nouncement of election schedule for the eighth parliament, religious mi-
norities in the country had come under various threats, attacks and perse-
cution. Their properties were looted and women and children were raped. 
Excepting a disciplinary action against a police superintendent in Bhola, 
and few arrests of alleged attackers in some places, the government so far 
took no measures to ensure safety of religious minorities.’ (see Table 10)
Hindus were affected in 57 districts. The highest number of incidents 
was in Barisal (26), in Bagerhat (21 incidents), Bhola (17 incidents), Ra-
jshahi (13) and Faridpur (12). The division-wise occurrence of violence is 
however a little different with the highest taking place in the Dhaka division 
(see Table 11).
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Assault Threat Phys-
ical 
torture
Looting Break-
ing/
Torching
Extor-
tion
Explo-
sions
Other Total
15-30 
Sept
21 52 24 11 19 11 4 22 164
1-15 
Oct
38 42 41 37 54 21 3 10 246
16-27 
Oct
32 16 29 39 57 0 2 13 188
Total 91 110 94 87 130 32 9 45 598
Table 10. Incidents of violence against minorities in 2001
Table 11. Incidents of violence against minorities in 2001
Division 15-30 Sept 1-15 Oct 16-27 Oct Total
Dhaka 20 34 29 83
Chittagong 18 17 11 46
Rajshahi 9 19 36 64
Khulna 20 26 21 67
Barisal 13 32 18 63
Sylhet 0 3 4 7
Total 80 131 119 330
Representation of minorities in public employment
In Bangladesh ‘affirmative action’ is not totally new and the debates and 
controversies that are prevalent at the national level with regard to the ‘quo-
ta system’ need to be linked with the condition of Dalit communities under-
going caste-based discrimination. 
In Bangladesh, the ‘quota system’ in civil services has been in force from 
1972, but only in recent times has the system come under some scrutiny. The 
popular discourse that the country is ‘homogenous’ in its ethnic composi-
tion and that Bengali Muslims form an overwhelming majority of the people 
has played a role in shaping the policies in relation to the ‘quota system’. 
Most importantly, the system has never been subject to serious academic 
or policy debates. Instead, it has been seen as an ‘administrative’ issue that 
might require some technical refinement. An informed review of the system 
could bring certain issues like how the real ‘backward’, ‘non-advanced’ or 
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Good practice case study:
Bangladesh Dalit and Excluded 
Rights Movement
Like in many other countries in South Asia, Dalits in Bangladesh con-
tinue to experience discrimination. The country is home to approx-
imately 5.5 million Dalits who are socially known as ‘untouchables’. 
Extreme poverty, social exclusion and lack of adequate representation 
in different decision making bodies are some of the problems that the 
Dalits continue to face. Mainstream political parties have never taken 
up the issue of inhuman social practices that Dalits suffer from in the 
country. One also does not come across many laws and social safety 
nets on the part of the state to protect the rights of the Dalit communi-
ty. It is unfortunate that there was a dearth of even civil society efforts 
to safeguard Dalit interests till the beginning of the 21th century. 
The beginnings
In 2002 the Dalit movement in its current form came into existence. 
The Bangladesh Dalit Human Rights (BDHR) organization was es-
tablished in 2002 to engage with Dalit issues. A handful of organiza-
tions working with issues of the Dalit population also came up in the 
country at the beginning of the 21th century. But all these organiza-
tions were isolated and excluded. To bridge the gap between these 
organizations and to understand the Dalit situation in the country, 
in 2006 BDHR submitted a detailed report on the conditions of the 
Dalit population across the country to the United Nations Sub-Com-
mission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. This was, 
without much doubt, one of the early attempts by civil society orga-
nizations to study the issues of Dalit people in Bangladesh. In con-
nection with this, a consultative meeting detailing the overall situa-
tion of Dalits in Bangladesh was held in October 2006. The meeting 
was organized by BDHR in collaboration with Nagorik Uddyog and 
the International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). The meeting was 
marked by the presence of different activists working among Dalit 
groups and prominent human rights activists. The meeting gave the 
participants and activists a platform that had hitherto been absent 
to exchange their views on the possibility of forming a national level 
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‘systematically excluded’ communities could be included through meaning-
ful reform of the system to the surface. By means of such a review, Dal-
it communities will be able to make their claim to affirmative action that 
they also fundamentally deserve to ensure their representation in decision 
making.
Until now, the ‘quota system’ in the country has basically revolved 
around two categories of people – ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘women’. Argu-
ments and controversies have also focused on these two groups of benefi-
ciaries. However, the question as to how the quota system can be used more 
dynamically to support different ‘minority’, ‘marginal’ and ‘disadvantaged’ 
groups has never been systematically analysed by policymakers or civil so-
ciety stakeholders. In 1985, and then in 1997, the quota system was revised 
and attained the shape that currently exists. (See Table 12) 
Identity and culture
Legal and Constitutional Position
State of Urdu speakers
There were no expectations that the socioeconomic status of Biharis would 
drastically change after they were issued national identity cards and they 
became voters. Camp dwellers still face discrimination and have difficulties 
in getting passports, public service employment and trade licenses. Their 
Sl Type of Quotas Class I & 
Class 
II posts (%)
Class III & Clas 
IV posts (%)
1. Merit (outside district quota) 45 00
2. Physically handicapped/ mentally retarded (outside 
district quota)
00 10
3. Freedom Fighters or if freedom fighters are not 
available then shaheed freedom fighter’s children
30 30
4. Women 10 15
5. Tribal people 05 05
6. Ansars/ VDP members 00 10
7. Remaining (for general candidates of the district) 10 30
Table 12. Incidents of violence against minorities in 2001
Source: Yasmin, 2010: page 21.
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network and launching a nation-wide movement to end the atrocities 
on Dalits. Finally, on 22 April 2008, at a national consultation orga-
nized by BDHR and Nagorik Uddyog, the national movement called 
the Bangladesh Dalit and Excluded Rights Movement (BDERM) was 
formed. (BDERM, 2011: 6). 
BDERM is not merely a civil society organization, it exists as a move-
ment of the Dalit population at the national level that attempts to 
combine and collate the work of different civil society organizations 
working on Dalit rights in Bangladesh. BDERM describes itself as ‘a 
National Platform, which launched campaign in 2008 against caste 
based discrimination through mobilizing Dalit community and rights 
activists’ (BDERM and NU, 2016: 85). The organic linkage between 
different civil society organizations and BDERM is the key factor in 
its success. 
BDERM is associated with 34 civil society groups (BDERM and NU, 
2016: 5). As a national level movement, BDERM is engaged in aware-
ness raising, mobilization, capacity building and advocacy. BDERM 
works in approximately 50 districts in the country. Relentless wok 
among the Dalit community across the country has also brought 
the organization international recognition as the movement is now 
a member of the International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) and 
the Asian Dalit Rights Forum (ADRF) (BDERM and NU, 2016: 86). 
BDERM’s objective is to lead a national campaign and initiate a 
movement from the grassroots through to national and international 
levels to help secure Dalit rights. In a broad sense, the goal of the 
movement is to build ‘an equal society by eliminating all forms of 
discrimination against Dalit and excluded communities on the basis 
of equality, dignity, prosperity and security’. BDERM is committed 
to achieving its goal through organizing different Dalit organizations 
and individuals. BDERM’s objectives are: 
1. To build awareness among Dalit and Excluded community people 
on socio-economic, cultural, education and political rights. 
2. To build public awareness against discrimination based on work 
and descent.
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camps are always under threat of eviction. The government has continuous-
ly violated their fundamental rights. The Urdu-speaking Bihari community 
does not yet have state recognition as a linguistic minority in Bangladesh.
Serious obstacles remain for those who want to access additional identity 
documents or related services. Many Biharis are unaware of courts judgment 
or details of the rights that they are entitled to. Those who want to use their 
national identity cards to access other documents and services – applying 
for a passport, seeking a trade license – are often not familiar with the ad-
ministrative processes or requirements. Or worse, they may feel intimidated 
in government offices where they have to apply for such services; a challenge 
especially stark for women, who want birth certificates for their children but 
tend not to stray outside their camps into the city. Consequently, many camp 
dwellers do not even attempt to approach the government.
Camp dwellers who have sought government services have encountered 
problems such as corruption, discriminatory requirements, and in some 
cases, even denial of requests for documents due to their identity or camp 
address. Government records are critical for camp dwellers if they have to 
enjoy their rights as citizens when it comes to education, employment and 
the opportunity to travel abroad for education or work. The realization of 
these rights can ultimately help overcome poverty.
Many passport applications have been rejected because of lack of a res-
idential address; a ‘camp address’ is considered an improper residential 
address. Governmental officials also say that they have written instructions 
not to issue passports to Biharis. However, even after obtaining an official 
document from the Home Ministry indicating that Biharis were entitled to 
get passports, some applicants still failed to have their passport applications 
approved. (Hussain, 2016) 
Freedom of religion
Restrictions on freedom of religion
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
(OHCHR), in its preliminary findings of a country report by Special Rap-
porteur on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs Heiner Bielefeldt on 9 September 
2015, stated that:
One particularly atrocious crime is the abduction of people, mostly girls, 
with the purpose of forcing them to convert to another religion, while 
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3. To make the policy makers sensitive and responsible both gov-
ernment and non-government level to the rights of Dalit and Ex-
cluded community people and take initiative.
4. To ensure access of Dalit and Excluded to development process 
and basic service provision.
5. To establish network harmony and communication in regional 
and international level.
6. To strengthening capacity of Dalit run organizations and play a 
catalytic role for internal communication among Dalit groups. 
As a social movement and a strong platform for ensuring Dalit rights 
in the country, the movement has grown bigger since its inception. 
One of its important achievements is recognizing and bringing to the 
surface Dalit issues in the country. This seems to have led the state to 
come out of denial mode. At the international level, BDERM’s con-
tinuous engagement has also helped bring the issue to the attention 
of different agencies including UN bodies and the World Bank. In its 
2011 report, the movement noted: ‘There is now tentative recogni-
tion from the government, donors, media, civil society and academ-
ics that there are Dalits and excluded communities living in Bangla-
desh who face discrimination and poverty’ (BDERM, 2011: 13). 
The campaign and movement
From its inception, BDERM has taken up Dalit issues across the 
country. On the one hand, BDERM undertook both reactive and 
proactive popular campaigns perhaps in an attempt to bring up the 
issue of discrimination against Dalits among civil society groups and 
society. Thus, for instance, different strategies like ‘human chains - 
where people stand by the side of the road with festoons and pho-
tographs – have been a vital tool to raise visibility and gain media 
coverage’ (BDERM, 2011: 13). Human chains are a common form of 
protest for the movement. On international days, BDERM organizes 
human chains to demand specific issues including inclusion of mi-
norities in the larger stream of society and ending atrocities against 
Dalits. ‘Events, rallies, human chains and awareness raising events 
have been held across the country to mark International Human 
...Good practice case study continued ...
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at the same time forcing them into an unwanted marriage, potentially 
even ‘marrying’ them with their abductor. In addition to other elements 
of a brutal violation of human dignity, these crimes amount to rape or 
similar cruel abuses. Such incidents linger long in the memory of the af-
fect families and communities instilling in them yet another dimension 
of fear that they will in the long run lose out in the country. (OHCHR, 
2015)
In evidence presented to the Sub-committee on International Human 
Rights of the Canadian Parliament on 24 February 2015, Mr Kirit Sinha Roy 
(President, Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council) stated:
Finally, I would like to inform you about the unique problem of abduc-
tion and rape, leading to forced conversions and forced marriages. Mi-
nority women and girls are the most vulnerable of all because they enjoy 
greater freedom of movement. Sexual assault and rape are still consid-
ered very shameful in South Asia among all communities, and victims 
get little comfort by going to the police. The police are corrupt and un-
trustworthy and likely to mistreat the victim.
Abductions of women and underage teens often end in forced con-
versions and marriages. There are no specific laws banning forced 
marriages.
Abductions are usually not taken seriously by the local police. There are 
often notices in the vernacular press saying, ‘I AB of XY and daughter of 
CD have converted from Hinduism to Islam. My new name is EF. I am 
now the wife of GH.” This is a sure sign that this is a case of forced con-
version and marriage. Unfortunately, there are no statistics about forced 
conversions and marriages’ (Parliament of Canada, 2015)
The OHCHR report of 9 September 2015 continues:
Religious conversions are generally rare and, if occurring, mostly take 
place in the context of interreligious marriages. However, conversions 
have also occurred outside interreligious marriages, in particular from 
Buddhism to Christianity or from various religions to Islam. Occasion-
ally Muslims have also converted to Christianity or Baha’ism. Within 
the indigenous people of the Mro, who traditionally practise Buddhists, 
some tens of thousands turned to a newly founded religion named 
 ‘Krama’.
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Rights Day, World Dignity Day, International Women’s Day, Day 
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, National 
Victory Day and International Mother Language Day. For example 
on 5th December 2009 human chains and rallies were held in 11 dis-
tricts. Leaflets and posters were distributed, events received national 
and local media coverage and highlighted caste based discrimination 
to new audiences. In Dhaka around 200 people from different Dalit 
colonies attended, gave speeches and held a human chain in front of 
the national museum.’ (BDERM, 2011: 13)
Immediately after it came into existence, BDERM called for a hu-
man chain to protest against the sexual harassment of a Dalit girl in 
July 2009. The larger demand was ensuring women’s security in the 
workplace. This mode of campaigning against discrimination also 
strengthened the self-confidence of the Dalit population as it gives 
them a basis to register their protest before the world.  
BDERM also stands strong in campaigning for protecting minority 
and Dalit rights and security in the country. It has also strengthened 
its capacity to respond to atrocities and discrimination against mi-
nority and Dalit groups. In many districts BDERM has succeeded in 
getting law enforcing agencies and the administration to take action 
against atrocities like murder, rape and kidnapping of Dalit communi-
ty members. Thus, for instance, BDERM registered its protest against 
the murder of Tulshi Kumar Das. To protest the murder, BDERM or-
ganized a human chain on 4 August 2015 in front of the National Press 
Club, Dhaka. Tulshi Kumar Das, a dalit, was allegedly beaten to death 
inside a factory for ‘stealing a bicycle’ (Daily Janakantha, 2015).  
BDERM also undertakes advocacy with policymakers and govern-
ment institutions to reform existing laws/policies to protect social-
ly excluded Dalit minorities in the country. To improve the lives of 
Dalits and to end historical atrocities against them, BDERM along 
with different rights groups have put pressure on the government 
to make legislative changes. A demand to draft the proposed an-
ti-discriminatory law has been a major concern for human rights 
activists and BDERM. In an interview, Dr Shah Alam, a member of 
the Law Commission of Bangladesh, recognized the demand as he 
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Those having converted to another religion – including sometimes even 
their offspring after generations – typically face social ostracism in their 
social environment based on the ascription that the conversion had al-
legedly not been genuine and instead been motivated by the expectation 
of material benefits or other non-religious incentives. Some converts ac-
tually had to go into hiding or have concealed their newly adopted faith 
for fear of social stigmatization.
UCA News, an Asian Catholic News Service, reported on 5 February 
2015:
On November 9 last year [2014], the pastors were arrested while hold-
ing a secret mass conversion. ‘They attempted to convert a group of 40 
Muslim villagers secretly and it made other villagers angry,’ said Mah-
fuzur Rahman, officer in-charge at Banbhasa police station in Lalmonir-
hat district. Police say unless there is violence over conversions there is 
nothing to worry about. […] Sayedul Islam, imam of a local mosque, said 
area Muslims have no problem with conversion as it is almost always 
temporary. ‘We have seen for years that most Muslims convert back to 
Islam soon after. Those who don’t come back we declare them ‘outcast’ 
from society, but their number is very few,’ he said. 
There are instances of forced conversion of religious minorities to Islam, 
mainly of Hindus but also of Christians and others. For example, the USSD 
IRF (2014) report noted:
Local inhabitants reported that in May a group of Muslim men in Lal-
monirhat abducted, forcibly converted, illegally married, and raped a 
12-year-old Hindu girl. A Hindu community leader stated police refused 
to investigate the incident and pressured the victim’s family to drop the 
case. He stated another girl was abducted from her village in a similar 
manner in April. A journalist said the girl was being held by her ab-
ductors in Dhaka, but police refused to intervene (US Department of 
State, 2014).
Family/Personal laws
Family lawshave separate provisions for Muslims, Hindus and Christians. 
Family laws concerning marriage, divorce and adoption differ depending on 
the religious beliefs of the people involved. Muslim and Hindu family laws 
are codified in the legal system (US Department of State, 2014).
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commented: ‘We have been researching the law for the past two 
years and we launched it in January through a seminar. The law will 
be an umbrella law which will address not just discrimination faced 
by Dalits, which is discrimination due to profession and identity, but 
also other forms of discrimination including religion, race, gender, 
physical disabilities.’ The Chief Executive of Nagorik Uddyog, Zakir 
Hossain welcomed the effort and added: ‘Even if it is an umbrel-
la law, it will still be a great development for the Dalit population’ 
(Al Jazeera, 2014). 
There is no denying that as a consequence of its relentless struggle, 
an anti-discrimination law was drafted by the Law Commission in 
2014 to address the issue of widespread discrimination of the Dal-
it community in the social sphere. Organizations like the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Manusher Jonno Founda-
tion (MJF), Nagorik Uddyog, Bangladesh Dalit and Excluded Rights 
Movement (BDERM) and Research and Development Collective 
(RDC) were associated with this drafting process (The Daily Star, 
2015). As part of a larger level advocacy to reform the policy land-
scape, Nagorik Uddyog and BDERM have organized meetings with 
parliamentarians. One such meeting was held on 12 October 2015 
at the Parliament Members’ Club of the National Assembly in Ban-
gladesh. The overall objective of the meeting was to campaign for a 
space for policy reforms to end and eliminate caste based discrimi-
nation in the country. 
The problem of housing for the Dalit population in the country has 
also been highlighted through BDERM’s continuous persistence at 
different levels. BDERM has engaged in on-going lobbying with the 
Dhaka municipal authorities for improved housing, water and sani-
tation for Dalits, especially scavengers, living in the city.        
It is interesting to note that in the process of reforming policy 
through advocacy with policymakers and different ministries, 
BDERM has undertaken different studies to make the point of exclu-
sion of and atrocities against Dalits across the country. BDERM or-
ganized a series of seminars and conferences in an attempt to create 
pressure on the government to adopt/reform specific policies/laws. 
...Good practice case study continued ...
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OHCHR, in its preliminary findings of a country visit to Bangladesh by 
Heiner Bielefeldt, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs on 
9 September 2015, further noted that:
Whereas most aspects of the law in Bangladesh are secular, personal 
status issues – such as marriage, family life, divorce, custody of chil-
dren, maintenance, inherence etc. – remain governed by religious laws. 
Depending on the religious backgrounds of the concerned individuals, 
provisions of Islamic law, Hindu law or Canon law etc. apply. The Bud-
dhists do not have their own personal status law in Bangladesh, but fall 
under the Hindu law. Projects supported by the Government to design 
a specific personal status law for the Buddhist community so far seem 
to have failed.
The Baha’is reported that they apply their own family laws, which are 
recognized by the Government (OHCHR, 2015).
Human Rights Watch (HRW), in its 2012 report noted:
Since its independence in 1971, the bulk of Bangladesh’s laws are ap-
plicable to all citizens without discrimination based on sex or religious 
belief, with one major anomaly: its personal laws. Some reforms, espe-
cially laws against domestic violence and acid attacks, have addressed 
family issues and apply across the religious spectrum. But personal laws 
on marriage, separation, and divorce, some dating to the 19th century, 
have remained largely frozen in time. […]
All three sets of personal laws [Muslims, Hindus, and Christians] dis-
criminate against women with respect to marriage, divorce, separation, 
and maintenance, as explained below. They also fail to recognize mar-
ital property and its division on an equal basis after divorce or upon 
separation.
A report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, published 
on 9 October 2013, noted:
The Director of Research Initiatives Bangladesh noted that Hindu per-
sonal laws do not grant women a right to inheritance, so Manipuri wom-
en ‘will face problems in having a good resource base independently’. 
Other sources corroborate that Hindu personal laws in Bangladesh dis-
criminate against women, and many women who separate face poverty 
due to a lack of legal recourse. [...]
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The seminars and meetings were marked by the presence of differ-
ent activists, academics and politicians. Broadly the following topics 
were the points of discussion in the seminars/meetings: situation of 
Dalit human rights, problems of Dalit housing, draft United Nations 
Principles and Guidelines for the Effective Elimination of Discrim-
ination Based on Work and Descent, the situation and needs of tea 
workers (almost all the tea workers are Dalits and minorities in Ban-
gladesh), general discussion on the Dalit movement in South Asia 
and the lessons to be learned for Bangladesh (BDERM, 2011: 14).  
Reports of different meetings held by BDERM can be found on their 
website (see http://www.bderm.org/reports).  
The movement has not been restricted to organizing conferences 
and seminars to detail the conditions of the Dalit population in the 
country though. A more meticulous task of research was undertaken 
to come up with a detailed report focusing on different Dalit issues.  
BDERM has published a Research Report on Dalit Scavengers in 
Dhaka City. The report presents the health and safety conditions of 
Dalits engaged in scavenging in Dhaka. Detailed in-depth interviews 
suggest that most of the scavengers were suffering from various in-
fectious diseases. The study concluded that lack of medical facilities 
for the scavengers made the situation worse for them (see http://
www.bderm.org/node/40 for details). 
BDERM as a movement has gained strength from its effective or-
ganic linkage with different organizations working in different parts 
of the country on Dalit issues. There is no denying the fact that ef-
fective participation at the grassroots level continues to be a key in 
BDERM’s success. BDERM follows a bottoms-up approach to en-
sure the rights of Dalits. It is a national platform for promoting their 
rights. BDERM is spread over almost every district in Bangladesh. 
Currently it has 52 district committees in 52 of the 64 districts in 
Bangladesh. The working committees in the districts collaborate 
with the national working committee to chart out detailed plans. 
BDERM sustains its work as a movement. It is an on-going move-
ment to ensure the inclusion of Dalits in mainstream society.              
...Good practice case study continued ...
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The Professor at BRAC University said, ‘Hindu Manipuri women are 
triple minorities - religion, ethnicity and gender all make them in-
credibly vulnerable to violence, abuse and exploitation’. She expressed 
certainty that ‘accessing housing, employment or services from the 
police will be enormously, triply difficult for a Hindu Manipuri woman.’ 
(Canada, 2013)
The laws cater to the requirements of religious observance by the mi-
norities. For example, the USSD IRF 2014 report (published in 2015), noted 
that while:
Religious studies are compulsory and part of the curriculum in all gov-
ernment schools. Students attend classes in which their own religious 
beliefs are taught. Schools with few students from minority religious 
groups are generally allowed to make arrangements with local churches 
or temples to hold religious studies classes outside of school hours [and] 
the jail code makes allowances for the observance of religious festivals 
by prisoners, including access to extra food for feast days or permission 
for religious fasting (US State Department, 2014).
Interfaith marriages
OHCHR, in its September 2015 report, further notes that:
[...] Even though the structure is to a certain degree pluralistic in ac-
knowledgment of diverse religious-normative traditions, the system 
does not easily, if at all, accommodate certain constellations of inter-
religious partnership. Moreover, some people – for instance, converts, 
agnostics, atheists and others – may face even greater difficulties to fit 
into the limited options provided by a religion-based structure of per-
sonal status laws.
An Australia Refugee Review Tribunal (2008), discussed the situation 
in general terms as:
There is no legal barrier to inter-religious marriages, and such marriag-
es are reportedly becoming more common in the larger cities of Ban-
gladesh. However, couples in inter-religious marriages still experience 
problems, ranging from family pressure to physical attacks. The sourc-
es suggest that the more extreme instances of violence occur in rural 
areas. Inter-religious marriages are reportedly recognised under the 
Special Marriages Act of 1872. Information indicates that a non-Muslim 
woman wishing to marry a Muslim man is required to convert to Islam. 
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However, if she refused to convert to Islam, and the family accepted this 
decision, the marriage may be reportedly solemnised under the Special 
Marriages Act. […]. If a Muslim boy marries a Christian or Jewish girl 
conversion is essential. If they are not converted, neither the family 
members, nor the society nor even the civil court accept this marriage. 
As a result the couples concerned face immeasurable harassment and 
there are certain cases where they are kidnapped and killed.
The OHCHR report of 9 September 2015 noted that:
Interreligious marriages, although slowly becoming more popular in ur-
ban areas, so far have been very rare in Bangladesh. The striking paucity 
of interreligious marriages in a country in which people of different reli-
gious orientations have always lived side by side is a surprising phenom-
enon. I would assume that difficulties arising from the existing structure 
of personal status laws are a main factor explaining that situation. While 
some interreligious constellations can be accommodated within the ex-
isting system, in accordance with the rules of the concerned religious 
communities, others cannot. For instance, a Muslim woman cannot le-
gally marry a non-Muslim man.’
The Chittagong University Journal of Law (2008), in an article titled, 
‘Inter-religious Marriage in Bangladesh: An Analysis of the Existing Legal 
Framework’ noted that: ‘Although IRM [inter-religious marriage] is accept-
ed in some social stratum in Bangladesh, it will not be correct to say that it is 
widely accepted in Bangladeshi society as a whole […] If the IRM parties are 
not economically independent, their social lives may be particularly precari-
ous. This social unacceptance has its roots again in the religious disapproval 
of such marriages.’
Implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord
The CHT Accord signed in 1997 has completed 18 years without making any 
real progress in commissioning an effective and functioning local self-gov-
ernance system that ensures land and other rights for the indigenous people 
in CHT. The central issues of the CHT Accord include the preservation of 
tribal inhabited characters of CHT; transfer of all subjects and functions, 
as envisaged to be under the jurisdiction of the three Hill District Councils 
to be supervised by the CHT Regional Council at the top and their enforce-
ment thereof; holding elections to these councils; resolution of land disputes 
after inserting necessary amendments to the CHT Land Dispute Resolu-
tion Commission Act 2001 in line with the CHT Accord; rehabilitation of 
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internally displaced persons and India returnee refugees to their respective 
homesteads with restitution of their land to their rightful ownership; dis-
mantling all temporary military camps including ‘Operation Uttoran’; can-
cellation of land leases given to non-residents; appointment of permanent 
residents to all services available in the CHT on a priority basis; effecting 
necessary amendments to the CHT Regulation 1900, Bangladesh Police Act 
and all other relevant laws in accordance with the spirit of the accord and; 
rehabilitation of Bengali settlers outside CHT with due honour and dignity. 
However, all these remain unimplemented (Kapaeeng, 2015: 181).
Despite the government’s explicit assurances, nationally and at various 
international forums, including at UNHRC and at the UN Permanent Fo-
rum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), implementation of these provisions 
remains frozen till date. The government claims that 48 out of the 72 pro-
visions of the accord have been implemented. But PCJSS and some civil 
society and professional organizations in CHT claim that only 25 of the pro-
visions had been implemented till the filing of this report. However, what 
cannot be denied is that the core components of the accord like the authority 
to deal with the administration and management of land, forest, police (lo-
cal), and law and order has not been devolved to the Hill District Councils. 
Futhermore the rehabilitation of India returnee refugees and internally dis-
placed persons through the CHT Task Force, the de-militarization through 
dismantling of all temporary security or military camps, the cessation of 
‘Operation Uttoron’ (or Operation Uplift), a de facto military rule in the 
CHT, and the resolution of land disputes by the CHT Land Dispute Res-
olution Commission are yet to be implemented. As these provisions have 
not been implemented along with the non-implementation of the agreed on 
amendments to the CHT Land Dispute Resolution Commission, the ‘Trib-
al Area Status’ of the CHT region is getting eroded severely and fast. Civil 
Aviation and Tourism Minister and member of the Parliamentary Caucus 
on Indigenous Affairs, Mr Rashed Khan Menon addressing a High Level 
Policy Dialogue on the Status of the Implementation of the CHT Accord 
also admitted that the characteristics of the CHT are diminishing and this is 
something which should not be overlooked (The Daily Star, 2015).
Recommendations
• All intimidation and harassment of indigenous people should be 
stopped.
• All those responsible for attacks on and intimidation of indigenous peo-
ple should be prosecuted.
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• The majority party should take measures as per its electoral pledge of 
implementing the CHT Accord within a declared time-frame for a road 
map and providing a forum for solving land disputes of indigenous peo-
ple in CHT and plain land.
• Stop the systematic and forcible displacement of minorities from their 
ancestral land.
• Establish a separate land commission for indigenous people in the 
plains for restoration of their dispossessed land.
• Allocate adequate budget for indigenous people and ensure their full 
and effective participation in major decision-making processes in all de-
velopment programmes.
• The NHRC should investigate human rights violations against indige-
nous people.
• Bangladesh and its donors must ensure that Urdu speakers are not dis-
criminated against particularly when the government issues new identi-
ty documents, in obtaining passports or their access to education.
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The Indian Constitution makes no attempt to define or comprehensively list 
the groups to be regarded as minorities. The term ‘minorities’ occurs in only 
two articles (29, 30), which explicitly mention minorities based on language, 
religion and culture. ‘Backward’ castes (Scheduled Castes and Tribes) are 
not minorities within the meaning of Article 30, although they are includ-
ed in the non-discrimination provisions of Article 29. The focus of our our 
report to this chapter is religious minorities, who together make up over 19 
per cent of the country’s population. According to the official National Com-
mission for Minorities - presumably using the numerical minority yardstick 
– these are Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsis, with Jains 
being added to the group recently. Communities such as those of Jews have 
not been official designated as such, showing a significant anomaly in the 
system of official categorization.1 There are also many inter-sectionalities 
so that not only are some religious minorities also linguistic minorities, but 
also ethnic and those making up ‘indigenous peoples’, and Dalits. Women 
and girls among the minorities bear a large burden of the disadvantages 
experienced by minorities as a whole (see Table 1). 
This chapter reports on the conditions of minorities by individual rights 
as defined by the United Nations. In Section 2 we catalogue legal rights for 
minorities as enshrined in the Constitution. Section 3 examines the provi-
sion of life and security while  Section 4 deals with socioeconomic rights. 
Is the Idea Unraveling?
Sajjad Hassan and Naaz Khair*
Chapter 3 
India
* Support provided by Arnab Roy, Nazia Khan and Sneha Chandna
1. Tribes have been denied their specific religious identity – animist, among others -  since the 
1951 Census by enrolling them as Hindus (if they had not converted to Christianity or Islam).
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Section 5 examines effective participation and Section 6 discusses identity 
and culture. The attempt is to build a baseline on precepts and practices of 
minority rights in India. Section 7 provides a snapshot of the on-going de-
bates, which have somewhat accelerated in recent years, seeking to refash-
ion majority-minority relations in the country; it also discusses secularism 
with implications for minority rights. The chapter concludes with a set of 
recommendations for action. 
The Constitutional framework
Minority rights (and provisions impinging on pluralism) in the Indian Con-
stitution which are laid out in considerable detail can be grouped into two 
broad categories: 
i. Common domain: rights that all citizens of India, including religious mi-
norities, are guaranteed. 
Some of these are ‘Fundamental Rights’ (in Part III of the Constitution): 
- Equality before law (Article 14)
- Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, ethnicity or 
gender (Article 15, ½)
- Right  of citizens to equal opportunities in employment and appoint-
ment to public offices; and prohibition of discrimination (Article 
16[1], [2])
- Freedom of conscience and to practice and propagate it (Article 
25[1])
- Right of religious denominations to establish institutions for reli-
gious and charitable purposes (Article 26)    
- Prohibition to pay any taxes for promotion of any religion 
(Article 27) 
- Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or worship in ed-
ucational institutions wholly maintained, recognized or aided by 
state (Article 28)
Others figure as Directive Principles (Part IV) providing a vision for 
change:  
- Eliminate inequalities (Article 38[2])
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Muslims Christians Sikhs Parsis Buddhists Jains
Population 172,245,158 27,819,588 20,833,116 - 8,442,972 4,451,753
As percentage 
of total 
population 
14.23 2.30 1.72 n/a 0.70 0.37
Table 1. Religious minorities in India
Source: Census (2011).
- Promote educational and economic interests of weaker sections 
(Article 46)
There are also Fundamental Duties (in Part IVA, Article 51[A]), provid-
ing dos and don’ts for citizens:  
- duty to promote harmony
- duty to value diversity
ii. Separate domain: special rights that minorities (religious and linguistic) 
enjoy:
Some are Fundamental Rights:
- Right of any minority group to ‘conserve’ its ‘distinct language, script 
or culture’ (Article 29[1])
- Restriction on denial of admission to state maintained/aided educa-
tional institutions, ‘on religion, race, caste, language’ (Article 29[2])
- Right of all religious/linguistic minorities to establish and adminis-
ter educational institutions of their choice (Article 30[1])
- Freedom of minority-managed educational institutions from dis-
crimination in receiving aid from the state (Article 30[2])
There are also some special provisions:  
- Special provision relating to the language spoken by a section of the 
population of any state (Article 347)
- Provision for facilities for instruction in mother tongue at the prima-
ry stage (Article 350A)
- Provision for a special officer for linguistic minorities and his duties 
(Article 350B)
India 
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This is clearly an impressive and elaborate regime of minority rights, 
protection and promotion. In this chapter we examine how these laws mea-
sure up on the touchstone of minority rights and how the laws themselves 
have held up in practice.
Life and security
Constitutional provisions and their implementation: 
The Constitution of India guarantees life and liberty to all citizens (Article 
21) and ensures equality before the law and equal protection by the law (Ar-
ticle 14). There are also the Indian Penal Code (1860) and the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code (1973), among others, which guarantee life and security and 
the rule of law for all citizens  – for religious minorities as they do for other 
citizens. Yet data on violations of the right to life demonstrate that minority 
communities face particular challenges. This section catalogues the ways in 
which rights of religious minorities are denied through both the omissions 
(inability to provide security and guarantee of life) as well as commissions 
(state itself taking life and liberty away) of the state. It also examines, albeit 
in a summary fashion, how the state, the principal duty bearer, seeks to 
protect (or deny) right to life and legal justice including any reforms in pro-
vision of security and freedoms, including for minorities and how successful 
those attempts have been.
Status of  ‘right to life’ for minorities
A key challenge in reporting on violence against minorities is absence of 
official data on violence, disaggregated by religious groups. The National 
Crimes Records Bureau (NCRB), the principal official source of data on 
crimes and violence in the country, and whose annual reports provide a 
large amount of useful data, does not report those on data disaggregated 
by religious groups (except for one particular category - prison popula-
tion).  Some of NCRB’s data is also not very useful for our enterprise of 
capturing crimes and violence against minorities. For example, the scope 
of NCRB’s communal violence dataset is limited – reporting only incidents 
of clashes and deaths and, not other violations, such as hate speeches. In 
the absence of much official data useful for our purpose, we have had to 
cast our net wide, to garner and collate data to be able to report denials of 
right to life and violence specifically against minority groups in the coun-
try. International human rights networks, principally Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International produce regular reports on human rights vio-
lations, many against minority communities. Other India and South Asia 
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based human rights agencies such as the Asian Centre for Human Rights 
too report violations using a combination of official and non-official data 
sources and studies. There are also media reports and those by NGOs and 
grassroots community networks working on minority rights/human rights. 
These sources are variously used. 
Omissions by the state
According to NCRB (2015) there were 1,227 communal incidents in the 
country in 2014. According to the same report, in 2013, there were 823 
communal incidents involving the  killing of 133 persons and injury of 
2269 persons. Communal here means concerning clashes between religious 
groups or individuals. An overwhelming number of victims of the violence 
and more broadly the insecurity were religious minorities – Muslims and 
Christians and also Sikhs. The situation has taken a turn for the worse since 
the current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government came to power in May 
2014. A recent civil society report on violence against minorities noted:  
The results are visible (in) the saffronisation2  of governance at the Cen-
tre to the implementation of the Sangh’s3  agenda of coercion and isola-
tion of religious minority groups, to infiltration of administrative struc-
tures, police and education. The incitement to violence and coercion is 
one facet of it (Dayal and Hashmi, 2015: 7).
Incidents of hate speeches have been common. Dayal and Hashmi 
(2015: 8) note: 
A central government Minister, Sadhvi Niranjan Jyoti describes those 
who do not worship Ram (the Hindu god) as ‘haramzade’ or bastards. 
A Shiv Sena MP force-feeds a Muslim canteen functionary during his 
roza fast. Another, Sanjay Raut, calls for the disenfranchisement of 
Muslims. 
Hate speeches such as these have created a fertile ground for violence 
against religious minorities. Bbased on media-based tracking the report 
also notes that, in the one year since the BJP government came to power in 
May 2014, there have been at least 43 deaths in over 600 cases of violence, 
2. Meaning greater hold of hardline Hindu ideology and institutions. Saffron is the colour tradi-
tionally associated with Hinduism.  
3. Short for Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Nationalist Volunteer Corps) – RSS, the umbrella 
organization for hardline Hindu organizations.
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194 targeting Christians and the rest Muslims (Dayal and Hashmi, 2015: 
8). The US International Religious Freedom report (US State Department, 
2014: 1), noted,  ‘the local NGO, Act Now for Harmony and Democracy re-
ported more than 800 religiously- motivated attacks from May through to 
the end of the year.’ These figures do not include the 108 killed in Assam 
in attacks on Muslims by armed tribal political groups in early 2015. Given 
that official records are not easily available and the police does not register 
many crimes, or victims are often coerced into reaching a compromise with 
the perpetrators, these figures are likely to be much higher. Many of the in-
cidents of violence were directed against Muslim individuals and their plac-
es of worship. Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Assam are among 
the states where Muslims were targeted (Dayal and Hashmi, 2015: 8). 
Christians too have suffered. Desecration and destruction of churches, 
assault on pastors, illegal police detention of church workers and denial of 
constitutional rights of freedom of faith, aggravated coercion and terror in 
campaigns of ghar wapsi and love jihad.4 In Chhattisgarh, villages passed 
orders banning the entry of priests of faiths other than Hinduism (Dayal 
and Hashmi, 2015: 8). 
According to a report by the Evangelical Foundation of India (EFI), vio-
lence against Christians picked up in independent India in the early 1990s 
reaching its peak in 2008-09 with more than 1,000 incidents of violence 
and hate crimes being reported. Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh and Telengana had the highest incidents of anti-Christian violence. 
An analysis of the violence reveals that 54 per cent were threats, intimida-
tion and coercion often with the police looking on. Physical violence consti-
tuted a quarter (24 per cent) and violence against Christian women was 11 
per cent (Evangelical Fellowship of India and Alliance Defending Freedom 
India, 2015:7).
Sometimes specific laws facilitate violence against minorities, especially 
by non-state vigilante groups acting in connivance with a biased police and 
law enforcement. 
All states, barring a few (West Bengal, Kerala and select North East-
ern states) have laws banning cow slaughter and its transportation (for 
4. Ghar wapsi (literally ‘homecoming’), name given to forced conversion of non-Hindus to 
Hinduism by Hindu hard line groups. Love jihad – claims by Hindu groups to Muslim boys 
luring Hindu girls as jihad by another means.   
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example, Uttar Pradesh has the Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act 1955 and 
Bihar the Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act 1955) with varying 
attribution of crime and associated penalties (the Uttar Pradesh law com-
pletely bans slaughter of cows, bullock and ox, and provides for a 7-year jail 
term while the Bihar law permits killing of bulls and bullocks older than 15 
years and provides for a maximum of a 6-month jail term). These laws have 
been enforced in varying degrees. But the presence of the laws provides a 
ready tool for a communalized police force to target mostly poor Muslim 
transporter workers, resulting in arrests and incarceration of many for long 
periods of time without even the prospect of bail. Recently, with Hindu 
groups gaining ascendency and law enforcement increasingly coming under 
their influence, vigilante gau raksha samitis (cow protection committees) 
have sprung up all over the country which do not shy away from using phys-
ical violence, including public lynching of mostly poor Muslim cattle trans-
port workers, in acts of cow protection (see, for example, Firstpost, 2016; 
India Today, 2016).  
Similarly, several states (Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, 
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan) have passed free-
dom of religion legislations aimed essentially at preventing people from 
converting to Christianity and Islam (conversion to Hinduism, or to other 
‘indigenous’ faiths is not considered conversion by Indian law). And states 
that do not have anti-conversion laws resort to provisions in the Indian Pe-
nal Code (IPC) to target minorities. Section 153, prohibiting ‘promoting en-
mity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, 
residence, language, and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony’ 
and Section 295A, prohibiting ‘deliberate and malicious acts, intended to 
outrage religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious 
beliefs’, are used often by law enforcement to target missionaries and reli-
gious groups engaged in conversions. These together also provide the back-
drop (and rationalization) for much of the violence against Christian mis-
sionaries by vigilante Hindu groups in tribal areas in the country (see Osuri, 
2013a for a historical analysis). 
Mass violence
A specific form of violence against minorities in India is what is described 
as ‘communal riots’, that in reality is mass violence against minorities, 
some bordering on pogrom with violent elements of the majority commu-
nity targeting minority groups often with police support (or tacit conniv-
ance). India has had long history of these (see Table 2), the most recent 
major incident being in Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh in September 2013 
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(52 persons killed) and in Assam in May 2014 when on a single day 46 per-
sons, 28 of them young children, were murdered in Baksa district. 
‘Communal riots’ result in large-scale deaths, grievous injuries and 
widespread sexual violence; loss of property and significant displacement 
of populations; and have a long-term impact on survivors’ livelihoods and 
access to education and other services. Muzaffarnagar is a good example of 
losses in recent years.   
In September 2013, as parliamentary elections were approaching, large-
scale communal violence engulfed Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts in 
western Uttar Pradesh. A BBC report described the violence as ‘the worst in 
India in a decade.’ By the time the violence had abated later that month, 52 
persons had died, over 60 had been grievously injured and scores of houses 
had been  destroyed in fires across 14 villages in the two districts. This was 
the official count—many instances of death, injury, rape and destruction 
of property remain uncounted to this day.  The violence overwhelmingly 
targeted Muslims, especially from poorer backgrounds. Additionally, the 
violence affected another 74 villages in the region as Muslim families there, 
especially where they were in a minority, fled fearing violence resulting in 
one of the largest violence-induced displacements in India in recent years. 
Estimates vary, but a figure of 50,000 at its peak, has been widely accepted 
(Hassan, 2016:189). 
Post-violence justice and rehabilitation too seem beyond a victim’s 
reach. A recent report examining large episodes of mass communal vio-
lence (in Delhi, 1984; Bhagalpur, 1989; and Gujarat, 2002), reveals how 
survivors were systematically denied justice. The failures began from stage 
one, in which a survivor came in contact with the state through the flawed 
writings of first information reports (FIRs) in cases in which they were re-
corded to poor investigation resulting in a large number of cases being sum-
marily closed with no evidence of the complainant being given a chance to 
represent against the closure as required by law. These were followed by a 
poor show on arrests of the accused and poorer outcomes on prosecution. 
This also included an acute weakness of efforts by the prosecution to con-
test bail applications. Rates of acquittal were significantly high, suggesting 
either a passive trial court or one that was complicit in subverting justice. 
Chopra and Jha (2014: 334) contend, ‘...the scale of these failures, (and) 
the fact that they are repeated across different episodes demonstrates that 
these failures are systematic rather than occasional aberrations.’ According 
to Hassan (2015: 509), accountability of public officials ‘comes forth as a 
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Year Location Deaths Prime victim 
1964 Rourkela (Odisha), Jamshedpur, Kolkata 2,000 Muslim 
1967 Hatia, Bihar 180 Muslim 
1969  Ahmadabad, Gujarat 512 Muslim 
1979 Jamshedpur, Bihar 120 Muslim 
1980 Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh 2000 Muslim 
1983 Nellie, Assam 1800 Muslim 
1984 Bhiwandi, Maharashtra 146 Muslim 
1984 Delhi 2733 Sikh 
1985 Ahmedabad, Gujarat 300 Muslim 
1987 Hashimpura, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh 42 Muslim
1989-90 Bhagalpur, Bihar 896 Muslim 
1990 Various, incl. Gujarat, Delhi, Patna, Hyderabad 1000 Muslim 
1992-93 Surat (Gujarat), Bhopal, Mumbai 1300 Muslim 
2002 Various places in Gujarat 2000 Muslim 
2008 Kandamahal, Odisha 39 Christian 
Table 2. Major incidents of communal violence 
in post-independence India
Source: Tabulated by the author from Rajeshwari (2004).
particularly weak point. Gaps in the law and procedural barriers to prosecu-
tion make it easier for complicit officials and politicians to escape.’
Commissions by the state 
It is not only in acts of omission that the state fails its citizens from minority 
communities, the state has also undermined citizens’ fundamental rights 
of life and liberty by its actions. According to a recent human rights report 
(Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2015:3), ‘the right to life is perhaps the 
most violated right in India.’ The report also notes how in the last 10 years, 
from 2004 to 2014 according to official records, the right to life of at least 
130,407 persons (or 1,086 persons per month) was violated either by state 
agencies or was caused by the failure of state agencies. A large percentage of 
these were victims of custodial and ‘encounter deaths’, deaths in police fir-
ing, deaths of civilians in violence affected regions and deaths in communal 
violence. An overwhelming majority of these victims belonged to minority 
communities – mostly Muslims and Christians - besides Dalits and tribal 
groups. 
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Indian security forces have long applied unlawful methods against 
members of groups deemed as security threats, especially in ‘conflict zones’. 
These include parties to conflict in North East India, the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir and Maoist (Naxalite) rebels in much of the central and east-
ern parts of the country. In Kashmir’s case (Muslim majority), according to 
a state government report, between 1990 and 2011, 43,000 persons were 
killed – of these 21,232 were said to be ‘militants’ and 13,226 ‘civilians’. 
These represent only a part of the violations in the state. Activists estimate 
that up to half of all human rights violations by security force personnel in 
the state may have gone unreported in the 1990s and early 2000s. Torture, 
deaths in custody, extra judicial executions and enforced disappearances 
have been common (Amnesty International, 2015: 8). They continue to be 
so. Recent civil society reports throw some fresh light on the happenings in 
Kashmir. Research into unknown, unmarked and mass graves documented 
over 8,000 enforced and involuntary disappearances and more than 70,000 
deaths, including through extra judicial or ‘fake encounter’ executions,5 
and custodial brutality between 1989 and 2009 (Chatterji et al., 2009:10). 
Another recent report on forced  ‘disappearances’ in Kashmir documents 
the extra judicial killings of 1,080 persons and enforced disappearances of 
172 persons and numerous cases of torture and sexual violence (IPTK and 
APDP, 2015).
The North Eastern part suffers similar violations of right to life. Human 
Rights Alert, an Imphal-based human rights group, documented 17 cases in 
which security forces allegedly extra-judicially executed civilians in 2006; in 
2007, 12 cases were documented by the group; and as of July 2008, at least 
23 such cases had been listed (Human Rights Watch, 2008:6). Overall, state 
action in conflict zones needs to be seen in the context of the brutal count-
er-insurgency campaigns fought by Indian forces in the region that have left 
a long trail of human rights violations– minorities, Christians particularly, 
suffering much although there were non-Christian victims too – particular-
ly Manipur’s ethnic minorities.6 It could be claimed that atrocities are not 
designed to target minorities. However, the fact that minority concentrated 
regions in the country – Kashmir, the North Eastern states and Punjab, are 
5. ‘Encounter killing’: Killing of civilians alleged to be involved in armed confrontation with 
state forces. ‘Fake encounter killing’: Extra-judicial killing of civilians, often while they are 
in the custody of state forces, recorded by officials as resulting from an armed confrontation 
with state forces instigated by the recently deceased, see Human Rights Watch (2009). 
6.  One of the first detailed accounts of this is provided by Luithui and Haksar (1984), docu-
menting human rights violations in Nagaland and Naga areas of Manipur through the 1950s 
and 1960s that peaked in the 1980s.   
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or have all been sites of large-scale and systematic violation of the right to 
life speaks volumes for the failure of the Indian state to provide security to 
its minorities. 
Like those suffering mass violence, the victims of human rights abus-
es in conflict zones have been unable to secure justice. Amnesty Interna-
tional (2013: 8) reports: ‘there is a pattern of impunity, including unlawful 
government orders to the police not to register complaints of human rights 
violations against the security forces.’ The Asian Centre for Human Rights 
report echoes this claim, noting that the root causes of violations of right to 
life in India include impunity at all levels and across the spectrum and the 
dispensability of victims because of their caste, creed, ethnic origin, eco-
nomic status, gender or simply geographical location, that is, residing in 
areas notified as ‘disturbed areas’ under the Armed Forces Special Powers 
Act (AFSPA) of 1958 (Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2015: 5). 
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 and the Armed Forces 
(J&K) Special Powers Act 1990 have been in force since 1958 in parts of 
North East India and since 1990 in Jammu and Kashmir. The Amnesty re-
port notes, ‘The laws provide sweeping powers to soldiers, including the 
power to shoot to kill in certain situations and to arrest people without war-
rants. They also provide virtual immunity from prosecution by requiring 
prior permission from the central government before security personnel 
can be prosecuted. This permission is almost never given,’ going on to con-
clude that the law has facilitated grave human rights violations, including 
extra judicial executions, enforced disappearances, rape and torture and 
other ill treatment. (Amnesty International 2013:1).  Attempts to challenge 
AFSPA by human rights activists, UN bodies, as well as by government set 
up committees (Justice Verma Committee, notably) have been met with 
weak responses from authorities, and little evident commitment to tackling 
impunity. And in a landmark judgment recently, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the protection provided to armed forces under AFSPA is not ‘absolute’, 
propping up hopes of civil rights activists in their fight for greater state ac-
countability (The Indian Express, 2016).   
‘Conflict zones’ are not the only sufferers. Over the past decades, and 
especially in the context of the ‘war on terror’, police and security forces 
have been armed with various emergency powers – mostly on preventive 
detention. Whilst they differ in details, most, like the one the recent Gu-
jarat Control of Terrorism and Organized Crime Bill (GCTOC), sought to 
legislate, have provisions that undermine due process - detention without 
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charge for extended periods; making confessions to police admissible in 
courts of law; and immunity of police and security forces from prosecution. 
(SAHRDC, 2015: 12-14). Evidence is surfacing about the extensive abuse of 
anti-terror laws in targeting minorities, tribals, deprived sections as well as 
political activists. 
Commenting on India’s principal anti-terror law, the Unlawful Activities 
Prevention Act (UAPA), Manisha Sethi (2014: 7) notes that it provides ‘a 
ready recipe for witch-hunting and targeting of people, groups, and commu-
nities, seen as inimical to “national interest”, that is itself defined according 
to the political, ethnic or communal prejudices of the Executive.’ Putting 
things in context, Human Rights Watch states that ‘the security forces in 
India, the world’s largest democracy, have time and again responded to 
horrific attacks (such as bomb blasts) by committing numerous, serious hu-
man rights violations in their quest to identify and prosecute suspected per-
petrators. These abuses are both unlawful under Indian and international 
law and counterproductive in the fight against terrorism’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 2011:3).
Indeed, the discourse on terrorism has, as Sethi (2014: 7) notes, allowed 
and justified the ‘usual suspects’, namely Muslim youth, to be detained, ar-
rested and incarcerated on charges of terrorism. This has the most severe 
effect on victims as they suffer harrowing experiences for varying lengths of 
time: illegal detention and torture (physical and psychological), incarcer-
ation and trial. The losses are deeper. As a report by the Jamia Teachers’ 
Solidarity Association (JTSA), a victim support group (2012: 8) notes, ‘busi-
nesses were destroyed; family members were broken, having suffered the 
humiliation and trauma of being associated with “terrorists”; children had 
to abandon their studies and the normality of everyday life, while parents 
passed away in grief and despair.’ 
A good indicator of how the criminal justice system works for minorities 
is the representation of different religious groups in the prison population 
in the country.7 Muslims and Christians find disproportionate representa-
tion among detenues, under-trial prisoners and convicts (see Table 3). 
State-level data shows that states like Tamil Nadu in particular have 
very high proportion of ‘detenues’ from minority groups and Gujarat, Tamil 
7. The fact that data on this is available on an annual basis, disaggregated by states and religious 
groups is of course the other reason why this can be used as a good indicator.
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Nadu and Uttar Pradesh have very high numbers of minority ‘under-trial’ 
prisoners (NCRB, 2014:106, 103). This reveals, among other things, the bias 
against these communities in the criminal justice system. The case of Maha-
rashtra is telling (see Table 4).
Providing context to these figures is a recent study of prisoners in Ma-
harashtra’s jails, where Muslims were very over-represented. Most victims 
were male; had poor education; and belonged to lower income groups. Only 
31 per cent were convicts while the rest were all under-trials. Seventy-five 
per cent had been arrested for the first time; 52 per cent had had their 
bail applications rejected (most of them did not even know the reason for 
rejection); 25 per cent had no lawyers to fight for them; and 61 per cent had 
no contact with NGOs (Raghavan and Nair, 2011: iv-v). 
A study of Naxalite under-trials in Jharkhand found a large number of 
fake cases under CLA Act, UAPA and that the anti-state sections of the In-
dian Penal Code (IPC) had been foisted upon the victims mostly Christian 
Adivasis, besides Dalits and other backward classes (Puthumattathil et al., 
2015). The study ‘exposes the deliberate misuse of criminal justice proce-
dures to repress alleged Naxalite under-trial detainees inside Jharkhand’s 
jails’ - many from Christian backgrounds. Torture in custody; inhibiting 
pre-trial and trial proceedings; serial foisting of cases and re-arrests; fake 
cases; prejudiced denial of bail; and under-trial detentions were common. 
The study also revealed a very high incidence of acquittals indicating gross 
misuse of the criminal justice system (Puthumattathil et al., 2015: 3-4). 
The failures of reforms
In this section we examine the outlook for improvements. The key instru-
ment of police reforms in India is the 2006 Supreme Court directive to cen-
tral and state governments for making changes in the evocative words of 
a Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) report, so as to move 
them from being a ‘force’ to ‘service’ (Commonwealth Human Rights Initia-
tive, 2012). The directives cover a range of reforms including (i) establishing 
state security commissions for policy and oversight of police functioning 
and to lessen undue interference;  (ii) fixed tenure for director generals of 
police and other key security functionaries; (iii) setting up police establish-
ment boards in states and the National Security Commission at the centre 
for managing personnel matters professionally; (iv) separation of investi-
gation and law and order functions; and (v) setting up independent police 
complaints authorities at the state and district levels.  
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According to the CHRI (2012:30) report, state governments’ compliance 
with the 2006 directives, including adopting the model police bill, ‘is slow 
and rife with dilution.’ At places, adoption of recommendations is slow, 
elsewhere while structures have been put in place the spirit of reforms has 
been defeated – a case in point is the independent police complaints au-
thority (PCA), as a grievance redressal mechanism which was imagined to 
encourage greater public responsiveness. Whilst states have set up PCAs, in 
most cases they are hardly ‘independent’ with serving police officers made to 
head these bodies and with no mechanism for public representatives. Other 
efforts at reforms encouraging accountability and strengthening the rule of 
law including compliance with human rights provisions are also going slow. 
The rule of law is in danger of being further diluted as the government is 
stalling efforts for adopting the revised Prevention of Torture Bill, drafted 
by a Parliamentary Select Committee (2010) whilst the central government 
has pushed through stringent amendments to the UAPA Act 2012. 
Finally, the world over a representative police/security force has been 
seen to minimize both poor treatment of minorities by police forces and 
also in enhancing trust in the police among the wider citizenry. It was for 
this reason that the Sachar Committee (looking into the socioeconomic con-
ditions of Muslims) proposed efforts for greater recruitment of Muslims in 
police/security forces and posting more Muslim officers in areas with large 
Muslim populations (Government of India, 2006). This was also adopted 
as a policy decision of the government (under the 15 Point Programme) to 
make the police force more representative. But as reports show there are not 
enough officers to post in all Muslim majority areas and there is also poor 
recruitment of police personnel from minority backgrounds, particularly 
Muslims by state governments. Official data shows that Muslim represen-
tation in police forces actually decreased from 8.39 per cent in 2001 to 6.52 
per cent in 2011 (see Table 5).  
Whilst laws on equality and non-discrimination abound, what is missing 
are measures to counter discrimination/biased treatment against particu-
lar groups, especially when the perception of discrimination is widespread. 
This is a central weakness of Indian minority rights. There are also specific 
gaps such as the absence of a clear anti-torture legislation, something that 
the Indian state has managed to stonewall for long, despite a strong push by 
UN agencies and international as well as local civil society groups. Another 
weakness of the rule of law in India which affects minorities is the impunity 
that state actors enjoy in law and the complete absence of effective account-
ability mechanisms. 
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2001 2011
Population 
share
Representation in 
police forces 
Population share Representation  in 
police forces 
SC 16.2 13.39 16.6 13.67
ST 8.2 8.05 8.6 10
Muslims 13.4 8.39 14.2 6.52
Others 62.2 70.14 61.37 69.78
Table 5. Police forces and group representation   (All figures in per cent)
Source: Tabulated by the author from NCRB reports (2001 to 2015).
Hindu Muslim Christian Other 
Population (2011) 78.35 14.20 02.40 -
Detenues 62.71 20.32 15.60 1.35
Under-trials 69.73 21.05 03.90 05.30
Convicts 72.49 16.38 03.93 07.18
Table 3. Prison data, India (2014) (All figures in per cent)
Table 4. Prison data, Maharashtra (2014) (All figures in per cent)
Source: Tabulated by the author from Prison Statistics India (NCRB 2015). 
Detenue: Any person detained in prison on the orders of competent authority
under the relevant preventive detention law.
Under-trial: Any person kept in prison (judicial custody) while the charges against him/her are being 
tried.
Convict: A prisoner undergoing a sentence.
Source: Tabulated by the author from Prison Statistics India (NCRB 2015). 
Detenue: Any person detained in prison on the orders of competent authority
under the relevant preventive detention law.
Under-trial: Any person kept in prison (judicial custody) while the charges against him/her are being 
tried.
Convict: A prisoner undergoing a sentence.
Hindu Muslim Others
Population (2011) 79.82 11.54 -
Detenues 43.75 34.34 21.87
Under-trials 60.29 26.39 13.38
Convicts 68.57 22.45 08.90
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Socioeconomic rights and 
non-discrimination
Constitutional provisions and programmes
The Constitution of India guarantees equality before law (Article 14); right 
to equal opportunity in employment and appointment to public office and 
prohibits discrimination, including on religious grounds (Article 15, ½, 
Article 16 [1], [2]). The Constitution also enjoins upon the state to eliminate 
inequalities (Article 38[2]). 
Status of implementation of rights
While assessing how these rights have been provided, we will first look at 
outcomes for religious minorities in terms of key indicators of develop-
ment and/or backwardness:  poverty, employment/unemployment, access 
to land and assets, nutrition/health and education among others. This will 
help us understand how equality works for minorities at the impact lev-
el. We will then try to see how the Indian government provides for mino- 
rities – the programmes and schemes put in place to close the gap – exam-
ining how they work, and what space there is for better impact.
Poverty
Poverty indices in different religious groups (what percentage of the pop-
ulation of the group lives below the official poverty line) show variations 
for rural and urban areas. Poverty lines for the two are different.8 Table 6 
shows that the incidence of poverty in rural areas was the highest amongst 
Buddhists; it was also high among Zoroastrians/Parsis and others includ-
ing Muslims. In urban areas, it was the highest among Muslims by a wide 
margin as compared to the next group of Buddhists. Overall, Hindus, the 
dominant group in the country, do much better than the minorities – 
at least some of them – on poverty incidences. 
Another way to look at the poverty trend is to see the share of religion 
in the overall population of the poor (see Table 7). All minority groups did 
poorly on this count, with a higher share among the poor than their popula-
tion would warrant. However, the figure that stands out is the very high and 
disproportionate share of Muslims among the poor in urban areas. This is a 
running theme in our study of poverty trends in the country. 
8. Urban poverty line= Rs 47 per day.  Rural poverty line = Rs 32 a day.
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Religious group Rural Urban
Buddhists 40.59 28.62
Christians 16.21 12.47
Hindus 28.90 23.35
Jains 2.59 2.57
Muslims 29.26 41.38
Others 36.02 22.91
Sikhs 5.00 6.08
Zoroastrians 35.42 10.74
Total 28.29 25.62
Table 6. Poverty incidences across religious communities
(based on NSSO Consumption Expenditure (2004-05)
Source: Thorat (2013:16).
Source: Thorat (2013:16).
Religious 
Communities
Rural Urban
 Population   
(2001 Census)      
 Poor 
(NSSO, 
2004-05
Population 
(2001 Census)       
Poor (NSSO, 
2004-05
Buddhists 0.77 0.89 0.66 1.07
Christians 1.14 2.81 2.14 2.86
Hindus 85.52 79.99 82.33 75.60
Jains 0.01 1.10 0.14 1.12
Muslims 11.78 12.93 11.96 17.26
Others 0.43 0.09 0.81 0.22
Sikhs 0.34 2.12 1.90 1.79
Zoroastrians 0.01 0.07 NA NA
Table 7. Share of religious poor (in all-India poor)
Other indicators of poverty show similar trends. Mean per capita con-
sumption expenditure (MPCE), another measure of economic well-be-
ing, was low for Muslims and Buddhists. Buddhists had the lowest MPCE 
in rural areas at Rs 506.26 (against the national average of Rs  558.71) 
with the Muslims not far above; in urban areas, Muslims did significantly 
worse than other groups at Rs 776.50 (against the national average of Rs 
1,052.36) (Thorat, 2013: 19).  Much of the problem stems from poor ac-
cess of minorities such as Muslims and Buddhists to productive livelihood 
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opportunities. The relative deprivation of Muslims and Buddhists was evi-
dent in their ownership of assets as well – the access index of asset ownership 
across social groups was the lowest for SCs, while across religious commu-
nities it was the lowest among Muslims in 2002–03. (Government of India, 
2011: 6) (see Table 8).
The workforce participation rate (WPR) measures population from 
groups participating in the national workforce in different categories. 
Among the major religious groups, WPR (based on Employment/Unem-
ployment Survey, NSSO 61st round, 2004-05), was the highest among 
Zoroastrians in urban areas and among Buddhists in rural areas. That for 
Hindus, Christians and Sikhs was comparable, ranging between 34 and 37 
per cent in urban areas, but was lower for Muslims at close to 32 per cent 
in both urban and rural areas (Thorat, 2013: 24). As the Arjun Sengupta 
report on workers in the unorganized sector shows, most Muslims  in the 
workforce were in the unorganized sector (Government of India, 2007a). 
Organized sector participation, again based on the NSSO 61st round survey 
(both in the public and private sectors) was the lowest for Muslims among 
all religious groups. According to Sachar Committee, Muslims represent-
ed only 4.9 per cent of all employees (in central and state governments) 
(Government of India, 2006: 165). 
The picture that then emerges is of minority groups doing worse than 
the majority community and also vast differences within minority groups 
themselves, with Muslims and (neo) Buddhists (officially categorized most-
ly as SCs) worse off as compared to the others. The Sachar Committee 
tasked with examining deprivation among the country’s Muslims found that 
Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal constituted the 
poorest sections of India’s population along with SCs and STs. These were 
also states where most Muslims lived. Other reports like the India Human 
Development Report (India-HDR, 2011) show similar trends (Government 
of India, 2011:4). Significantly high urban poverty among Muslims was also 
reported by India-HDR, using NSS 2007-08 data at 23 per cent as com-
pared to 13 per cent for Hindus as a whole. 
Notably, it is Dalits who make up the bulk of the poor within each re-
ligious group. This applies as much to Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, as it 
does to Muslims and Christians. Table 9 confirms that poverty trends for 
religious groups as a whole are also reflected in poverty trends for Dalits 
among them. 
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Economic status ST/SC All OBCs 
(except 
Muslims)
All Muslims 
(except STs/
SCs)
Others (without 
SCs/STs, OBCs, 
Muslims)
Extremely poor 32.4 20.3 27.4 8.5
Marginal and vulnerable 55.4 59.6 57.1 46.3
Poor and vulnerable (PV) 87.8 79.9 84.5 54.8
Middle and high income (MHI) 12.2 20.1 15.5 45.2
All (PV+MHI) 100 100 100 100
All (millions) 302 391 138 258
Table 8. Distribution of expenditure classes by social identity
Table 9: Poverty levels of Dalits among religious groups
Source: Government of India (2007a:8); based on NSS 61st round (2004-05).
Source: Deshpande (2008:28, 29), based on NSSO (2004-05).
And yet traditionally Dalit communities among Muslims and Chris-
tians – the poorest of the poor as data shows - are not categorized as  SCs. 
The law barring this is contained in Article 341 (3) of the Constitution that 
bars non-Hindus (interpreted in Indian jurisprudence as those following 
‘non-indigenous’ faiths – Islam, Christianity, Judaism) -  from being con-
ferred Scheduled Caste status, thus depriving them of a range of affirmative 
action policies and priority coverage under anti-poverty schemes. This fail-
ure of the state provides one of the clearest cases of discrimination in law 
against sections of religious minorities.  
Health and nutrition
We now look at the health and nutritional status of marginalized sections, 
particularly children and women, across religious groups. When it comes 
to children’s health we take two measures – nutritional status and level of 
immunization. Pregnant women’s health uses the place of delivery as the 
Rural Urban
Buddhists 45.9 28.9
Christians 30.1 32.3
Hindus 37.7 40.9
Muslims 39.6 46.8
Sikhs 7.6 24.8
All Dalits 36.8 39.8
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measure. Data confirms that while it is true that overall health indicators 
(outcome – IMR, U5MR, MMR) are improving, and over time these indica-
tors for marginalized groups like SCs/STs and Muslims are converging with 
the national average (Government of India, 2011: 8), process indicators such 
as the immunization rate, institutional deliveries and contraception prev-
alence rates are less robust, especially when it comes to excluded groups 
including particular minorities. In input indicators (public investment in 
health, health facilities and human resources, sanitation, safe drinking 
water and the like), according to NHFS III data (2005-06) there are the 
most problems for Muslims and others like them. STs and Muslims had the 
highest total fertility rate (TFR), only one-third of Muslim and SC wom-
en had institutional deliveries, only around 50 per cent of Muslim, SC and 
ST women received three or more antenatal ANC (I) visits (Government of 
India, 2011: 10). 
Table 10 provides a snapshot of child immunization status across re-
ligious groups.  It is clear that access of Muslims to essential services that 
potentially impact health well-being was limited with poor rates particularly 
for BCG and DPT. 
Similarly, the per cent distribution of live births by place of delivery and 
percentage delivered in a health facility (see Table 11) is a good measure 
of access (and awareness) among communities about health facilities and 
good health practices. Here too, the Muslims did badly, with only 33 per 
cent live births in a health facility as compared to 39 per cent for Hindus and 
much higher figures for other groups  (NFHS III 2005-06 data). 
Finally, malnutrition is an indicator of chronic hunger, which is critically 
linked to people’s health status. As we know, India fares badly on this count. 
The incidence of children suffering from anaemia and stunting and female 
malnutrition were above the national average among Muslims, particularly 
in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and other states with a high concentration of 
Muslims. And while female malnutrition nationally has been reducing over 
time, it is increasing for Muslims (data between 1998–99 and 2005–06). 
(Government of India 2011: 8). Table 12 shows the status of child malnu-
trition across religious groups providing data on the percentage of children 
under-5 years, classified as malnourished according to two anthropometric 
indices of nutritional status: height-for-age and weight-for-age. Minority 
groups, particularly Muslims and Buddhists, do particularly poorly across 
the two measures. 
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Education
Poverty and education have a well-established correlation. To find out the 
relative performance of religious groups on this count we take three mea-
sures – literacy rate, school attendance and education level. As is clear 
(see Table 13) there were wide variations across religious groups on these 
counts. On the one hand, Jains and Christians had the highest literacy rates, 
much higher than Hindus as a whole, while on the other, Sikhs, Buddhists 
and Muslims figured at the bottom. 
The variances in school attendance were similar (Table 14) with just over 
42 per cent Muslim boys and 37.52 per cent girls in the 6-14 years age group 
according to NSSO 2004-05 survey attending school. Jains and Christians 
led here too and were much better than the majority Hindus. 
According to Census 2001, Muslims were the least literate among all re-
ligious communities. The NSSO 2007-08 survey, education round, further 
confirmed a high proportion of Muslims as illiterate. This proportion was 
at par with that of SCs/STs and higher than that for OBCs. Muslim women 
(47.3 per cent) were amongst the most illiterate sections of society, com-
parable to SC/ST (53.2) women. A substantial proportion of Muslims—18 
per cent male and 15.4 per cent female - had attained only primary educa-
tion. Meanwhile at higher, upper primary and above levels, the proportion 
of Muslim children was significantly lower than that among all other groups 
including SCs. Most seriously, the incidence of ‘out-of-school’ children (of 
all social groups) was the highest among Muslims (Fazal, 2013: 6). 
The main concern with education among Muslims remains low reten-
tion rates leading to dropouts and poor transition as children progress 
through the school system. According to a government fact-finding re-
port, using data from 2011-12  Muslim children constituted 16.6 per cent 
of the total national enrolment in Grade I, but this declined to 8.4 per 
cent at Grade VIII (Government of India, 2013:11), leading the report to 
conclude, ‘...transition to upper primary stage is one of the major bottle-
necks in the education of Muslim children’ (Government of India 2013:14). 
Table 15 confirms this. The other concern is around girls’ education, with 
only a minuscule proportion of Muslims girls having completed secondary 
and graduate education (Government of India, 2013: 5). 
According to HDR (2011), the incidence of out-of-school children was 
associated with poverty. Financial constraints turned out to be the main 
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Public 
sector 
NGO Private Own 
home 
Parents Other In a health 
facility 
Hindus 18.4 0.5 20.3 50.9 9.3 0.4 39.1
Muslims 15.4 0.3 17.3 56.7 9.6 0.5 33.0
Christians 23.6 0.9 28.9 42.0 3.8 0.7 53.4
Sikhs 15.1 1.2 42.0 32.3 9.2 0.1 58.3
Buddhists 37.2 0.2 21.3 23.4 17.2 0.6 58.8
Jains 30.9 2.6 59.6 4.1 2.8 0 93.1
Table 11. Place of delivery
Table 12. Child nutrition levels across religions
Table 13. Literacy rates
Source: Thorat (2013:33), based on NFHS III.
Source: Thorat, (2013: 41), based on NFHS III (2005-06).
Source: Thorat, (2013:3-4), based on Census of India (2001).
Religious group Height-for-age-status Weight-for-age-status
Percentage 
below -3 SD 
Chronically 
malnourished
Percentage  
Below-2 SD1 
Severely 
malnourished
Percentage 
below-3SD 
Chronically 
malnourished
Percentage 
below-2 SD1 
Severely 
malnourished
Hindus 23.4 48.0 16.1 43.2
Muslims 26.2 50.3 15.6 41.8
Christians 17.9 39.0 8.7 29.7
Sikhs 13.4 29.8 7.8 22.0
Buddhists 23.2 56.1 14.7 39.2
Jains 5.9 31.2 6.6 24.0
Others 34.0 58.5 35.4 62.7
Religious groups    Person Male Female
Hindus 54.92 64.22 44.92
Muslims 48.05 54.99 40.63
Christians 69.45 72.76 66.17
Sikhs 60.56 65.03 55.56
Buddhists 62.16 71.05 52.83
Jains 84.09 86.67 81.35
Others 38.57 49.78 27.27
All Religions 54.51 63.24 45.15
India 
Is the Idea Unraveling?
178
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
barrier to continuation of education forcing children into child labour. This 
was higher among Muslims (3 per cent) as compared to the national average 
(2.4 per cent) in 2007-08. Involvement of Muslims in traditional occupa-
tions (weaving carpets and working with glass, locks and brassware, among 
others) which due to old technology attract child labour, has been a fac-
tor here. Overall, the literacy problem among Muslims is the worst in Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal (Government of India, 2011: 229).
Providing for minorities: The limited policy space
Provisions for equality (Article 14, and Article 16 [1] [2]) and non-discrimi-
nation (Article 15[1] [2]) in the Constitution have failed to prevent the socio-
economic marginalization of sections of minorities. As data demonstrates, 
rural Buddhists, urban Muslims and sections of Sikhs and Christians form 
a bulk of these marginalized groups.  Besides provisions for equality, the 
Constitution also makes it the state’s duty to eliminate inequalities (Article 
38 [2]) and promote educational and economic interests of weaker sections 
(Article 46). More concretely, the law authorizes the state to make special 
provisions for the economic advancement of backward classes (Article 
15 [4]) and to make reservations in appointments for backward sections 
(Article 16 [4]). These have been used to fruitful ends to support groups des-
ignated as Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Back-
ward Castes (OBCs) to overcome poverty and marginalization. Yet, succes-
sive governments as well as courts in India have, despite evidence, refused 
to extend these affirmative action provisions of the Constitution to religious 
minorities. As discussed earlier, Dalit Muslims and Christians from the SC 
category have been excluded thus depriving them of the extensive and elab-
orate regime of compensation. There is also discrimination in how the state 
treats different religions when it comes to addressing poverty and depriva-
tion of some of its poorest citizens. Article 341 (3) of the Constitution bars 
non-Hindus from being counted among SCs, claiming that the caste sys-
tem exists only among Hindus (and other ‘indigenous’ religions – Sikhism, 
Buddhism and Jainism–  being officially counted as Hindus).
The Prime Minister’s High Level Committee on Social, Economic and 
Educational Status of Muslim Communities in India, (otherwise known as 
the Sachar Committee) broke new ground in public discourse on depriva-
tion of the Muslim community in the country. By collating and analysing 
considerable empirical evidence, perhaps for the first time in indepen-
dent India and, using official data sources, the report shifted the public 
debate on the conditions of Muslims from one based on perceptions and 
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Religious  Communities Males Females 
Jains 54.68 57.20
Christians 52.22 47.14
Buddhists 49.82 46.43
Sikhs 47.83 44.34
Hindus 46.76 39.74
Others 43.10 39.30
Muslims 42.27 37.52
Zoroastrians 41.55 34.31
Table 14. School attendance (6-14 years)
Table 15. School attendance (6-14 years)
Source: Thorat, (2013:7-8) based on NSSO, 61st round, 2004-05.
Source: Thorat, (2013:13), based on NSSO (2004-05).
Illiterate Literate 
without 
formal 
education
Literate 
but 
below 
primary  
Primary Middle Secondary 
and above 
Graduate 
& above  
Hindus 26.66 36.75 18.91 9.23 4.81 0.52 3.12
Muslims 30.12 43.19 16.34 6.13 2.49 0.24 1.49
Christians 15.26 36.26 25.08 11.85 5.72 2.28 3.54
Sikhs 27.10 35.43 14.48 13.54 6.19 0.74 2.51
Jains 11.63 25.72 20.58 24.07 8.53 0.34 9.13
Buddhists 16.60 38.07 24.19 11.73 6.33 0.25 2.82
Zoroastrians 17.28 27.57 0 27.57 0 0 27.57
rhetoric (that denied Muslim deprivation) to one that was evidence-based 
thus establishing Muslims as a legitimate subject of public policy (Govern-
ment of India, 2006:2). The Sachar Committee report led the government 
to declare a package of measures for all religious minorities - not just Mus-
lims – containing affirmative action policies; special development initia-
tives; enhanced access to credit and education opportunities; social inclu-
sion measures; and efforts for better minority sensitization of government 
functionaries (Government of India, 2009). 
An assessment of the working of schemes for minorities, four years after 
the policy announcement, revealed serious drawbacks (Centre for Equity 
Studies, 2011).These included poor design of schemes and their poor re-
sourcing resulting in their being little more than symbolic gestures, if even 
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that; and a weak institutional environment that prevented robust imple-
mentation including weak and ad-hoc structures and processes and poor 
capacities of implementing agencies, combined with a pervasive inability 
on the part of frontline state actors to connect purposefully with minority 
communities (Centre for Equity Studies, 2011:40). The findings of the study 
include: 
i. Minorities made up 19 per cent of the country’s population (Census 
2001).  Budgetary allocations for schemes meant specifically for the mi-
norities was just above 5 per cent of the total plan allocation in FY 2010-
11. The Ministry of Minority Affairs’ outlay for FY 2010-11 was Rs 2,600 
crore, a small sum given its status as a nodal ministry. Per capita plan 
allocation for minorities in 2010-11 was Rs 797 (against Rs 1,521 for STs 
and Rs 1,228 for SCs).
ii. Government departments had not been able to spend even the limited 
funds for minorities. Utilizations under the multi-sectoral development 
programme (MSDP) was a serious concern. Poor spending was a result 
of poor design of programmes and weak institutional mechanisms.
iii. Coverage of ‘minority schemes’ was narrow focusing mainly on basic 
services (local infrastructure and housing) and scholarship schemes. 
Provisions for creating livelihoods and boosting education attainments 
– both serious concerns for minorities – were only token in nature.
iv. The flagship programme for minorities – The 15-Point Programme – 
sought to earmark a minimum 15 per cent of outlays and physical targets 
of select universal programmes for better reach. This had not worked. 
Although akin to a sub-plan for minorities, the 15-Point programme 
had very limited detailing and enforcement of systems for planning and 
reporting financial and physical performance on minorities’ access to 
universal programmes on education (Sarva Siksha Abhiyan), health and 
nutrition (ICDS, NRHM) and urban services (JNNURM). And only a 
few central ministries had actually allocated the minimum 15 per cent of 
their outlays. 
v. The other ‘minority’ scheme, MSDP too had little budgetary provisions 
and a very blunt area-development mandate and approach to be of much 
help in lifting minorities out of poverty. Institutional weaknesses fur-
ther dampened impact. These included poor capacities of implement-
ing agencies; poor monitoring of projects; and absence of participatory 
planning and implementation.
vi. The Ministry of Minority Affairs, the central agency charged with 
providing leadership to minority programmes, lacked the institutional 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority:
Caste among religious 
minorities in India
This profile discusses the issue of intersectionality of caste and re-
ligion. One of the important purposes of the profile is to break the 
common and clichéd stereotype of identifying caste as a category 
that exists in Hinduism. In contrast to this popular understanding, 
we bring stories of a minority caste (Dalit) within the ambit of reli-
gious minorities in India. It is interesting to note that the most ex-
cluded Dalit community as a category exists within the fold of four 
religious minorities  – Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and Sikhs. 
Hence, it would be appropriate to take a historical detour to under-
stand the historical origin of caste outside the purview of Hinduism. 
Tracing the origin of caste system within the Muslim community 
Yoginder Sikand said: 
Most Indian Muslims are descendants of ‘ untouchable and ‘low’ 
caste converts, with only a small minority tracing their origins to 
Arab, Iranian and Central Asian settlers and invaders… Indian 
Muslim society is characterised by numerous caste-like features, 
consisting of several caste-like groups (jatis). Muslims who claim 
foreign descent claim a superior status for themselves as ashraf 
or ‘noble’. Descendants of indigenous converts are, on the other 
hand, commonly referred to contemptuously as ajlaf or ‘base’ or 
‘lowly’. As among the Hindus, the various jatis among the ajlaf 
Muslims maintain a strong sense of jati identity (Countercur-
rents, 2013). 
Sikand goes on to add that the wider Dalit identity, a result of the 
Dalit movement, ‘does not seek to deny individual jati identities. 
Rather, it takes them into account but seeks to subsume them with-
in the wider collective Dalit identity, based on a common history 
of suffering as well as common racial origins as indigenous people. 
This seems to have been a crucial factor in the emergence of a spe-
cific ‘Dalit Muslim’ identity (http://www.countercurrents.org/dal-
it-sikander200903.htm). 
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and political authority to ensure compliance by all state actors for mi-
nority focused objectives. Overall, it seems to have made little effort to 
push the minority development agenda with governments and agencies 
through capacity building and sensitization or in minority communities 
themselves through outreach. States and districts suffered similar, or 
worse, institutional weaknesses. Minority welfare departments and dis-
trict offices had very poor capacity and very limited mandate and trac-
tion with other departments. 
A recent analysis confirms this assessment. The first official evaluation 
of the working of programmes set up on the recommendation of the Sachar 
report (Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014, popularly called Kundu 
Committee) concluded that not a great deal had changed since the start 
of programme. The findings of the Kundu report include (Government of 
India, 2014a:152-153):
i. Schemes under the PM’s 15-Point programme and MSDP were area 
development schemes, with little targeted focus on minority communi-
ties. A good example is Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JN-
NURM) where large investments, purportedly as part of the 15-Point 
Programme mostly on urban infrastructure had little resonance for mi-
norities. Barring the odd exception, such as scholarship schemes, there 
was little attempt to specifically target minority communities through 
clear operational plans and beneficiary lists. 
ii. Connected to this is the problem of sound data. Except a very rapid base-
line survey of the MCDs, ‘there has not been any systematic assessment 
of the development deficits in MCDs and determination of the target un-
der different schemes’. There seemed to be no clear plan and roadmap, 
with targets and allocations fluctuating year on year.  And non-availabil-
ity of disaggregated data by religious groups locally for several schemes 
constrained the assessment of the effectiveness of the schemes for dif-
ferent communities.
iii. There was also lack of institutional mechanisms and implementation 
staff at the state, district and block levels. Further, whatsoever staff 
existed in many states, a large proportion lacked motivation. It was 
not surprising then that the impact of the programmes for minorities 
remained the least, leaving them disillusioned with government 
promises. Also, no effective evaluation of any programme was done 
and social audits had not been conducted. In fact political promises 
and rhetoric for minority development stood in contrast to the effective 
benefits to minorities from the schemes.
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Commenting on the origin of the caste system in the everyday prac-
tices of the Muslim community, the National Commission for Mi-
norities report, prepared by Satish Deshpande, noted:
Day-to-day relationships between different individuals in any lo-
cal Muslim community are determined by their membership of the 
caste-analogue rather than by the broad categories of ashraf and ajlaf. 
In any local area or community the Muslim population is divided into a 
number of social groups which are analogous to castes among Hindus. 
These caste-analogues are … characterised by endogamy, hereditary 
membership … particular occupation and is usually associated with a 
more or less distinct ritual status in a hierarchical system (Deshpande, 
2008: 14). 
Compared to Muslims, there is much less ambiguity about caste 
practices among Indian Christians. Deshpande’s study brings out 
the fact that a substantial portion (50 to 75 per cent) of the Chris-
tian community is made of former Hindu untouchable castes (Desh-
pande, 2008: 14-15). During colonial times Christianity held out 
several promises, especially to the then untouchable Hindu society. 
Education by the missionaries and a promise for social justice, hith-
erto unknown among the Hindu Dalits, must have played an import-
ant role in the mass conversions from Hinduism to Christianity (Ba-
rua, 2015: 95. Also see another interesting book on the same theme 
which makes the same point, Frykenberg, 2003).  
However, it is not only the lower caste that converted to Christian-
ity. Significant sections of the upper caste population, especially in 
the southern state of Kerala, too converted. Deshpande writes that 
the ‘old Christians are known as Syrian Christians whereas Harijan 
converts are known as Putu Christians (Neo-Christians), Chermar 
Christians, Pulaya Christians etc.’ (Deshpande, 2008:16) 
Caste as a social and institutional category is also present in a signif-
icant way among the Buddhists community in India. Maharashtra is 
home to the largest population of Indian Buddhists. Under the po-
litical influence of Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar, a larger section 
of the erstwhile Hindu Dalit population denounced their religious 
... contd. ...
... Profile of a vulnerable vinority continued ....
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iv. Plans and financial allocations were modest in relation to the depriva-
tion of the minorities, especially Muslims, and for some of the schemes 
this meagre amount had not been fully utilized showing lack of zeal and 
coordination among officials and agencies.
Effective participation
The right to effective participation sees to it that minorities have a right to 
participate in decisions at national and local levels that affect their lives. 
There are various ways in which this outcome is sought to be actualized, 
including through effective representation of minorities in governing insti-
tutions and effective political participation. Effective political participation 
is a key ingredient in enabling minority voices to be heard.     
Constitutional provisions
Constitutional provisions with regard to rights of all citizens to effective par-
ticipation include: 
• Part 15 of the Constitution, governing the right to vote and the right to 
contest elections.
• Article 14 and Article 15 (1) provide that these ‘political’ rights are avail-
able without discrimination to all citizens. 
• Article 324 provides for an independent Election Commission. 
• Article 16 provides equality of opportunity in matters of public employ-
ment. 
• Article 19 (1) C gives to all citizens the right to form associations or unions.
Political representation of minorities
The key national governing institution is the Parliament. A look at the rep-
resentation9 in the Lok Sabha (the lower and the directly elected House of 
Parliament) reveals some stark facts (see Figure 1). 
Representation of minorities in the Lok Sabha is poor. The larg-
est demographic minority in India, Muslims, comprised 14.2 cent of the 
9. Defined as the difference between a minority group’s proportion in a country’s legislature and 
its proportion in that population. A negative score implies under-representation.
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identity and converted to Buddhism to escape the most horrific level 
of oppression that was present during colonial times.1 The tradition 
of Hindu Dalits converting to Buddhism continues even today. Thus, 
for instance, in 2006 more than 70 people from village Kumarriguda, 
40 miles outside Hyderabad, gave up Hindu religion. D. Anjaneyulu, 
a local Dalit politician, who was apparently stopped by local Brah-
mins from raising the Indian flag because of his caste, commented 
that ‘we want to be equal to upper castes. Being a Dalit in Hindu 
society means this is not possible. Being Buddhist means we will be 
separate but equal’ (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/
oct/13/religion.india).  
The prevalence of caste in colonial times was widespread across 
the country. The North Western Province was no exception. The 
rejection of the caste system by Guru Nanak, the first the Sikh gu-
rus, was categorical. The teachings of Sikh gurus and subsequent-
ly the Granth Sahib, the holy book of the Sikhs, appeared to have 
given the out-castes a welcome feeling of honour. Though the 
Hindu varna order was altered, it did not guarantee the end of 
caste distinctions (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down-
load;jsessionid=F31AD339E2272A88CAE6DCCBEBF14007?-
doi=10.1.1.614.4430&rep=rep1&type=pdf). 
Dalits who constitute as much as 29 per cent of the total population 
of contemporary Punjab, which comes close to the number of Jat 
Sikhs, is another major community heavily concentrated (over 80 
per cent ) in the villages. The Dalit category among Sikhs is made 
up of mazhabis or the scavenger caste of chuhras and ramdasis 
(also called ravidasis) or the caste of leather workers, the chamars 
(Fazal, 2015).
The SCs in Punjab are divided into different communities with their 
own distinct social identities and experiences of economic develop-
ment. According to the official list Punjab has 37 SCs. However, a 
large majority of them can be clubbed into two or three clusters. The 
first cluster of mazhabi Sikhs and the balmikis/bhangis constitute 
41.9 per cent (30.75 and 11.15 per cent respectively) of the total SC 
population in the state. The second cluster is made up of ad dharmis 
... contd. ...
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population (2011 Census) but they make up only 4.24 per cent of the current 
Lok Sabha (elected in 2014). That is a representation score of (-) 9.16 per-
centage points. Smaller minority groups find better representation. Sikhs 
have a representation score of 0.3 percentage points, while Christians, Bud-
dhists and Jains each have a score of (-)1 percentage point or less. Given that 
there is no system to compensate minority groups for poor representation 
in elected bodies (such as through ‘proportional representation’ or through 
reserved seats, as is the case for SCs and STs), it would be fair to conclude 
that the current Lok Sabha does not truly reflect the social make-up of the 
country and does not allow for minority voices to be heard.  
The Lok Sabha currently has only 23 Muslim Members of Parliament 
(MPs), all elected from seven states with concentrations of Muslims. How-
ever, Uttar Pradesh, the state with the highest Muslim population, sent no 
Muslim MP. It is equally remarkable that not a single MP of the 282 from 
the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the current Lok Sabha, is a Mus-
lim. A key issue of course was the fielding of candidates. Out of the 428 
members that the BJP fielded in the elections, it gave tickets only to seven 
Muslims. In the circumstance, all lost. Table 16 gives Muslim representa-
tives by political parties in the current Lok Sabha. 
Twenty-six other parties, including the ruling BJP (with 282 MPs in the 
House), have no representation of Muslims in the Lok Sabha. 
Even in the 15th Lok Sabha (2009) it was the same case. National par-
ties (Congress, BJP, CPI (M) and BSP) together sent 17 Muslim MPs, re-
gional parties contributed eight MPs and so-called Muslim parties another 
four; there was also an independent member, taking the total to 30 Muslim 
MPs in a House of 545. Notably, it was regional parties, rather than the 
national ones, that fielded more Muslim candidates (293 and 116 
respectively) (Jaffrelot et al., 2009). Clearly there are no incentives for 
-1.01
-0.25
-0.22
0.31
Jain
-9.16
Sikh
Catholic
Buddhist
Muslim
Figure 1. Representation of minorities in the 
16th Lok Sabha 2014
Source: Livemint, 2016.
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(15.74 per cent) and chamar/ravidasi/ramdasi Sikhs (25.85 per cent) 
who together constitute another 41.59 per cent. The remaining 33 
caste groups constitute only 16.51 per cent of the total SC population 
in Punjab.
Statistical data and a few facts
We now try to understand the present day condition of the Dalits 
living outside the purview of Hinduism. Drawing on NSSO data, the 
Deshpande report estimated the number of Dalit Muslims and Dalit 
Christians across the country. There were only about 8 lakh Dalit 
Muslims (5 lakh in rural and 3 lakh in urban India). Dalit Christians 
were about 23.5 lakh (almost 15 lakh in rural India and a little less 
than 9 lakh in urban India). The same report suggests a population 
of 56.8 lakh Dalit Sikhs in the country. Out of a total estimated 71.3 
lakh Dalit Buddhists, 29.7 lakh live in urban India, while 41.6 lakh 
live in rural areas (Deshpande, 2008: 25). Some of the findings of 
the report which gives details of the socioeconomic status of Dalits 
belonging to different religious minorities are mentioned here to give 
an idea about their plight/miserable conditions:     
1. ‘With respect to proportions of population in poverty or affluence, 
Dalit Muslims are unquestionably the worst off among all Dalits, 
in both the rural and specially the urban sector, being completely 
absent in the affluent group … Dalit Christians may be said to 
moderately better off than other Dalits except Dalit Sikhs, who 
are even better off.’ 
2. ‘The picture with respect to average levels of consumption mea-
sured by percentiles of MPCE confirms that, with the exception of 
rural Dalit Sikhs who are slightly better off all along the economic 
spectrum except at the very top, all other Dalits are basically the 
same in economic terms … Also strongly emphasised is the seri-
ous poverty among urban Muslims.’ 
3. ‘With respect to comparisons of educational levels, Dalit Muslims 
are the worst off in rural India in terms of illiteracy, but are close-
ly matched by Hindu Dalits in both rural and urban India. Dalit 
Christians are slightly better off in rural, and significantly better 
... contd. ...
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Party INC TNC PDP Muslim-led 
parties*
CPI-M NCP LJP RJD AIADMK Total
Total 
MPs
44 34 3 6 9 6 6 4 37
Muslim 
MPs
4 4 3 5 2 2 1 1 1 23
Table 16. Muslim MPs (16thLok Sabha)
Source: Tabulated from the Election Commission of India’s website.  
Note: *: AIDUF, IUML and AIMIM.
political parties to field minority candidates in elections as a means to great-
er minority representation and participation.  
A look at some of the historical data, however, reveals that it is not only 
in recent times that Parliament has shown such skewed representation; in-
stead this has always been the case. Table 17 shows Muslim representation 
in the Lok Sabha since independence. Although the current Lok Sabha may 
be particularly unrepresentative, Muslim representation has always been 
sub-par.  
State assemblies provide similar stories of poor representation of 
minorities, especially Muslims.  
Drivers of poor political representation
The Sachar Committee report, looking into the socioeconomic backward-
ness of Muslims, cited two mechanisms at play when it comes to the dismal 
representation of minorities, particularly Muslims (Government of India, 
2006: 25):
- Non-inclusion of Muslims in voter lists resulting in their not being able 
to vote.
- Notification of reserved constituencies: Muslim concentrated assembly 
constituencies being declared as ‘reserved’ constituencies where only SC 
candidates can contest elections, resulting in Muslims being unable to 
contest on those seats.
An analysis of the data relating to reserved constituencies for SC 
candidates in three states - Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal-  shows 
that constituencies declared reserved for SCs were by and large those where 
Muslims were in greater numbers, often more than 50 per cent of the 
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off in urban India. At the other end of the educational spectrum, 
there are no major differences across Dalits in rural India (except 
Buddhists, who seem to have comparatively high proportions 
with graduate or higher degrees)’ (Deshpande, 2008: 63-64)  
Let us go beyond the numbers to understand the experiences of Dal-
its from different religious minority groups to come up with anecdot-
al evidence to show their discrimination and suffering. For instance, 
although Christianity does not encourage discrimination Dalit Chris-
tians continue to be discriminated against and marginalized even by 
upper caste and non-Dalit members of the same religion. Writing 
about the relationship between Dalit and non-Dalit Christians in 
Kerala in the 1970s, the Deshpande report quoted a case study:
During the course of the field work, it was found that only Syrian Chris-
tians were referred to as ‘Christians’, and Pulaya Christians were re-
ferred to as ‘Pulayas’ by all, including the Pulaya Christians themselves. 
The Pulaya Christians addressed the Syrian Christians by honorific titles 
such as Tampuran (Lord), Panikke (Master), whereas Syrian Christians 
added the suffix ‘Pulaya’ while addressing a Pulaya Christian … It was 
found that the Syrian and Pulaya members of the same Church conduct 
religious rituals separately in separate buildings (Deshpande, 2008: 16). 
On another occasion, in Trichi  (Tamil Nadu), a wall was built across 
the Catholic cemetery. Dalit Christians, converted from the formerly 
‘untouchable’ Hindu caste, were allocated space for burial on one side 
of the wall while upper caste converts were buried on the other side. 
Fr Yesumariyan, a Jesuit, practising lawyer and a Dalit-Christian ac-
tivist, says: ‘In Tamil Nadu, over 70% of Catholics are Dalit converts. 
But only four out of 18 bishops are from the Dalit-Christian commu-
nity’ (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11229170). 
While commenting on the nature and cause of discrimination 
of Dalit Christians by the non-Christian population  (mostly the 
Hindu population), a separate report on the Christian community 
noted that the ‘Christian Dalits are treated even worse than Hindu, 
Sikh or Buddhist Dalits. In the first place, in the eyes of the Indians,  
... contd. ...
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Table 17. Muslim MPs since the first Lok Sabha (1952)
Source:Tabulated by the author from the Election Commission of India’s website.
population and higher than the proportion of SCs, whereas many constit-
uencies with large SC concentrations remained ‘un-reserved’. Reserving 
Muslim concentrated constituencies is seen as discriminatory, reducing the 
chances for Muslims to stand and be elected to state assemblies and Parlia-
ment (Government of India, 2006:25, footnote 7). Further, since Dalit Mus-
lims and Dalit Christians are officially not recognized as Scheduled Castes, 
Dalit Muslims cannot contest in the constituencies reserved for Scheduled 
Castes, thus denying them that right too. 
Apart from these reasons, it is clearly poor incentives for political par-
ties to field Muslim candidates that sustain poor Muslim representation 
in Parliament and state assemblies. The case of majoritarian parties such 
as the BJP is self-explanatory. But, as data shows, even so-called secular 
parties like the Indian National Congress (INC), Samajwadi Party (SP), Ba-
hujan Samajwadi Party (BSP), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Trinamool 
Congress  (TNC) shy away from nominating Muslim candidates. So in the 
16th Lok Sabha elections in 2014, while among BJP’s 428 candidates, only 
seven were Muslim, Congress’ case was not exemplary either. Of the 462 
Year Number of Muslim MPs per cent of the house
1952 11 2
1957 19 4
1962 20 4
1967 25 5
1971 28 6
1977 34 7
1980 49 10
1984 42 8
1989 27 6
1991 25 5
1996 29 6
1998 28 6
1999 31 6
2004 34 7
2009 30 6
2014 23 4.2
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Christian Dalits made the “mistake” of embracing the Christian 
faith, in addition to their “crime” of being born in an untouchable 
caste. The consequence of this is that Christian Dalits are in fact 
twice discriminated: as Dalits and as Christians’ (http://www.indi-
anet.nl/pdf/christiandalits.pdf).   
Thus, even a change in religion for a majority of the untouchables 
might not have brought them good lives with honour. The stories 
of many Christian Dalits echo the same agony and marginalization. 
Caste hostilities and violence against Dalit Christians is a periodical 
phenomenon. In one instance, more than 100 Dalit Catholic families 
were forced to spend a night in the fields to hide from a rampaging 
mob of upper caste Catholics. The role of the administration and po-
lice was negative. Naveen Kumar, whose father was attacked in the 
riot, recalled that the upper caste Catholic people destroyed houses, 
attacked women and children. They did not even spare cattle and 
dogs (The Hindustan Times, 2015).  
The condition of mazhabi Sikhs continues to be the worst. Even in 
their religion, the Dalits are marginalized to a great extent by gurd-
wara authorities. For instance, Dhotian village in Tarn Taran district, 
made headlines in August 2012 for conversion of 40 Sikhs to Christi-
anity. A rumor spread that Dalit Sikhs had converted to Christianity 
on the grounds of the treatment meted out to the ‘Low Caste’ Sikhs 
by the gurdwara management. The most prominent place of worship 
in the village, Gurdwara Raja Ram, does not allow mazhabis to en-
ter its premises. The nihang in the gurdwara explained that the re-
hat-maryada of the place obligates the followers to comply with a few 
adherences (Singh, 2012). He justified the prohibition on the entry 
of mazhabis as they were considered to dress shabbily and were even 
into drinking, which prompted the administration to decide that 
they would not perform the langar seva, though the other services 
were open to all. Kiranjot Kaur, a Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak 
Committee (SGPC) member and former secretary acknowledged the 
existence of caste-based gurdwaras in the state. Kaur admitted that 
the influence of caste had been removed from the gurdwaras after 
the Singh Sabha movement in the early 20th century (www.the-
hindu.com/news/national/probe-castebased-segregation-in-gurd-
waras-panel-tells-punjab-dgp/article5422572.ece).
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seats it contested, it fielded only 27 Muslims (5 per cent). With few Muslims 
put forward by centrist parties too, it is no wonder that Muslim representa-
tion in elected bodies remains poor. 
There could be various reasons for poor incentives. A key one is what ac-
ademics have described as ‘Hindu backlash’ (Hasan, 2004).  As Abdul Bari 
Siddiqui, the senior-most Muslim politician in the ruling Mahagathband-
han alliance in the 2015 Bihar elections (that returned a record number of 
Muslims to the state assembly – 10 per cent of the total, but still lower that 
the state Muslim population ratio of 16 per cent) noted (The Times of India, 
2015c):  ‘Had more Muslim candidates been given tickets, BJP would have 
blamed us for creating a Pakistan in Bihar.’
Share of minorities in public employment
As with representation in elected bodies representation in public employ-
ment is also most problematic for Muslims. 
According to data collected by the Sachar Committee, Muslims repre-
sented only 4.9 per cent of all employees in central and state governments 
in 2005. Their representation in central public sector undertakings (PSUs) 
at 3.3 per cent was only slightly bettered by state PSUs at 10.8 per cent 
(Government of India, 2006: 165). Overall, and across states, public sector 
employment data for Muslims showed better representation at the lower 
rungs (poor at the higher managerial levels) and in university jobs, espe-
cially non-teaching and in clerical positions in the postal department and 
railways. Only Andhra Pradesh had close to the population share’s repre-
sentation in jobs (Government of India, 2006: 170). In the case of senior 
management positions, the Sachar Committee report found the representa-
tion to be even lower – 3 per cent in the Indian Administrative Service, 1.8 
per cent in the Indian Foreign Service and 4 per cent in the Indian Police 
Service (Government of India, 2006: 165). 
The case of other minority communities - Christians and Buddhists in 
particular -  is somewhat more nuanced. Almost a third of India’s Christians 
belong to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) category, eligible for ‘reservations’ in 
jobs and educational institutions. Despite being a small portion (8 million) 
of the total (84 million) ST population, ST Christians command a large share 
of reserved (ST) seats in both central and state services. This is attributed 
to greater education levels particularly among Christians from the North 
Eastern states, who mostly happen to be STs and greater demand for public 
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Dalit Sikhs did not receive equal treatment in the gurdwaras of up-
per caste Sikhs. ‘Mazhabis were forbidden to enter the Golden Tem-
ple for worship; their offering of karah prasad was not accepted and 
the Sikhs denied them access to public well and other utilities’ (Singh 
1993:146-147,156-57 cited in Puri 2003:2697). Thus, the mazhabi 
Sikhs have been discriminated against as they are not allowed to use 
the wells or enter gurdwaras; they are exploited as labourers.   
As mentioned earlier, Dalit Buddhists embraced Buddhism; they 
were moved by the political and spiritual influence of the tradition 
of a rich Dalit movement in the country. But breaking away from the 
caste system became impossible for all of them, as they were pri-
marily seen as Dalits by the upper caste Hindu society. Prashita, a 
14-year-old Dalit Buddhist girl in an interview commented on the 
stark reality of discrimination: ‘In India, people don’t usually ask 
your name; they ask you, “What is your surname?” and their inten-
tion is to know what caste you belong to … Conversion does not ac-
tually change you. Though you are converted, you need to struggle 
very hard. In Buddhism there is no caste system; we are all free, we 
are all equal, but we have to put that in our mind first, and only then 
can we tell society, convince them about this.’ Nothing can capture 
more brilliantly the realization of discrimination of Dalit Buddhists 
in contemporary society (Srinivasan, 2011). 
In the book Dalit Literature we find some stories about Dalit Bud-
dhists’ conditions. In particular it gives a vivid description of the Ma-
har community and how it is denied social justice.  
The Deshpande report shows the condition of Dalit Muslims as most 
pathetic among all Dalit groups. To give an idea of the nature of 
their impoverishment, we discuss the case of Muslims of Mahawat 
caste. In villages in Barabanki district, there are a group of people 
living in extremely low socioeconomic conditions, identifying them-
selves as Muslims of the ‘Mahawat’ caste. They are mainly engaged 
in making hand-made decorative plastic flowers and other items 
and selling them in nearby areas.  According to existing literature, 
Mahawats are a sub-category of the Muslim ‘Nat’ caste  (the other 
sub-castes being Aman, Goleri, Rari, Siarmaroa and Turkata) who 
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sector jobs among them (Centre for Policy Studies, 2011).  But that leaves 
out the large proportion of non-ST Christians from the ambit of any affir-
mative policy action. This is particularly relevant for Dalit Christians who 
are excluded from coverage under the SC category. In the absence of disag-
gregated data for Christian representation in public sector employment, it 
is difficult to say what the extent of the under-representation is, but suffice 
it to say that a majority of the Christians face exclusion of representation in 
public sector employment. 
As for Buddhists, almost 90 per cent are included in the SC category 
and another 7.4 per cent find place within the ST fold (Deshpande, 2008). 
Between the two, most Buddhists are able to access a range of affirmative 
action opportunities – reservations for elected seats and in jobs and educa-
tional institutions.  
Explaining the poor representation of Muslims in public sector em-
ployment, the Sachar Committee report noted a general perception among 
Muslims  of being discriminated against in procedures (such as unhelpful 
eligibility criteria), practices (unrepresentative selection boards) and a gen-
eral sense of discrimination in selection processes which led to the absence 
of those in positions of authority raising their voice. This, the report noted, 
meant lack of any concerted focus at best and prejudice at worst, leading 
to denial to Muslims of their rightful share of services even in Grade IV 
positions where high qualifications are not required (Government of India, 
2006: 20-21). As for higher positions where there are high eligibility criteria 
and laid down procedures, based on data provided by the Union Public Ser-
vice Commission, the Sachar Committee report proposed that the biggest 
challenge was that not enough Muslim youth applied indicating a possible 
sense of alienation of Muslim youth from the Indian mainstream (Govern-
ment of India, 2006: 165-166).
Poor representation of minorities continues to endure. Part of the gov-
ernment’s efforts, as a result of the post-Sachar Committee package of 
measures, was to make greater efforts to recruit members from minority 
communities. State governments and central government departments as 
well as large agencies – paramilitary forces and PSUs – were encouraged 
to make especial efforts, including to report representation periodically. 
The Amitabh Kundu Committee, looking into the impact of the measures 
concluded that they had only had a modest impact. Table 18 reports the 
percentage of total minority recruitments in government departments 
and PSUs as a share of total recruitments between 2006-07 and 2011-12. 
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are seen across northern India but are concentrated in Varanasi, 
Allahabad, Barabanki and Jaunpur districts (Samiuddin and 
Khanam, 2008).
The word ‘Nat’ comes from the word nata or dancer, and identifies a 
group of vagrant acrobats and showmen  ‘especially those who make 
it their business to do feats on the tight-rope or with poles, and those 
who train and exhibit snakes’ (Russell and Lal, 1916). 
Mahawats live together in colonies as Muslims and Hindus have sep-
arated them from others of their religion. Although neither Muslims 
nor Hindus accept them as their own, Mahawats consider themselves 
Muslims. They make plastic flowers and take them to cities to sell, 
and some of them also sell medicinal plants. They leave the old peo-
ple in the village and the younger ones routinely migrate. They do 
not have any land of their own, and mostly live on common land in 
the village in pitiable conditions. There have been many cases of local 
strongmen forcefully occupying such land.   
Inclusion of some of these groups within the Scheduled Caste catego-
ry continues to be a debatable issue in the country. It is true that the 
neo-Buddhist population has been identified as a SC and this gives 
them recognition at least in terms of availing some of the limited fa-
cilities available. But it is unfortunate that till date the Muslim and 
Christian Dalits are fighting for recognition by the state to avail of 
different facilities offered by the government.
... Profile: Profile: Caste among religious minorities in India continued ....
2006-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12
Minorities recruited  6.93  8.23 - 7.28 10.18  6.24
Table 18: :  Minorities in public sector employment  
(Figures in per cent)
Source: Tabulated from the Government of India (2014a).
In some cases, as with police and security forces, the situation seems to have 
worsened, decreasing from 8.39 per cent in 2001 to 6.52 per cent in 2011 
(Government of India, 2014a:123).
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Minority representation in the non-public sphere
Private sector employment
Mirroring the poor minority representation in elected bodies and public em-
ployment there is also poor minority representation in corporate sector em-
ployment and poor presence in developmental civil society. A recent study 
reported that representation of Muslims in BSE 500 companies was merely 
2.67 per cent. Of the 2,324 directors and top executives in BSE 500 compa-
nies, only 62 were Muslims. Among BSE 100 companies, only 27 of the total 
587 were Muslims. (The Times of India, 2015a). In private enterprises, Mus-
lims constituted 8.16 per cent of the total employees (Khanam, 2013:139). 
Minority civil society engagement
A vibrant civil society is understood to facilitate greater outreach, aware-
ness creation, service provisioning and overall engagement among citi-
zens. Whilst civil society, in the true sense of the word, is understood as a 
non-communal space, its strength (including number of actors and orga-
nizations, types and capacity) among community groups, especially those 
that are marginalized, is a good indicator of the ability of the community to 
engage and  organize, demand and obtain rights and entitlements. In that 
sense, civil society’s strength is an aspect of effective participation.  
Data on civil society, disaggregated by minority groups, is difficult to 
come by. Here are some pointers: 
The Home Ministry publishes data on foreign contributions (under 
FCRA regulations). According to data for 2008-09 and 2010-11, there were 
4,700 Christian, 250 Muslim, 100 Buddhist and 14 Sikh NGOs, receiving 
foreign funds (The Times of India, 2012).  These groups varied significantly 
on the extent of funding that they received. Whilst it is not to claim that it is 
only foreign funding that NGOs rely on to undertake their activities, FCRA 
and its dynamics provide a good barometer of the contestations between 
the state on the one hand and minority organizations on the other. In the 
recent past, especially the last few years during the tenure of the current 
BJP regime, regulations controlling foreign donations for groups belonging 
to minority communities as well as those working for the rights of minority 
groups, have increasingly been made stringent. These have made the space 
for civil society activism around human and minority rights difficult.
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Through an order issued in June 2014 the central government banned 
over 30 NGOs working for the welfare of minorities from receiving foreign 
aid. A number of these were either Christian or Muslim-led (The Times of 
India, 2015d).  A prominent human rights NGO, Sabrang Trust, has been 
targeted by the government for its proactive role in fighting for victims of 
mass violence. The trust, led by social activist Teesta Setalvad is one of the 
leading voices against violence and injustices against minorities, fighting 
many cases relating to the pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat (2002). Sa-
brang Trust as well as another leading human rights group, the Lawyers 
Collective, have recently had their FCRA registrations revoked thus banning 
them from receiving foreign funding. This happened even as the govern-
ment was silent on the funds being received by NGOs affiliated to the Hin-
du right wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak  Sangh (RSS) (The Diplomat, 2015) 
blamed by many authoritative sources for engineering hatred and violence 
against minorities (Awaaz – South Asia Watch, 2004; Jaffrelot, 2007).
Against the proactive policy of restricting foreign funding to minori-
ty NGOs, there is little that the government itself provides for supporting 
groups led by minorities or those working for minority rights. The only ex-
ception here is the scheme for leadership development of minority women, 
called nai roshni. Firstly, the scheme is too small in scope to cover the ex-
tent of the problem of minority disempowerment.  It is also too new to have 
had an impact. Anecdotal evidence points to the need for greater awareness 
about the scheme and its procedures and better implementation by agencies 
for any meaningful impact on those for whom it is meant. 
The outcome is a civil society sector that is very restricted, particularly 
so for Muslim-led NGOs. A recent study of civil society organizations came 
up with a list of only 39 Muslim community led organizations (CLOs)10 
(of these 15 were led by Muslim women) across nine states, in which at 
least three states have large Muslim populations (Centre for Social Equity 
and Inclusion, 2014). Another study covering eight states with large Mus-
lim populations came up with a sample of 372 NGOs working for Muslims 
and reflecting some variety in sectors and approaches (Naqvi, 2015). In any 
case, most NGOs working on minority issues lack capacity, infrastructure 
and required information.
Backward sections among Muslims (pasmanda, including Dalit and 
Backward Castes) suffer further disadvantage at the hands of self-styled 
10. Presumably, these exclude faith-based organizations or those set up for religious purposes.
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ashraf (or ‘forward’) leaders in faith-based community organizations like 
madrassas and personal law boards, representative institutions (Parliament 
and state assemblies) and government departments, ministries and institu-
tions that claim to work for Muslims (minority affairs, waqf boards, Urdu 
academies and ‘minority’ universities) (Table 19). 
Poor participation of minorities
Representation and participation of minorities in governing institutions in 
India is poor. There are various factors here, including low education at-
tainment and a leadership vacuum among Muslims on the one hand and 
post-partition backlash on the community and the setting in of majoritarian 
politics, hardening communal polarization and social exclusion on the oth-
er. Observers, however, note a key right that has always been missing for 
minorities in India, and which has implications for poor participation as 
‘political’ (Robinson, 2012: 9-10). So whilst all citizens, including minori-
ty members, were guaranteed equality and non-discrimination  to vote, to 
stand for public office and to access public employment and education, the 
provisions of the Constitution for special measures for economic advance-
ment of backward sections (Article 15[4]) and for reservations in appoint-
ments for backward sections (Article 16 [4]) were understood as excluding 
religious minorities from their ambit. 
Religious minorities were left out of political rights (specifically, res-
ervations for seats in elected bodies and in public employment), in the 
final draft of the Constitution (1950) and given only cultural rights even 
though until then they were in the reckoning for this expanded package of 
rights along with SCs and STs. The 1948 draft of the Constitution carried 
both political and cultural rights for all the three disadvantaged commu-
nities – SCs, STs and religious minorities. It turned out that in the final 
version of the Constitution, only SCs and STs were bestowed political rights, 
including reservations for elected seats to Parliament and state assem-
blies and in public employment and education (Bajpai, 2002:4; Robinson, 
2012:9).
Given the dispersed nature of the Muslim population in India (barring 
the Kashmir valley) and elections based on the first-past-the-post system 
(encouraging winner take all outcomes) not to mention the other patholo-
gies that Indian minorities are increasingly subject to (rise of majoritarian 
politics, communal polarization and Hindu backlash), it is difficult to imag-
ine Muslims ever finding fair representation in elected bodies and public 
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The Bharatiya Muslim 
Mahila Andolan
As the largest minority, Muslims (approximately 14.8 per cent of the 
total population) face the most exclusions. Different studies and at 
least three special commissions set up by the central government 
point out the stark inequalities in terms of every human develop-
ment index including issues like jobs, life and security, economic 
status, poor participation in the decision making process and access 
to basic services. It is of no surprise that amidst their wretched con-
ditions of existence, it is the women within the community who have 
suffered the most historically for different economic-socio-political 
factors. Thus, one should not have any doubt in identifying them as 
‘doubly colonized’, which is perhaps a clichéd term but which is very 
effective in capturing the plight of Muslim women in the country. 
In developmental projects for the Muslim population, most of the 
time the case of women has not been properly unfolded with all its 
complexities because of which it does not receive proper attention.             
It is in this backdrop that this case study discusses the experience 
of Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA), popularly known as 
Andolan, which came into being in January 2007 at a national meet-
ing in Delhi. It was in the aftermath of Gujarat genocide that some of 
the present day women leaders and main exponents of the Andolan, 
hitherto unknown, assembled in different rehabilitation camps in the 
state to assist riot victims. From their experiences, they realized that 
the state was in complete denial mode as to what had happened to 
the minorities. Most interestingly they also observed that it was the 
women among the minority community who had to undergo a strain 
of a completely different kind as they were the most vulnerable in a 
riot like this, partly due to their social position in a society like ours. 
The leaders, from their own work experience among the Muslim 
community in general and riot victims in Gujarat in particular, re-
alized that Muslim women suffered from multiple marginalizations 
owing to poverty, lack of education, inequalities and lack of oppor-
tunities. The issue of marginalization and injustice was compounded 
by the fact that it was a minority community which was deeply in-
fluenced by conservative, religious and patriarchal forces on the one 
hand and which existed in extreme poverty on the other. Moreover, 
rising communalism and fundamentalism had resulted in increased 
Good practice case study:
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Name of the Institution Total members Upper Caste 
(Ashraf)
Backward Caste
(Pasmanda) 
Executive Committee of All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board (AIMPLB)
39 36 3
Office Bearers of AIMPLB 11 10 1
Executive Committee of All India Milli 
Council
48 44 4
Table 19: Pasmanda Muslim representationt 
Source: Anwar (2000:112).
employment. It is remarkable then that the makers of the Constitution did 
not consider compensatory mechanisms for the country’s sizeable minori-
ties such as reservations as with SCs and STs, or that other system for polit-
ical inclusiveness – ‘proportionate representation’ - used quite successfully 
in many multi-ethnic polities.11  
Another opportunity for providing religious minorities some degree of 
political rights was again missed when the presidential order was passed 
in 1950 formalizing reservations in legislatures and public employment 
for SCs. Only those belonging to the Hindu faith were considered fit to be 
included under the SC category. Christians and Muslims from Dalit back-
grounds or those Dalits who had converted to these faiths were left out. 
The justification provided for this exclusion was that Islam and Christianity 
were egalitarian faiths, thus a Dalit person who converted to these faiths 
stopped suffering disabilities that Hindu SCs did. There is enough evidence 
available, including that collected by official agencies, notably the National 
Commission for Minorities, to hint at Dalit Muslims and Christians too 
suffering similar disabilities as Hindu Dalits (Deshpande, 2008). The 1950 
order was amended in 1956 to include Dalit Sikhs and in 1990 to include 
Dalit Buddhists within the meaning of SCs, the egalitarian ethos of the 
two religions notwithstanding (Robinson, 2012:13). Despite strong public 
movements, Muslim and Christian Dalits continue to be kept out of the SC 
category thus denying them political rights provided to the rest of SCs. 
11. Nepal’s 2007 Interim Constitution is the latest example of great use of this tool in combina-
tion with greater decentralization to share power with territorial minorities and reservations 
for ethnic and religious ones. 
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insecurity and sense of alienation especially in the women members 
of the community. This realization, coming out of the working expe-
rience among the riot victims in Gujarat, triggered off the possibility 
of forming an informal group within the women exponents of the 
current day Andolan. In this context it is interesting to note that the 
leaders of the Andolan also had to undertake journeys of diverse na-
ture in their personal lives to establish themselves. However, formed 
as an informal group, they started meeting on a periodical basis from 
the end of 2004 with the intention of working among the women 
members of the largest minority community in India.
In the initial years, the leaders of the Andolan realized the necessity 
of involving more Muslim women working in different places on the 
issue of women in the minority community. Thus, the convergence of 
interests and objectives made it possible to form a sisterhood, which 
in the course of their work translated into a dedicated group called 
BMMA. Finally in 2007 the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (In-
dian Muslim Women’s Movement) was formed. The membership of 
the organization has crossed 70,000 today. The areas of its opera-
tions have extended in different states including Gujarat, Maharash-
tra, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Odisha, 
West Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand.  
Organizational Format, Objectives 
and Area of Activity
A democratic organization, which aims to promote citizenship rights 
for all, especially Muslim women across the country, BMMA is led by 
Muslim women themselves. The very name ‘Andolan’ seems to sug-
gest that its leaders wanted to retain the character of a movement. 
BMMA is not a formal registered organization; however, it believes 
in democratic decision-making through discussions and delibera-
tions. The National Council comprises of the founder members and 
state convenors. Some of the state leaders are active in different civil 
rights movements and many of them are associated with NGOs. The 
decision-making body at the national level meets three to four times 
a year and decides on the programmatic and other agenda. The Na-
tional Working Committee, consisting of seven senior members is 
responsible for running the organization on an everyday basis. Apart 
from this, the Andolan has an informal advisory group of eminent 
activists, academics and civil society leaders; their experiences are 
usually drawn on in devising a mechanism to work among the target 
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Identity and culture
Constitutional position
Cultural rights of minorities under the Constitution include mainly right to 
freedom of religion (Articles 25 and 26); freedom against religious instruc-
tion or worship in educational institutions (Article 28); right to preserve 
one’s distinct language, script or culture (Article 29); and special education-
al rights for linguistic and religious minorities (Article 30).  
In terms of how the state relates to different faiths, in 1979 the Pream-
ble to the Constitution was amended to include ‘secular’, signifying a de-
sire to accord equal status to all religions and remain equidistant from all. 
This forms the core of the plural character of the Indian state as evidenced 
from the Constitution. Sections of religious minorities also happen to be 
linguistic minorities. Constitutional provisions with regard to linguistic mi-
norities include Article 347 (special provisions relating to language spoken 
by a section of the population, Article 350 (citizens’ right to submission of 
representation in any language used in the union or in the state), Article 
350A (instruction in mother tongue at the primary stage) and Article 350B 
(appointment of linguistic commissioners to safeguard the rights of linguis-
tic minorities). Finally, certain sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) have 
bearings on the preservation of social harmony among different faith, lin-
guistic (and other) groups. The government has claimed its purported social 
goal of maintaining harmony in diversity – what is called ‘unity in diversity’.
‘Indigenous’ versus ‘non-indigenous’ religions
The first issue relates to the definition and status of ‘Hindu’ under the Con-
stitution. This has implications for how minority religions such as Islam, 
Christianity and Zoroastrianism are considered ‘non-indigenous’ as well as 
so-called indigenous ones - Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism -  are treated in 
law and its interpretations, vis-a-vis the majority Hindus,  with wide rang-
ing implications for the rights of citizens identifying with those minority 
religions. The non-indigenous tag for Islam, Christianity and Zoroastrian-
ism means that many minority rights – particularly Article 25 (especially 
the freedom to profess and propagate religions) and those to follow person-
al laws of marriage, inheritance and adoption – are slowly being chipped 
away. As for ‘indigenous’ faiths, the National Commission for Minorities 
(NCM) Act 1992 recognized Sikhism and Buddhism as separate religions, 
distinct from Hinduism as minority religions.  Recently, NCM has accord-
ed religious minority status to Jainism. However, Sikhism, Buddhism and 
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group. An identical structure also exists at the state level which is 
accountable for running the affairs of the Andolan on a day-to-day 
basis in different states.             
A rich blend of modernity and tradition is what marks BMMA’s na-
ture as it embraces modern, liberal, democratic and secular values 
enshrined in Indian Constitution on the one hand, and draws its in-
spiration from the Quran to uphold the values of peace and justice 
for all (including women) on the other. Unambiguously, the goal of 
the Andolan is to unshackle Muslim women from the bondage of 
poverty to enable them to lead lives of equality and justice with dig-
nity. The broad objectives of the Andolan can be divided into four 
major themes: 1) to work towards understanding and ameliorat-
ing the marginalization, backwardness and insecurity of the Mus-
lim community with a definite and special focus on Muslim women 
to ensure their social, economic, political, civil, legal and religious 
rights, 2) to promote liberal interpretations of religion which are in 
consonance with the principles of justice, equality, fairness and pro-
tection of human rights, 3) to oppose communalism, neo-liberalism 
and patriarchy, and 4) to take forward the process of legal reforms 
within the Muslim Personal Law.
There is a realization among the rank and file of the organization 
that the state is not meeting the demands of the minority popula-
tion in every aspect of life. Thus, it is no wonder that the Andolan 
engages in a continuous process with the state and takes up issues 
of the economic, social and political rights of the minority popula-
tion. While taking up the issue of life and security in a wider sense 
of the term and pointing out the failure of the modern state to pro-
tect the minorities, the Andolan also challenges the notion of the 
self-proclaimed Muslim male leadership in the country. The bridge, 
established between the modern state and the patriarchal Muslim 
leadership that assumes to ‘represent’ the entire community, has 
been challenged by BMMA. BMMA’s objectives and activities have 
seriously questioned the problematic nature of the representation 
of women under the hegemony of a patriarchal Muslim leadership. 
This probably explains BMMA’s focus on taking up the issue of gen-
der justice in the broad sense of the term. 
As part of its struggle to promote women rights, BMMA works on 
education, jobs, security, law and health. The BMMA pamphlet for 
2016 notes: 
1. Campaign for the implementation of Sachar report and all 
schemes and entitlements due to the Muslim community. 
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Jainism continue in law and practice to be subsumed under Hindu. Their 
personal laws, for instance, are governed by the Hindu Code Bill. The defi-
nition of Hindu in Article 25 2 (b) of the Constitution and its ratification in 
the Hindu Code Bill and other legislations,12  treats Sikhs, Jains and Bud-
dhists as a part of the Hindu community refusing to recognize their distinct 
identities or accord them minority privileges despite demands by members 
of the communities. This compromises the multicultural character of the 
Indian state. 
Anti-conversion laws: Restricting freedom of religion
Article 25 gives citizens the freedom of conscience and the freedom to pro-
fess, practice and propagate their religion. Yet there are many restrictions, 
both in the law and how it is interpreted and implemented by state au-
thorities (and law courts) when it comes to Muslims, Christians and other 
faiths, not seen as ‘indigenous’ exercising that right, especially to profess 
and propagate. This relates to the issue of ‘conversions’ and the restrictions 
imposed on missionary groups. Given the definition of Hindu in Article 25 
of the Constitution, ‘conversion’ implies change of religion to Islam, Chris-
tianity, Judaism or Zoroastrianism, but not to one of the three ‘indigenous’ 
religions (Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism) subsumed under Hinduism. In 
many cases, and increasingly, the law itself is being amended or new laws 
are being made to prevent conversion. There is a historical background to 
this. In the post-independence era, in 1954 the Parliament took up for con-
sideration the Indian Conversion (Regulation and Registration) Bill and 
later in 1960 the Backward Communities (Religious Protection) Bill, both 
of which had to be dropped for lack of enough support. A similar attempt 
much later, the proposed Freedom of Religion Bill of 1979, was opposed 
by the Minorities Commission due to the bill’s evident bias (Legal Service 
India, 2011). 
Several Indian states (Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, 
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan) have passed free-
dom of religion legislations primarily to prevent people from converting to 
Christianity and Islam. Legal interpretation too has favoured a restrictive 
application of Article 25. Laws enacted by the Odisha and Madhya Pradesh 
high courts were challenged in the Supreme Court citing rights under Ar-
ticle 25. But the court in its judgment supported the laws saying, ‘What is 
12. Notably, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; the Hindu Adop-
tions and Maintenance Act, 1956;  and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
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2. Demanding implementation of all state reports for the political 
and social empowerment of the Muslim community. 
3. Creating awareness and running programmes with Muslim 
youth and women and doing advocacy on issues of education, 
health, security, livelihood and PDS (through Sehr, Udaan and 
Karwaan).
4. Creating awareness about the Quranic rights of women and cod-
ifying the Muslim family law within the broader framework of 
Islamic feminism and the Indian Constitution. 
5. Setting up alternative institutions and structures within the com-
munity to address institutionalized discrimination against Mus-
lim women.
6. Conducting studies and research to highlight the conditions and 
demands of Muslim women. 
7. Organizing and aligning with Dalit Muslim women and other 
subaltern women to highlight their specific issues and concerns.
8. Opposing communalism and working for upholding pluralism 
and diversity in society.
9. Highlighting and challenging the fundamentalism of conserva-
tive religious/cultural groups and working towards building and 
supporting alliances of women and youth across religions. 
10. Creating alliances and solidarity with other subaltern feminist 
groups for addressing common issues of deprivation and dis-
crimination. 
11. Bringing before the world the social and political contribution of 
Muslim women.                 
Some of the achievements of the Andolan are: 
1. Formation of Sehr groups comprising of young Muslim women 
in several cities.
2. Formation of Udaan groups comprising of young Muslim boys in 
several cities.
3. Running vocational training centres called Karwaans in seven 
cities.
4. Managing Aurton Ki Shariah Adalat in three cities.
5. Established the Darul Uloom e Niswaan – Centre for Religious 
Learning and Theology for women.
6. Prepared draft of Muslim Family Law which forms the basis of its 
work on law reforms. 
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freedom for one, is freedom for the other in equal measure, and there can, 
therefore, be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to 
one’s own religion.’ This position was criticized because it ignored Article 
25 and did not differentiate between forced conversion and conversion by 
persuasion. Restrictions to Article 25 have taken more direct forms too. 
It has been reported that since the 1960s, no new foreign Christian mis-
sionaries have been granted visas to work in the country. Still other laws 
seek to limit the entry of any foreign religious institution or missionary. 
Observers see the recent wave of anti-conversion laws in various Indian 
states as a gradual increase of the grip that ideological Hindu nationalism 
has on state institutions (US State Department, 2014). States that do not 
still have anti-conversion laws resort to provisions in IPC to target minori-
ties.  Section 153, prohibiting ‘promoting enmity between different groups 
on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language and doing 
acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony’ and Section 295A, prohibiting 
‘deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings or any 
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs’, are often and mischievous-
ly used by a biased law enforcement to target missionaries and religious 
groups engaged in conversions. These together also provide the backdrop 
(and rationalization) for much of the violence against Christian missionar-
ies (see Osuri, 2013b for a discussion on this). 
Personal laws and the secular character of the state
The Constitution is seen to act to disincentivize conversions to so-called 
non-indigenous faiths thus acting unfairly in its treatment of citizens. A par-
ticular instance is the application of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, that en-
ables discrimination on grounds of conversion to a non-Hindu religion (Is-
lam, Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism). Children born to a Hindu 
after s/he has converted to another religion (and their descendants) are dis-
qualified from inheriting property, unless any descendant re-adopts Hindu-
ism before opening of succession. This acts as inducement for re-conversion 
to Hinduism. Further, the act enjoins that a wife’s consent for adoption of a 
child is necessary only if she remains Hindu. And a married Hindu woman 
can directly adopt a child without the consent of her non-Hindu husband. 
Further, there is gender discrimination as well. A Hindu wife cannot direct-
ly adopt a child if her husband is Hindu. She can only be a consenting party 
(Engineer, 2012).
There are other instances too of the law violating the secular character 
of the Constitution and discriminating between religions, privileging Hindu 
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7. Conducted national studies and researches for campaigning and 
advocacy. 
8. Stood up in solidarity with the efforts of people from different ex-
cluded communities to uphold the constitutional values of social 
justice and equality.
These achievements are a direct result of BMMA’s continuous en-
gagement with women from the grassroots. Thus, for instance, or-
ganizing public meetings to create awareness among the women is 
an everyday act. We will come back to the issue of public meetings 
while discussing in some detail a few of the major achievements of 
the Andolan. The Andolan has been active in different parts of the 
country connection with creating livelihood options for the minority 
population, with special reference to women’s employment. For in-
stance, in 2011 the Tamil Nadu unit of the Andolan led the right to 
food campaign; 245 persons benefited with OAP, ID cards and ration 
cards in Sivagangai district; 95 women and men benefited with OAP, 
ID cards and ration cards in Dindigul district; and 30 women and 
men obtained OAP, ration cards, ID cards and community certifi-
cates in Ramnad district. The achievement of the Odisha unit in the 
same year in terms of creating employment opportunities for women 
is worth mentioning. Paper bags and thongas were marketed to bou-
tiques and different shops. This scheme benefitted 20 women. Young 
girls and women have been empowered and they are marketing their 
products. Ten Muslim women benefitted by supplying small en-
velopes to homoeopathic shops and hakims. Hamara Bagicha is a 
project in two districts of Odisha, Bhadrak and Cuttack Rural. Eight 
women have benefited from the project, the objective behind which 
was to help and encourage all eight members to grow healthy food 
which they can eat and sell to make profits. Apart from providing 
seeds, BMMA also provided them training on organic farming. 
Hamara Beapar is a project in two districts in Odisha, Khurda and 
Cuttack which supports six women.  
 
Muslim Personal Law: A Battle
Let us now turn our attention to some of the Andolan’s major 
achievements to get an idea of how it works at the grassroots level. 
Reform in the Muslim personal law is one of the primary objectives 
that the Andolan has been working for.
Draft Muslim Family Law (Heading C)
Over the last several years through multiple consultations involving 
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faith. One of the grounds for divorce in the Hindu Marriage Act is conver-
sion by one party to ‘another’ religion and his/her ceasing to be a Hindu. 
Further, under the Special Marriage Act 1954, a Parsi, Muslim, Christian or 
Jew loses coverage of his or her personal laws for succession and will be cov-
ered under the Indian Succession Act of 1925, but a Hindu, Buddhist, Jain 
or a Sikh will retain the personal laws for succession except when it is an 
inter-religious marriage. This makes the state discriminatory as it favours 
some religions over others.
But there have been progressive developments too. In a landmark judg-
ment in 2014 the Supreme Court ruled that any person can adopt a child 
under the Juvenile Justice (Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Chil-
dren) Act 2000, irrespective of the religion that he or she follows and even 
if the personal laws of the particular religion do not permit it. The right to 
adopt a child - till now restricted to Hindus, Buddhists and Jains – was thus 
extended to Muslims, Christians, Jews, Parsis and all other communities. 
Terming the JJ Act a ‘small step towards formation of a uniform civil code,’ 
the court said that a person was always free to adopt or choose not to do so 
and, instead, follow the personal law (India Today, 2014).
Saffronization of education
Education and schools are the crucibles of national identity. From represen-
tations of the nation’s history, to what makes its society and the roles that 
different sections play, are all material for the development of a national 
identity. It is also for this reason that public education policies and practices 
are often contested spaces between different ideological positions. What is 
taught in schools and textbooks goes a long way in making or breaking a 
plural society. 
In recent times, and in clear violations of the constitutional provision 
guaranteeing freedom from attendance at religious instruction or worship 
in educational institutions (Article 28) the BJP ruled Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan have introduced  in government and government-aided schools, 
practices of a religious nature favouring the majority Hindu faith (suryana-
maskar). In Rajasthan, the government has asked private schools too to 
follow the practice (The Times of India, 2015b). 
But attempts at Hindu homogenization run deeper than this. In the 
late 1990s, the national government began school textbook revisions 
without much of a public consultation. These particularly affected history 
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thousands of Muslim women, lawyers and religious scholars BMMA 
has prepared a draft Muslim family law based on Quranic tenets 
concerning age at marriage, mehr, talaq, polygamy, maintenance 
and custody of children. These are in consonance with the Constitu-
tion of India. Some of the important provisions of this draft law are: 
1. Minimum age of marriage of a girl to be 18 years and a boy to be 
21years at the time of marriage.
2. Consent of both parties must be obtained without force or fraud.
3. Minimum mehr to be equivalent of one full annual income of the 
groom to be paid at the time of the nikah.
4. Talak-e-ahsan to be the method of divorce requiring mandatory 
arbitration over a 90 day period; oral unilateral divorce to be de-
clared illegal. 
5. Maintenance during marriage is the responsibility of the hus-
band even if wife has an independent source of income. 
6. Maintenance after divorce as per the Muslim Women’s Protec-
tion on Divorce Act, 1986.
7. Polygamy to be declared illegal. 
8. Both mother and father are natural guardians of the child. 
9. Custody of a child based on the best interests of the child and the 
decision of the child.
10. Halala to be made an offence.
11. Muta marriage to be made an offence.
12. In property matters Quranic shares to be applied after making a 
will and clearing debts.
13. Daughters to get equal share as sons through hiba or gift-deed or 
will.
14. Compulsory registration of marriages.
15. Qazi to be held accountable for violations during talaq, polygamy 
and in other such matters.
Divorce and Right to Alimony
In 1986 the Supreme Court ruled that divorced Muslim women 
who were unable to sustain themselves were entitled, like their 
counterparts from other religions, to alimony throughout their 
lifetime or till they remarried. But the government of the day 
passed a law reverting the alimony period to the traditional three 
months, with a provision for women to move court if denied this 
relief. Wakf boards are expected to help the women after this  
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textbooks. Few well-formulated propositions about pre-modern society in 
India, informed by the national anti-colonial movement’s stress on plural-
ism and nation-building were revised and some deleted without debate and 
discussion. Observers have noted that this was a blatant attempt to replace 
mainstream (multi-cultural) history by the Hindutva version of history, ba-
sically seeing history through the prism of a Hindu-majoritarian ideology 
at a time when the then BJP-led government at the centre wanted the state 
educational system to conform to a Hindu-infused curriculum espoused by 
RSS and other Hindu cultural organizations to weaken the secular under-
pinnings of the Indian nation (Habib et al., 2003).
According to noted historian Bipan Chandra, Hindu communalism un-
folding rapidly in the country from the late 1990s, is essentially an ideology 
and a communal interpretation of history which forms the core of this com-
munal ideology (see Bipan Chandra 2001 and Thapar 2001). Much of this 
related to the relationship between Muslims portrayed in these accounts as 
non-indigenous invading forces and Hindus as victims in medieval India 
and its implications for inter-community relationships in modern India. 
Two myths were used by communal historians to point out the threat that 
the Hindus might face from the minority Muslim population. Firstly, the 
medieval period was a long history of Hindu-Muslim conflict where Mus-
lims were seen as foreign invaders and Hindus, by and large, at the receiving 
end. And secondly, the entire medieval period was a ‘dark age’ compared to 
the ‘glorious’ advancement that India had made in ancient times. History 
taught in schools in this manner helps to create and consolidate commu-
nal divides against minorities and goes against the very ethos of secularism 
(Habib et al., 2003). This narration of history generates elements that are 
being manifested in popular culture. Thus, for example, over-glorification 
of ancient (read Hindu) India and denigration of the medieval period (read 
Muslim) is being reproduced in popular literature - cartoon strips, chil-
dren’s stories, television serials and social and mainstream media. 
With the BJP returning to power in 2014, the communal fabrication of 
history with its implications for homogenization has started again and is 
rapidly spreading to other disciplines including the sciences. This organized 
effort to promote a history and worldview inimical to pluralism and an in-
clusive Indian identity is having repercussions in marginalizing minorities. 
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period but they say that they lack funds. Organically connected with 
this, Muslim women also face discrimination,  at least in the present 
context of  the interpretation of Sharia law, in Muslim men’s right to 
polygamy and oral divorce. 
Yasmin Khatoon, 32, a graduate from Kolkata, was orally divorced 
when her elder daughter was 6-years-old and her younger daughter 
was just six months old. Twenty-year-old Mumbai resident Sumana’s 
five-month long marriage ended in an unfortunate oral talaq. In both 
the cases the women were denied any alimony, not even the three-
month maintenance stipulated by Muslim personal law. BMMA 
claims that Yasmin and Sumana are not isolated cases. Asma from 
Jaipur left her family and converted to Islam to marry the man she 
loved. But instead of providing her a home, he pronounced triple ta-
laq and tried to grab her house. 
Another case is of Farida whose husband gave her a talaq on the 
grounds that she wore spectacles. It is, of course, ridiculous to hear 
instances of Muslim men divorcing their wives through letters, on 
telephone, Facebook, WhatsApp and other social media.   
The real success of BMMA lies in its ability to connect to this vast 
majority of the destitute population. It is no wonder then that Yas-
min, Asma, Farida, Sumana and many others are among the 70,000 
members of the eight-year-old Andolan. The Andolan meticulous-
ly meets people throughout the year by taking up some activities. 
Without public meetings and continuous awareness programmes, 
the Andolan could not have taken up the issue to reform the Mus-
lim personal law. From a 2011 report it can be seen that all the state 
units were busy in mobilizing women and creating public awareness 
through campaigns. Mention should be made of the public meetings 
organized by the BMMA unit in Uttar Pradesh where the issue of 
codification was discussed with the participants. The focus was on 
reforms pertaining to polygamy and halala. 
In another public meeting organized by the Khajuraho district unit 
in Madhya Pradesh, this issue was discussed with members of the 
organizations working in the area. More than 500 women attended 
this meeting where rights of women in Islam were also discussed. A 
draft was prepared for codification which was circulated among dif-
ferent experts to seek their opinions. In Odisha and Uttar Pradesh, 
the BMMA units took the initiative independently to call the lawyers 
for consultations. All these activities seem to suggest that the call to 
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Minority educational institutions
Many believe that the most important minority right is contained in Article 
30 – the right of minorities to establish educational institutions. While most 
rights conferred on citizens refer to all religious communities, minorities in 
particular are extended the right to manage educational institutions to pro-
vide for religious education in such institutions and to receive aid from the 
state to run these institutions. Article 30 is aimed at helping religious and 
linguistic minorities preserve their unique culture and identity, something 
that they can do by establishing institutions for this purpose. But just as the 
Constitution provides, it also takes it away. Restrictions have been placed 
on Article 30 through the provisions under Article 29 (2), which prohib-
it any citizen from being denied admission in any educational institution 
maintained by or receiving aid from the state, on the grounds of religion, 
race, caste or language. 
Multiple judicial re-interpretations of particular provisions have result-
ed in weakening the right. The Supreme Court, in its judgment in the St. Ste-
phen’s College case (1992) placed a bar on the percentage of students that a 
minority institution could take from its own community at 50 per cent. The 
purported purpose was to promote national integration. Observers criti-
cized this judgment, arguing that similar logic is not applied to reserve seats 
for minorities in non-minority institutions. According to them, the restric-
tion placed amounted to placing the entire burden of national integration 
on the minorities. Another Supreme Court judgment, this one in the case of 
the TMA Pai Foundation (1997) was according to observers an unmitigated 
disaster for minorities (Nariman, 2014:44). The judgment had the outcome 
of watering down Article 30. Originally, the right of minorities to establish 
educational institutions was equated with the fundamental right granted to 
religious and linguistic minorities under Article 19 (to practice any profes-
sion, occupation, trade or business) as an unrestricted fundamental right. 
The re-interpretation of the right in the TMA Pai Foundation case, led to 
‘reasonable restrictions’ being placed on the right through invoking Article 
19 (1) (g). Recent attempts by the Government of India to bring in dispute 
the ‘minority character’ of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Jamia 
Millia Islamia (JMI), two national institutions identified with Muslims, is 
the determined move of the state in the same direction (The Wire, 2016). 
Clearly, the plural character of the Indian state, guaranteed in law, is 
still to be realized in practice and indeed, the secular character of the state 
is coming under increasing attack. 
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reform the Muslim personal law could not have taken place without 
the active support and engagement of the large mass of the popula-
tion. 
The Andolan realized this from its early days and hence one can wit-
ness a thrust on mobilizing larger public opinion for reform in Mus-
lim personal law. Most importantly, in its struggle to reform the law 
BMMA has gone beyond its usual circle. BMMA started collaborat-
ing with other like-minded organizations to come up with a common 
draft. Hence, a joint meeting was held between the Centre for Study 
of Society and Secularism and BMMA. In 2011, the draft of the Mus-
lim family law was sent to experts for their opinions. The Muslim 
Lawyers Association, Majlis and AIDWA were also approached for 
their opinions and cooperation.                          
How exactly does BMMA function to reform Muslim personal law to 
protect women? What is the source of its understanding that many 
Muslim women want a reform in the Muslim personal law? In order 
to understand the hardships of people like Sumana and Yasmin, the 
Andolan embarked upon completing a task across different states 
that required some intense surveys to come to some fundamental 
conclusions related to issues such as marriage, divorce, mainte-
nance, custody of children and the traditional oral talaq. One such 
national study on Muslim women’s views on reform in the Muslim 
personal law was released on 20 August 2015 in Delhi by the orga-
nization. This study was conducted across 10 states. As part of this 
study, 4,710 Muslim women were directly surveyed. 
Another national survey called No More Talaq, Talaq, Talaq: Muslim 
Women Call for a Ban on an UnIslamic Practice was released at the 
9 Annual Convention of BMMA held in Delhi on 6 November, 2015. 
This report carries case studies of over 117 Muslim women who have 
been victims of triple talaq. The report unhesitatingly highlights that 
an overwhelming majority of the respondents want a reform in the 
Muslim personal law in matters related to polygamy, marriage, di-
vorce etc. (dna.com; The Hindustan Times, 2015) The survey, while 
bringing out the reality, is not the single factor that led to a reform 
in the law. A re-interpretation of the Quranic principles was also 
important that gave BMMA a basis on which they demanded a re-
form. In this connection, the knowledge and opinions of established 
experts on the Quran were also drawn on. However, there was oppo-
sition from the Muslim Personal Law Board. As a response, BMMA 
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Conclusion
In a special debate in Parliament in November 2015 to commemorate 65 
years of the adoption of the Constitution (in the Constituent Assembly in 
1949), a senior leader of the ruling BJP, raised issues with ‘secularism’, not-
ing how it had become the most misused word in Indian politics, arguing 
that the time had come to end such misuse (The Hindu, 2015). Earlier, in 
an advertisement released by the central government on the eve of Republic 
Day, the word secular had been edited out from the Preamble of the Con-
stitution. Some claimed that this was a mischievous attempt by the ruling 
BJP to test waters in an attempt to undermine secularism (Punyani, 2015). 
Hindu nationalists have for long resented the secular aspects of the Indian 
Constitution and by extension of the Indian state. For a senior government 
minister to say so in a formal debate in Parliament was however a first. BJP 
and its associates have sought to force their Hindu majoritarian views in 
the past too. In its last stint in power at the centre, the BJP-led National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government had sought to push for a review of 
the Constitution, many claim with an eye to changing its secular character, 
among others. 
The only reference to secularism in the Constitution is in its Pream-
ble inserted only in 1976. But the provisions that have existed from the 
beginning, emphasizing religious freedom, freedom of conscience, equal-
ity and non-discrimination, leave no doubt about the Constitution’s secu-
lar character. In the circumstance, NDA’s plans for a major surgery of the 
Constitution came a cropper. But what has endured is the Hindu national-
ist parties’ commitment, as evidenced by their statements and actions from 
time to time to transform India from a plural country founded on secular 
principles to one that clearly has a Hindu imprint offering only second-class 
citizenship to its many minorities. 
The tension between the current plural-secular character, written in law 
and that desired by a powerful section of the political community to see In-
dia as a Hindu rashtra (nation) is growing. These tensions came to a head 
recently with the BJP coming to power at the centre with a clear majority 
thus enabling an avowedly majoritarian party for the first time in indepen-
dent India to be in a position to change laws governing majority-minority 
relations, the role of religion in matters of the state and such like. These 
are no mere threats – in states, as well as at the centre, where it has been 
possible for BJP and its allies to introduce Hindu cultural principles and 
practices they have done so, as we saw in the case of special Hindu prayers 
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circulated documents, re-interpreting the Quran and drawing on 
different sources/writings of famous scholars, detailing issues like 
triple talaq as non-Islamic. 
However, if not among conservative Muslim leaders, the Andolan’s 
acceptability is ever growing in the country, as is evident from the 
recent meeting organized by the AMU Teachers Club on Women’s 
Day where one of the founding leaders of BMMA was invited. In her 
speech Ms Zakia Soman shared her experiences of working with Mus-
lim women and the necessity to reform the Muslim personal law in a 
patriarchal setting; her speech was well received. BMMA, as part of 
its agenda to reform the personal law on different issues that shape a 
Muslim woman’s life, has written to Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
demanding codification of the Muslim personal law to end discrim-
ination against women (The Hindustan Times, 2015). Though we 
are yet to see any change in the Muslim personal law’s framework, 
the relentless call to reform coming from one of the most deprived 
sections within the community is growing which might draw policy-
makers’ attention to call for a review of the law in the future.       
Qazi Training: Challenge to the Patriarchy 
BMMA has also formed the Darul Uloom Niswaan (DUN), a centre 
for Islamic learning and theology. As part of this initiative, DUN has 
starting training of women qazis (law officers, under shariat law). 
The initiative began in Jaipur with a group of 30 Muslim women 
who have embarked on the journey to becoming qazis. Candidates 
from across different states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajas-
than, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Bihar, West Ben-
gal and Odisha have so far undertaken two modules of training of 
three days each. During its work in different states over the last ten 
years BMMA has observed that owing to ignorance about Quranic 
injunctions there is widespread practice of triple talaq and halala in 
spite of there being no Quranic sanction for them. This is a way of 
challenging the male dominated interpretation of Muslim law. One 
of the objectives is to impart Islamic teachings that talk of gender 
justice principles. 
The candidates have been given training in Quranic injunctions 
pertaining to marriage and family, personal laws in Muslim coun-
tries, the Constitution of India and the basics of Indian and global 
jurisprudence pertaining to gender justice and equality. Apart from 
this they have been trained in preparing elaborate nikahnamas, 
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introduced through a government fiat in public and private schools in Mad-
hya Pradesh and Rajasthan, both ruled by the BJP. Perhaps what is prevent-
ing a complete overhaul of the constitutional framework and the breaking 
up of the plural arrangement is rules of the game that disallow changing 
the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution something defended jealously by 
constitutional courts. Some observers, however, believe that it is the Hindu 
underpinnings of the Indian Constitution, as it exists already,  that make it 
possible for Hindu majoritarian parties to continue to have the resonance 
that they do among citizens and keep the pot boiling, so to speak. They con-
tend that the secular foundations of the Indian republic are shallow. 
Pritam Singh (2005) has argued, and many have concurred (Perry An-
derson, 2012, among them), that ‘despite the many admirable and histor-
ically progressive features, the Indian Constitution has many elements of 
retrogressive Hindu bias in it.’ Singh (2005: 921) further argues, ‘recognis-
ing the Hindu bias in India’s constitution helps to show that Hindutva in In-
dia is widespread and deeply rooted and goes beyond what is represented by 
the Hindutva group of organisations known as the Sangh Parivar.’ He goes 
on, ‘this Hindu bias must be seen in the larger context of the continuation 
of Hindu bias in the national movement for India’s independence. The rise 
of Hindutva forces can be considered more a continuation and deepening of 
that bias than a rupture with it’ (Singh, 2005: 2).
i. The bias according to Singh, starts with Article 1 of the Constitution, 
naming India as Bharat, a decision arrived through a compromise 
between the then ruling Congress party and a Hindu sanyasi who went 
on hunger strike for the adoption of Bharat (in place of India) (Singh, 
2005: 911). Bharat has Hindu overtones. Article 1, according to Singh, 
also hints at another compromise to Hindutva forces – the choice of 
union, in place of federation, as a system of governance, a choice fa-
voured by Congress, but particularly by Hindutva parties, standing for 
a Hindu, Hindi India that batted for a strong centre in place of a feder-
ation favoured by other parties, prominently Muslim League, but also 
Sikh parties and those representing the southern provinces in the Con-
stituent Assembly (Singh, 2005: 914).  
ii. Article 25 (freedom of conscience and of free profession, practice and 
propagation of religion) provides another instance, according to Singh, 
of a Hindu bias, with Section 2 (b) expressing special interest of the state 
in favour of ‘social welfare and reform’ of Hindu religion. Singh clarifies: 
‘It seems that the overriding concern behind these social reform mea-
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conducting a nikah and divorce procedures as per the talaq-e-ahsan 
method found in the Quran. 
However, the journey has not been smooth as can be seen from 
different reports and incidents. Different Muslim religious organi-
zations like the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and the Ja-
mait-Ulema-i-Hind  have objected to the very idea of women qazis. 
In another instance, two women Jahan Ara and Afroz Begum who 
became qazis came under verbal assault from different quarters of 
society. But the training proved to be productive as these two women 
qazis are not worried by the assault. Jahan Ara commented, ‘I have 
been working for Muslim women since a long time. I understand 
their daily trials and tribulations, and I realise there is a need to view 
issues in the Muslim community from women’s perspective.’ Simi-
larly, Afroz defended Quranic teachings of equality and commented, 
‘People are opposing us but nowhere in Quran it is said that a woman 
can’t be a qazi. True, women can’t be Imams (one who lead prayers 
in a mosque), but they can be qazis and help women’ (Yasmin, 2016).
Important Features of the Andolan 
It appears from BMMA’s note, ‘Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan: 
Justice, Equality, Wisdom, Compassion, Freedom’ note it works both 
at the local and pan-Indian levels. The essence of the training and 
conducting surveys bear testimony to a fine collaboration between 
the local and national levels. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to 
say that the crux of its advocacy power at the policy level lies in the 
sheer number of its members  – 70,000. What is even more import-
ant is that common Muslim women, defying the patriarchal notion 
of a traditional Muslim family (of course not everyone belongs to 
the highly orthodox, oppressive family structure), have come out to 
become a part of the Andolan that calls for a transformation of the 
traditional understanding of Islam and putting forth a more humane 
face of the religion. The intense network of BMMA workers in differ-
ent states is helping in making this possible.  
Lessons Learned
After talking to Ms Zakia Soman, the following points can be men-
tioned as the lessons that can be drawn. BMMA is a Muslim wom-
en’s organization but it has been able to successfully break down the 
patriarchal ‘stereotype’ of the Muslim community. BMMA’s work-
ing pattern shows that it seems to have grasped the intersectionality 
between gender, religion and patriarchy as a first step in building a 
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sures was to prevent the exodus of the dalits from the Hindu fold.’ This, 
he concludes  was an instance of active state intervention to consolidate 
the Hindu identity (Singh, 2005: 915). In any case, Explanation II of 
the article (situating Sikhs, Jains and Buddhist under the wider Hin-
du category) reflects a Hindu assimilationist perspective towards these 
communities in India. We have seen in our own assessment elsewhere of 
this formulation of Hindu, how the definition favours the majority faith 
at the expense of other ‘non-indigenous’ faiths.
iii. There is also Article 48, a Directive Principle that urges the state to, 
among other things, endeavour to prohibit the slaughter of cows and 
calves and other milch and draught cattle. Insertion of this clause, ac-
cording to Singh (2005: 917), is ‘an unmistakable reflection of the re-
ligious preferences and powers of the dominant upper caste Hindus 
among the constitution makers.’
iv. Finally Articles 343 and 351, on Hindi in Devnagiri script being adopt-
ed as the official language of the union and the directive to develop the 
Hindi language respectively. According to Singh (2005: 917), ‘the im-
portance accorded to Hindi language and especially to the Devnagiri 
script and the Sanskrit language in the constitution reflects the strong 
pro-Hindi and pro-Hindu bias of a very powerful section among the con-
stitution makers.’ 
In this formulation, it is these Hindu underpinnings of the Indian Con-
stitution, despite its clear progressive elements that seem to have compro-
mised the essence of secularism as it affects citizens – equality and non-dis-
crimination and also why minority rights in India have been interpreted as 
being mostly about cultural autonomy, with little to show on effective par-
ticipation of minorities – in decision making at the national and local lev-
els. Our own conclusion, drawn from an empirical analysis in the previous 
sections about the poor ability of the law to enforce equality and non-dis-
crimination, echo these arguments. Clearly mere claims of secularism and 
multiculturalism are not going to go far enough, as evidence shows already. 
Without clear cut safeguards and a strong regime of anti-discrimination it 
will be difficult to ensure effective realization of minority rights in India. 
Some other general conclusions
a.  A survey of the state of religious minorities in India across the four mi-
nority rights,13 makes it clear that there is great variation in how religious 
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minorities perform on these four parameters. Table 20 tries to plot the 
concerns that specific minorities have on the count. Clearly Muslims, 
besides Christians and Buddhists, especially those from backward sec-
tions, suffer the worst disabilities. 
b.  Availability of data disaggregated by religious groups is a big challenge 
to the effective monitoring and tracking of minorities’ performance. 
There is little systematic tracking and reporting of the state of minori-
ties and rights violations in the country. The National Commission for 
Minorities and the union Ministry of Minority Affairs, the principal in-
stitutions for realizing minority rights in the country, produce poor re-
ports. Besides that there are occasional, stand-alone and limited studies 
of which the Sachar Committee, Ranganath Mishra Commission and 
Kundu Commission reports are the principal official ones. There is also 
little non-state effort as most of it is around violence and some socio-
economic rights. The Sachar Committee had proposed the setting up 
of an agency to collect and analyse data by socio-religious groups. The 
central government responded to this recommendation by announcing 
the establishment of the Assessment and Monitoring Authority (AMA). 
13. Of life and security, Socioeconomic rights, Participation and Identity and culture.
... Good practice case study continued ...
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struggle. Through its on-going struggle, BMMA has tried to portray 
a face of the religion. Despite being a minority, BMMA works within 
constitutional provisions. The emphasis on jiski ladai uski agwayi 
(my struggle, my leadership) has been a good guiding principle. The 
organization has been able to bring in several Muslim women as 
social leaders as well as change makers in their personal lives. The 
working pattern and the all-India nature of the campaigns confirm 
that the campaigns are grounded in various local contexts, which en-
ables maximum participation of women. 
BMMA as an independent civil society organization points out the 
need to stay away from political parties as such an influence can af-
fect ground level activists/activism. In mobilizing and working for 
the minority community, BMMA has engaged with the media in a 
sustained way but has not succumbed to the ideas/ideologies of me-
dia houses.
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But AMA has been a non-starter (Government of India, 2014b). One 
of the few official data to be made available to the public is police data 
published by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). Since 2009, 
NCRB has been reporting prison data of detenues, under-trial prisoners 
and convicts by religious and other groups for each state. Similarly, it 
has reported the share of minorities in police forces in each state. It was 
reported recently that the government had decided to stop reporting 
even this data (The Indian Express, 2015).
Lastly, a quick word about the National Commission for Minorities 
(NCM) – the principal national institution for the protection and promo-
tion of rights of minorities in India. Set up in 1978, NCM was granted con-
stitutional status in 1993. But it has done little to develop the condition of 
minorities which was its charter (Rahman, 2002). The other national in-
stitution for promotion of pluralism, the Prime Minister-chaired National 
Integration Council, has also been a non-starter in either promoting the 
rights of different sections or preventing discord between social groups 
(Srivastava, 2013).
Recommendations
Here we propose some tentative recommendations 
For state parties:
- Data disaggregated by religion on life and security and socioeco-
nomic rights and working of laws and programmes, collected and 
reported publically to enable effective tracking and documenting of 
outcomes for minorities. The Assessment and Monitoring Authority 
Life & 
security
Socioeconomic Participation Identity& culture
Buddhists 3 3 - 3
Christians 3 3 - 3
Jains  - - - 3
Muslims  3 3 3 3
Parsis - - - 3
Sikhs 3 - - 3
Source: Anwar (2000:112).
Table 20. Minorities and their denials 
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set up to better record outcomes for excluded groups must be revived 
and strengthened and the scope of its data collection, tracking and 
dissemination must be expanded to include all minority rights. Or 
alternative arrangements be made to realize the goal of standardized 
data disaggregated by religious groups, available periodically, to aid 
in tracking.  
- The Justice Ranganath Misra report (Government of India, 2007b) 
recommended that SC status should be delinked completely from 
religion, as it is in the case of STs thus proposing amending the pres-
idential order of 1950 to include Muslim and Christian Dalits under 
the category of SCs. Various studies, notably by NCM, have proven 
the case for inclusion of Dalit Muslims and Christians within the SC 
category. The government must pursue the public interest litigation 
(PIL) with regard to extending reservations to Indian Christians 
being considered by the Supreme Court and include Dalit Muslims 
in it. 
- The civil service, police and armed forces must reflect the diversity 
of society, especially at the frontline where the state comes in contact 
with citizens. The government must promote greater minority repre-
sentation either through affirmative action policies or a strong pro-
gramme of recruitment and coaching, much stronger than the cur-
rent support programmes. This must be a time bound action plan.  
- Demands for reservations for minorities in jobs and educational in-
stitutions must be expeditiously looked at by the Supreme Court and 
the government in power. The Ranganath Misra report recommends 
15 per cent reservation of seats in non-minority educational institu-
tions by law for minorities (10 per cent for Muslims and 5 per cent 
for other minorities).  
- The Election Commission and political parties must proactively ad-
dress the issue of low minority political representation, especially of 
Muslims in elected bodies – Parliament and state assemblies.  Politi-
cal parties must put forward more minority members as their candi-
dates; and Parliament must look into the question of delimitation of 
constituencies to allay fears that they do not prevent minorities from 
better representation. 
- There is need for greater accountability of law enforcement agencies 
and better rule of law so that the guilty are punished and justice done 
in cases of mass violence. 
India 
Is the Idea Unraveling?
222
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
- The Parliament must re-examine special laws such as AFSPA and 
UAPA and their implementation, besides scrutinizing institutions 
governing them so as to ensure greater accountability of state actors 
in an effort to prevent systematic violations of human rights. 
- Improved design, management and audit of pro-poor programmes 
(‘universal’ and ‘minority’) for excluded minority communities. The 
15-Point Programme has been a damp squib. There have been de-
mands for a minority sub-plan. The nub of the demand is better tar-
geting (both who and what) and improved results. 
- The National Commission for Minorities (NCM) must act more pro-
actively as a body defending and promoting minority rights. It needs 
to be made more autonomous and free of government interference 
for it to act as a true defender of minorities. It should also work 
across institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission, 
the National Commission for Women and such like to ensure that 
minority rights are mainstreamed in those fora too. Need for clear-
cut safeguards, and a strong regime of anti-discrimination, under-
grids any successful attempt at providing for minorities. India too 
must give serious consideration to adopting and rolling these out, for 
any meaningful change. 
- A policy decision to include a section of  ‘SC converted to Buddhists’, 
which will only take count of SCs over 17 per cent and legislation on 
SCSP/TSP to prevent denial of due share to Dalits and Adivasis.
For civil society:
- Tracking and documenting outcomes as well as processes so as to 
create a body of evidence to both hold the state accountable and to 
educate the public on conditions of minorities. 
- Greater focus on rights of minorities in their programming through 
mainstreaming minority rights. 
- Public education and advocacy on minority rights including through 
use of media. This should include moving away from representation 
of minorities focused on identity issues to those on rights and their 
denial.  
- Creating cross-minority/cross-excluded group platforms for minori-
ty and human rights, for solidarities, experience sharing and pro-
poor/rights-based advocacy. 
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- Creating policy and grassroots capacity for minority rights/defend-
ers and activists through documenting, creating awareness, orga-
nizing, project implementation and advocacy. This to enable policy 
changes to be translated in reality on the ground affecting the lives 
of minorities. The capacity of the grassroots’ community is the big 
missing link in minority rights work and without attention to this 
element the results on communities will remain but a pipe dream. 
For minority communities:
- Working across minorities: creating minority-wide platforms, learning 
from each other, developing advocacy together on common issues of 
concern (violence against minorities, minority programmes, minority 
educational institutions, changes to the 1950 presidential order).    
- Developing positions in thematic areas: not all minorities are affect-
ed in all domains (violence, socioeconomic rights, culture).         
- Community mobilization, developing local leadership/a robust and 
progressive civil society at the grassroots. 
- Ensuring that rights-based approaches also structure intra-commu-
nity work seeing to it that minorities within minorities are equally 
protected and their rights defended. 
- Connected is the point about developing community led organiza-
tions/community based organizations (CLOs/CBOs) of minorities to 
develop community capacity that have a clear rights base focus and 
agenda.    
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It is commonly asserted that Nepal is a country of minorities because it is 
home to 125 different caste/ethnic groups who speak 123 recognized lan-
guages, follow 10 different religions and live in three distinct ecological 
zones (CBS, 2012). Geographically, the population is distributed into two 
near equal groups of those living in the southern Tarai plains and those 
living in the hills and mountains, but there is no majority group in terms 
of caste/ethnicity or language. Hindus, however, form a majority at 81 per 
cent of the population although there are great internal variations in terms 
of caste/ethnicity and language among those who profess Hinduism.
The historical trajectory of the country has given rise to a dominant mi-
nority in the form of hill-origin, upper-caste groups, now called the Khas-
Aryas, comprising 31 per cent of the population. The other macro-ethnic 
categories of Dalits, Adivasi Janajatis and Madhesis are in a subordinate 
position vis-à-vis the Khas-Aryas but at the same time the Janajatis and 
upper-caste Madhesis exhibit similar traits of dominance towards Dalits.
These different groups are spread across Nepal and there are only a 
few areas where any one of them is in a majority. There are also significant 
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overlaps between and among these groups. For instance, there are Dalits 
who are also Madhesis while there are also a significant number of Janajatis 
whose origins, along with those of the Madhesis, are in the Tarai (plains) 
belt of Nepal (CBS, 2012). Despite this diversity, large sections of the 
population are either inherently marginalized, like Dalits; historically de-
nied access to influence, like the Adivasi Janajatis or ‘indigenous national-
ities’; or not considered full citizens of Nepal, like Madhesis (DIFD, 2006). 
There are also religious minorities who, too, have been marginalized due to 
their religious identity such as Muslims nearly all of whom face exclusion 
like Madhesis (Sijapati, 2012) and, more recently, Christians.
There is no universally accepted definition of minorities, but the one 
that has received wide circulation was provided in 1977 by Francesco Capo-
torti, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those 
of the rest of the population and maintain, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion 
or language (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commis-
sioner 2010). 
In Nepal, the term ‘minorities’ was used for the first time in the 2007 
Interim Constitution1 to denote groups requiring special protection from 
the state.2 The Constitution of Nepal 2015 also uses ‘minority group’ and 
‘minorities’ for the same purpose but has expanded the number of such 
groups.3 Unlike the 2007 Interim Constitution, however, the 2015 Constitu-
tion actually defines what constitutes a minority:
1. Nepal has enacted seven constitutions so far in 1948, 1951, 1959, 1962, 1990, 2007 and 2013.
2. Article 35(14) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 lists them as: ‘landless squatters, 
bonded labourers, persons with disability, backward communities and sections, and the 
victims of conflict, including women, Dalits, indigenous tribes (Adivasi Janajati), Mad-
hesis and Muslims’ Source: www.lawcommission.gov.np.  Activists prefer ‘indigenous 
nationalities’ as a translation of ‘Adivasi Janajatis.’
3.  Namely, ‘socially or culturally backward women, Pichhada class, minorities, the margin-
alized, farmers, labours, youths, children, senior citizens, gender and sexual minorities, 
persons with disabilities, persons in pregnancy, incapacitated or helpless, backward 
region and indigent Khas Arya,’ www.lawcommission.gov.np.
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[E]thnic, linguistic and religious groups whose population is less 
than the percentage specified by the Federal law, and includes groups 
that have their distinct ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, 
aspirations to protect such features and subjected to discrimination and 
oppression4. 
At the time of writing this report it was not clear which of the 125 caste/
ethnic groups would qualify as a ‘minority’. However, following a UN docu-
ment on minority rights that states that the main requirement to be counted 
as a minority group is to be in a non-dominant position (United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner, 2010), this chapter uses this definition to 
consider the country’s ethnic, linguistic and religious groups – Dalits, Jana-
jatis, Madhesis, Muslims and Christians –all of whom are in a non-domi-
nant position in one way or another (see Table 1).5 
Historical context and constitutional provisions
The modern state of Nepal was created by Prithvi Narayan Shah in the mid-
to-late 18th century. Its consolidation during the Rana regime (1846-1951) 
was based on the organizing ideology of the Hindu caste system and nation-
4. ‘Part - 34, Definitions and Interpretations,’ The Constitution of Nepal 2015.
5. The 2015 Constitution also used the terms ‘minority/minorities’ and ‘marginalised’ consis-
tently in tandem, providing further cause to equate ‘marginalised’ with ‘minority’ in the case 
of Nepal.
Groups Population 
Adivasi Janajatis (Moun-
tain, Hill and Tarai)
35.8 per cent (26.1 per cent Hill-Mountain Janajatis and 9.75 per cent 
Tarai Janajatis).
Madhesis Including the Tarai Dalits in this category, Madhesis constitute 19.23 
per cent of the total population of Nepal.* If Tarai Janajatis are included 
as well, the Tarai-origin population would be 28.97 per cent. Excluding 
Tarai Janajatis and Tarai Dalits, the rest of the Madhesi population is 
14.77 per cent of the population.
Dalits (Madhesi Dalits and 
Hill Dalits)
12.58 per cent (8.1 per cent Hill Dalits and 4.5 per cent Tarai Dalits).
Muslims 4.4 per cent.
Christians 1.4 per cent.
Table 1. Groups Identified as Minorities for this Report
Source: Groups taken from Sharma (2014); Sharma (2008); CBS (2012).  
Note: The Census figures are generally contested by all the minority groups listed in the table, with each 
claiming a higher share of the population.
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al integration was attained through a default ‘unification’ of diverse groups. 
As a unifying framework, the caste system codified in the Muluki Ain 
(National Code) of 1854, subsumed the different languages, customary laws 
and religious, social and cultural traditions found in the country into one 
overarching framework informed by Hindu religious law. Further, it also 
ranked the different social groups in Nepal according to Hindu concepts of 
ritual purity and pollution, thus institutionalizing inter-group discrimina-
tion and marginalization (Gaige, 1975).
Nepal has undergone major shifts in its constitutional and legal frame-
work since the end of the Rana rule, starting with the abortive 1948 Con-
stitution by the dying regime and through the Constitution of 2015. It took 
until the 1990 Constitution, when the country shifted from an autocratic 
monarchy-based system to a multi-party democracy, for statutory recogni-
tion of Nepal’s great socio-cultural diversity as well as the inherent inequi-
ties inherited from the past.
The 1990 constitution
 The 1990 Constitution declared Nepal a ‘multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, dem-
ocratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu, Constitutional Monar-
chical Kingdom’ and granted ‘equality before law and equal protection of 
law.’ It made special provisions to secure the interests of ‘women, children, 
incapacitated persons or those who belong to a class of socially, econom-
ically and educationally backward groups.’6 Despite these positive devel-
opments, the Constitution contained provisions that were discriminatory 
towards different groups. For instance, Hindu statehood was retained, 
privileging Hindu norms and values; Nepali language was declared the 
6. Hence, Article 26(2) stated: ‘The State shall…pursue a policy of strengthening the national 
unity by promoting healthy and cordial social relations amongst the various religions, castes, 
tribes, communities and linguistic groups, and by helping in the promotion of their languag-
es, literatures, scripts, arts and cultures.’ Likewise, Article 26(10) stated: ‘The State shall pur-
sue a policy which will help promote the interests of the economically and socially backward 
groups and communities by making special provisions with regard to their education, health, 
and employment.’ But the 1990 Constitution had no reference to Dalits, Adivasi Janajatis 
and Madhesis as historically marginalized groups.  Because of the absence of any specific 
reference to these groups, a case was filed in the Supreme Court against the affirmative action 
policy of the government relating to a scholarship grant for higher education.  The dispute 
arose because it was claimed that Dalits and Adivasi Janajatis were not clearly mentioned 
in the 1990 Constitution as the targeted beneficiaries of the policy.  There was only a vague 
provision of special measures for those who were economically and socially backward.  Since 
no law had been enacted pursuant to this provision the policy was challenged.  The Supreme 
Court issued a directive order in 2004 for the enactment of a law to implement the provision 
for affirmative action. 
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language of the nation even though other native languages were to be 
allowed in schools up to the primary level. Hence, though Articles 11.2 
and 11.3 mentioned religion, race, sex, caste, tribe or ideological convic-
tions as the bases for non-discrimination, language was not mentioned. 
Further, Article 112.3 restricted the mobilization of socio-cultural groups 
for collective welfare and empowerment and constrained political choices 
(Lawoti, 2005).
The interim constitution 2007
The Interim Constitution (IC) of 2007 marked a significant departure from 
the 1990 document. One of the key objectives of IC, which itself had emerged 
from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the state and the 
Maoists after a decade-long conflict, was the commitment to progressive 
restructuring of the state. As a result, IC declared Nepal to be a secular,7 
democratic, federal state in an attempt to address the ‘problems’ that the 
state had been facing on the basis of class, ethnicity, religion and gender 
while undertaking ‘an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring 
of the state.’8 Its 4th amendment in May 2008 abolished the monarchy and 
declared Nepal a federal republic. Similarly, IC also emphasized the need 
to strengthen national unity by maintaining cultural diversity through the 
promotion of healthy and harmonious social relations. It also explicitly rec-
ognized Dalits, Adivasi Janajatis and Madhesis as historically marginalized 
groups requiring special treatment from the state.9 
The Fundamental Rights enshrined in IC were: right to life; right to a 
(criminal) justice system; right against preventive detention; right against 
torture; right against exploitation; and right against exile. The provisions re-
lating to inclusion incorporated in IC were: right against untouchability and 
racial discrimination (Article 14), positive discrimination for Dalits, wom-
en, indigenous/ethnic groups, Madhesis, farmers and other socially and 
economically marginalized communities (Article 13[3]); and proportional 
7. Nepal was declared a secular state in May 2006 following the Second People’s Movement 
against a monarchy that had usurped power in the previous years.
8. Preamble, Part 1, Article 3, 5; Part 3, Article 13, 14, 1; Part 4, Article 33, 35 (3); Part 7, 63 (3.a) 
and (4.5); Part 16, Article 142 (4), Part 17, Article 138 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 
2063 (2007).
9. The 1990 Constitution recognized the existence of different ‘communities’ in the country 
when dealing with the right to culture and education (Article 18), different ‘denomina-
tions’ when dealing with the right to religion.
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representation of women, Dalits, Madhesis, indigenous/ethnic groups and 
other oppressed groups in the state structures (Article 21).
Constitution of Nepal 2015
The latest Constitution of Nepal was promulgated on 20 September 2015 
only to be immediately contested by the Janajatis and Madhesis, giving rise 
to a prolonged agitation in the Tarai. The major issues of contention were 
a demand for more proportional representation (PR) seats, demarcation of 
electoral constituencies on the basis of population, re-organization of the 
proposed federal units and amending discriminatory citizenship laws, along 
with the demand that past agreements between the government and differ-
ent groups be honoured. Compared to IC, the 2015 Constitution reduced the 
proportion of PR seats in Parliament from 56 per cent to 40 per cent while 
the issue of proportional inclusion was not mentioned in the case of accom-
modating minorities in different state structures. As a response to the Tarai 
agitation, the Constitution was amended in January 2016 and the principle 
of proportionate inclusion in state bodies (Article 42) was introduced while 
the demarcation of electoral constituencies would consider population as 
the main basis and geography as the second point (Article 84).
Methodology and data collection
This chapter looks at the state of Nepal’s minorities in a historical context 
and examines the last three constitutions of Nepal that can be considered 
relatively inclusive: the 1990 Constitution, the Interim Constitution of 2007 
and the 2015 Constitution. It analyses how the current Constitution mea-
sures up to international standards vis-à-vis minority rights. Using publicly 
available data, it delves into specific themes:
i. Right to life and security with a focus on the criminal justice system; 
ii. Right to non-discrimination and equality by looking at indicators of 
socioeconomic attainments in education, health, poverty and employ-
ment; 
iii. Right to participation, providing an overview of the representation of 
minorities in national government institutions; and 
iv. Right to culture and identity with an overview of the denial and attain-
ment of identity and cultural rights.
The information presented in this chapter is derived from sources such 
as national censuses and surveys as well as human development reports 
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from different years to provide a comparative perspective on the status of 
each group. Data on representation in various state organs was collected 
from the respective bodies and also from reports from organizations work-
ing on minority issues as well as other available literature.
Limitations
A study of minorities is inherently complex, particularly in a country like 
Nepal that is home to numerous minority groups, which have not yet been 
recognized as such. A major challenge was the difficulty in obtaining caste/
ethnicity and gender-disaggregated data on the various indicators consid-
ered. Lack of standardized data on violence did not allow for a systematic 
study in comparative terms. The biggest limitation, however, is the absence 
of almost any kind of data on Christians. Nepal’s rapidly changing political 
context was also challenging, particularly since it had a direct bearing on the 
content of this chapter.
Right to life and security
Articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) pro-
vide for right to life and security of every individual and protection again 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. These principles were subsequently 
translated into Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). These reminders are especially relevant for post-colonial 
regions like South Asia where the debate on human security has remained 
at the level of rhetoric and has not fed into policymaking even as groups de-
manding a more people-centred conception of security have challenged its 
‘military-centred’ conceptions (Bajpai, 2000). In particular, struggles to re-
define nationalism vis-à-vis increasing ethno-nationalist demands and the 
radical redefining of structural arrangements in Nepal have resulted in the 
‘securitization’ of the state and the failure to institutionalize people-centred 
policies and bringing human security to the fore. The state has invested the 
security forces with unprecedented power, resulting in the abuse of power 
at the cost of suffering of the most marginalized.
Structures and functions of the criminal 
justice institution
All three constitutions—1990, 2007 and 2015—guarantee the right to 
justice to all citizens and require anyone detained to be informed about 
the grounds for arrest as well as be produced before a court of law with-
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in 24 hours of the arrest. Article 14(4) of the 1990 Constitution provided 
protection against torture, and even though it mentioned compensation to 
the victim it was silent on punishment for perpetrators. Nepal also acceded 
to the United Nations Convention against Torture in 1991, and Article 26 
the Interim Constitution and Article 22 of the 2015 Constitution provide for 
the ‘right against torture’; they also say that any such act would be punish-
able by law and the victim would have the right to compensation.
At the same time, there are multiple shortcomings in Nepal’s criminal 
justice system that not just promote impunity and foster human rights’ 
abuses but also stand in contravention of the spirit of all the three con-
stitutions. Some of these include extant legal provisions from an authori-
tarian past. For instance, Section 22 of the 1989 Public Security Act (PSA) 
grants immunity to state officials for any acts committed ‘in good faith’ in 
the course of their duty. PSA allows people to be held in preventive deten-
tion for up to 90 days on the orders of a local authority, which is normally 
the Chief District Officer (CDO). This period can be extended to six months 
with permission from the Home Ministry. Likewise, the equally draconian 
Anti-State Crimes and Penalties Act 1989 (ASCPA) contains provisions that 
are in clear breach of the Constitution as well as international obligations 
such as ICCPR (Amnesty International, 2003).
Nepal has not yet defined what constitutes crimes against humanity and 
extrajudicial killings. The Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and 
Reconciliation Act 2014, enacted to look into excesses committed during the 
decade-long Maoist conflict, defines gross violations of human rights but 
abstains from including provisions in line with the Rome Statute, such as 
Article 7 that specifies ‘crimes against humanity’ consisting of, among oth-
ers, ‘imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in viola-
tion of fundamental rules of international law’ and ‘persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cul-
tural, religious, gender.’10 The 2014 Act only mentions murder, abductions, 
enforced disappearances, physical and mental torture, mutilations, physical 
disabilities, rape and sexual violence and any kind of acts inconsistent with 
international human rights or humanitarian laws or other crimes against 
humanity. The act, however, also contains provisions for amnesty even in 
the most serious cases of human rights violations and that, too, without the 
10.  The Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2071; Rome Statute 
Article 7.  Retrieved from: http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm .
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11.  The Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2071; Rome Statute 
Article 7.  Retrieved from: http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm .
12. Advocacy Forum, Asian Human Rights Commission, the Redress Trust, World Organization 
against Torture, ‘Submission to the United Nations: Universal Periodic Review,’ 23rd Session 
of the Working Group on UPR, Human Rights Council, 22 March 2015. 
consent of the victim. These provisions were retained over the objections 
of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) although with the 
Supreme Court having nullified some of them it is not clear how the act will 
be implemented.11 
The 1959 Army Act contained provisions for a court of inquiry board 
and a court martial for violations of the act. But nothing in the 1959 Act or 
any other law requires the army to release full and complete details of court 
martial proceedings or other such judgments, even if a first information re-
port (FIR) has been filed and the civilian police has commenced criminal 
investigations on the matter. This has obstructed investigations into alleged 
extrajudicial executions and other abuses. For instance, in the well-known 
Maina Sunar case, in which a 15-year-old Dalit girl was killed by the Nepal 
Army in 2004, the army’s refusal to share the findings of the court martial 
with the police and her family, despite a court directive, is a case in point 
(Amnesty International, 2013). In another example, in 2015 the Bardiya 
district police office refused to register FIRs in six cases of political killings 
during the Maoist conflict, despite a 2014 order from the Appellate Court 
in Nepalgunj.12 Similarly, the widespread torture and at least 200 disap-
pearances after arrests by security forces in Bardiya district during 2001 to 
2003, in which the vast majority of victims were from the disadvantaged 
Tharu community, indicates the vulnerability of marginalized groups to 
atrocities at the hands of security forces (International Crisis Group, 2010). 
More recently, during the agitation in the Tarai following the promulgation 
of the 2015 Constitution, more than 50 people, most of them of Tarai origin, 
lost their lives (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
Although difficult to come by, there is some evidence that members of 
minority groups fare worse at the hands of the security forces. As a report 
of the Nepali human rights organization, Advocacy Forum, on the situa-
tion in the Tarai details detainees belonging to groups such as Muslims and 
other Tarai groups are more likely to be tortured while those from Bahun- 
Chhetri groups are least likely to face the same fate (Kathmandu Advocacy 
Forum, 2010) 
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Grievance redressal mechanisms
As stated earlier, Nepal’s justice delivery system faces major shortcomings. 
Most cases never make it to the courts. Criminal cases reported to the police 
are most often dealt with by the police itself. Since there is no accountability 
for failure to investigate cases, there is little incentive for the police to regis-
ter and investigate cases.13 Many civil cases are mediated through tradition-
al or informal means, while others do not reach the courts because citizens 
do not understand the court system, the legal process, or more broadly, 
their rights as citizens. There has been little systematic education to raise 
awareness about the role of the courts, how they can protect citizens’ rights, 
or what rights citizens possess. Judicial independence is further hindered 
by political pressure as well as the general perception that judicial appoint-
ments are driven by political partisanship (James et al., 2015).
Confidence in the justice system’s institutions is further weakened by 
the historic exclusion of many groups. The police, courts and government 
prosecutors’ offices consist predominantly of men from ‘upper castes’ who 
lack sensitivity towards the social diversity of Nepal. Excluded groups face 
cultural resistance and structural barriers in entering professions in the ju-
dicial sector. While most lawyers begin their careers with unpaid ‘appren-
ticeships’, women and men from marginalized groups often lack financial 
or other means of social support to complete this stage. They find it difficult 
to break into professional networks dominated by men from the tradition-
ally dominant castes. The judicial sector, hence, does not represent Nepal’s 
social diversity, reducing confidence about fair treatment among the mar-
ginalized (James et al., 2009). This situation has, however, started changing 
with the provision of reservations in government service since 2007, but its 
impact is yet to be felt fully in terms of having such groups better represent-
ed in the higher echelons of the judicial service.
Criminal proceedings and decisions by quasi-judicial authorities take 
place behind closed doors and generally without defence lawyers or by fol-
lowing standardized procedures, public hearings and witnesses. Such prac-
tices also impede the process of fair trials. Quasi-judicial authorities such 
as CDOs and district forest officers (DFO) often do not have even the basic 
training in legal or judicial matters and are not independent since they are 
also part of the executive branch of the government (Adhikari, 2013).
13.  Advocacy Forum, Asian Human Rights Commission, the Redress Trust, World Organization 
against Torture, ‘Submission to the United Nations: Universal Periodic Review’, 23rd Session 
of the Working Group on UPR, Human Rights Council, 22 March 2015.
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There are only limited legal aid services available to disadvantaged Ne-
palis: the first is where the Supreme Court appoints and supervises a mem-
ber of the bar as a ‘stipendiary advocate’ in most courts; and the second, 
launched under the Legal Aid Act of 1997 and administered by the Ministry 
of Law and Justice, relies on legal aid committees set up in collaboration 
with local bar cells in each district to assess legal aid applications and ap-
point private lawyers to act for those granted assistance. However, both 
schemes are poorly funded and the absence of a system for monitoring their 
effectiveness translates into only a low level of assistance to those eligible to 
use such services (James et al., 2009).
Right to non-discrimination 
and equality
In Nepal, social and gender identity determine individual and group access 
to assets, capabilities and voice. In this regard, poverty outcomes, including 
indicators of economic well-being, human development and voice and po-
litical influence reflect the results of discrimination and inequality faced by 
minorities due to historical and cumulative discrimination and exclusion 
in Nepal (DFID, 2006). Being party to international agreements such as 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IC-
ESCR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Nepal has an obligation to right these 
long-standing inequities since these instruments require ratifying states 
to grant all people ‘the right of self-determination...[to] freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (Article 1, ICESCR) and to do all it can to eliminate such dis-
crimination (Article 2[2], ICERD).14 
In 2007, Nepal also became the only country in Asia to ratify the In-
digenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (ILO Convention 169) along 
with the United Nations Declaration of the Right of Indigenous Peoples 
14. Article 2(2) of ICERD states, States parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, 
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure 
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging 
to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for 
which they were taken have been achieved.
15. This was part of the agreement with the agitating Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationali-
ties (NEFIN) and the Indigenous Nationalities Joint Struggle Committee in September 2007.
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(UNDRIP).15 However, the National Action Plan on ILO Convention 169 
has not been implemented yet and is pending cabinet approval since being 
drafted in 2009. Likewise, the Committee on Natural Resources, Economic 
Rights and Revenue Allocation of the first Constituent Assembly had called 
for inclusion of the provision ‘[t]o ensure prior use rights to the indigenous, 
ethnic and other communities in natural resources and their use’ in the Pre-
amble to the Constitution (http://www.ncf.org.np/upload/CA/concept_
paper_Natural_Resource.ENG.pdf). But the dissolution of that CA meant 
such provisions calling for greater social inclusion in the Constitution died 
a quiet death.
On the other hand, the 2015 Constitution has continued to uphold the 
principles of non-discrimination and equality while the practice of untouch-
ability has been made a punishable offence. In practice, however, the gov-
ernment has not been able to fully safeguard all these rights. Additionally, 
the 2015 Constitution fails to guarantee collective rights over traditional 
territory, land and resources in line with UNDRIP and ILO 169, which the 
Adivasi Janajatis have demanded as inalienable individual rights in the 
Constitution.
Cases of identity-based violations
The Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Pun-
ishment) Act was adopted by Nepal in 2011. This act states that if any one 
commits or causes to commit any act of discrimination shall be deemed 
to have committed caste-based discrimination and untouchability, and is 
liable for punishment.16 However, the mechanisms to eliminate such dis-
crimination are not effective and only a few cases relating to untouchability 
have been lodged in the courts.17 Most police officers are either unaware that 
caste-based discrimination is a crime or they are reluctant to file cases in the 
name of maintaining social harmony and instead tend to pressure victims 
15. This was part of the agreement with the agitating Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationali-
ties (NEFIN) and the Indigenous Nationalities Joint Struggle Committee in September 2007.
16. Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act 2011 (2068).  
Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/–-ed_protect/–-protrav/–-
ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_190732.pdf .
17. ,The NHRI Nepal Joint Submission for The Second Universal Periodic Review of Nepal’ sub-
mitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, and submitted by the National 
Human Rights Commission, the National Women’s Commission and the National Dalit 
Commission on 22 March 2015.
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to withdraw their complaints. According to one report of the 18 registered 
cases related to caste-based discrimination and untouchability that reached 
the courts, none of the perpetrators was sent to jail and instead they were 
imposed paltry fines with small compensations provided to the victims. In 
fact, in two incidents the victims were forced to change their cases of physi-
cal assault stemming from caste discrimination into cases of slander under 
the less serious State Case Act 1990 and Libel and Slander Act 1959 (Kisan 
et al., 2015) .
According to the Office of the Attorney General’s annual reports, 10 
cases related to untouchability were taken to the courts in the fiscal 
year 2014-15, which represent a decline from the 14 in the previous year 
(Pun, 2015) and indicate either lack of awareness or foot-dragging on the 
part of police officials who often cite the absence of rules and regulations to 
implement the act.
The Nepal Social Inclusion Survey (NSIS) conducted by Tribhuvan Uni-
versity recorded that incidents of violations of the rights and security of Dal-
its and Muslims took the form of both verbal abuse and physical violence, 
while psychological abuse was reported to be the highest against Madhesi 
Dalits, Hill Dalits and Muslims. The latter groups also faced discrimination 
by being barred from entering private homes (CDSA, 2014a) (see Box 1).
Socioeconomic status of minority18 groups
Multidimensional Exclusion Index (MEI) 
The Multidimensional Exclusion Index (MEI) developed by the World Bank 
measures the status of social exclusion/deprivation of 80 different caste/
ethnic groups19 along health, income, education and empowerment-related 
indices. The MEI is a tool developed to measure exclusion using three di-
mensions; economic life, social services and civic and social participation 
(Bennett and Parajuli, 2011). 
According to the MEI measure, the Chepang-Raji-Raute-Kusunda clus-
ter is the most excluded/deprived in Nepal with a MEI value of 0.53, where-
as the Marwaris are the least excluded with a MEI value of 0.04, followed 
18.  Details are given in Annex 2. Data on minorities in Nepal.
19. The 80 different caste /ethnic populations are classified into four categories: highly excluded, 
excluded, included and highly included. 
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by the Thakalis, Kayasthas, Newars and Hill Bahuns. Musahars are the sec-
ond-most excluded/deprived group with a MEI value of 0.47.
Poverty headcount ratio
According to the Nepal Human Development Report (NHDR) (2014), pov-
erty incidence or the poverty headcount rate for Nepal was 25.2 per cent. 
However, as can be expected, poverty levels varied according to social iden-
tities and locations—the highest incidence of poverty was among Hill Dalits 
(43.6 per cent) and Tarai Dalits (38.2 per cent), followed by Tarai middle 
Box 1. Setbacks and reasons for hope
Discrimination against Madhesi Dalits
The Teacher’s Service Commission had announced the fulfilment of 
the quota of three Dalit science teachers for the secondary level for 
the country’s western region. There were only three applicants for 
the post, including Gulab Chandra Chamar (a Madhesi Dalit), as ev-
ident in the list of applicants provided on the website of the Western 
Regional Education Directorate. When the results were published, 
Gulab’s name was missing and in his place was someone from a Hill 
Dalit community. Gulab’s application form as well as his examina-
tion paper had both gone missing, and when he sought clarifications 
the officials refused to respond (http://taraihumanrights.org/De-
tails.php?news=106).
Caste-based Discrimination
A couple was banished from their village in Gorkha district for in-
ter-caste marriage. A Dalit boy named Ganesh married Jyoti, a 
Thakuri (hill high-caste) girl. The Thakuris not only evicted the cou-
ple from the village but also all members of Ganesh’s family. The 
couple were to sit for their 12th Grade examination from the village 
school but were not allowed to do so and Ganesh’s brother was also 
barred from attending school (Singh, 2016).
Justice for Dalits
There are some instances where some cases have been decided in fa-
vour of Dalits. For instance, in the attempted rape case of Maya Sarki 
in July 2013 in Belbari VDC of Morang, Maya and Manoj Bishwokar-
ma, a local Dalit rights activist were publicly humiliated for accusing 
a local of a crime. Following investigations by the CDO’s office and 
the Morang district court, in April 2014 the court penalized nine of-
fenders with a fine of NPR 15,000 each (Kisan et al., 2015).
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castes (28.7 per cent), Hill Janajatis (28.3per cent), Tarai Janajatis (25.9 
per cent), Muslims (20.2 per cent) and Tarai Brahmins (18.6 per cent). Hill 
Bahuns and Newars had the lowest incidence of poverty at approximately 
10.3 per cent.
The Human Development Index (HDI) 
In 2014, Nepal’s HDI score was 0.458, the lowest in South Asia apart from 
Afghanistan.20 Within Nepal, HDI scores varied significantly between mi-
nority groups and the rest of the population. Muslims had the lowest HDI 
value (0.422), followed by Dalits with an HDI value of 0.434 and Janaja-
tis (excluding Newars) at 0.482. In contrast, the Bahuns/Chhetris had the 
highest HDI value of 0.557. In terms of intra-group differences, HDI for 
Madhesi Dalits was lower (0.400) than Hill Dalits (0.446); Tarai Janajatis 
(0.473) fared worse than Hill Janajatis (0.509).
Education
According to NHDR (2014), Nepal’s adult literacy rate was 56.5 per cent. 
However, there were significant variations across different groups. The 
literacy rate of Janajatis overall was 66.93 (Hill Janajatis, 68.45 per cent; 
Tarai Janajatis, 62.48 per cent). Muslims had the lowest literacy rate 
(43.56 per cent), followed by Dalits (52.48 per cent) and Madhesi castes 
(55.49 per cent). Disaggregated further, literacy rates for Madhesi Dalits 
was only 34.50 per cent, significantly lower than Hill Dalits (61.93 per cent). 
Although all groups have seen significant attainments in higher levels of ed-
ucation, Hill and Tarai Dalits remained the lowest at the tertiary level with 
2.1 per cent each followed by Tarai Janajatis at 3.1 per cent (CDSA, 2014b).
The percentage share of teachers from Dalit and Janajati groups by level 
and gender was also lower compared to their share in the population. Dalits 
made up only 4.9 per cent of the teachers at the basic level (Grades 1 to 8) 
while Janajatis did better at 28.1 per cent (DoE, 2015). The DoE Flash Re-
port does not provide comparable data for other minority groups, although 
this percentage was much lower in proportion to their shares in the national 
population at 12.58 per cent for Dalits and 35.8 per cent for Janajatis.
20. The Nepal Human Development Index (NHDI) measures long and healthy life, knowledge 
and standard of living.  Healthy life is measured by life expectancy, knowledge is measured 
by adult literacy and mean years of schooling and living standard is measured by the gross 
national income (GNI) per capita in purchasing power parity.
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Employment
According to the 2011 Census Tarai Janajatis (72.9 per cent) had a higher 
rate of involvement in agricultural-related employment, followed by Hill 
and Tarai Dalits (69.3 and 69.4 per cent respectively) and Hill Janajatis 
(66.5 per cent). The figures for Hill Bahuns/Chhetris and Tarai Brahmins/
Rajputs were 54.6 per cent and 39.6 per cent respectively and within the 
Hill Bahun/Chhetri group, the situation of Chhetris at 71.5 per cent was 
comparable to Tarai Janajatis whereas only 59.2 per cent of the Bahuns 
were engaged in agriculture (CDSA, 2014b).
Health
The Nepal Demographic Health Survey (2011) showed that people from the 
Tarai faced greater problems in accessing healthcare despite travel being 
relatively easier in the region compared to the hills and mountains. Muslim 
women (86.3 per cent) and Tarai Dalit women (85.3 per cent) faced severe 
problems of accessibility, followed by Hill Dalits (79.2 per cent) and Hill Ja-
najatis (72.9 per cent). Muslims (318), Madhesis (307) and Dalits (273) had 
the highest maternal mortality rates (MMR) per 100,000 live births, and 
while Janajatis (207) also fared better, Bahuns/Chhetris (182) and Newars 
(105) had the lowest MMR (Government of Nepal, 2013).
State programmes
The 9th Plan (1998-2002) laid the foundation for introducing ‘social inclu-
sion’ in government programmes and policies. It had a separate chapter 
on Janajatis with regard to their integration in society and in a first-ever 
instance it mentioned providing 20 per cent of the employment opportuni-
ties in the public sector to women (http://npc.gov.np/images/download/
ninth_eng_2.pdf). Moving ahead, the government adopted ‘social inclu-
sion’ as one of its major policy objectives in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2002-
07) (also known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). The 10th Plan 
envisaged social inclusion as the third pillar of poverty reduction and sought 
to include marginalized sections of the population and backward regions 
into the mainstream of development and also to make visible progress in re-
ducing existing inequalities (Government of Nepal, 2007). The Three-Year 
Interim Plan (2007-10) also came up with special programmes for disad-
vantaged groups, including women, Dalits, Janajatis and Muslims (Gov-
ernment of Nepal, 2007). The Interim Plan, drawn up concurrently with 
the Interim Constitution 2007, introduced for the first time reservations for 
Dalits, women, Muslims, Madhesis and Janajatis to increase their participa-
tion in the education, health and employment sectors. The Interim Plan also 
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allocated budgets for each group—NPR 13 billion for Dalits, NPR 15 billion 
for Janajatis, NPR 10 billion for Madhesis and NPR 1.5 billion for Muslims. 
The current Three-Year Plan (2013-16) also has programmes to identify and 
amend legal and policy provisions aimed at marginalized groups.
Building on the goals and achievements of the previous periodic plans, 
the government’s budget for 2014-15 (Ministry of Finance, 2014) has pro-
visioned monthly stipends of NPR 1,500 to 3,000 for students belonging to 
low-income groups from Dalit, Chepang and Raute communities who have 
passed the School Leaving Certificate Examination with a first division from 
public schools. Similarly, announcements have been made that the govern-
ment will bear all the costs for students from Dom, Badi, Chamar, Musa-
har and Dalit communities pursuing graduate-level studies in engineering 
and medicine. In addition, the budget speech also ensures that scholarships 
will be provided to intelligent, disabled, conflict-affected, liberated kamlari 
(former female bonded child labourers), marginalized and Dalit students.
Some vague provisions vis-à-vis Madhesis have also been inserted: ‘Suit-
able mechanism of addressing Madhesi issues and mainstreaming them at 
various levels of the state will be developed. A policy of getting participation 
of Madhesi community in the process of programme preparation, imple-
mentation and monitoring related to the Madhes will be followed’ (Govern-
ment of Nepal, 2007). The said mechanism has been left undefined, hence it 
is difficult to measure any achievements in this regard.
The political context played an important role in shaping the focus of 
Nepal’s different development plans. The 9th Plan was adopted when the 
Maoist insurgency was rising while the 10th Plan tried to head off the Mao-
ist insurgency that was beginning to reach its peak. The 11th Plan was the 
most inclusive since it was formulated in the backdrop of the CPA and the 
2006 People’s Movement, both of which had inclusion at their core. How-
ever, these advances fizzled out in the 12th and the 13th Plans, and the em-
phasis reverted as earlier more towards poverty in general.
Government structures
Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) units have been established 
in a number of key ministries to address the issue of marginalization of dif-
ferent social groups.21 Gender itself had been given priority with the estab-
lishment of a Gender Responsive Budget (GRB) committee in the Ministry 
of Finance (Ministry of Finance, 2012) while a Gender Equity and Environ-
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ment Division (GEED) has been functional in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives since 1992. These units, however, have still not integrated 
other dimensions of exclusion in their mandate. Even where GESI units/
sections have been established, these are afflicted by the same problems 
that made the Gender Focal Persons ineffective – institutional failures to 
link their responsibilities to the core functions of ministries, inadequate 
technical qualifications of staff and lack of specific funds for activities.
A positive development with the 2015 Constitution is the statutory pro-
vision for various minority commissions—the Women’s Commission, Dalit 
Commission, Janajati Adivasi Commission, Muslim Commission, Madhesi 
Commission, Tharu Commission and an Inclusion Commission—although 
these have been given a mandate of only 10 years after which their fate will 
be re-evaluated. So far, the duties and responsibilities of these commissions 
have not been spelt out apart from the case of the pre-existing Dalit Com-
mission and Women’s Commission.
Education
In terms of education, Nepal has taken progressive measures such as 
adopting Education for All (EFA) as a national campaign. With the prime 
objective of ensuring access and equity in primary education, enhancing the 
quality and relevance of primary education and improving efficiency and 
institutional capacities, EFA has adopted both a pro-poor approach and tar-
geted gender mainstreaming, while Dalit students have been singled out as 
the prime beneficiary group. The School Sector Reform Programme (SSRP 
2009-15) (Ministry of Education, 2009), which complemented EFA, how-
ever, provided for special assistance only to Dalits (and residents of Karnali 
zone). An important aspect of SSRP is its institutionalization of traditional 
education systems such as madrassas, gumbas/vihars and gurukuls/ash-
rams to enable these bodies to meet the national standards of formal ed-
ucation. However, the Multilingual Education Implementation Guidelines 
2009 are being implemented in only 24 schools even though the aim was to 
operationalize multilingual education in 7,500 schools by 2015 (Ministry of 
Education, 2009).
21.  These include the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Population, Ministry of Urban 
Development, Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare, Ministry of Cooperatives 
and Poverty Alleviation, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development.  The Ministry of Education has an Inclusive Education 
section and a Gender Equity section.
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Right to participation
The aim of minority rights’ regimes set forth in international instruments 
such as ICCPR is both right to diversity and removal of structural barriers to 
equal opportunities and participation by members of minority groups. Rec-
ognizing that different groups have in the past faced multiple discrimina-
tions, Nepal sought to address such historical inequities through constitu-
tional and legal frameworks. Additionally, realizing that formal equality or 
‘equal treatment’ is not always sufficient to ensure equal rights and oppor-
tunities for historically disadvantaged groups, special measures including 
affirmative action policies, have also been introduced to ‘level the playing 
field’ for members of such groups.
Legal and policy framework
Constitutional provisions
The Preamble of the 2015 Constitution commits the state to creating ‘an 
egalitarian society on the basis of the principles of proportional inclusion 
and participation to ensure equitable economy, prosperity and social jus-
tice’. Accordingly, specific provisions in the Constitution to promote partic-
ipation of minority groups include: 
• Article 40(1), giving Dalits the right to proportionate participation in all 
agencies of the state.
• Article 70, which requires that the President and the Vice-President be-
long to different gender or macro-ethnic categories.
• Articles 83, 84, 88(2) and 176, which provide for a parliament at the 
federal level and assemblies at the provincial, while ensuring a degree of 
inclusiveness within the legislative bodies.
Legal provisions
The 2007 amendment to the Civil Service Act 1991 set aside 45 per cent of 
the civil service positions for different marginalized groups. Accordingly, 15 
per cent of all the seats are reserved for women, 12 per cent for Janajatis, 
10 per cent for Madhesis and 4 per cent for Dalits (and 2 per cent for the 
disabled and 2 for 10 districts identified as backward).The only comparable 
earlier legislation is limited to the Local Self-Governance Act 1999 that stip-
ulated that village, municipal and district councils have at least one Dalit 
member.
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Progress in Increasing Participation
Political Representation
In the three parliaments in the post-1990 period, only one Dalit had been 
elected. Their representation under the existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
system was 0.5 per cent in 1991 and nil in both 1994 and 1999. Even in 
the 2008 Constituent Assembly, which is considered a landmark for its 
inclusivity, Dalits managed to secure just 2.9 per cent of the seats under 
that system, a figure that went down to 0.8 per cent in 2013 (Vollan, 2015). 
Representation of all the other minority groups was considerably better 
and with the introduction of quotas in the proportional representation (PR) 
part of the CA elections of 2008 and 2013, their presence became more pro-
nounced although with the exception of Tarai Janajatis overall it went down 
in the second CA.
Although better than that of Dalits, political representation of Muslims 
too has been far from satisfactory. No Muslim candidate was elected in the 
1959 elections and the king nominated one Muslim to the national legisla-
ture in 1960 and 1963. Two Muslim candidates were elected to the national 
legislature, the Rastriya Panchayat, in 1981,while there was only one nomi-
nated member in the 1986 Rastriya Panchayat (Gaborieau, cited in Sijapati, 
2012). Muslim representation was steady in the years after 1990: 2.4 per 
cent in 1991, 2.4 per cent in 1994 and 2.0 per cent in 1999. The 2008 CA 
saw 16 Muslims elected including, for the first time, four Muslim women 
(see Table 2).
The record in the executive branch, however, has not been altogether 
encouraging despite all the focus on creating a more inclusive polity. The 
first cabinet formed after the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution reflect-
ed this regressive tendency, with nearly two-third of the members of the 
cabinet belonging to the dominant Khas-Arya group (see Table 3).
In fact, the record of previous cabinets in the transitional period (2007 
to 2015) is also quite mixed. None of the cabinets demonstrated the kind of 
inclusiveness that has been possible in the two constituent assemblies (see 
Figure 1).
Representation in government structures
Historically, there has been poor representation of minorities in the ad-
ministrative structures of the state such as the civil services, the judiciary 
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and security forces. The presence of Janajatis is substantial in the security 
services although that is generally limited to some Hill Janajati groups only.
However, after the 2007 amendment of the Civil Service Act and the 
provision of quotas, there has been some progress although not to the ex-
tent possible as evidenced in the 2009-12 period, when unavailability of 
appropriate candidates and the poor performance of those who attempted 
to get in resulted in less than 40 per cent of the seats set aside for minority 
groups being filled up (Awasthi and Adhikary, 2012).
Since Muslims are not considered a separate category for reserved quo-
tas, there is no information on how the new provision has affected their 
participation in government service.
Security forces, mainly the Nepal Army, have remained inherently ex-
clusive vis-à-vis Madhesis. The presence of Madhesis in the security forces 
has remained practically negligible. To rectify this situation, in 2007 the 
Nepal Army established a new battalion to include Madhesis (Nepalnews.
com, 2015), but the participation of the Madhesi community in the Nepali 
Army continues to remain low.
Citizenship
The 2015 Constitution retained citizenship provisions that directly discrim-
inate against women by declaring that, ‘in case of a person born to Nepali 
woman citizen married to a foreign citizen, he/she may acquire naturalized 
citizenship of Nepal as provided for by a Federal law if he/she is having the 
permanent domicile in Nepal and he/she has not acquired citizenship of 
the foreign country.’ This impinges on equal citizenship rights for women 
to confer full citizenship to their children since naturalized citizens are not 
allowed to hold any constitutional positions. This provision is particularly 
discriminatory towards Madhesis because cross-border marriages are high-
ly prevalent in the Tarai and so children born to Madhesi women and do-
miciled in Nepal will forever be denied the opportunity to rise to the high 
levels of governance.
Right to culture and identity
Despite acceding to ICCPR, which states that where ‘ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with other members of this group, to enjoy 
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Caste/Ethnicity Number of Ministers Percentage
Khas-Arya 25 62.5
Hill Janajati 5 12.5
Tarai Janajati 2 5.0
Tarai Caste 5 12.5
Hill Dalit 1 2.5
Tarai Dalit 1 2.5
Muslim 1 2.5
Total 40 100
Table 3. Social Composition of First Council of Ministers 
formed after the 2015 Constitution
Source: http://www.opmcm.gov.np/en/council.
Khas-Arya Janajati Madhesis Dalit Muslim
Figure 1. Social Composition of Council of Ministers under 
Prime Ministers, 2007-2015
Source: Dhruba et al., (forthcoming).  
Note: The figures represent the number of individuals who were nominated as ministers and does not 
reflect the duration of their office terms.
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their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their 
own language’ (Article 27), in law and practice, the Nepali state continues 
to place curbs on these rights. Historically, this began with the process of 
sometimes-forced adoption of the Nepali language and Hindu religion. Ever 
since the emergence of Nepal as a modern nation-state in 1769 and through 
the end of the Panchayat system (1960-90), the rulers have promoted a doc-
trine of ‘one nation, one culture, one language, one religion’ to the exclusion 
of minority languages (Turin, 2007). Till 1991, discussions about ethnic dif-
ference or inequalities were jailable offences (Miklian, 2008). Under Pan-
chayat rule, the supreme status ascribed to Nepali language left little incen-
tive for mother tongue Nepali speakers to learn minority languages, while 
political, educational, developmental and administrative activities required 
speakers of other languages to learn Nepali (Turin, 2007). Many mem-
bers from Janajati groups from the middle hills adopted both the language 
(Nepali) and the culture of the dominant group in this period.
The 1990 Constitution provided a slight departure from this policy by 
preserving Nepali as the ‘language of the nation’ but also designating all 
languages spoken as mother tongues in the country as ‘national languages’ 
and guaranteed the right to primary education in these languages (Gellner, 
2015). The latter right, however, was never brought into practice by the 
state, and neither were the ‘national languages’ accorded any kind of offi-
cial sanction. A well-documented case is that of the independently arrived 
decisions in 1997 by the Kathmandu municipality to use Newari and by the 
Dhanusha District Development Committee and Rajbiraj municipality 
to use Maithili as languages of communication in addition to Nepali. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the use of regional languages by local bodies was 
unconstitutional and illegal (Turin, 2007), and there has been no judgment 
so far to reverse this decision. But in an indication of how far the ground 
has shifted over time, following the uproar by Vice-President Parmananda 
Jha taking his oath of office in Hindi, ruling on a case filed before it, the 
Supreme Court decided that taking the oath in one’s mother tongue was not 
unconstitutional, and Jha took his oath once again—in Maithili. Given that 
the 2015 Constitution provides federal units to determine one or more lan-
guages in addition to Nepali as the official language, a start has been made 
in some district courts to appoint, at government expense, interpreters.22 
In terms of religious freedom in an apparent step back from the Interim 
Constitution, which had categorically defined Nepal as a secular state, the 
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... contd. ...
Profile of a vulnerable minority: 
Musahars
Musahars are a historically marginalized and highly excluded Dal-
it caste group from Nepal’s Tarai region. This case study describes 
the current status of Musahars in Nepal and provides an overview of 
their historical background and how they continue to be discriminat-
ed against and marginalized by landowners and the state.
The origin of Musahars in Nepal is linked to the history of Musa-
hars in India. Musahars believe that they are the descendants of the 
Kol tribe of the Chhota Nagpur Plateau in eastern India. Being land-
less, their ancestors migrated to Bihar in the 12th century to serve as 
agricultural labourers and remained the largest labour force there 
(Kumar, 2006). The term ‘musahar’ is derived from masa=‘flesh’ 
and hera=‘seeker’ (Dahal et al., 2014). However, it has since been 
distorted by the mainly Hindu Brahmin jamindars (Kumar, 2006), 
to mean ‘rat-eaters’.
Musahars are found mainly in the eastern and central Tarai districts 
of Siraha, Saptari, Dhanusha, Sunsari, Morang, Udayapur, Mahot-
tari, Bara, Parsa, Sarlahi, Rautahat and Nawalparasi. According to 
the 2011 Census, Musahars formed 0.89 per cent of the population 
of Nepal and constituted the second-largest Tarai Dalit group. Al-
though there is a lack of records about the history of Musahars in 
Nepal, it is believed that they entered and settled in the plains of Ne-
pal during the Rana regime working as labourers–-clearing forests 
for agricultural land and working for the extension of the railways 
between Nepal and India. As labourers, Musahars were bonded to 
the jamindars in the Tarai during the Rana regime and were treated 
as untouchables (Dahal et al., 2014; Salter and Gurung, 1999). Mu-
sahars claim that they have no specific ritual occupations among the 
Hindu caste groups and that they are an ethnic group with their own 
distinct cultural identity and proximity to the Bhil and Munda tribes 
in India (Giri, 2012). 
Discrimination and Marginalization of Musahars 
According to the Census 2011, the literacy rate among Musahars was 
only 21.8 per cent, which was far below the national average of 65.9 
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2015 Constitution qualified ‘secularism’ to mean ‘religious, cultural freedom 
including protection of religion and culture handed down from time imme-
morial’, the latter being an explicit reference to Hinduism with its use of the 
term ‘sanatan’ in the Nepali original of ‘time immemorial’. Further, the cow 
has been retained as the national animal, which impinges on the food cul-
ture of some indigenous and religious groups (Constitution of Nepal, 2015). 
The Nepali state has long punished members of Janajati communities who 
kill cows for consumption with jail terms extending up to 12 years. In 2013 
and 2014 alone, at least 38 individuals belonging to Janajati groups were 
either serving prison time or facing prosecution on charges of cow slaughter 
(Ghale, 2015).
Religious minorities of Nepal
Muslims
According to the 2011 Census, Muslims in Nepal constituted the third largest 
religious group with a 4.39 per cent share of the population. Muslims have 
registered consistent growth over the years from their share of only 2.54 
per cent in 1952.23 Muslims in Nepal are primarily rural, with 85 per cent re-
siding in rural areas (CBS, 2014).24 They form the largest population group 
in five Tarai districts—Banke (21.10 per cent), Rautahat (19.47 per cent), 
Kapilvastu (19.42 per cent), Parsa (15.41 per cent) and Bara (13.43 per cent). 
In five other Tarai districts, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, Sunsari and 
Siraha, Muslims constitute the second largest group (CBS, 2001).
Muslims fare poorly on major socioeconomic indicators. The literacy 
rate of Grade 5 and above is only 43.6 per cent among Muslims (as com-
pared to the national average of 65 per cent). Muslims have only 3.24 mean 
years of schooling—the least for any social group in Nepal. Their per capita 
income of US$695 is also among the lowest; although minimally better than 
Yadavs and Madhesi Dalits (US$671 and US$616 respectively), it is sub-
stantially lower than the national average of US$1,160 (NHDR, 2014) (See 
also Annex 1.)
22.  For instance, the Chitwan District Court has provided for interpreters in 11 different languag-
es while it was reported that the Panchthar District Court has appointed interpreters for 14 
languages.  http://kantipur.ekantipur.com/news/2016-04-04/20160404073956.html and 
http://gorkhapatraonline.com/news/28569.
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per cent. Further, the National Social Inclusion Survey (2012) re-
vealed that only 0.69 per cent Musahars had attained education up 
to the intermediate level. According to the Multi-Dimensional Ex-
clusion Index, Musahars were located at the very bottom among all 
the caste and ethnic groups in Nepal (Bennet and Parjauli, 2011). 
Political participation of Musahars at all levels was negligible as was 
their presence in the civil services (NHDR, 2009).
Musahars have been economically, politically and culturally mar-
ginalized. The practice of untouchability continues to be a major 
problem for the community since it leads to their exclusion even 
from public places such as drinking water sources. Landlessness is a 
major cause of the economic and political marginalization of Musa-
hars (Dahal et al., 2014), who dependent on the landowners for their 
survival. After the 2001 abolition of the haruwa-charuwa practice, 
which bound them to their landlords, Musahars have started work-
ing as free labourers, making their living as agricultural labourers, 
by fishing, selling firewood and pulling rickshaws.
Specific socioeconomic developments programmes targeted at Mu-
sahars are lacking. On the contrary, development interventions such 
as those relating to community forestry and national parks have 
ended up displacing and further marginalizing Musahars from their 
livelihoods (Paudel et al., 2007).
Poor over Generations
Fifty-year-old Bombholi Sada is a resident of Babhangamakatti vil-
lage in Saptari district. His father, Bechan Sada, spent his entire 
youth and old age as a servant for an affluent family in the village. 
Bombholi also spent his entire youth as a cowherd for others. His 
late brother, Sakunta, worked as a labourer until he was killed in a 
machine accident in Punjab. Not only Bombholi and Sakunta, but 
all the five sons of Bechan spent their lives as labourers. Bombho-
li’s grandfather also worked as a servant until he died. Bombholi’s 
son works as a tractor labourer. No one in his family has received 
any education. Bombholi said, ‘For many generations, we have been 
working for others and we have remained poor and we have survived 
somehow.’
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The National Muslim commission
Despite the history of Muslim settlements in Nepal going back to the early 
16th century, until recently there was no recognition of Muslims as a sepa-
rate religious and cultural group. Equal citizenship was not granted to Mus-
lims by the Nepali state until 1962. Muslims were categorized as ‘impure but 
touchable’ in the caste hierarchy codified in the Muluki Ain (National Code) 
of 1854 (Hoefer, 2004). Acknowledging the extent of marginalization of the 
Muslim community, on 5 April 2012, the cabinet approved the formation of 
a Muslim Commission, which was given constitutional status by the 2015 
Constitution (http://www.nmc.gov.np/).
Christians
Christians make up another small religious minority in Nepal and currently 
account for 1.4 per cent of the total population.25 It is believed that the first 
Christians came to the Kathmandu Valley in 1628 (Whelpton, 2005) and 
Christian missionaries have been arriving intermittently from the begin-
ning of the 18th century (Lindell, 2002). After his conquest of Kathmandu 
Valley in the mid-18th century, Prithvi Narayan Shah expelled all the Chris-
tians along with the new converts. These exiled Christians settled in Bettiah 
in the Indian state of Bihar and returned to Nepal only after the demise of 
the Rana regime in 1951 (Rongong, 2012).
In 1947, Father Marshall Moran, an American Jesuit, arrived in Kath-
mandu to supervise the BA examinations at Tri-Chandra College, which was 
then affiliated to Patna University. Responding to entreaties by Kathman-
du’s elite, the priest set up the St. Xavier’s School for boys in Kathmandu in 
23. Many Muslims and even Hindus in Nepal claim that the total population of Muslims 
reported in the Census is incorrect and that the precise figure for Muslims is anywhere 
between 6 to 10 per cent of the population.  In the report ‘Indian Ethnic Groups in the 
Nepal Tarai. Ansari (1980), showed that the population of Muslims living in Sunsari dis-
trict was more than 50,000, which is three times the number reported in the 1971 Census 
(19,373). The often-cited reasons for the under-representation of Muslims include: fear 
of being discriminated for being Muslim; use of Census data for possible conscription in 
the army; and imposition of more taxes (see also Siddique 2001, Dahal 1978). These rea-
sons imply that Muslims strategically under-represent themselves, but as a 2014 Census 
of a VDC in Parsa district found, the 6.7 per cent Muslim population had been reported 
as zero (Ayub et al 2014).
24. Although Muslims can be divided into Hill Muslims and Tarai Muslims, the latter are so 
small that they were not even enumerated in 2011. In 2001, they numbered just 4,893 
compared to the national Muslim population of 975,873.
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1951 (Messerschimdt, 1977), marking the formal entry of Christians back 
into Nepal. A school for girls run by Catholic nuns, St. Mary’s School, was 
established in 1954.
Caste discrimination and Christianity
It is claimed that growing poverty and religious and caste discrimination 
have contributed to the growth of Christianity. Although the focus has been 
on people from the ‘lower castes’ converting to escape an exploitative caste 
hierarchy, statistics indicate that people from all castes and ethnicities 
convert to Christianity. However, even among Christians, converts from 
25. Now Nepal has one of the fastest-growing Christian populations in the world, according to 
the World Christian Database, which tracks global trends in Christianity (http://www.npr.
org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/02/03/463965924/why-nepal-has-one-of-the-worlds-
fastest-growing-christian-populations).
Eighty-year-old Dular Sada of the same locality is in his twilight 
years. His father, Pachu and grandfather, Faagu, worked in the vil-
lage. Until he got old, Dular worked at digging soil in the fields. His 
nephew, Bhutai, is also working as a labourer. ‘In our family, there 
has been no difference from the time of grandfather till now. We 
earn during the day, eat at night, and start again in the morning. 
Fate has been like that. What can we do?’
‘Leaders promise a lot during elections, but they have never come 
back and helped in improving our livelihoods,’ said Dewan Sada, the 
leader of the locality.
Another local, Bulan Sada, said, ‘Our main problem is land. Since we 
do not have land, we cannot even take the facilities provided by the 
government.’
The only Musahar who has achieved a high political position is Asar-
fi Sada from Saptari. He was a nominated member of the legisla-
ture-parliament in 2007-08. He is currently a leader of the UCPN 
(Maoist).
Source: Jha (2016).
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‘lower caste’ groups continue to be discriminated against (Bhattachan et al., 
2009),while top positions in the Christian community are disproportionate-
ly occupied by converts from Hindu ‘high-caste’ backgrounds (Shah, 1993).
There is a dearth of writing on the Christians of Nepal. What is clear 
though is that Christians began their work in the name of modernization 
and contributed to different sectors such as education, health services, 
communication and transportation. But the Nepali state has always viewed 
Christians with suspicion with regard to proselytism, particularly during the 
Panchayat years. At the end of the Panchayat system in 1990, there were 
30 persons serving jail sentences for conversion-related charges and an-
other 200 had cases pending against them in different courts. All of them 
were granted amnesty when the interim government was formed. But, the 
2015 Constitution continues to retain the discriminatory clause against 
Christians by considering proselytising a crime (Article 26[3]).26 The am-
biguity in the Constitution regarding what constitutes ‘forceful conversion’ 
and the right of an individual to change one’s religious faith has provided 
the state with leverage against Christian communities and organizations. In 
another blow to the Christian community, coinciding with the promulgation 
of the 2015 Constitution, the practice of declaring Christmas a national holi-
day that had started after 2007 has since been stopped.
There have also been some attacks on Christians by right-wing Hin-
du groups who blame them for the introduction of secularism in 2006. In 
2008, a Roman Catholic priest was killed in eastern Nepal and in 2009 an 
explosion in a church in Kathmandu killed three people. While physical at-
tacks have ceased after members of the self-styled National Defence Army 
were arrested, Christians in Nepal still feel discriminated against and treat-
ed like untouchables (Timsina, 2013).
Conclusion and recommendations
Nepal was under monarchical rule for a long time with most powers reposed 
in the king. In its efforts to institutionalize a monolithic state, the monar-
chy suppressed minorities and the diverse cultures of Nepal by denying 
26. Article 26 (3) states: ‘While exercising the right as provided for by this Article, no person shall 
act or make others act in a manner which is contrary to public health, decency and morality, 
or behave or act or make others act to disturb public law and order situation, or convert a 
person of one religion to another religion, or disturb the religion of other people.  Such an act 
shall be punishable by law.’
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Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities
Since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in Nepal in 
1990, the issue of identity politics has strengthened people’s claims 
on every structure of the government (Lowati, 2005). The shift in 
discourse to ‘inclusion’ within the ‘mainstream’ political and social 
institutions has become central in challenging structural inequali-
ties based on caste, ethnicity, gender, religion and region (Gellner, 
2003). One of the leading organizations in this struggle has been the 
Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN).
Brief history of NEFIN
NEFIN began life as the Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN), 
which was formed in 1990 as an umbrella organization of indige-
nous people (Onta, 2006). The founding members of NEFEN includ-
ed eight organizations representing Gurung, Limbu, Magar, Newar, 
Rai, Sherpa, Sunuwar and Tamang communities. During the pre-
1990 period, organizations representing different Janajati groups 
had been formed such as Chwasa-Pasa (1924), the Tharu Kalyanka-
rini Sabha (1949) (Krauskopff, 2003), the Nepal Tamang Ghedung 
(1957), the Nepal Bhasa Manka Khala (1979) and the Nepal Langhali 
Sangh (1982) (Tamang, 2004). But NEFEN paved the way for a na-
tional-level network.
NEFEN changed its name to NEFIN in 2001. It currently consists of 
48 organizations representing communities distributed throughout 
the Tarai, Hills and Himalaya of Nepal. The recognition of NEFIN’s 
work has led to its involvement in different international fora such as 
the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNP-
FII) and the Asian Indigenous People’s Pact (AIPP). Over time, with 
the help of international development partners, NEFIN has also led 
and coordinated projects with a particular focus on empowerment 
among which are the Janajati Empowerment Project (JEP and JEP-
II) supported by the Department for International Development and 
Enabling State Programme (DfID/ESP), the Janajati Social and Eco-
nomic Empowerment Project (JANSEEP) with Care Nepal and the 
European Union (EU) (JANSEEP) and the Sustainable Development 
of Disadvantaged Ethnic Communities in Nepal (SAMARTHYA) 
with Action Aid and EU.
... contd. ...
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them fundamental rights to culture, language, citizenship and identity. This 
made Nepal’s transition to democracy challenging since democratic con-
solidation, which is largely determined by participation in power-sharing 
and by addressing and reducing social inequalities, has yet to see significant 
progress. Although Nepal has made progress in its overall development in-
dicators, it still fares badly in economic growth as compared to its South 
Asian neighbours, with the marginalized sections faring even worse. Dalits 
in particular fare badly on all socioeconomic indicators as well as on indica-
tors of political participation. Nepal has acceded to most of the international 
conventions relating to minority rights even though it is yet to meet all its 
obligations under them.
Nepal made significant progress in its constitutional provisions with the 
Interim Constitution of 2007. Some of these gains were reversed with the 
2015 Constitution. That this has not been fully accepted by marginalized 
groups such as the Madhesis is an indication of the state’s failure to rec-
ognize and address the interests of minority and marginalized groups. The 
weakness of the state in ensuring fair distribution of resources, develop-
ment flows and power-sharing among all sections of the population is clear. 
The deep-rooted marginalization of minority groups is also due to incoher-
ent development plans and their ineffective implementation.
Recommendations
i. There is a need for a robust and categorical definition of ‘marginalized’ 
and ‘minorities’ with clear listings of caste, ethnic and religious groups. 
Further, these categories should be used in all sectors and for affirmative 
action to ensure effective representation.
ii. Although government agencies have started disaggregating data by eth-
nicity and gender since the 1991 Census, there is a need for greater dis-
aggregation of all relevant national data based on similar criteria. Given 
their increasing numbers, the data should also deal with Christians as a 
separate category.
iii. The provision of different commissions in the new Constitution to ad-
dress issues of minorities is a positive step and included in the duties 
and responsibilities of these commissions should be to defining the 
types of inclusion that will address the demands of these groups and 
monitor progress of the same. 
iv. The periodic development plans need to focus on gauging progress 
along different socioeconomic indicators by minority and marginalized 
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Campaigns and interventions
Focusing on the need for the inclusion of this huge mass of popu-
lation within the mainstream developmental agenda, NEFIN’s de-
mands in the main were (Bhattachan and Bhattachan, 2003):
• right to self-determination,
• ethnic autonomy,
• equal language rights, including a tri-lingual language policy and 
education in the mother tongue,
• secularism, and
• affirmative action.
It is a measure of NEFIN’s advocacy work, along with other political 
processes that by the end of the 1990s, the Government of Nepal had 
considered introducing the following (Subba et al., 2008): 
•  right to education in the mother tongue,
•  reservations for Janajatis in higher technical education,
•  use of local languages in local offices,
•  secularism,
•  special or proportional representation and ethnic autonomy,
•  establishment of a foundation/academy to preserve and promote 
Janajati languages and cultures,
•  positive discrimination in government jobs,
•  removal of discriminatory provisions in the Constitution, laws, 
by-laws and policies, 
•  recognition of rights to natural resources,
•  disaggregated data by ethnicity and caste, and 
•  ratification of ILO Convention No. 169 and the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
Interventions and impact
The objectives of NEFIN have been to develop unity and fraternity 
among Janajatis while also developing their leadership and capaci-
ties (NEFIN.org). The establishment of District Coordination Coun-
cils (DCCs) has been instrumental in this context. So far, NEFIN 
has established DCCs in 69 districts (NEFIN.org), paving the way 
for strengthening Janajati political activism. This allowed NEFIN to 
play a prominent role in the 2006 people’s movement that led to 
... contd. ...
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groups. Further, the plans need to build on previous iterations as there 
exist discontinuities between successive plans.
v. Constitution:
• The 2015 Constitution articulates sentiments for ending discrimina-
tion, but since it does not spell out clear pathways to promote equal-
ity, the government will have to take heed of the spirit behind the 
sentiments when designing specific interventions.
• Citizenship rights to women have been particularly discriminato-
ry in Nepal. Multiple clauses in the Constitution ensure transfer of 
citizenship to children only through the father and curb women’s 
right to transfer full citizenship rights to their children. The state, 
therefore, has the duty to repeal discriminatory clauses based on cit-
izenship, avoid statelessness and prevent arbitrariness in conferring 
citizenship (Malla, 2016).
vi. Public Service: 
• Since Dalits are particularly vulnerable to their human rights being 
violated, there should be a provision to include at least one Dalit rep-
resentative in the National Human Rights Commission. 
• The quota or reservation system should be strengthened by making 
special provisions to encourage members of marginalized communi-
ties to seek employment in civil service and public institutions.
• Political participation of Dalits, especially of Tarai Dalits, is bleak. 
Dalit inclusion should be mandatory at each level of government 
planning and implementation. The state should develop effective 
mechanisms for checks and balances to ensure that affirmative ac-
tion in this regard is implemented. 
vii. Implementation of International Standards: 
• Nepal has rejected all the 29 recommendations on human rights 
made during the 23rd Universal Periodic Review held in Geneva in 
2015, including those related to conventions on transitional justice 
and has refused to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture, International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rai, 2016). Nepal should ratify these 
protocols and also adhere to pledges made for accountability and 
justice to the people. 
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the end of direct rule by the king and the end of the Maoist conflict 
(Shah, 2008).
After the political change of 2006, inclusion became a major agen-
da in Nepal’s political discourse. The issues and demands of the 
Janajatis focused on state restructuring along the lines of federalism, 
autonomy with the right to self-determination, representation of Ja-
najatis in government structures in proportion to their population 
and special representation for minority Janajati groups. Following 
a protracted struggle, NEFIN signed a 20-point agreement with the 
government in August 2007, which included a provision accepting 
ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. Around the same time, the Inter-
im Parliament also approved revisions to the Civil Service Act 1993, 
which led to fixed quotas for Janajatis (and also others) in govern-
ment jobs.
Lessons for advocacy
Despite many challenges, NEFIN provides a number of lessons for 
advocacy. Changes in the provisions of the constitutions since the 
1990s reflect effective advocacy on the part of NEFIN. NEFIN has 
successfully advocated for the definition and classification of indige-
nous/Adivasi Janajatis and also legitimized the definition via various 
protests, rallies, demonstrations, press conferences and publications 
(Tamang, 2004). However, the real strength of the organization  – 
engaging in advocacy – became possible only through regular inter-
actions at the grassroots level since its branches are spread across 
different districts and villages.
However, NEFIN has also had its share of problems. The most 
prominent of these was its falling out with the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID), which had supported the Jana-
jati Empowerment Project. Following a national strike in 2011 called 
in support of its position of federalism that would recognize iden-
tity as one of the bases for the division of provincial units, NEFIN 
was served a warning by DfID to refrain from the sometimes-violent 
street confrontations. NEFIN refused and DfID withdrew its support 
for a very effective awareness-raising programme.
Since then, NEFIN has been reduced to a shell of its former self. 
Growing interference by political parties has led to factionalism 
within NEFIN members and led to a weakening of the whole Jana-
jati movement. Co-option of the organization’s leaders and activists 
by established parties has challenged its legitimacy and also under-
mined all its previous efforts.
... Good practice case study continuied ...
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• International standards set by instruments such as ILO Convention 
169 should be implemented to protect the rights of indigenous peo-
ple. Existing initiatives of land reforms and management should in-
corporate a specific focus on the rights of indigenous people over 
land, territories and natural resources that they have traditionally 
owned or used, either individually or collectively. Accordingly, the 
state should obtain free and informed consent of indigenous people 
prior to giving approval to any project affecting their land, territories 
and other resources.
viii. Education:
• Nepal has not ratified crucial international documents like the 
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960). 
Existing plans for bilingual education should be enforced as a matter 
of priority in order to promote and develop lingual diversity and also 
to make teaching and learning processes more effective, including by 
allocating the required human and financial resources to allow for 
effective implementation of such programmes. This includes sup-
porting madrassa education and accepting it as a formal educational 
institution up to the higher level. 
• Nepal has implemented plans like EFA and SSRP, but access to ed-
ucation appears discouraging since groups such as Janajatis, Mad-
hesis and Dalits still struggle to educate their children. In a welcome 
move, the government has been providing scholarships to Dalit chil-
dren. What is required next is effective monitoring of the distribu-
tion of scholarships and creating a Dalit children-friendly environ-
ment in schools. 
• Scholarships, food and uniforms in schools should be provided to 
Dalits, backward communities and the poor in order to reduce drop-
out rates. 
ix. Access to Justice:
• Studies show that the torture inflicted among Madhesis, Dalits and 
Janajatis is higher as compared to Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars 
(Advocacy Forum Nepal, 2012). Civil society as well as the state 
should invest in making core law-enforcing bodies such as the Ne-
pal Police and the Armed Police Force more tolerant and sensitive 
towards the socio-cultural diversity of Nepal.
• Existing laws must be strengthened through amendments to guaran-
tee that complaints are registered, investigations proceed in a timely 
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manner, investigators are shielded from political or other pressures 
and victims are afforded requisite protection.
x. Caste-based Discrimination:
• Mechanisms to eliminate caste-based discrimination should be 
made effective.27
• The government needs to repeal all discriminatory laws, regulations, 
rules, directives, policies and programmes that contravene the hu-
man rights of groups such as Dalits.
xi. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
• Special arrangements need to be made for the inclusion, protection 
and promotion of human rights of the Muslim community while rec-
ognizing their existence as a religious community with distinct cus-
toms, culture, language and way of life.
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overlaps between and among these groups. For instance, there are Dalits 
who are also Madhesis while there are also a significant number of Janajatis 
whose origins, along with those of the Madhesis, are in the Tarai (plains) 
belt of Nepal (CBS, 2012). Despite this diversity, large sections of the 
population are either inherently marginalized, like Dalits; historically de-
nied access to influence, like the Adivasi Janajatis or ‘indigenous national-
ities’; or not considered full citizens of Nepal, like Madhesis (DIFD, 2006). 
There are also religious minorities who, too, have been marginalized due to 
their religious identity such as Muslims nearly all of whom face exclusion 
like Madhesis (Sijapati, 2012) and, more recently, Christians.
There is no universally accepted definition of minorities, but the one 
that has received wide circulation was provided in 1977 by Francesco Capo-
torti, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those 
of the rest of the population and maintain, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion 
or language (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commis-
sioner 2010). 
In Nepal, the term ‘minorities’ was used for the first time in the 2007 
Interim Constitution1 to denote groups requiring special protection from 
the state.2 The Constitution of Nepal 2015 also uses ‘minority group’ and 
‘minorities’ for the same purpose but has expanded the number of such 
groups.3 Unlike the 2007 Interim Constitution, however, the 2015 Constitu-
tion actually defines what constitutes a minority:
1. Nepal has enacted seven constitutions so far in 1948, 1951, 1959, 1962, 1990, 2007 and 2013.
2. Article 35(14) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 lists them as: ‘landless squatters, 
bonded labourers, persons with disability, backward communities and sections, and the 
victims of conflict, including women, Dalits, indigenous tribes (Adivasi Janajati), Mad-
hesis and Muslims’ Source: www.lawcommission.gov.np.  Activists prefer ‘indigenous 
nationalities’ as a translation of ‘Adivasi Janajatis.’
3.  Namely, ‘socially or culturally backward women, Pichhada class, minorities, the margin-
alized, farmers, labours, youths, children, senior citizens, gender and sexual minorities, 
persons with disabilities, persons in pregnancy, incapacitated or helpless, backward 
region and indigent Khas Arya,’ www.lawcommission.gov.np.
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[E]thnic, linguistic and religious groups whose population is less 
than the percentage specified by the Federal law, and includes groups 
that have their distinct ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, 
aspirations to protect such features and subjected to discrimination and 
oppression4. 
At the time of writing this report it was not clear which of the 125 caste/
ethnic groups would qualify as a ‘minority’. However, following a UN docu-
ment on minority rights that states that the main requirement to be counted 
as a minority group is to be in a non-dominant position (United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner, 2010), this chapter uses this definition to 
consider the country’s ethnic, linguistic and religious groups – Dalits, Jana-
jatis, Madhesis, Muslims and Christians –all of whom are in a non-domi-
nant position in one way or another (see Table 1).5 
Historical context and constitutional provisions
The modern state of Nepal was created by Prithvi Narayan Shah in the mid-
to-late 18th century. Its consolidation during the Rana regime (1846-1951) 
was based on the organizing ideology of the Hindu caste system and nation-
4. ‘Part - 34, Definitions and Interpretations,’ The Constitution of Nepal 2015.
5. The 2015 Constitution also used the terms ‘minority/minorities’ and ‘marginalised’ consis-
tently in tandem, providing further cause to equate ‘marginalised’ with ‘minority’ in the case 
of Nepal.
Groups Population 
Adivasi Janajatis (Moun-
tain, Hill and Tarai)
35.8 per cent (26.1 per cent Hill-Mountain Janajatis and 9.75 per cent 
Tarai Janajatis).
Madhesis Including the Tarai Dalits in this category, Madhesis constitute 19.23 
per cent of the total population of Nepal.* If Tarai Janajatis are included 
as well, the Tarai-origin population would be 28.97 per cent. Excluding 
Tarai Janajatis and Tarai Dalits, the rest of the Madhesi population is 
14.77 per cent of the population.
Dalits (Madhesi Dalits and 
Hill Dalits)
12.58 per cent (8.1 per cent Hill Dalits and 4.5 per cent Tarai Dalits).
Muslims 4.4 per cent.
Christians 1.4 per cent.
Table 1. Groups Identified as Minorities for this Report
Source: Groups taken from Sharma (2014); Sharma (2008); CBS (2012).  
Note: The Census figures are generally contested by all the minority groups listed in the table, with each 
claiming a higher share of the population.
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al integration was attained through a default ‘unification’ of diverse groups. 
As a unifying framework, the caste system codified in the Muluki Ain 
(National Code) of 1854, subsumed the different languages, customary laws 
and religious, social and cultural traditions found in the country into one 
overarching framework informed by Hindu religious law. Further, it also 
ranked the different social groups in Nepal according to Hindu concepts of 
ritual purity and pollution, thus institutionalizing inter-group discrimina-
tion and marginalization (Gaige, 1975).
Nepal has undergone major shifts in its constitutional and legal frame-
work since the end of the Rana rule, starting with the abortive 1948 Con-
stitution by the dying regime and through the Constitution of 2015. It took 
until the 1990 Constitution, when the country shifted from an autocratic 
monarchy-based system to a multi-party democracy, for statutory recogni-
tion of Nepal’s great socio-cultural diversity as well as the inherent inequi-
ties inherited from the past.
The 1990 constitution
 The 1990 Constitution declared Nepal a ‘multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, dem-
ocratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu, Constitutional Monar-
chical Kingdom’ and granted ‘equality before law and equal protection of 
law.’ It made special provisions to secure the interests of ‘women, children, 
incapacitated persons or those who belong to a class of socially, econom-
ically and educationally backward groups.’6 Despite these positive devel-
opments, the Constitution contained provisions that were discriminatory 
towards different groups. For instance, Hindu statehood was retained, 
privileging Hindu norms and values; Nepali language was declared the 
6. Hence, Article 26(2) stated: ‘The State shall…pursue a policy of strengthening the national 
unity by promoting healthy and cordial social relations amongst the various religions, castes, 
tribes, communities and linguistic groups, and by helping in the promotion of their languag-
es, literatures, scripts, arts and cultures.’ Likewise, Article 26(10) stated: ‘The State shall pur-
sue a policy which will help promote the interests of the economically and socially backward 
groups and communities by making special provisions with regard to their education, health, 
and employment.’ But the 1990 Constitution had no reference to Dalits, Adivasi Janajatis 
and Madhesis as historically marginalized groups.  Because of the absence of any specific 
reference to these groups, a case was filed in the Supreme Court against the affirmative action 
policy of the government relating to a scholarship grant for higher education.  The dispute 
arose because it was claimed that Dalits and Adivasi Janajatis were not clearly mentioned 
in the 1990 Constitution as the targeted beneficiaries of the policy.  There was only a vague 
provision of special measures for those who were economically and socially backward.  Since 
no law had been enacted pursuant to this provision the policy was challenged.  The Supreme 
Court issued a directive order in 2004 for the enactment of a law to implement the provision 
for affirmative action. 
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language of the nation even though other native languages were to be 
allowed in schools up to the primary level. Hence, though Articles 11.2 
and 11.3 mentioned religion, race, sex, caste, tribe or ideological convic-
tions as the bases for non-discrimination, language was not mentioned. 
Further, Article 112.3 restricted the mobilization of socio-cultural groups 
for collective welfare and empowerment and constrained political choices 
(Lawoti, 2005).
The interim constitution 2007
The Interim Constitution (IC) of 2007 marked a significant departure from 
the 1990 document. One of the key objectives of IC, which itself had emerged 
from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the state and the 
Maoists after a decade-long conflict, was the commitment to progressive 
restructuring of the state. As a result, IC declared Nepal to be a secular,7 
democratic, federal state in an attempt to address the ‘problems’ that the 
state had been facing on the basis of class, ethnicity, religion and gender 
while undertaking ‘an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring 
of the state.’8 Its 4th amendment in May 2008 abolished the monarchy and 
declared Nepal a federal republic. Similarly, IC also emphasized the need 
to strengthen national unity by maintaining cultural diversity through the 
promotion of healthy and harmonious social relations. It also explicitly rec-
ognized Dalits, Adivasi Janajatis and Madhesis as historically marginalized 
groups requiring special treatment from the state.9 
The Fundamental Rights enshrined in IC were: right to life; right to a 
(criminal) justice system; right against preventive detention; right against 
torture; right against exploitation; and right against exile. The provisions re-
lating to inclusion incorporated in IC were: right against untouchability and 
racial discrimination (Article 14), positive discrimination for Dalits, wom-
en, indigenous/ethnic groups, Madhesis, farmers and other socially and 
economically marginalized communities (Article 13[3]); and proportional 
7. Nepal was declared a secular state in May 2006 following the Second People’s Movement 
against a monarchy that had usurped power in the previous years.
8. Preamble, Part 1, Article 3, 5; Part 3, Article 13, 14, 1; Part 4, Article 33, 35 (3); Part 7, 63 (3.a) 
and (4.5); Part 16, Article 142 (4), Part 17, Article 138 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 
2063 (2007).
9. The 1990 Constitution recognized the existence of different ‘communities’ in the country 
when dealing with the right to culture and education (Article 18), different ‘denomina-
tions’ when dealing with the right to religion.
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representation of women, Dalits, Madhesis, indigenous/ethnic groups and 
other oppressed groups in the state structures (Article 21).
Constitution of Nepal 2015
The latest Constitution of Nepal was promulgated on 20 September 2015 
only to be immediately contested by the Janajatis and Madhesis, giving rise 
to a prolonged agitation in the Tarai. The major issues of contention were 
a demand for more proportional representation (PR) seats, demarcation of 
electoral constituencies on the basis of population, re-organization of the 
proposed federal units and amending discriminatory citizenship laws, along 
with the demand that past agreements between the government and differ-
ent groups be honoured. Compared to IC, the 2015 Constitution reduced the 
proportion of PR seats in Parliament from 56 per cent to 40 per cent while 
the issue of proportional inclusion was not mentioned in the case of accom-
modating minorities in different state structures. As a response to the Tarai 
agitation, the Constitution was amended in January 2016 and the principle 
of proportionate inclusion in state bodies (Article 42) was introduced while 
the demarcation of electoral constituencies would consider population as 
the main basis and geography as the second point (Article 84).
Methodology and data collection
This chapter looks at the state of Nepal’s minorities in a historical context 
and examines the last three constitutions of Nepal that can be considered 
relatively inclusive: the 1990 Constitution, the Interim Constitution of 2007 
and the 2015 Constitution. It analyses how the current Constitution mea-
sures up to international standards vis-à-vis minority rights. Using publicly 
available data, it delves into specific themes:
i. Right to life and security with a focus on the criminal justice system; 
ii. Right to non-discrimination and equality by looking at indicators of 
socioeconomic attainments in education, health, poverty and employ-
ment; 
iii. Right to participation, providing an overview of the representation of 
minorities in national government institutions; and 
iv. Right to culture and identity with an overview of the denial and attain-
ment of identity and cultural rights.
The information presented in this chapter is derived from sources such 
as national censuses and surveys as well as human development reports 
235
from different years to provide a comparative perspective on the status of 
each group. Data on representation in various state organs was collected 
from the respective bodies and also from reports from organizations work-
ing on minority issues as well as other available literature.
Limitations
A study of minorities is inherently complex, particularly in a country like 
Nepal that is home to numerous minority groups, which have not yet been 
recognized as such. A major challenge was the difficulty in obtaining caste/
ethnicity and gender-disaggregated data on the various indicators consid-
ered. Lack of standardized data on violence did not allow for a systematic 
study in comparative terms. The biggest limitation, however, is the absence 
of almost any kind of data on Christians. Nepal’s rapidly changing political 
context was also challenging, particularly since it had a direct bearing on the 
content of this chapter.
Right to life and security
Articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) pro-
vide for right to life and security of every individual and protection again 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. These principles were subsequently 
translated into Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). These reminders are especially relevant for post-colonial 
regions like South Asia where the debate on human security has remained 
at the level of rhetoric and has not fed into policymaking even as groups de-
manding a more people-centred conception of security have challenged its 
‘military-centred’ conceptions (Bajpai, 2000). In particular, struggles to re-
define nationalism vis-à-vis increasing ethno-nationalist demands and the 
radical redefining of structural arrangements in Nepal have resulted in the 
‘securitization’ of the state and the failure to institutionalize people-centred 
policies and bringing human security to the fore. The state has invested the 
security forces with unprecedented power, resulting in the abuse of power 
at the cost of suffering of the most marginalized.
Structures and functions of the criminal 
justice institution
All three constitutions—1990, 2007 and 2015—guarantee the right to 
justice to all citizens and require anyone detained to be informed about 
the grounds for arrest as well as be produced before a court of law with-
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in 24 hours of the arrest. Article 14(4) of the 1990 Constitution provided 
protection against torture, and even though it mentioned compensation to 
the victim it was silent on punishment for perpetrators. Nepal also acceded 
to the United Nations Convention against Torture in 1991, and Article 26 
the Interim Constitution and Article 22 of the 2015 Constitution provide for 
the ‘right against torture’; they also say that any such act would be punish-
able by law and the victim would have the right to compensation.
At the same time, there are multiple shortcomings in Nepal’s criminal 
justice system that not just promote impunity and foster human rights’ 
abuses but also stand in contravention of the spirit of all the three con-
stitutions. Some of these include extant legal provisions from an authori-
tarian past. For instance, Section 22 of the 1989 Public Security Act (PSA) 
grants immunity to state officials for any acts committed ‘in good faith’ in 
the course of their duty. PSA allows people to be held in preventive deten-
tion for up to 90 days on the orders of a local authority, which is normally 
the Chief District Officer (CDO). This period can be extended to six months 
with permission from the Home Ministry. Likewise, the equally draconian 
Anti-State Crimes and Penalties Act 1989 (ASCPA) contains provisions that 
are in clear breach of the Constitution as well as international obligations 
such as ICCPR (Amnesty International, 2003).
Nepal has not yet defined what constitutes crimes against humanity and 
extrajudicial killings. The Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and 
Reconciliation Act 2014, enacted to look into excesses committed during the 
decade-long Maoist conflict, defines gross violations of human rights but 
abstains from including provisions in line with the Rome Statute, such as 
Article 7 that specifies ‘crimes against humanity’ consisting of, among oth-
ers, ‘imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in viola-
tion of fundamental rules of international law’ and ‘persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cul-
tural, religious, gender.’10 The 2014 Act only mentions murder, abductions, 
enforced disappearances, physical and mental torture, mutilations, physical 
disabilities, rape and sexual violence and any kind of acts inconsistent with 
international human rights or humanitarian laws or other crimes against 
humanity. The act, however, also contains provisions for amnesty even in 
the most serious cases of human rights violations and that, too, without the 
10.  The Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2071; Rome Statute 
Article 7.  Retrieved from: http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm .
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11.  The Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2071; Rome Statute 
Article 7.  Retrieved from: http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm .
12. Advocacy Forum, Asian Human Rights Commission, the Redress Trust, World Organization 
against Torture, ‘Submission to the United Nations: Universal Periodic Review,’ 23rd Session 
of the Working Group on UPR, Human Rights Council, 22 March 2015. 
consent of the victim. These provisions were retained over the objections 
of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) although with the 
Supreme Court having nullified some of them it is not clear how the act will 
be implemented.11 
The 1959 Army Act contained provisions for a court of inquiry board 
and a court martial for violations of the act. But nothing in the 1959 Act or 
any other law requires the army to release full and complete details of court 
martial proceedings or other such judgments, even if a first information re-
port (FIR) has been filed and the civilian police has commenced criminal 
investigations on the matter. This has obstructed investigations into alleged 
extrajudicial executions and other abuses. For instance, in the well-known 
Maina Sunar case, in which a 15-year-old Dalit girl was killed by the Nepal 
Army in 2004, the army’s refusal to share the findings of the court martial 
with the police and her family, despite a court directive, is a case in point 
(Amnesty International, 2013). In another example, in 2015 the Bardiya 
district police office refused to register FIRs in six cases of political killings 
during the Maoist conflict, despite a 2014 order from the Appellate Court 
in Nepalgunj.12 Similarly, the widespread torture and at least 200 disap-
pearances after arrests by security forces in Bardiya district during 2001 to 
2003, in which the vast majority of victims were from the disadvantaged 
Tharu community, indicates the vulnerability of marginalized groups to 
atrocities at the hands of security forces (International Crisis Group, 2010). 
More recently, during the agitation in the Tarai following the promulgation 
of the 2015 Constitution, more than 50 people, most of them of Tarai origin, 
lost their lives (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
Although difficult to come by, there is some evidence that members of 
minority groups fare worse at the hands of the security forces. As a report 
of the Nepali human rights organization, Advocacy Forum, on the situa-
tion in the Tarai details detainees belonging to groups such as Muslims and 
other Tarai groups are more likely to be tortured while those from Bahun- 
Chhetri groups are least likely to face the same fate (Kathmandu Advocacy 
Forum, 2010) 
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Grievance redressal mechanisms
As stated earlier, Nepal’s justice delivery system faces major shortcomings. 
Most cases never make it to the courts. Criminal cases reported to the police 
are most often dealt with by the police itself. Since there is no accountability 
for failure to investigate cases, there is little incentive for the police to regis-
ter and investigate cases.13 Many civil cases are mediated through tradition-
al or informal means, while others do not reach the courts because citizens 
do not understand the court system, the legal process, or more broadly, 
their rights as citizens. There has been little systematic education to raise 
awareness about the role of the courts, how they can protect citizens’ rights, 
or what rights citizens possess. Judicial independence is further hindered 
by political pressure as well as the general perception that judicial appoint-
ments are driven by political partisanship (James et al., 2015).
Confidence in the justice system’s institutions is further weakened by 
the historic exclusion of many groups. The police, courts and government 
prosecutors’ offices consist predominantly of men from ‘upper castes’ who 
lack sensitivity towards the social diversity of Nepal. Excluded groups face 
cultural resistance and structural barriers in entering professions in the ju-
dicial sector. While most lawyers begin their careers with unpaid ‘appren-
ticeships’, women and men from marginalized groups often lack financial 
or other means of social support to complete this stage. They find it difficult 
to break into professional networks dominated by men from the tradition-
ally dominant castes. The judicial sector, hence, does not represent Nepal’s 
social diversity, reducing confidence about fair treatment among the mar-
ginalized (James et al., 2009). This situation has, however, started changing 
with the provision of reservations in government service since 2007, but its 
impact is yet to be felt fully in terms of having such groups better represent-
ed in the higher echelons of the judicial service.
Criminal proceedings and decisions by quasi-judicial authorities take 
place behind closed doors and generally without defence lawyers or by fol-
lowing standardized procedures, public hearings and witnesses. Such prac-
tices also impede the process of fair trials. Quasi-judicial authorities such 
as CDOs and district forest officers (DFO) often do not have even the basic 
training in legal or judicial matters and are not independent since they are 
also part of the executive branch of the government (Adhikari, 2013).
13.  Advocacy Forum, Asian Human Rights Commission, the Redress Trust, World Organization 
against Torture, ‘Submission to the United Nations: Universal Periodic Review’, 23rd Session 
of the Working Group on UPR, Human Rights Council, 22 March 2015.
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There are only limited legal aid services available to disadvantaged Ne-
palis: the first is where the Supreme Court appoints and supervises a mem-
ber of the bar as a ‘stipendiary advocate’ in most courts; and the second, 
launched under the Legal Aid Act of 1997 and administered by the Ministry 
of Law and Justice, relies on legal aid committees set up in collaboration 
with local bar cells in each district to assess legal aid applications and ap-
point private lawyers to act for those granted assistance. However, both 
schemes are poorly funded and the absence of a system for monitoring their 
effectiveness translates into only a low level of assistance to those eligible to 
use such services (James et al., 2009).
Right to non-discrimination 
and equality
In Nepal, social and gender identity determine individual and group access 
to assets, capabilities and voice. In this regard, poverty outcomes, including 
indicators of economic well-being, human development and voice and po-
litical influence reflect the results of discrimination and inequality faced by 
minorities due to historical and cumulative discrimination and exclusion 
in Nepal (DFID, 2006). Being party to international agreements such as 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IC-
ESCR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Nepal has an obligation to right these 
long-standing inequities since these instruments require ratifying states 
to grant all people ‘the right of self-determination...[to] freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (Article 1, ICESCR) and to do all it can to eliminate such dis-
crimination (Article 2[2], ICERD).14 
In 2007, Nepal also became the only country in Asia to ratify the In-
digenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (ILO Convention 169) along 
with the United Nations Declaration of the Right of Indigenous Peoples 
14. Article 2(2) of ICERD states, States parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, 
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure 
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging 
to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for 
which they were taken have been achieved.
15. This was part of the agreement with the agitating Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationali-
ties (NEFIN) and the Indigenous Nationalities Joint Struggle Committee in September 2007.
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(UNDRIP).15 However, the National Action Plan on ILO Convention 169 
has not been implemented yet and is pending cabinet approval since being 
drafted in 2009. Likewise, the Committee on Natural Resources, Economic 
Rights and Revenue Allocation of the first Constituent Assembly had called 
for inclusion of the provision ‘[t]o ensure prior use rights to the indigenous, 
ethnic and other communities in natural resources and their use’ in the Pre-
amble to the Constitution (http://www.ncf.org.np/upload/CA/concept_
paper_Natural_Resource.ENG.pdf). But the dissolution of that CA meant 
such provisions calling for greater social inclusion in the Constitution died 
a quiet death.
On the other hand, the 2015 Constitution has continued to uphold the 
principles of non-discrimination and equality while the practice of untouch-
ability has been made a punishable offence. In practice, however, the gov-
ernment has not been able to fully safeguard all these rights. Additionally, 
the 2015 Constitution fails to guarantee collective rights over traditional 
territory, land and resources in line with UNDRIP and ILO 169, which the 
Adivasi Janajatis have demanded as inalienable individual rights in the 
Constitution.
Cases of identity-based violations
The Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Pun-
ishment) Act was adopted by Nepal in 2011. This act states that if any one 
commits or causes to commit any act of discrimination shall be deemed 
to have committed caste-based discrimination and untouchability, and is 
liable for punishment.16 However, the mechanisms to eliminate such dis-
crimination are not effective and only a few cases relating to untouchability 
have been lodged in the courts.17 Most police officers are either unaware that 
caste-based discrimination is a crime or they are reluctant to file cases in the 
name of maintaining social harmony and instead tend to pressure victims 
15. This was part of the agreement with the agitating Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationali-
ties (NEFIN) and the Indigenous Nationalities Joint Struggle Committee in September 2007.
16. Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act 2011 (2068).  
Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/–-ed_protect/–-protrav/–-
ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_190732.pdf .
17. ,The NHRI Nepal Joint Submission for The Second Universal Periodic Review of Nepal’ sub-
mitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, and submitted by the National 
Human Rights Commission, the National Women’s Commission and the National Dalit 
Commission on 22 March 2015.
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to withdraw their complaints. According to one report of the 18 registered 
cases related to caste-based discrimination and untouchability that reached 
the courts, none of the perpetrators was sent to jail and instead they were 
imposed paltry fines with small compensations provided to the victims. In 
fact, in two incidents the victims were forced to change their cases of physi-
cal assault stemming from caste discrimination into cases of slander under 
the less serious State Case Act 1990 and Libel and Slander Act 1959 (Kisan 
et al., 2015) .
According to the Office of the Attorney General’s annual reports, 10 
cases related to untouchability were taken to the courts in the fiscal 
year 2014-15, which represent a decline from the 14 in the previous year 
(Pun, 2015) and indicate either lack of awareness or foot-dragging on the 
part of police officials who often cite the absence of rules and regulations to 
implement the act.
The Nepal Social Inclusion Survey (NSIS) conducted by Tribhuvan Uni-
versity recorded that incidents of violations of the rights and security of Dal-
its and Muslims took the form of both verbal abuse and physical violence, 
while psychological abuse was reported to be the highest against Madhesi 
Dalits, Hill Dalits and Muslims. The latter groups also faced discrimination 
by being barred from entering private homes (CDSA, 2014a) (see Box 1).
Socioeconomic status of minority18 groups
Multidimensional Exclusion Index (MEI) 
The Multidimensional Exclusion Index (MEI) developed by the World Bank 
measures the status of social exclusion/deprivation of 80 different caste/
ethnic groups19 along health, income, education and empowerment-related 
indices. The MEI is a tool developed to measure exclusion using three di-
mensions; economic life, social services and civic and social participation 
(Bennett and Parajuli, 2011). 
According to the MEI measure, the Chepang-Raji-Raute-Kusunda clus-
ter is the most excluded/deprived in Nepal with a MEI value of 0.53, where-
as the Marwaris are the least excluded with a MEI value of 0.04, followed 
18.  Details are given in Annex 2. Data on minorities in Nepal.
19. The 80 different caste /ethnic populations are classified into four categories: highly excluded, 
excluded, included and highly included. 
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by the Thakalis, Kayasthas, Newars and Hill Bahuns. Musahars are the sec-
ond-most excluded/deprived group with a MEI value of 0.47.
Poverty headcount ratio
According to the Nepal Human Development Report (NHDR) (2014), pov-
erty incidence or the poverty headcount rate for Nepal was 25.2 per cent. 
However, as can be expected, poverty levels varied according to social iden-
tities and locations—the highest incidence of poverty was among Hill Dalits 
(43.6 per cent) and Tarai Dalits (38.2 per cent), followed by Tarai middle 
Box 1. Setbacks and reasons for hope
Discrimination against Madhesi Dalits
The Teacher’s Service Commission had announced the fulfilment of 
the quota of three Dalit science teachers for the secondary level for 
the country’s western region. There were only three applicants for 
the post, including Gulab Chandra Chamar (a Madhesi Dalit), as ev-
ident in the list of applicants provided on the website of the Western 
Regional Education Directorate. When the results were published, 
Gulab’s name was missing and in his place was someone from a Hill 
Dalit community. Gulab’s application form as well as his examina-
tion paper had both gone missing, and when he sought clarifications 
the officials refused to respond (http://taraihumanrights.org/De-
tails.php?news=106).
Caste-based Discrimination
A couple was banished from their village in Gorkha district for in-
ter-caste marriage. A Dalit boy named Ganesh married Jyoti, a 
Thakuri (hill high-caste) girl. The Thakuris not only evicted the cou-
ple from the village but also all members of Ganesh’s family. The 
couple were to sit for their 12th Grade examination from the village 
school but were not allowed to do so and Ganesh’s brother was also 
barred from attending school (Singh, 2016).
Justice for Dalits
There are some instances where some cases have been decided in fa-
vour of Dalits. For instance, in the attempted rape case of Maya Sarki 
in July 2013 in Belbari VDC of Morang, Maya and Manoj Bishwokar-
ma, a local Dalit rights activist were publicly humiliated for accusing 
a local of a crime. Following investigations by the CDO’s office and 
the Morang district court, in April 2014 the court penalized nine of-
fenders with a fine of NPR 15,000 each (Kisan et al., 2015).
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castes (28.7 per cent), Hill Janajatis (28.3per cent), Tarai Janajatis (25.9 
per cent), Muslims (20.2 per cent) and Tarai Brahmins (18.6 per cent). Hill 
Bahuns and Newars had the lowest incidence of poverty at approximately 
10.3 per cent.
The Human Development Index (HDI) 
In 2014, Nepal’s HDI score was 0.458, the lowest in South Asia apart from 
Afghanistan.20 Within Nepal, HDI scores varied significantly between mi-
nority groups and the rest of the population. Muslims had the lowest HDI 
value (0.422), followed by Dalits with an HDI value of 0.434 and Janaja-
tis (excluding Newars) at 0.482. In contrast, the Bahuns/Chhetris had the 
highest HDI value of 0.557. In terms of intra-group differences, HDI for 
Madhesi Dalits was lower (0.400) than Hill Dalits (0.446); Tarai Janajatis 
(0.473) fared worse than Hill Janajatis (0.509).
Education
According to NHDR (2014), Nepal’s adult literacy rate was 56.5 per cent. 
However, there were significant variations across different groups. The 
literacy rate of Janajatis overall was 66.93 (Hill Janajatis, 68.45 per cent; 
Tarai Janajatis, 62.48 per cent). Muslims had the lowest literacy rate 
(43.56 per cent), followed by Dalits (52.48 per cent) and Madhesi castes 
(55.49 per cent). Disaggregated further, literacy rates for Madhesi Dalits 
was only 34.50 per cent, significantly lower than Hill Dalits (61.93 per cent). 
Although all groups have seen significant attainments in higher levels of ed-
ucation, Hill and Tarai Dalits remained the lowest at the tertiary level with 
2.1 per cent each followed by Tarai Janajatis at 3.1 per cent (CDSA, 2014b).
The percentage share of teachers from Dalit and Janajati groups by level 
and gender was also lower compared to their share in the population. Dalits 
made up only 4.9 per cent of the teachers at the basic level (Grades 1 to 8) 
while Janajatis did better at 28.1 per cent (DoE, 2015). The DoE Flash Re-
port does not provide comparable data for other minority groups, although 
this percentage was much lower in proportion to their shares in the national 
population at 12.58 per cent for Dalits and 35.8 per cent for Janajatis.
20. The Nepal Human Development Index (NHDI) measures long and healthy life, knowledge 
and standard of living.  Healthy life is measured by life expectancy, knowledge is measured 
by adult literacy and mean years of schooling and living standard is measured by the gross 
national income (GNI) per capita in purchasing power parity.
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Employment
According to the 2011 Census Tarai Janajatis (72.9 per cent) had a higher 
rate of involvement in agricultural-related employment, followed by Hill 
and Tarai Dalits (69.3 and 69.4 per cent respectively) and Hill Janajatis 
(66.5 per cent). The figures for Hill Bahuns/Chhetris and Tarai Brahmins/
Rajputs were 54.6 per cent and 39.6 per cent respectively and within the 
Hill Bahun/Chhetri group, the situation of Chhetris at 71.5 per cent was 
comparable to Tarai Janajatis whereas only 59.2 per cent of the Bahuns 
were engaged in agriculture (CDSA, 2014b).
Health
The Nepal Demographic Health Survey (2011) showed that people from the 
Tarai faced greater problems in accessing healthcare despite travel being 
relatively easier in the region compared to the hills and mountains. Muslim 
women (86.3 per cent) and Tarai Dalit women (85.3 per cent) faced severe 
problems of accessibility, followed by Hill Dalits (79.2 per cent) and Hill Ja-
najatis (72.9 per cent). Muslims (318), Madhesis (307) and Dalits (273) had 
the highest maternal mortality rates (MMR) per 100,000 live births, and 
while Janajatis (207) also fared better, Bahuns/Chhetris (182) and Newars 
(105) had the lowest MMR (Government of Nepal, 2013).
State programmes
The 9th Plan (1998-2002) laid the foundation for introducing ‘social inclu-
sion’ in government programmes and policies. It had a separate chapter 
on Janajatis with regard to their integration in society and in a first-ever 
instance it mentioned providing 20 per cent of the employment opportuni-
ties in the public sector to women (http://npc.gov.np/images/download/
ninth_eng_2.pdf). Moving ahead, the government adopted ‘social inclu-
sion’ as one of its major policy objectives in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2002-
07) (also known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). The 10th Plan 
envisaged social inclusion as the third pillar of poverty reduction and sought 
to include marginalized sections of the population and backward regions 
into the mainstream of development and also to make visible progress in re-
ducing existing inequalities (Government of Nepal, 2007). The Three-Year 
Interim Plan (2007-10) also came up with special programmes for disad-
vantaged groups, including women, Dalits, Janajatis and Muslims (Gov-
ernment of Nepal, 2007). The Interim Plan, drawn up concurrently with 
the Interim Constitution 2007, introduced for the first time reservations for 
Dalits, women, Muslims, Madhesis and Janajatis to increase their participa-
tion in the education, health and employment sectors. The Interim Plan also 
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allocated budgets for each group—NPR 13 billion for Dalits, NPR 15 billion 
for Janajatis, NPR 10 billion for Madhesis and NPR 1.5 billion for Muslims. 
The current Three-Year Plan (2013-16) also has programmes to identify and 
amend legal and policy provisions aimed at marginalized groups.
Building on the goals and achievements of the previous periodic plans, 
the government’s budget for 2014-15 (Ministry of Finance, 2014) has pro-
visioned monthly stipends of NPR 1,500 to 3,000 for students belonging to 
low-income groups from Dalit, Chepang and Raute communities who have 
passed the School Leaving Certificate Examination with a first division from 
public schools. Similarly, announcements have been made that the govern-
ment will bear all the costs for students from Dom, Badi, Chamar, Musa-
har and Dalit communities pursuing graduate-level studies in engineering 
and medicine. In addition, the budget speech also ensures that scholarships 
will be provided to intelligent, disabled, conflict-affected, liberated kamlari 
(former female bonded child labourers), marginalized and Dalit students.
Some vague provisions vis-à-vis Madhesis have also been inserted: ‘Suit-
able mechanism of addressing Madhesi issues and mainstreaming them at 
various levels of the state will be developed. A policy of getting participation 
of Madhesi community in the process of programme preparation, imple-
mentation and monitoring related to the Madhes will be followed’ (Govern-
ment of Nepal, 2007). The said mechanism has been left undefined, hence it 
is difficult to measure any achievements in this regard.
The political context played an important role in shaping the focus of 
Nepal’s different development plans. The 9th Plan was adopted when the 
Maoist insurgency was rising while the 10th Plan tried to head off the Mao-
ist insurgency that was beginning to reach its peak. The 11th Plan was the 
most inclusive since it was formulated in the backdrop of the CPA and the 
2006 People’s Movement, both of which had inclusion at their core. How-
ever, these advances fizzled out in the 12th and the 13th Plans, and the em-
phasis reverted as earlier more towards poverty in general.
Government structures
Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) units have been established 
in a number of key ministries to address the issue of marginalization of dif-
ferent social groups.21 Gender itself had been given priority with the estab-
lishment of a Gender Responsive Budget (GRB) committee in the Ministry 
of Finance (Ministry of Finance, 2012) while a Gender Equity and Environ-
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ment Division (GEED) has been functional in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives since 1992. These units, however, have still not integrated 
other dimensions of exclusion in their mandate. Even where GESI units/
sections have been established, these are afflicted by the same problems 
that made the Gender Focal Persons ineffective – institutional failures to 
link their responsibilities to the core functions of ministries, inadequate 
technical qualifications of staff and lack of specific funds for activities.
A positive development with the 2015 Constitution is the statutory pro-
vision for various minority commissions—the Women’s Commission, Dalit 
Commission, Janajati Adivasi Commission, Muslim Commission, Madhesi 
Commission, Tharu Commission and an Inclusion Commission—although 
these have been given a mandate of only 10 years after which their fate will 
be re-evaluated. So far, the duties and responsibilities of these commissions 
have not been spelt out apart from the case of the pre-existing Dalit Com-
mission and Women’s Commission.
Education
In terms of education, Nepal has taken progressive measures such as 
adopting Education for All (EFA) as a national campaign. With the prime 
objective of ensuring access and equity in primary education, enhancing the 
quality and relevance of primary education and improving efficiency and 
institutional capacities, EFA has adopted both a pro-poor approach and tar-
geted gender mainstreaming, while Dalit students have been singled out as 
the prime beneficiary group. The School Sector Reform Programme (SSRP 
2009-15) (Ministry of Education, 2009), which complemented EFA, how-
ever, provided for special assistance only to Dalits (and residents of Karnali 
zone). An important aspect of SSRP is its institutionalization of traditional 
education systems such as madrassas, gumbas/vihars and gurukuls/ash-
rams to enable these bodies to meet the national standards of formal ed-
ucation. However, the Multilingual Education Implementation Guidelines 
2009 are being implemented in only 24 schools even though the aim was to 
operationalize multilingual education in 7,500 schools by 2015 (Ministry of 
Education, 2009).
21.  These include the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Population, Ministry of Urban 
Development, Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare, Ministry of Cooperatives 
and Poverty Alleviation, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development.  The Ministry of Education has an Inclusive Education 
section and a Gender Equity section.
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Right to participation
The aim of minority rights’ regimes set forth in international instruments 
such as ICCPR is both right to diversity and removal of structural barriers to 
equal opportunities and participation by members of minority groups. Rec-
ognizing that different groups have in the past faced multiple discrimina-
tions, Nepal sought to address such historical inequities through constitu-
tional and legal frameworks. Additionally, realizing that formal equality or 
‘equal treatment’ is not always sufficient to ensure equal rights and oppor-
tunities for historically disadvantaged groups, special measures including 
affirmative action policies, have also been introduced to ‘level the playing 
field’ for members of such groups.
Legal and policy framework
Constitutional provisions
The Preamble of the 2015 Constitution commits the state to creating ‘an 
egalitarian society on the basis of the principles of proportional inclusion 
and participation to ensure equitable economy, prosperity and social jus-
tice’. Accordingly, specific provisions in the Constitution to promote partic-
ipation of minority groups include: 
• Article 40(1), giving Dalits the right to proportionate participation in all 
agencies of the state.
• Article 70, which requires that the President and the Vice-President be-
long to different gender or macro-ethnic categories.
• Articles 83, 84, 88(2) and 176, which provide for a parliament at the 
federal level and assemblies at the provincial, while ensuring a degree of 
inclusiveness within the legislative bodies.
Legal provisions
The 2007 amendment to the Civil Service Act 1991 set aside 45 per cent of 
the civil service positions for different marginalized groups. Accordingly, 15 
per cent of all the seats are reserved for women, 12 per cent for Janajatis, 
10 per cent for Madhesis and 4 per cent for Dalits (and 2 per cent for the 
disabled and 2 for 10 districts identified as backward).The only comparable 
earlier legislation is limited to the Local Self-Governance Act 1999 that stip-
ulated that village, municipal and district councils have at least one Dalit 
member.
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Progress in Increasing Participation
Political Representation
In the three parliaments in the post-1990 period, only one Dalit had been 
elected. Their representation under the existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
system was 0.5 per cent in 1991 and nil in both 1994 and 1999. Even in 
the 2008 Constituent Assembly, which is considered a landmark for its 
inclusivity, Dalits managed to secure just 2.9 per cent of the seats under 
that system, a figure that went down to 0.8 per cent in 2013 (Vollan, 2015). 
Representation of all the other minority groups was considerably better 
and with the introduction of quotas in the proportional representation (PR) 
part of the CA elections of 2008 and 2013, their presence became more pro-
nounced although with the exception of Tarai Janajatis overall it went down 
in the second CA.
Although better than that of Dalits, political representation of Muslims 
too has been far from satisfactory. No Muslim candidate was elected in the 
1959 elections and the king nominated one Muslim to the national legisla-
ture in 1960 and 1963. Two Muslim candidates were elected to the national 
legislature, the Rastriya Panchayat, in 1981,while there was only one nomi-
nated member in the 1986 Rastriya Panchayat (Gaborieau, cited in Sijapati, 
2012). Muslim representation was steady in the years after 1990: 2.4 per 
cent in 1991, 2.4 per cent in 1994 and 2.0 per cent in 1999. The 2008 CA 
saw 16 Muslims elected including, for the first time, four Muslim women 
(see Table 2).
The record in the executive branch, however, has not been altogether 
encouraging despite all the focus on creating a more inclusive polity. The 
first cabinet formed after the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution reflect-
ed this regressive tendency, with nearly two-third of the members of the 
cabinet belonging to the dominant Khas-Arya group (see Table 3).
In fact, the record of previous cabinets in the transitional period (2007 
to 2015) is also quite mixed. None of the cabinets demonstrated the kind of 
inclusiveness that has been possible in the two constituent assemblies (see 
Figure 1).
Representation in government structures
Historically, there has been poor representation of minorities in the ad-
ministrative structures of the state such as the civil services, the judiciary 
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and security forces. The presence of Janajatis is substantial in the security 
services although that is generally limited to some Hill Janajati groups only.
However, after the 2007 amendment of the Civil Service Act and the 
provision of quotas, there has been some progress although not to the ex-
tent possible as evidenced in the 2009-12 period, when unavailability of 
appropriate candidates and the poor performance of those who attempted 
to get in resulted in less than 40 per cent of the seats set aside for minority 
groups being filled up (Awasthi and Adhikary, 2012).
Since Muslims are not considered a separate category for reserved quo-
tas, there is no information on how the new provision has affected their 
participation in government service.
Security forces, mainly the Nepal Army, have remained inherently ex-
clusive vis-à-vis Madhesis. The presence of Madhesis in the security forces 
has remained practically negligible. To rectify this situation, in 2007 the 
Nepal Army established a new battalion to include Madhesis (Nepalnews.
com, 2015), but the participation of the Madhesi community in the Nepali 
Army continues to remain low.
Citizenship
The 2015 Constitution retained citizenship provisions that directly discrim-
inate against women by declaring that, ‘in case of a person born to Nepali 
woman citizen married to a foreign citizen, he/she may acquire naturalized 
citizenship of Nepal as provided for by a Federal law if he/she is having the 
permanent domicile in Nepal and he/she has not acquired citizenship of 
the foreign country.’ This impinges on equal citizenship rights for women 
to confer full citizenship to their children since naturalized citizens are not 
allowed to hold any constitutional positions. This provision is particularly 
discriminatory towards Madhesis because cross-border marriages are high-
ly prevalent in the Tarai and so children born to Madhesi women and do-
miciled in Nepal will forever be denied the opportunity to rise to the high 
levels of governance.
Right to culture and identity
Despite acceding to ICCPR, which states that where ‘ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with other members of this group, to enjoy 
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Caste/Ethnicity Number of Ministers Percentage
Khas-Arya 25 62.5
Hill Janajati 5 12.5
Tarai Janajati 2 5.0
Tarai Caste 5 12.5
Hill Dalit 1 2.5
Tarai Dalit 1 2.5
Muslim 1 2.5
Total 40 100
Table 3. Social Composition of First Council of Ministers 
formed after the 2015 Constitution
Source: http://www.opmcm.gov.np/en/council.
Khas-Arya Janajati Madhesis Dalit Muslim
Figure 1. Social Composition of Council of Ministers under 
Prime Ministers, 2007-2015
Source: Dhruba et al., (forthcoming).  
Note: The figures represent the number of individuals who were nominated as ministers and does not 
reflect the duration of their office terms.
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their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their 
own language’ (Article 27), in law and practice, the Nepali state continues 
to place curbs on these rights. Historically, this began with the process of 
sometimes-forced adoption of the Nepali language and Hindu religion. Ever 
since the emergence of Nepal as a modern nation-state in 1769 and through 
the end of the Panchayat system (1960-90), the rulers have promoted a doc-
trine of ‘one nation, one culture, one language, one religion’ to the exclusion 
of minority languages (Turin, 2007). Till 1991, discussions about ethnic dif-
ference or inequalities were jailable offences (Miklian, 2008). Under Pan-
chayat rule, the supreme status ascribed to Nepali language left little incen-
tive for mother tongue Nepali speakers to learn minority languages, while 
political, educational, developmental and administrative activities required 
speakers of other languages to learn Nepali (Turin, 2007). Many mem-
bers from Janajati groups from the middle hills adopted both the language 
(Nepali) and the culture of the dominant group in this period.
The 1990 Constitution provided a slight departure from this policy by 
preserving Nepali as the ‘language of the nation’ but also designating all 
languages spoken as mother tongues in the country as ‘national languages’ 
and guaranteed the right to primary education in these languages (Gellner, 
2015). The latter right, however, was never brought into practice by the 
state, and neither were the ‘national languages’ accorded any kind of offi-
cial sanction. A well-documented case is that of the independently arrived 
decisions in 1997 by the Kathmandu municipality to use Newari and by the 
Dhanusha District Development Committee and Rajbiraj municipality 
to use Maithili as languages of communication in addition to Nepali. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the use of regional languages by local bodies was 
unconstitutional and illegal (Turin, 2007), and there has been no judgment 
so far to reverse this decision. But in an indication of how far the ground 
has shifted over time, following the uproar by Vice-President Parmananda 
Jha taking his oath of office in Hindi, ruling on a case filed before it, the 
Supreme Court decided that taking the oath in one’s mother tongue was not 
unconstitutional, and Jha took his oath once again—in Maithili. Given that 
the 2015 Constitution provides federal units to determine one or more lan-
guages in addition to Nepali as the official language, a start has been made 
in some district courts to appoint, at government expense, interpreters.22 
In terms of religious freedom in an apparent step back from the Interim 
Constitution, which had categorically defined Nepal as a secular state, the 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority: 
Musahars
Musahars are a historically marginalized and highly excluded Dal-
it caste group from Nepal’s Tarai region. This case study describes 
the current status of Musahars in Nepal and provides an overview of 
their historical background and how they continue to be discriminat-
ed against and marginalized by landowners and the state.
The origin of Musahars in Nepal is linked to the history of Musa-
hars in India. Musahars believe that they are the descendants of the 
Kol tribe of the Chhota Nagpur Plateau in eastern India. Being land-
less, their ancestors migrated to Bihar in the 12th century to serve as 
agricultural labourers and remained the largest labour force there 
(Kumar, 2006). The term ‘musahar’ is derived from masa=‘flesh’ 
and hera=‘seeker’ (Dahal et al., 2014). However, it has since been 
distorted by the mainly Hindu Brahmin jamindars (Kumar, 2006), 
to mean ‘rat-eaters’.
Musahars are found mainly in the eastern and central Tarai districts 
of Siraha, Saptari, Dhanusha, Sunsari, Morang, Udayapur, Mahot-
tari, Bara, Parsa, Sarlahi, Rautahat and Nawalparasi. According to 
the 2011 Census, Musahars formed 0.89 per cent of the population 
of Nepal and constituted the second-largest Tarai Dalit group. Al-
though there is a lack of records about the history of Musahars in 
Nepal, it is believed that they entered and settled in the plains of Ne-
pal during the Rana regime working as labourers–-clearing forests 
for agricultural land and working for the extension of the railways 
between Nepal and India. As labourers, Musahars were bonded to 
the jamindars in the Tarai during the Rana regime and were treated 
as untouchables (Dahal et al., 2014; Salter and Gurung, 1999). Mu-
sahars claim that they have no specific ritual occupations among the 
Hindu caste groups and that they are an ethnic group with their own 
distinct cultural identity and proximity to the Bhil and Munda tribes 
in India (Giri, 2012). 
Discrimination and Marginalization of Musahars 
According to the Census 2011, the literacy rate among Musahars was 
only 21.8 per cent, which was far below the national average of 65.9 
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2015 Constitution qualified ‘secularism’ to mean ‘religious, cultural freedom 
including protection of religion and culture handed down from time imme-
morial’, the latter being an explicit reference to Hinduism with its use of the 
term ‘sanatan’ in the Nepali original of ‘time immemorial’. Further, the cow 
has been retained as the national animal, which impinges on the food cul-
ture of some indigenous and religious groups (Constitution of Nepal, 2015). 
The Nepali state has long punished members of Janajati communities who 
kill cows for consumption with jail terms extending up to 12 years. In 2013 
and 2014 alone, at least 38 individuals belonging to Janajati groups were 
either serving prison time or facing prosecution on charges of cow slaughter 
(Ghale, 2015).
Religious minorities of Nepal
Muslims
According to the 2011 Census, Muslims in Nepal constituted the third largest 
religious group with a 4.39 per cent share of the population. Muslims have 
registered consistent growth over the years from their share of only 2.54 
per cent in 1952.23 Muslims in Nepal are primarily rural, with 85 per cent re-
siding in rural areas (CBS, 2014).24 They form the largest population group 
in five Tarai districts—Banke (21.10 per cent), Rautahat (19.47 per cent), 
Kapilvastu (19.42 per cent), Parsa (15.41 per cent) and Bara (13.43 per cent). 
In five other Tarai districts, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, Sunsari and 
Siraha, Muslims constitute the second largest group (CBS, 2001).
Muslims fare poorly on major socioeconomic indicators. The literacy 
rate of Grade 5 and above is only 43.6 per cent among Muslims (as com-
pared to the national average of 65 per cent). Muslims have only 3.24 mean 
years of schooling—the least for any social group in Nepal. Their per capita 
income of US$695 is also among the lowest; although minimally better than 
Yadavs and Madhesi Dalits (US$671 and US$616 respectively), it is sub-
stantially lower than the national average of US$1,160 (NHDR, 2014) (See 
also Annex 1.)
22.  For instance, the Chitwan District Court has provided for interpreters in 11 different languag-
es while it was reported that the Panchthar District Court has appointed interpreters for 14 
languages.  http://kantipur.ekantipur.com/news/2016-04-04/20160404073956.html and 
http://gorkhapatraonline.com/news/28569.
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per cent. Further, the National Social Inclusion Survey (2012) re-
vealed that only 0.69 per cent Musahars had attained education up 
to the intermediate level. According to the Multi-Dimensional Ex-
clusion Index, Musahars were located at the very bottom among all 
the caste and ethnic groups in Nepal (Bennet and Parjauli, 2011). 
Political participation of Musahars at all levels was negligible as was 
their presence in the civil services (NHDR, 2009).
Musahars have been economically, politically and culturally mar-
ginalized. The practice of untouchability continues to be a major 
problem for the community since it leads to their exclusion even 
from public places such as drinking water sources. Landlessness is a 
major cause of the economic and political marginalization of Musa-
hars (Dahal et al., 2014), who dependent on the landowners for their 
survival. After the 2001 abolition of the haruwa-charuwa practice, 
which bound them to their landlords, Musahars have started work-
ing as free labourers, making their living as agricultural labourers, 
by fishing, selling firewood and pulling rickshaws.
Specific socioeconomic developments programmes targeted at Mu-
sahars are lacking. On the contrary, development interventions such 
as those relating to community forestry and national parks have 
ended up displacing and further marginalizing Musahars from their 
livelihoods (Paudel et al., 2007).
Poor over Generations
Fifty-year-old Bombholi Sada is a resident of Babhangamakatti vil-
lage in Saptari district. His father, Bechan Sada, spent his entire 
youth and old age as a servant for an affluent family in the village. 
Bombholi also spent his entire youth as a cowherd for others. His 
late brother, Sakunta, worked as a labourer until he was killed in a 
machine accident in Punjab. Not only Bombholi and Sakunta, but 
all the five sons of Bechan spent their lives as labourers. Bombho-
li’s grandfather also worked as a servant until he died. Bombholi’s 
son works as a tractor labourer. No one in his family has received 
any education. Bombholi said, ‘For many generations, we have been 
working for others and we have remained poor and we have survived 
somehow.’
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The National Muslim commission
Despite the history of Muslim settlements in Nepal going back to the early 
16th century, until recently there was no recognition of Muslims as a sepa-
rate religious and cultural group. Equal citizenship was not granted to Mus-
lims by the Nepali state until 1962. Muslims were categorized as ‘impure but 
touchable’ in the caste hierarchy codified in the Muluki Ain (National Code) 
of 1854 (Hoefer, 2004). Acknowledging the extent of marginalization of the 
Muslim community, on 5 April 2012, the cabinet approved the formation of 
a Muslim Commission, which was given constitutional status by the 2015 
Constitution (http://www.nmc.gov.np/).
Christians
Christians make up another small religious minority in Nepal and currently 
account for 1.4 per cent of the total population.25 It is believed that the first 
Christians came to the Kathmandu Valley in 1628 (Whelpton, 2005) and 
Christian missionaries have been arriving intermittently from the begin-
ning of the 18th century (Lindell, 2002). After his conquest of Kathmandu 
Valley in the mid-18th century, Prithvi Narayan Shah expelled all the Chris-
tians along with the new converts. These exiled Christians settled in Bettiah 
in the Indian state of Bihar and returned to Nepal only after the demise of 
the Rana regime in 1951 (Rongong, 2012).
In 1947, Father Marshall Moran, an American Jesuit, arrived in Kath-
mandu to supervise the BA examinations at Tri-Chandra College, which was 
then affiliated to Patna University. Responding to entreaties by Kathman-
du’s elite, the priest set up the St. Xavier’s School for boys in Kathmandu in 
23. Many Muslims and even Hindus in Nepal claim that the total population of Muslims 
reported in the Census is incorrect and that the precise figure for Muslims is anywhere 
between 6 to 10 per cent of the population.  In the report ‘Indian Ethnic Groups in the 
Nepal Tarai. Ansari (1980), showed that the population of Muslims living in Sunsari dis-
trict was more than 50,000, which is three times the number reported in the 1971 Census 
(19,373). The often-cited reasons for the under-representation of Muslims include: fear 
of being discriminated for being Muslim; use of Census data for possible conscription in 
the army; and imposition of more taxes (see also Siddique 2001, Dahal 1978). These rea-
sons imply that Muslims strategically under-represent themselves, but as a 2014 Census 
of a VDC in Parsa district found, the 6.7 per cent Muslim population had been reported 
as zero (Ayub et al 2014).
24. Although Muslims can be divided into Hill Muslims and Tarai Muslims, the latter are so 
small that they were not even enumerated in 2011. In 2001, they numbered just 4,893 
compared to the national Muslim population of 975,873.
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1951 (Messerschimdt, 1977), marking the formal entry of Christians back 
into Nepal. A school for girls run by Catholic nuns, St. Mary’s School, was 
established in 1954.
Caste discrimination and Christianity
It is claimed that growing poverty and religious and caste discrimination 
have contributed to the growth of Christianity. Although the focus has been 
on people from the ‘lower castes’ converting to escape an exploitative caste 
hierarchy, statistics indicate that people from all castes and ethnicities 
convert to Christianity. However, even among Christians, converts from 
25. Now Nepal has one of the fastest-growing Christian populations in the world, according to 
the World Christian Database, which tracks global trends in Christianity (http://www.npr.
org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/02/03/463965924/why-nepal-has-one-of-the-worlds-
fastest-growing-christian-populations).
Eighty-year-old Dular Sada of the same locality is in his twilight 
years. His father, Pachu and grandfather, Faagu, worked in the vil-
lage. Until he got old, Dular worked at digging soil in the fields. His 
nephew, Bhutai, is also working as a labourer. ‘In our family, there 
has been no difference from the time of grandfather till now. We 
earn during the day, eat at night, and start again in the morning. 
Fate has been like that. What can we do?’
‘Leaders promise a lot during elections, but they have never come 
back and helped in improving our livelihoods,’ said Dewan Sada, the 
leader of the locality.
Another local, Bulan Sada, said, ‘Our main problem is land. Since we 
do not have land, we cannot even take the facilities provided by the 
government.’
The only Musahar who has achieved a high political position is Asar-
fi Sada from Saptari. He was a nominated member of the legisla-
ture-parliament in 2007-08. He is currently a leader of the UCPN 
(Maoist).
Source: Jha (2016).
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‘lower caste’ groups continue to be discriminated against (Bhattachan et al., 
2009),while top positions in the Christian community are disproportionate-
ly occupied by converts from Hindu ‘high-caste’ backgrounds (Shah, 1993).
There is a dearth of writing on the Christians of Nepal. What is clear 
though is that Christians began their work in the name of modernization 
and contributed to different sectors such as education, health services, 
communication and transportation. But the Nepali state has always viewed 
Christians with suspicion with regard to proselytism, particularly during the 
Panchayat years. At the end of the Panchayat system in 1990, there were 
30 persons serving jail sentences for conversion-related charges and an-
other 200 had cases pending against them in different courts. All of them 
were granted amnesty when the interim government was formed. But, the 
2015 Constitution continues to retain the discriminatory clause against 
Christians by considering proselytising a crime (Article 26[3]).26 The am-
biguity in the Constitution regarding what constitutes ‘forceful conversion’ 
and the right of an individual to change one’s religious faith has provided 
the state with leverage against Christian communities and organizations. In 
another blow to the Christian community, coinciding with the promulgation 
of the 2015 Constitution, the practice of declaring Christmas a national holi-
day that had started after 2007 has since been stopped.
There have also been some attacks on Christians by right-wing Hin-
du groups who blame them for the introduction of secularism in 2006. In 
2008, a Roman Catholic priest was killed in eastern Nepal and in 2009 an 
explosion in a church in Kathmandu killed three people. While physical at-
tacks have ceased after members of the self-styled National Defence Army 
were arrested, Christians in Nepal still feel discriminated against and treat-
ed like untouchables (Timsina, 2013).
Conclusion and recommendations
Nepal was under monarchical rule for a long time with most powers reposed 
in the king. In its efforts to institutionalize a monolithic state, the monar-
chy suppressed minorities and the diverse cultures of Nepal by denying 
26. Article 26 (3) states: ‘While exercising the right as provided for by this Article, no person shall 
act or make others act in a manner which is contrary to public health, decency and morality, 
or behave or act or make others act to disturb public law and order situation, or convert a 
person of one religion to another religion, or disturb the religion of other people.  Such an act 
shall be punishable by law.’
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Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities
Since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in Nepal in 
1990, the issue of identity politics has strengthened people’s claims 
on every structure of the government (Lowati, 2005). The shift in 
discourse to ‘inclusion’ within the ‘mainstream’ political and social 
institutions has become central in challenging structural inequali-
ties based on caste, ethnicity, gender, religion and region (Gellner, 
2003). One of the leading organizations in this struggle has been the 
Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN).
Brief history of NEFIN
NEFIN began life as the Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN), 
which was formed in 1990 as an umbrella organization of indige-
nous people (Onta, 2006). The founding members of NEFEN includ-
ed eight organizations representing Gurung, Limbu, Magar, Newar, 
Rai, Sherpa, Sunuwar and Tamang communities. During the pre-
1990 period, organizations representing different Janajati groups 
had been formed such as Chwasa-Pasa (1924), the Tharu Kalyanka-
rini Sabha (1949) (Krauskopff, 2003), the Nepal Tamang Ghedung 
(1957), the Nepal Bhasa Manka Khala (1979) and the Nepal Langhali 
Sangh (1982) (Tamang, 2004). But NEFEN paved the way for a na-
tional-level network.
NEFEN changed its name to NEFIN in 2001. It currently consists of 
48 organizations representing communities distributed throughout 
the Tarai, Hills and Himalaya of Nepal. The recognition of NEFIN’s 
work has led to its involvement in different international fora such as 
the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNP-
FII) and the Asian Indigenous People’s Pact (AIPP). Over time, with 
the help of international development partners, NEFIN has also led 
and coordinated projects with a particular focus on empowerment 
among which are the Janajati Empowerment Project (JEP and JEP-
II) supported by the Department for International Development and 
Enabling State Programme (DfID/ESP), the Janajati Social and Eco-
nomic Empowerment Project (JANSEEP) with Care Nepal and the 
European Union (EU) (JANSEEP) and the Sustainable Development 
of Disadvantaged Ethnic Communities in Nepal (SAMARTHYA) 
with Action Aid and EU.
... contd. ...
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them fundamental rights to culture, language, citizenship and identity. This 
made Nepal’s transition to democracy challenging since democratic con-
solidation, which is largely determined by participation in power-sharing 
and by addressing and reducing social inequalities, has yet to see significant 
progress. Although Nepal has made progress in its overall development in-
dicators, it still fares badly in economic growth as compared to its South 
Asian neighbours, with the marginalized sections faring even worse. Dalits 
in particular fare badly on all socioeconomic indicators as well as on indica-
tors of political participation. Nepal has acceded to most of the international 
conventions relating to minority rights even though it is yet to meet all its 
obligations under them.
Nepal made significant progress in its constitutional provisions with the 
Interim Constitution of 2007. Some of these gains were reversed with the 
2015 Constitution. That this has not been fully accepted by marginalized 
groups such as the Madhesis is an indication of the state’s failure to rec-
ognize and address the interests of minority and marginalized groups. The 
weakness of the state in ensuring fair distribution of resources, develop-
ment flows and power-sharing among all sections of the population is clear. 
The deep-rooted marginalization of minority groups is also due to incoher-
ent development plans and their ineffective implementation.
Recommendations
i. There is a need for a robust and categorical definition of ‘marginalized’ 
and ‘minorities’ with clear listings of caste, ethnic and religious groups. 
Further, these categories should be used in all sectors and for affirmative 
action to ensure effective representation.
ii. Although government agencies have started disaggregating data by eth-
nicity and gender since the 1991 Census, there is a need for greater dis-
aggregation of all relevant national data based on similar criteria. Given 
their increasing numbers, the data should also deal with Christians as a 
separate category.
iii. The provision of different commissions in the new Constitution to ad-
dress issues of minorities is a positive step and included in the duties 
and responsibilities of these commissions should be to defining the 
types of inclusion that will address the demands of these groups and 
monitor progress of the same. 
iv. The periodic development plans need to focus on gauging progress 
along different socioeconomic indicators by minority and marginalized 
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Campaigns and interventions
Focusing on the need for the inclusion of this huge mass of popu-
lation within the mainstream developmental agenda, NEFIN’s de-
mands in the main were (Bhattachan and Bhattachan, 2003):
• right to self-determination,
• ethnic autonomy,
• equal language rights, including a tri-lingual language policy and 
education in the mother tongue,
• secularism, and
• affirmative action.
It is a measure of NEFIN’s advocacy work, along with other political 
processes that by the end of the 1990s, the Government of Nepal had 
considered introducing the following (Subba et al., 2008): 
•  right to education in the mother tongue,
•  reservations for Janajatis in higher technical education,
•  use of local languages in local offices,
•  secularism,
•  special or proportional representation and ethnic autonomy,
•  establishment of a foundation/academy to preserve and promote 
Janajati languages and cultures,
•  positive discrimination in government jobs,
•  removal of discriminatory provisions in the Constitution, laws, 
by-laws and policies, 
•  recognition of rights to natural resources,
•  disaggregated data by ethnicity and caste, and 
•  ratification of ILO Convention No. 169 and the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
Interventions and impact
The objectives of NEFIN have been to develop unity and fraternity 
among Janajatis while also developing their leadership and capaci-
ties (NEFIN.org). The establishment of District Coordination Coun-
cils (DCCs) has been instrumental in this context. So far, NEFIN 
has established DCCs in 69 districts (NEFIN.org), paving the way 
for strengthening Janajati political activism. This allowed NEFIN to 
play a prominent role in the 2006 people’s movement that led to 
... contd. ...
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groups. Further, the plans need to build on previous iterations as there 
exist discontinuities between successive plans.
v. Constitution:
• The 2015 Constitution articulates sentiments for ending discrimina-
tion, but since it does not spell out clear pathways to promote equal-
ity, the government will have to take heed of the spirit behind the 
sentiments when designing specific interventions.
• Citizenship rights to women have been particularly discriminato-
ry in Nepal. Multiple clauses in the Constitution ensure transfer of 
citizenship to children only through the father and curb women’s 
right to transfer full citizenship rights to their children. The state, 
therefore, has the duty to repeal discriminatory clauses based on cit-
izenship, avoid statelessness and prevent arbitrariness in conferring 
citizenship (Malla, 2016).
vi. Public Service: 
• Since Dalits are particularly vulnerable to their human rights being 
violated, there should be a provision to include at least one Dalit rep-
resentative in the National Human Rights Commission. 
• The quota or reservation system should be strengthened by making 
special provisions to encourage members of marginalized communi-
ties to seek employment in civil service and public institutions.
• Political participation of Dalits, especially of Tarai Dalits, is bleak. 
Dalit inclusion should be mandatory at each level of government 
planning and implementation. The state should develop effective 
mechanisms for checks and balances to ensure that affirmative ac-
tion in this regard is implemented. 
vii. Implementation of International Standards: 
• Nepal has rejected all the 29 recommendations on human rights 
made during the 23rd Universal Periodic Review held in Geneva in 
2015, including those related to conventions on transitional justice 
and has refused to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture, International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rai, 2016). Nepal should ratify these 
protocols and also adhere to pledges made for accountability and 
justice to the people. 
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the end of direct rule by the king and the end of the Maoist conflict 
(Shah, 2008).
After the political change of 2006, inclusion became a major agen-
da in Nepal’s political discourse. The issues and demands of the 
Janajatis focused on state restructuring along the lines of federalism, 
autonomy with the right to self-determination, representation of Ja-
najatis in government structures in proportion to their population 
and special representation for minority Janajati groups. Following 
a protracted struggle, NEFIN signed a 20-point agreement with the 
government in August 2007, which included a provision accepting 
ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. Around the same time, the Inter-
im Parliament also approved revisions to the Civil Service Act 1993, 
which led to fixed quotas for Janajatis (and also others) in govern-
ment jobs.
Lessons for advocacy
Despite many challenges, NEFIN provides a number of lessons for 
advocacy. Changes in the provisions of the constitutions since the 
1990s reflect effective advocacy on the part of NEFIN. NEFIN has 
successfully advocated for the definition and classification of indige-
nous/Adivasi Janajatis and also legitimized the definition via various 
protests, rallies, demonstrations, press conferences and publications 
(Tamang, 2004). However, the real strength of the organization  – 
engaging in advocacy – became possible only through regular inter-
actions at the grassroots level since its branches are spread across 
different districts and villages.
However, NEFIN has also had its share of problems. The most 
prominent of these was its falling out with the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID), which had supported the Jana-
jati Empowerment Project. Following a national strike in 2011 called 
in support of its position of federalism that would recognize iden-
tity as one of the bases for the division of provincial units, NEFIN 
was served a warning by DfID to refrain from the sometimes-violent 
street confrontations. NEFIN refused and DfID withdrew its support 
for a very effective awareness-raising programme.
Since then, NEFIN has been reduced to a shell of its former self. 
Growing interference by political parties has led to factionalism 
within NEFIN members and led to a weakening of the whole Jana-
jati movement. Co-option of the organization’s leaders and activists 
by established parties has challenged its legitimacy and also under-
mined all its previous efforts.
... Good practice case study continuied ...
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• International standards set by instruments such as ILO Convention 
169 should be implemented to protect the rights of indigenous peo-
ple. Existing initiatives of land reforms and management should in-
corporate a specific focus on the rights of indigenous people over 
land, territories and natural resources that they have traditionally 
owned or used, either individually or collectively. Accordingly, the 
state should obtain free and informed consent of indigenous people 
prior to giving approval to any project affecting their land, territories 
and other resources.
viii. Education:
• Nepal has not ratified crucial international documents like the 
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960). 
Existing plans for bilingual education should be enforced as a matter 
of priority in order to promote and develop lingual diversity and also 
to make teaching and learning processes more effective, including by 
allocating the required human and financial resources to allow for 
effective implementation of such programmes. This includes sup-
porting madrassa education and accepting it as a formal educational 
institution up to the higher level. 
• Nepal has implemented plans like EFA and SSRP, but access to ed-
ucation appears discouraging since groups such as Janajatis, Mad-
hesis and Dalits still struggle to educate their children. In a welcome 
move, the government has been providing scholarships to Dalit chil-
dren. What is required next is effective monitoring of the distribu-
tion of scholarships and creating a Dalit children-friendly environ-
ment in schools. 
• Scholarships, food and uniforms in schools should be provided to 
Dalits, backward communities and the poor in order to reduce drop-
out rates. 
ix. Access to Justice:
• Studies show that the torture inflicted among Madhesis, Dalits and 
Janajatis is higher as compared to Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars 
(Advocacy Forum Nepal, 2012). Civil society as well as the state 
should invest in making core law-enforcing bodies such as the Ne-
pal Police and the Armed Police Force more tolerant and sensitive 
towards the socio-cultural diversity of Nepal.
• Existing laws must be strengthened through amendments to guaran-
tee that complaints are registered, investigations proceed in a timely 
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manner, investigators are shielded from political or other pressures 
and victims are afforded requisite protection.
x. Caste-based Discrimination:
• Mechanisms to eliminate caste-based discrimination should be 
made effective.27
• The government needs to repeal all discriminatory laws, regulations, 
rules, directives, policies and programmes that contravene the hu-
man rights of groups such as Dalits.
xi. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
• Special arrangements need to be made for the inclusion, protection 
and promotion of human rights of the Muslim community while rec-
ognizing their existence as a religious community with distinct cus-
toms, culture, language and way of life.
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August 11 is a historic day that marks the celebration of Minorities’ Day 
in Pakistan. It was on this date that the father of the nation, Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah, in a speech at the first Legislative Assembly of the country on 
11 August 1947, i.e,. three days before the official announcement of the 
creation of Pakistan, proclaimed all minorities as equal citizens of the 
new nation. The Government of Pakistan subsequently declared August 
11 as “Minorities Day”. The day got an official reorganization in 2009 
due to the efforts of former minister of Pakistan Minority Affairs Clem-
ent Shahbaz Bhatti, who was murdered on 2 March 2011 by the Teh-
reek-e-Taliban in Islamabad.
At the time of its formation, the rhetoric around Pakistan included 
rights to freedom of religion. The forefathers of the State envisaged a 
free state where each minority group would have the right to profess 
their beliefs freely, without fear of being persecuted. Unfortunately soon 
after its creation, the political religious parties, purporting to be guard-
ians of Islam, hijacked the State of Pakistan. And, today, intolerance 
towards pluralism and inter faith harmony has seeped into the general 
populace and the apparatus of the state.
Attacks on minorities and forced conversions are a common occur-
rence resulting in mass exodus of the minorities, as in the case of Hin-
du minorities of Sindh. The Constitution and other laws and policies 
officially restrict religious freedom. The government’s limited capacity 
and will to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of extremist attacks 
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against religious minorities is promoting further intolerance, allowing 
impunity for those who take the law into their own hand.
Each year there have been several reports of societal abuses or discrim-
ination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice, a trend that is 
unfortunately increasing. Violent extremists in the country have de-
manded that all citizens follow their authoritarian interpretation of Is-
lam and threatened brutal consequences if anyone chooses not to abide.
Bushra Khaliq, State of Minority Rights in Pakistan.1 
This chapter discusses the condition of religious minorities in Pakistan. 
The attempt is to report on the conditions and not so much to analyse and 
identify the factors and drivers that create the conditions, although some 
effort has been made in that direction too. However, given that this is the 
first ‘annual report’ on the state of minorities in this series, our attempt was 
also to develop something like a baseline for future annual documentations. 
This necessarily meant that we had to go back into history to understand 
among other things the context and the evolution of the structures of today 
that have implications for minorities. The chapter uses the UN minority 
rights framework in looking at minorities’ various rights – to life and secu-
rity; non-discrimination in services and opportunities; participation; and 
to culture and identity. This is also how the paper is structured. It begins 
with a quick overview of who the minorities in Pakistan are with a focus 
on religious minorities and what the constitutional framework is for them. 
Minorities in Pakistan
According to the last official Census (1998), religious minorities made up 
4 per cent of the total population of Pakistan (close to 5 million persons in 
a total population of 132.4 million).2 Christians formed the largest group, 
numbering between 2-3 million (1.69 per cent of the population), equally 
divided between Catholics and Protestants living in urban centres as well 
as in rural areas mostly in Punjab province. Occupationally, most of them 
were landless labourers, farmhands and sweepers. There were 2.5 million 
(1.4 per cent) Hindus. A vast majority lived in Sindh province, with half 
1. Based on the reports by National Commission on Justice and Peace, Women in Struggle 
for Empowerment (WISE), Asian Human Rights Commission-Hong Kong, Human Rights 
Committee-UK.
2. The current population is estimated at 199 million.
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3. In 1974, Ahmadis were officially deemed non-Muslim, thus making them a non-Muslim 
minority.
4. Replaced recently by Urdu (See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34215293).
5. One view holds that Jinnah maintained some ambiguity about the relationship between 
the two.
of that number in Tharparkar district alone. Most worked as farm labour, 
many of them ‘bonded’. Dalits formed a large section (0.33 per cent of the 
total population). Smaller non-Muslim minorities included Sikhs, Parsis, 
Bahais and Buddhists, numbering in thousands. Among Muslim minorities, 
Ahmadis, numbering between 500,000-600,000, made up 0.35 per cent of 
the population (although these figures may have been very under-reported), 
with most concentrated in Rabwah in Jhung district in Punjab province.3 
Shias made up a quarter of the country’s Muslim population with large con-
centrations in Karachi and other urban centres as well as in rural areas of 
Baluchistan (mostly Hazaras) and Punjab (MRG 2002:1; Zia, 2010:144). 
Urdu is the national language and most Pakistanis converse in or under-
stand it. Yet it is the first language of only about 10 per cent of the population 
– the mohajir, or post-partition immigrants. Regional languages, Punjabi, 
Balochi, Pushtu and Sindhi, among others form other linguistic groups with 
Punjabi being the language of the majority (MRG, 2002). English was the 
official language until 2015.4 Territorially, Pakistan is made up of four pro-
vincial and three administrative territories – Azad Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan 
and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), with over a dozen reli-
gious and ethnic groups. Language, ethnicity and regionalism which are the 
markers of identity combine and overlay each other to determine outcomes 
for citizens and political contestations across these identity divides often 
also resulting in conflicts, as best seen in the case of Baluchistan. Religion 
is thus one of the ways in Pakistan’s case-determining minority status of a 
community. But both language and ethnicity also play a role in determining 
the minority status of its citizens.
Minority rights framework – 
the successive erosion of a plural space
The foundational debate in post-independence Pakistan that had implica-
tions for minority rights was about differing visions of the objectives of the 
(pre-partition) demand for Pakistan: protecting the rights of India’s larg-
est minority versus establishing an Islamic state. Whilst M.A. Jinnah stood 
Pakistan 
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for the former,5 a strong section saw the movement providing an oppor-
tunity for establishing an Islamic state. Contributing to the crisis was the 
fact that Pakistan was not a territorial state, and its leaders were at a loss 
to find its purpose as many leaders of the Muslim League were without a 
constituency in the newly formed state. This state of limbo was a process 
that entailed a delay in democratic decision-making. In the absence of such 
a process, the authorities resorted to the language of Islam to provide vali-
dation for their governance strategies. Most found it convenient to do so in 
religious terms. Jinnah’s early demise, the particular situation that a fledg-
ling Pakistan found itself in and the vested interests of the ruling class want-
ing to maintain the status quo meant that the Islamist sections won the day. 
The outcome was the Objectives Resolution adopted by the first Constit-
uent Assembly (March 1949) that settled the Islamic credentials of Pakistan. 
It accepted the premise that ‘sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to 
God Almighty alone, and that the state of Pakistan would exercise authority 
within the limit prescribed by Him’ (Ispahani, 2016:41)
The Objective Resolution opened the doors for a further push by Isla-
mist parties. Over the years, the plural character of the state has been com-
promised with each of Pakistan’s successive constitutions enhancing its 
Islamic content, consequently narrowing the space for minority rights. An 
early straw in the wind indicating what was to come was the mass sectarian 
violence against Ahmadi Muslims in 1953 (an estimated 2,000 were killed) 
and the mobilization against their fundamental right to freedom of religion. 
But the state’s compromises with Islamists were no insurance against 
loss of power; 1953 was also the year when the first bloodless coup took 
place supported by a strong military-civilian bureaucracy combined that 
took power away from a duly elected government. This, Ispahani notes, sig-
nalled the ‘rise of the national security establishment, that would repeatedly 
use religion to tighten its grip over power,’ in opposition to popular legiti-
macy obtained through elections (Ispahani, 2016).
Pakistan’s first Constitution was announced in 1956. The Objective Res-
olution became its Preamble (Article 2A). Pakistan was designated ‘Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan’ where ‘the principles of freedom, equality, tolerance 
and social justice, as enunciated by Islam would be fully observed’ (Zia, 
2010: 150). Part 3 contained Directive Principles of State Policy that includ-
ed many Islamic provisions including the declaration that ‘steps shall be 
taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan… to order their lives in accordance 
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with the Holy Quran and Sunnah.’ The Constitution barred non-Muslims 
from holding the office of head of state. Part 12 titled ‘Islamic provisions’ 
called for Islamic research and education. 
More significantly, Article 198 proclaimed, ‘No law shall be repugnant 
to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah.’ The 
Constitution also sought to bring existing laws in conformity with Islamic 
injunctions (Zia, 2010).
Observers have noted that the long state of limbo – with there being no 
constitution and elections put off for most of the first 10 years of the coun-
try’s existence - allowed for the founding ideas of Pakistan, as espoused by 
its founder, M.A. Jinnah, to be questioned and compromised with Islamist 
parties and the military-bureaucratic leadership gaining centre-stage in 
place of elected politicians (Ispahani, 2016). 
In 1958, Ayub Khan staged a coup and took power establishing a mili-
tary dictatorship with a focus on national security and conflict with India. 
This focus also had adverse implications for Hindus who were seen as Indi-
an sympathizers. Ayub Khan was a strong believer in Pakistan as an Islamic 
ideological state (as against secular). The second Constitution that he de-
vised in 1962 mirrored the 1956 Constitution with regard to the minorities. 
It incorporated Islamic provisions, including the setting up of a Council of 
Islamic Ideology, to recommend changes to bring laws in conformity with 
Islamic injunctions (Ispahani, 2016: 68). The Constitution ‘legitimized the 
view that religious minorities lived in the country only at the sufferance of 
the Muslim majority’ (Ispahani, 2016: 71). Ayub Khan also oversaw the re-
vision of school curricula. Social studies was introduced in classes 6 to 10 
and Islamic studies in classes 6 to 8 as a means to indoctrinate young minds 
reflecting the thinking of the ideological state that he sought to build. 
Observers see Ayub Khan using Islam to bolster the authoritarian sys-
tem he envisaged for Pakistan (Ispahani, quoting Khalid bin Sayeed, 2016: 
68). His successors put Islam to similar cynical purposes. Yahya Khan, who 
took over from Ayub in 1969, issued the Martial Law Regulation 51 (1970), 
penalizing publishing or possession of any book, pamphlet ‘offensive to Is-
lam’ attracting a penalty of seven years rigorous imprisonment. This was 
the precursor to the draconian blasphemy laws to come later. The slide into 
further homogenization as reflected in law was quick and so was further 
marginalization of minorities.
Pakistan 
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The secession of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh in 1971 was in part 
the consequence of these homogenizing tendencies. It reduced the minority 
composition of Pakistan’s population to about 4 per cent that was a sig-
nificant drop. The larger Hindu population in united Pakistan had given a 
measure of voice, however limited, to its minorities. That was no longer the 
case. Tellingly, ‘having achieved a measure of purity in relation to non-Mus-
lims within Pakistan, Islamists were now getting ready to purify the country 
of unorthodox groups hitherto identified as Muslims’ (Ispahani, 2016:96).
The third Constitution, 1973, that emerged out of a compromise that 
an elected government (Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party) struck with the 
powerful Islamist plank retained the Islamic provisions of previous consti-
tutions. Additionally, Islam was made the state religion (Article 2) and the 
President and Prime Minister were required to be Muslims (Article 41 and 91 
respectively). Notably, succumbing to Islamist parties and to Bhutto’s own 
interests in limiting his exposure to this issue just as he had launched a mas-
sive army operation against the Baluch independence movement, the PPP 
government amended the Constitution, declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims 
in response it claimed, to ‘the will and aspirations of the Muslims of Paki-
stan’ (1974). ‘Qadianis’, as Ahmadis are pejoratively called, were included as 
a minority (Article 106, Clause 3) and the Constitution also sought to define 
‘Muslim’ (new clause to Article 260), to effectively exclude Ahmadis from 
the category. This amendment to outlaw Ahmadis who consider themselves 
Muslims, has been the source of severe violence against and disenfranchise-
ment of the Ahmadi community. Their legal status is such that by practic-
ing their religion, Ahmadis break the law of the land. In later amendments, 
access to citizenship services – passports, identity cards, public sector jobs 
and the like – were made contingent on Muslims negating Ahmadism, thus 
foreclosing these rights for Ahmadis. The amendments paved the way for 
the draconian anti-Ahmadi ordinance of 1983.
In 1977 Zia ul Haq took power through another coup and ruled as mar-
tial law dictator for 11 years legitimizing his rule by claiming the mantle 
of Islamization. According to Ispahani (2016: 110), ‘(the) end of Bhutto’s 
government marked the end of efforts to strike a balance between Jinnah’s 
vision of a pluralist Pakistan and the demands of Islamists for an Islamic 
state.’ Zia ul Haq undertook a series of amendments to the Constitution and 
penal codes that were meant to emphasize his Islamic credentials. These 
changed the spectrum of policies and attitudes towards minorities (and 
women) (Hussain, 2010:191). These included: 
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i. the ‘hudood’ decree (1979) creating sharia courts, with stringent pun-
ishment for four offences (intoxication, theft, adultery and false allega-
tions) to emphasize the Islamic codes of personal behaviour;
ii. blasphemy laws (1980, 82 and 86), criminalizing any act deemed as dis-
honouring the Prophet, his family, sahabas (companions) and Islamic 
symbols;6  and
iii. the presidential ordinance XX (1984) against Ahmadis basically barring 
them from being Muslims and making their ‘outraging the religious 
feelings of Muslims, by whatever means’, punishable by imprisonment.
Offences were vaguely defined, and there were little procedural safe-
guards. In the hands of interested parties – jihadist groups as well as mali-
cious neighbours and fellow workers, among others - these discriminatory 
laws became handy tools for harassing the minorities. 
To sum up, ‘fundamental rights, liberties and liberal principles were 
duly incorporated in the 1956 Constitution and retained in the 1962 Con-
stitution and the Legal Framework Order, 1970 and the 1973 Constitution. 
However, alongside was the parallel constitutional debate flowing from the 
Objectives Resolution, which produced the incorporation of “‘Islamic pro-
visions’” (Zia, 2010:150). Zia ul Haq’s discriminatory legal order brutalized 
minorities. This left a legacy of denial of rights and marginalization of the 
minorities that has proved difficult to roll back to this day. 
Constitutional provisions and minorities
We now discuss provisions regarding minorities with regard to fundamen-
tal rights, protection and religious practices. Article 36 of the Constitution 
guarantees right to protection of religious minorities. Article 28 guaran-
tees protection of language and culture and Article 33 discourages racial, 
sectarian and provincial prejudices. There are other provisions too that 
guarantee equality and non-discrimination. But a closer examination re-
veals that many constitutional provisions are negated while some others 
are compromised by other laws. Thus, quite apart from the poor implemen-
6. In a 2013 reply to the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
process, while rejecting recommendations for repeal of blasphemy laws, the Pakistani gov-
ernment stated, ‘while the government has accepted and is already implementing measures 
that call on it to prevent the misuse of blasphemy law, there is no national consensus on the 
repeal of these laws’ (Pakistan’s statement during the Adoption of UPR Report in its 22nd 
Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 2013).
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tation of many rights’ provisions, many laws themselves are discriminatory 
and violate international human and minority rights covenants contained 
in statutes such as the UN Minorities Declaration (1992) and the Durban 
Declaration on Racism and Racial Discrimination (2001). 
Article 20 guarantees right to freedom of religion but it has many pro-
visos. It states ‘every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and 
propagate his religion.’ However, other constitutional provisions and laws 
impose limits on this right, which is ‘subject to law, public order and mo-
rality’ opening the floodgates to complaints of violation of this freedom 
against Muslims and non-Muslims, especially Ahmadis (US State Depart-
ment, 2014: 2). Further, the constitutional requirement for all laws to be 
consistent with Islam means that many provisions of the right to freedom of 
religion are neutralized. 
According to the Constitution and Penal Code, (1978 amendment, 
Clauses C and D of Section 298B of PPC) Ahmadis are not Muslims and are 
prohibited from calling themselves Muslims or their belief in Islam as well 
as from preaching or propagating their religious beliefs, proselytizing or in-
sulting the religious feelings of Muslims. These put definitive restrictions on 
Ahmadis’ right to freedom of religion. 
Ahmadis being declared non-Muslims also has other implications as 
their rights are denied to them: 
i. The Constitution provides for ‘freedom to manage religious institutions,’ 
but Ahmadis cannot call their place of worship a mosque thus effectively 
barring them from this right. 
ii. Ahmadis are barred from propagating their faith or publishing religious 
texts something that the Constitution allows the minorities. 
iii. Passports, national identity cards and electoral rolls designate religious 
affiliations. Applicants for public sector employment too require that the 
religion be mentioned. In both cases, Muslim applicants must negate 
the Ahmadi movement and denounce its founder. This effectively disen-
franchises Ahmadis denying them access to citizenship rights and public 
sector jobs. 
Article 25 guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law. 
But many provisions of the Constitution discriminate against minorities: 
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i. Freedom of speech is subject to ‘reasonable restrictions in the interest of 
the glory of Islam,’ as stipulated in the Penal Code. Blasphemy laws too 
are Muslim specific (that is only against Islam) and prescribe extremely 
strong penalties (Sections 298A, 298B and 298C of the Pakistan Penal 
Code). Persons are subject to death for ‘defiling Prophet Muhammad,’ 
to life imprisonment for ‘defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Quran,’ 
and to 10 years’ imprisonment for ‘insulting another’s religious feelings.’ 
Speech or action intended to incite religious hatred is punishable by up 
to seven years’ imprisonment. And Ordinance XX (1984), targeting Ah-
madis is particularly discriminatory with its vague definition of offence 
and draconian punishments. According to one estimate, up to 1992, 
1,790 criminal cases had been filed under this ordinance (Lau, 2006: 
114-115).
ii. The Hudood laws too discriminate thus contravening Article 25. Wit-
nesses against a Muslim accused are required to be adult Muslim males. 
There is no such restriction for non-Muslim accused. And the presiding 
judge (in a case involving a Muslim) must again be a Muslim. Besides 
violating the guarantee to equality this also violates the guarantee given 
under Article 227 (3) that nothing under the Islamic provisions section 
would affect the personal laws of non-Muslims or their status as citizens 
(Zia, 2010:155). 
There is no system of civil or common law marriages, marriages being 
performed and registered according to individuals’ religions. But the gov-
ernment does not have a legal mechanism to register the marriages of Hin-
dus and Sikhs causing women from these religious groups difficulties in in-
heritance, accessing health services, voting, obtaining passports and buying 
or selling property (US State Department, 2014: 3). It was only recently, in 
February 2016 that the parliamentary panel approved the Hindu Marriage 
Bill 2016 and the Sindh Assembly passed the bill, 2016 (The Hindu, 2016).
Article 22 assures freedom from forced religious instructions. 
Article 22 guarantees that no person shall be required to receive re-
ligious education other than his own, prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of religion alone with regard to admission in educational institu-
tions and receiving public assistance and allows affirmative action by public 
authorities for the advancement of disadvantaged groups. Islamic studies 
are compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools, which in itself 
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is a violation of individual rights. And although students of other religious 
groups are not legally required to study Islam, they generally are not offered 
parallel studies in their own religious beliefs and by default are required to 
take up Islamic studies (The Hindu, 2016).
Article 27 guarantees non-discrimination in public service appoint-
ments. But violating that is Article 41 which stipulates that only Muslims 
can be the head of state and the mandatory oath of office for the Prime 
Minister (swearing that he/she is a Muslim and believes in the unity of 
god and finality of the Prophet) effectively debars non-Muslims and Ah-
madis. Non-Muslim judges and advocates are discriminated in the Feder-
al Supreme Court and under the Hudood Ordinance unless the accused is 
a non-Muslim (Zia, 2010: 167). Applicants for public sector employment, 
designating themselves as Muslims, must sign a declaration negating their 
Ahmadi beliefs and its founder. 
Right to life and security
It is the state’s duty to provide security to its citizens, ensuring protection 
of their lives, security and property regardless of their religious, ethnic or 
linguistic affiliations. Minorities in any context expect the state to perform 
this basic state function and so do minorities in Pakistan. However, as re-
cent events demonstrate the Pakistani state is increasingly unable to guar-
antee this basic right, especially to its minorities. The latest Pakistan edi-
tion of the US State Department International Religious Freedom report, 
comments that the country represents one of the worst situations in the 
world for religious freedom, with Pakistan continuing to experience chronic 
violence targeting Shia Muslims, Christians, Ahmadi Muslims and Hindus 
– Pakistan’s principal religious minorities (USCIRF, 2015: 109). To give an 
idea about the kind of attacks on minorities in Pakistan, we refer to some 
incidents in 2015 when an estimated seven cases of organized assaults on 
minorities took place; of these terrorist organizations affiliated to Islamist 
parties attacked on four different occasions. In one such attack on 15 March 
on St. John’s Catholic Church and Christ Church in Lahore left 19 dead 
and 70 injured. Identical attacks against Christians took place on 26 and 
 27 May 2015. 
Attacks on minorities on questionable grounds of blasphemy, occurred 
on two occasions in 2015. In one instance, there was an attack on a factory 
belonging to a member of the Ahmadi community in Jhelum district. 
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Life and security of minorities
Different laws like the ones on blasphemy and attacks by a variety of ex-
tremist groups on different minority communities have increased over time. 
This section catalogues the many ways in which life and security is denied 
to the minorities using a historical lens but focusing on recent trends. This 
section is arranged based on the intensity of violence that principal religious 
minorities have suffered in recent years. Thus, we begin with the Shia com-
munity, followed by Ahmadi Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Sikhs. The 
last section discusses the issues of both omission and commission by the 
state to point out its inability to protect its minorities from the attacks that 
are increasing throughout the country at an alarming rate.
Attacks on Shias
Recent trends of assaults on the Shia community are a worrisome tendency 
that started developing in the mid-1980s. The site of many of these attacks 
was Punjab province – especially Jhang district - as well as urban areas 
across the country. According to available reports, between 1985 and 1989, 
over 300 Shias were killed in Jhang. Between 1989 and 2003, 1,468 Shias 
were killed and 3,370 injured in approximately 1,813 incidents. Over time 
anti-Shia violence has spread to other parts of the country, especially large 
urban centres. According to one report, in Karachi alone 293 people died of 
whom 200 were Shias in different riots between 1994 and June 2002 (On-
line Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence). According to a report by the Jinnah 
Institute, violence against Shias peaked in 2012-15: ‘The overall number of 
bomb blasts and targeted attacks have reached unprecedented levels with 
1,304 people killed from explosions, and another 601 people falling victim 
to targeted killings.’ The number of people injured in bomb blasts was 950; 
23 Imambarahs also came under attack in 2012-15.
The severity of violence targeted at Shias is given in Table 1. 
In recent years, ethnic Hazaras, predominantly Shias, have been facing 
violent attacks, especially in Balochistan province. Since 2008, an estimat-
ed 500 Hazaras have been killed in different attacks. This has resulted in 
large-scale migration (nearly 30,000 Hazaras, according to one report) of 
Hazaras from Balochistan in the last five years. On 21 January 2014, a sui-
cide bomber attacked a bus carrying Hazara Shia pilgrims in Balochistan’s 
Mastung district killing 24 and injuring 40. On 23 October of the same year, 
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a gunman fired on a bus transporting Hazara traders killing eight persons 
(US State Department, 2014: 11). Attacks on Shia mosques, some with dead-
ly consequences, have become common – in a two-month period in early 
2015, 90 Shias were reported killed in three major attacks against Shias in 
Shikarpyr (Sindh), Peshawar and Rawalpindi (Punjab) (SATP, 2015). Poor 
security for Shias has also been facilitated by the increasing Shia-Sunni ten-
sions, some of which at least were fanned historically by Zia ul Haq’ s Islam-
ization drive in the 1980s deepening sectarian tensions in Pakistan. 
Attacks on Ahmadis
Ahmadis, another Muslim minority, have faced the brunt of attacks and vio-
lence. The first large-scale violence against minorities in post-independence 
Pakistan against Ahmadis was in 1953 when an estimated 2,000 persons 
were killed by rampaging mobs in Rabwa town in Jhang district, Punjab. 
A repeat of this mass violence in 1974 in the same area resulted in the death 
of 42 persons of whom 27 belonged to the Ahmadi community (Online 
Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence). The frequency of anti-Ahmadi violence 
and its intensity have increased since (see Table 2). The constitutional 
change in 1974, resulting in Ahmadis being declared non-Muslims, vitiated 
the atmosphere against them making them further vulnerable to attacks. 
A recent study on Ahmadis reveals the seriousness of the assault on the 
community from 1984 to 31 December 2015. (see Table 3).
Many Ahmadis continue to be labelled as blasphemers and violent at-
tacks by mobs against Ahmadis occur at regular intervals. In 2014, 11 Ah-
madis were killed in mob attacks. According to media reports, on 16 May 
2014 one Khalil Ahmad, an Ahmadi, was in police custody allegedly for 
committing blasphemy. He was shot dead in police custody by someone 
who walked in and fired a gun at him. On 26 May, Dr Mehdi Ali Qamar, 
a Canadian-American cardiologist who had come to Pakistan was shot dead 
by two strangers. On 27 July 2014 a mob attacked an Ahmadi neighbour-
hood in Gujranwala and burned down eight houses because some members 
of the community had posted blasphemous material on Facebook (HRCP, 
2015: 131-134; US Department of State).
Ahmadi places of worships too are not spared the violence. In early 
October 2005, an Ahmadi mosque was attacked in village Mong near Mandi 
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Time period Number of 
attacks
Killed Injured Targeted 
bombing
Targeted 
shooting
July 2012 to 
June 2013
54 514 769 17 28
July 2013 to 
June 2014
54 222 289 11 29
Time period Number of 
attacks
Killed Injured Targeted 
bombing
Targeted 
shooting
July 2012 to 
June 2013
40 17 28 1 20
July 2013 to 
June 2014
10 10 1 0 4
Table 1. Statistics on Targeted Violence against the 
Shia Community in Pakistan 
Table 2. Statistics on Targeted Violence against the 
Ahmadi Community in Pakistan 
Table 3. Statistics on human rights violations of Ahmadis
(From 1984 to 31 December 2015)
Source: Compiled by the author from Factsheet Pakistan, August 2014 (US State Department 2014: 3-4). 
Note: We are unable to provide more up to date data as more recent data on violence, disaggregated by 
religion is not available.   
Source: Compiled by the author from Factsheet Pakistan, August 2014 (US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, pp. 3-4). 
Note: We are unable to provide more up to date data as more recent data on violence, disaggregated by 
religion is not available.     
Source: A Report on Persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan During 2015 retrieved from: https://www.per-
secutionofahmadis.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Persecution-of-Ahmadis-in-Pakistan-2015.pdf .
Type of Incident Number
Ahmadis killed 248
Ahmadis target-killed this year 2
Ahmadis assaulted for their faith 323
Ahmadi mosques demolished 27
Ahmadi mosques sealed by authorities 32
Ahmadi mosques set on fire or damaged 20
Ahmadi mosques forcibly occupied 16
Ahmadi mosques whose construction was barred by authorities 52
Ahmadi bodies exhumed after burial 39
Burial of Ahmadis was denied in common cemetery 65
Incidents of Kalmia (Islamic creed) removal from Ahmadi houses and shops 43
Incidents of Kalmia removal from Ahmadi mosques 102
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Bahauddin. The attack took the lives of eight Ahmadis, another 18 persons 
were injured. In 2006, five different Ahmadi places of worship came under 
attack. In February, 2009, another mosque of the community was attacked 
(South Asians for Human Rights, 2010:144). On 23 January 2014, some 
unknown persons burned down an Ahmadi place of worship. On 26 January 
of the same year, another Ahmadi mosque was attacked in Faisalabad. In 
June, some men accompanied by the police destroyed an Ahmadi mosque 
in Dera Ghazi Khan (HRCP, 2015: 133).
Attacks on Christians
Attacks on Christians too have been common. They spiked immediately af-
ter western intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. On 28 October 2001, 18 
Christians were gunned down inside the St. Dominic Church in Bahalwal-
pur, Punjab. On 17 March 2002, four grenades were thrown inside a church 
in Islamabad, an incident that claimed the lives of five people and injured 
over 40. In a suicide bomb attack on 8 May 2002, 14 people were killed 
including 11 French naval engineers who were associated with a submarine 
project with the Pakistan Navy (Online Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence).7 
Over the years, attacks against Christians have become regular (Table 4).
Often Christians are accused of blasphemy, and often immediately after 
being accused they fall prey to attacks by majoritarian mobs. A Christian 
couple (Shama and Sajjad) in Kot Radha Kishan, Punjab were lynched in 
2014. They were beaten to death and then burned on the pretext that they 
had desecrated a copy of the Quran (HRPC, 2014: 129; US Department of 
State:12). A serious attack on Christians took place in September 2013 in 
Michael Town, Korangi, Karachi, when 300 Christian homes were burned 
down in mob violence forcing the victims to flee (HRCP, 2015: 130).
In the same year, a Muslim mob of more than 3,000 persons in retal-
iation against alleged blasphemy, burned 100 Christian homes in Lahore’s 
Joseph Colony (US Department of State: 8).
Attacks on churches takes place frequently in Pakistan. In 2005, 
madrassa students pulled down an under-construction church on the 
grounds that it was being erected in close proximity to a mosque. Local 
Muslim religious leaders declared that a church could not be constructed 
7. The post-2001 situation saw an increase in the attack and this point was well accepted in 
different reports. Mention could be made of Minority Rights Group International (2013: 7).
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Time period Number of 
attacks
Killed Injured Targeted 
bombing
Targeted 
shooting
Rapes
July 2012 to 
June 2013
32 7 33 0 3 3
July 2013 to 
June 2014
22 128 185 1 5 3
Table 4. Statistics on Targeted Violence against the 
Christian Community in Pakistan 
Source: Compiled by the author from Factsheet Pakistan, August 2014 (US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, pp. 3-4). 
Note: We are unable to provide more up to date data as more recent data on violence, disaggregated by 
religion is not available.     
in close proximity to a mosque (South Asians for Human Rights, 2010:143). 
One of the largest attacks against Christians took place in September 2013 
when a suicide bomb attack killed more than 100 persons at the All Saints 
Church in Peshawar (Minority Rights Group International, 2013: 7). At-
tacks on churches continue. On 15 March 2015, at least 15 people were killed 
and 70 injured when two Taliban suicide bombers attacked churches in La-
hore (Dawn, 2015a). And, in yet another instance of suicide bombing, this 
time on Easter Sunday on 27 March 2016 over 70 persons were killed in 
Lahore city. 
There are other forms of violence too against Christians. According to 
a report of the Movement for Solidarity and Peace in Pakistan, every year 
around 700 Christian women were abducted, forcibly converted to Islam 
and then married to Muslim men. As a consequence of this violence and 
lack of security, thousands of Christians have migrated out of the country 
(HRCP, 2015: 129-130).
Attacks on Hindus
Violence against Hindus is also commonplace. Table 5 provides data on 
anti-Hindu violence in recent years. 
Most of the violence against Hindus takes the form of forcible conver-
sions, especially of women, to Islam. Cases of Hindu girls being abducted 
and then being forcibly converted to Islam and married to Muslim men is 
common. The Secretary-General of the All Pakistan Hindu Panchayat re-
ported that approximately 1,000 girls in Sindh had been victims of forced 
conversions to Islam (HRCP, 2015: 126). However, many incidents of forced 
Pakistan 
Need to Go Back to Founding Principles
286
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016 
Mapping the Terrain
conversions go unnoticed and are hence not reported (South Asians for 
Human Rights, 2010: 162). Kidnapping of Hindu traders too takes place 
with regularity, especially in Balochistan (HRCP, 2015: 126). Attacks against 
Hindu places of worship too are common. Reports point to the destruction 
and takeover of temples after Partition. A recent report commented that 
‘thousands of temples have been destroyed or converted into mosques in 
the years since then, and there are an estimated 360 temples remaining 
(with a smaller number still functioning).’ In retaliatory violence against the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid in India in 1992, there was a spike in temple 
attacks in Pakistan (Hindu American Foundation, 2015: 67). According to 
The New York Times (8 December 1992), Muslims attacked more than 30 
Hindu temples across Pakistan on 7 December 1992.
A recent HRCP report cites cases of such attacks. In January 2014, a 
Hindu temple was attacked in Peshawar; the police suspected it to be a mil-
itant attack. On 15 March just before midnight another temple in Larka-
na, Sindh, was attacked by a mob and subsequently burned down after a 
rumour spread that a member of the Hindu community had desecrated a 
copy of the Quran.8 Incidents of an identical nature were also witnessed in 
different corners of the country:
i. on 17 March a temple in Badin was attacked,
ii. on 28 March a small Hindu temple was torched in Hyderabad,
iii. on 30 March the Faqir Par Braham Ashram in Tharparkar was desecrat-
ed, and
iv. on 21 November an idol of Hanuman and some religious books were 
burned down in the Sindh area.9  
The first half of 2015 also saw a spike in incidents at Hindu religious 
sites. In February 2015, three Hindu temples in Sindh were attacked:
i. Makli Mata temple in Makli district; 
ii. Radha temple in Mirpurkhas; and 
iii. Krishna temple in Hyderabad (Hindu American Foundation, 2015: 68).
8. Reuters (2014).The same incident was reported in other reports that dealt with the issue of 
minorities in the same year. See, for instance, United States Department of State:14).
9. The attack on 21 November in the Sindh area was reported in different periodicals. See, for 
instance, Dawn, 21 November 2014 at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1145998.
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The trend of attacking temples continued in 2016 as one of the leading 
Indian newspapers The Hindu reported on 2 February 2016 that a 60-year-
old temple in Karachi was attacked on 21 January. The land mafia in Paki-
stan has occupied temples for different commercial purposes without the 
consent of the Hindu community (see, for instance, South Asians for Hu-
man Rights, 2010: 142).
Sustained attacks against Hindus have resulted in a steady migration 
of Hindus out of Pakistan, mostly to India. As a result, the Hindu popula-
tion’s ratio in Pakistan declined from 15 per cent in West Pakistan in 1947 to 
just 2 per cent in 1951. In Karachi, there was a sharp decline in the number 
of Hindus (from 51 per cent in 1947 to approximately 2 per cent in 1951) 
(Hindu American Foundation, 2015: 60). The number fell to just 1.85 per 
cent according to the 1998 Census. The increase in violence has resulted in 
large-scale migration of the Hindus, out of Pakistan to India (The Times 
of India, 2014). According to Ramesh Kumar Wankwani, a PML-N law-
maker and head of the Pakistan Hindu Council, around 5,000 Hindus have 
migrated from Pakistan to India every year due to religious persecution 
(See HRCP, 2015: 127).
Attacks on Sikhs
Details of the violence against Pakistan’s Sikh community in recent years 
are given in Table 6. 
On 3 September 2014, unidentified gunmen killed a Sikh in his shop in 
Shaheedan Bazaar, Mardan. Three days later, in another instance, there was 
open firing on three shops run by Sikhs in Hashtnagri, Peshawar. One Sikh 
was killed and two others were injured. Kidnapping and abductions are also 
Time period Number of 
attacks
Killed Injured Targeted 
bombing
Targeted 
shooting
Rapes
July 2012 to 
June 2013
10 2 2 0 3 5
July 2013 to 
June 2014
4 0 1 0 0 0
Table 5. Statistics on Targeted Violence against the 
Hindu Community in Pakistan
Source: Compiled by the author from Factsheet Pakistan, August 2014 (US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, pp. 3-4). 
Note: We are unable to provide more up to date data as more recent data on violence, disaggregated by 
religion is not available.     
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common against the Sikh community across the country. The abductors of-
ten demand a large amount and in many cases the Sikhs are unable to pay 
and hence the kidnapped Sikhs are killed (HRCP, 2015: 124-125). Killing 
of Sikhs is also reported elsewhere like http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/
afp/article-3043102/Spate-attacks-shake-Pakistans-dwindling-Sikh- com-
munity.html. 
Pakistan is an important place for the Sikh community. Guru Nanak 
Dev, the founder of the Sikh faith was born in Nankana, a town in Pakistan 
Punjab. A large number of Sikh pilgrims visit the country every year and 
there are many important gurdwaras across the country. But the security 
of these religious sites is in question. In September 2004, a violent mob 
attacked the famous gurdwara in Nankana Sahib. In 2008, a Sikh temple in 
Lahore was forcibly taken over by a group of Muslims (South Asians for Hu-
man Rights, 2010: 140). A HRCP report (2015: 125), said this on the security 
of Sikh places of worship: ‘the Sikh community said they were afraid to go 
to gurdwaras to worship and many of their religious places were closed due 
to the poor security situation in the region. A lot of Sikhs also had to close 
down their shops. Many parents were not sending their children, especially 
boys, to school because they could be easily identified by their headdress.’
Attacks on other communities
Other minority groups have also been attacked. Zikris, concentrated in 
south-western Balochistan, is one such vulnerable community. They fear 
that they will suffer the same fate as the Ahmadi community as there have 
been demands from certain majoritarian groups to identify Zikris as a 
non-Muslim minority on the ground that they are predominantly Baloch 
ethnic groups (upi.com, 2015). Sunni/Namazi Muslims, belonging to dif-
ferent fundamentalist organizations have launched attacks against Zikris 
(Malik, 2002). Their places of worship have come under attack. One such 
instance occurred when Khana-i-Zikr in Teertej in Awaran was attacked in 
late August 2014. Six persons were killed in the attack by unidentified gun-
men. Dawn (2015b) reported that ‘soon after the attack in Teertej, other 
cases targeting Zikris were also reported from across Awaran. It included 
instances where Zikris were identified while travelling and asked to step 
down and were looted.’
Omissions by the state
It is difficult to state categorically who the actors are that have unleashed 
the reign of terror against minorities in Pakistan. The responsibility for the 
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attacks on Shias has been attributed to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and other 
militant organizations with avowed anti-Shia interests. As for the other mi-
norities, there is no clearly identifiable group. Overall, it will be safe to say 
that although Pakistan does not present itself as a case of state sponsored 
massacres that often take place in other South Asian countries, non-state 
actors are actively engaged in attacks on different minority communities, 
something that the state is unable or unwilling to contain. The United States 
Department of State noted ‘there were several incidents involving the abuse 
of religious groups by individuals or organizations designated as terrorist 
organizations by the U.S. government, and by armed sectarian extremist 
groups with strong links to such organizations, including Lashkari Jhangvi, 
TTP, and Sipah-e-Sahaba.’ Other reports such as those by FIDH and HRCP, 
highlight the ‘….impunity for systematic attacks against members of mi-
nority groups by State and non-State actors’ (See FIDH, 2015). 
In any case, minority religions do not receive the same protection that 
Islam has been granted under the law. All fundamentalist forces seem to 
have exploited this gap in the law to launch assaults against religious mi-
norities. At the same time, attacks on minorities should be seen in the wid-
er context of terrorist violence in the country and the overwhelming of the 
state by different terrorist organizations launching assaults on different oc-
casions. The 2014 annual report of the State of Human Rights reported that 
1,723 Pakistanis had lost their lives and 3,143 were injured in 1,206 terrorist 
attacks, including 26 suicide hits in 2014 (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/
national/18-Apr-2015/hrcp-s-state-of-human-rights-report-1-723-paki-
stanis-lost-their-lives-in-terrorist-attacks-in). A large proportion of the 
victims belonged to different religious minorities. 
Time period Number of 
attacks
Killed Injured Targeted 
bombing
Targeted 
shooting
July 2012 to 
June 2013
2 1 0 0 0
July 2013 to 
June 2014
3 2 0 0 1
Table 6. Statistics on Targeted Violence against the 
Sikh Community in Pakistan 
Source: Compiled by the author from Factsheet Pakistan, August 2014 (US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, pp. 3-4). 
Note: We are unable to provide more up to date data, because more recent data on violence, disaggre-
gated by religion is not available..   
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Commissions by the state
It must, however, be noted that it is not only non-state actors - armed or-
ganizations designated as terrorists and violent majoritarian mobs – who 
unleash attacks on religious minorities. There are also cases where the state 
machinery has been accused of carrying out attacks on religious sites. The 
HRCP annual report (2015: 122) notes:
US Commission on International Religious Freedom pointed out that Pakistan 
topped the list of countries that jailed citizens for allegedly attacking religion. 
Though courts gave death sentence to people who were charged with blasphemy, 
no one had ever been executed by the state. However, the accused often faced mob 
attacks and vigilante violence. A majority of the people charged with blasphemy were 
Muslim. More Ahmadis were booked under these laws than Christians, Hindus, 
and Sikhs.
The army was reportedly planning to demolish a Hindu temple in Rawal-
pindi to build a barrack and an educational complex. In March, an unautho-
rized development project also threatened a 160-year-old Shri Ratneshwar 
Mahadev Mandir in Clifton, Karachi when Bahria town started digging up 
the road leading up to the temple to build a flyover. It was reported that the 
vibration from the excavators was damaging the roof of the historic under-
ground temple. On the basis of a HRCP letter (2015: 128), the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court summoned relevant officials. To meet this challenge, 
the Evacuee Trust Properties Board (ETPB) was set up with a mandate to 
protect the properties of minorities such as Hindus and Sikhs. But a sur-
vey conducted by the All Pakistan Hindu Rights Movement (APHRM) in 
March 2014 reported that out of the 428 places of worship, only 20 were 
operational, the remaining 95 per cent had been leased for residential and 
commercial purposes by ETPB itself (Minority Rights Group International, 
2013: 22). In a similar manner, in June 2014 the police forbade Ahmadis 
from building a place of worship in Narowal (HRCP, 2015: 133).
Another important point is use of the blasphemy laws to penalize mem-
bers of minority communities where the state has an active involvement. 
In 2014, 12 cases were registered under blasphemy laws. Sometimes the 
police itself crosses the line in using blasphemy laws. Mohammad Asghar, 
70, a psychiatric patient, was arrested for claiming to be a prophet. He was 
shot by a police officer. His cell mate, a Christian pastor was arrested for 
blasphemy and was shot dead during an attack by the same police officer 
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(HRCP, 2015: 133). There have also been cases where individuals were pe-
nalized by the judiciary for merely expressing their views that some sec-
tions of the population thought were blasphemous. Mention can be made of 
Younis Sheikh who was arrested under blasphemy laws in early 2005. He 
was sentenced to death by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Karachi on the ground 
of writing ‘blasphemous material’ in his book Shaitan Maulavi (Satanic 
Cleric) (South Asians for Human Rights, 2010: 147). 
Penalization of members of the Ahmadi community by the police is per-
haps the most telling example of commission by the state. In 2015, 19 per-
sons were charged by the police on religious grounds in eight cases (See A 
Report on Persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan during the year 2015 (Sum-
mary): 139).
A report notes: ‘Between 1927 (year in which Britishers introduced 
section 295-A) and 1986, there had been only seven reported cases of 
blasphemy. However, 1986 onwards as many as 4,000 cases have been 
reported. Between 1988 and 2005, Pakistani authorities charged 647 peo-
ple with offences under the Blasphemy Laws. Fifty percent of the people 
charged were non-Muslims. More than 20 people have been murdered for 
alleged blasphemy. Two third of all the cases are in the Punjab Province of 
Pakistan’ (http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/EP_Hearing_Pa-
kistan/Blasphemy_law_fact_sheet.pdf). So widespread is the misuse of 
blasphemy laws that in its 12th Regular Session, the General Assembly of 
the Human Rights Council of the United Nations observed: ‘Since 1986 
blasphemy laws have been frequently used to intimidate and persecute reli-
gious minorities and to settle personal vendetta. Hundreds of innocent peo-
ple have been imprisoned, forced to leave the country or killed by Islamic 
extremists’ (See http://un.op.org/en/node/2814).
We have already seen the nature of attacks by Muslim fundamentalist 
groups on temples, churches etc. There have been some attempts to resist 
such attacks. On one occasion, in the aftermath of the church attacks in 
March 2015, the Sindh provincial government announced that it would hire 
2,000 Hindu and Christian police officers to protect temples and churches. 
There is no denying that the initiative is a noble one, but one is unclear 
whether this has been implemented and how effective it has been or will be 
(Hindu American Foundation, 2015: 68).
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A consequence of these relentless attacks on the minorities has been 
the drastic fall in their population in the country – many who could, have 
migrated. This seems to be an outcome of the tendency of a section of Paki-
stan’s leaders to declare Pakistan as an Islamic state, a case of abandoning 
Jinnah’s idea of a secular Pakistan. In the 1960s, it was also accompanied by 
a sustained anti-Hindu (often Bengali) sentiment which resulted in regular 
violence against Hindus across the country. From 1970s onward (to be spe-
cific from 1974), with Zia ul Haq’s rule, a process of Islamization took roots. 
Islamization is a term used by some scholars to denote an all-out effort to 
make legislations and a legal framework in the country in tune with Sharia 
law. It is in this context that the Ahmadis were declared non-Muslim. This, 
in turn, gave many fundamentalist organizations an opportunity to unleash 
violence against the Ahmadis. From the mid-1980s Shias have come under 
many attacks. It is not only religious minorities, but even certain sections of 
Muslims, deemed non-Muslim by these fundamentalist organizations, who 
are being attacked. 
Right to non-discrimination 
in the socioeconomic sphere
The right not to be discriminated against is important in protecting the 
rights of minorities. But minorities in Pakistan experience significant dis-
crimination in their daily lives. In the absence of any disaggregated data, it 
is difficult to come up with numbers to show the status of the minorities in 
terms of their socioeconomic rights. Lack of data is a finding in itself that 
needs to be addressed if any progress is to be made in combating discrimi-
nation and improving the lives of the minorities. 
In this section, we map out the socioeconomic conditions of Pakistan’s 
minorities within the larger context of the socioeconomic situation in Paki-
stan. We try to understand the intersectionality between religion on the one 
hand and socioeconomic conditions on the other as it is seen that religious 
minorities in Pakistan have higher chances of being poor. We focus on three 
different themes: poverty, education and health to map the socioeconomic 
conditions of the minorities. Since there is no disaggregated data to point 
out poverty among members of religious minorities we focus on available 
sources to demonstrate the marginalized existence and poor levels of em-
ployment of members of different religious minorities. For this, we drew 
on material from various sources, including civil society reports. What we 
present in this section are patterns and trends of how minorities fare with 
regard to access to different socioeconomic rights. 
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Poverty
In the absence of any data related to the poverty prevalent among religious 
minorities, we studied employment figures. The Government of Pakistan 
(in 2009) reserved 5 per cent of all jobs in government departments for 
educated and skilled members of religious minorities. The Express Tribune 
(2014) reported that despite the quota, government departments only had a 
negligible number of non-Muslim employees. Only eight non-Muslims were 
employed in the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan that works 
under the Ministry of Commerce –four in Karachi and four in Punjab. The 
corporation’s offices in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and Balochistan had no 
non-Muslim employees. Similarly, only four non-Muslims were employed 
in the National Insurance Company Limited. Most members of religious mi-
norities live in extreme poverty and their children fail to attain education. 
Thus, quotas make little difference as few can meet the eligibility require-
ments. Most Christians are sweepers or brick kiln workers. Similarly, a ma-
jority of the Hindus, also identified as Dalits, are engaged in the agricultural 
sector; in reality they are engaged as bonded labour.10 
There is no official data disaggregated by religion to show the conditions 
of minorities in terms of employment. However, a survey by the Indian In-
stitute of Dalit Studies (IIDS, 2008: 26), reported that more than 48 per cent 
Scheduled Caste Hindus worked as agriculture workers and daily wagers. Of 
the total working population of Dalits in Pakistan, 11 per cent worked as do-
mestic workers (IIDS, 2008:26). A large portion of them worked as bonded 
labour in agriculture. Similarly, the Christian population in Pakistan was 
marginalized to such an extent that a majority of them picked up jobs in 
brick kilns, willing to be engaged as bonded labour. As a consequence of 
these working opportunities, Dalits and Christians generally lived a life of 
impoverishment. Thus, for instance, as wage labourers in agriculture, 85 per 
cent of the Dalits earned monthly incomes between Rs 500 and Rs 3,000, 
which even at the maximum level of Rs 3,000 was 35 per cent less than 
the official national minimum wages of an un-skilled worker (IIDS, 2008: 
27). The fact that Dalits, according to many accounts, represent the bulk of 
the Hindu population, says a lot about the condition of Hindus and other 
minorities in general. 
9. A report called “Status of the Minorities in Pakistan” commented the following: “Vast major-
ity of the Hindu population is concentrated in few districts of Sindh desert. They are grouped 
as Hindus and Scheduled Cast which means a good number of them belongs to low cast 
(Dalits)” (See http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/EP_Hearing_Pakistan/Fact_Sheet_
Minorities_in_Pakistan.pdf, page 1).
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Estimates of the Dalit population in Pakistan continue to be a matter of 
contestation. According to the 1998 Census, the total population of Hindus 
in Pakistan was 2,443,514 of which 2,111,171 were Hindu jatis (upper castes) 
and 332,343 were Scheduled Caste Hindus (lower castes). But according 
to IDSN (2008: 10-11), official sources seriously under-reported the Dalit 
population. A majority of the Hindus in Pakistan were Scheduled Castes. 
According to another study, and confirming IDSN’s claim, 85 per cent of the 
Hindus in Pakistan were Dalits (Counter Currents, 2012). According to civil 
society groups, official denial of the Dalit status of most Hindus is a clear 
example of the denial of rights to Dalits and other minorities. 
Bonded labour
A significant section of the workforce belonging to minority communities 
experiences modern day slavery in many parts of the country. In this typ-
ical form of slavery, the employers ‘forcibly extract labor from adults and 
children, restrict their freedom of movement, and deny them the right to 
negotiate the terms of their employment’ (HRW, 1995:1). The Global Slav-
ery Index (2013) commented on the widespread practice of bonded labour 
in the country and ranked Pakistan as the third worst place in the world for 
forced labour. Another report estimated that there could be 3 to 8 million 
bonded labour across the country (Dawn, 2014a). The existence of a bonded 
labour force, primarily belonging to the Dalit and Christian population, can 
be seen in different activities like brick kilns, agriculture, carpet weaving, 
mining, tanning, cotton seed production, handicraft production, production 
of glass bangles and domestic work (IDSN, 2014).
Access to employment opportunities
The issue of employment and livelihood for religious minorities is not re-
stricted to the question of bonded labour. Overall, employment avenues for 
religious minorities do not suggest a happy picture. Most of them are largely 
confined to low-wage, menial employment. Although it is also true that a 
small section within the minorities has held influential positions. Thus, for 
instance, only one Christian has reached the position of Major General in 
the history of the Pakistani Army (Hisam and Qureshi, 2013: 37). The is-
sue of minorities not having access to better employment opportunities and 
merely being reduced to wage earners and menial workers was also brought 
forth by the Minority Rights Group International (2014). In most of the 
cases, Hindus and Christians living in cities were engaged in menial work 
including low-level sanitary jobs and working as street sweepers, which the 
Muslims were generally unwilling to do. A large number of Christians were 
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Profile of a vulnerable minority: 
Bonded Labour
One of the problems that a vast majority of the workforce in Pakistan 
has experienced over time is the existence of bonded labour, a form 
of modern day slavery in certain parts of the country. The existence 
of bonded labour in modern Pakistan can also be seen as a larger 
problem of religious minorities, as significant sections of the Hindu 
Dalit and Christian population are trapped in this practice. Human 
Rights Watch has commented on the practice of bonded labour as 
(HRW, 1995: 1):
Throughout the country employers forcibly extract labor from adults 
and children, restrict their freedom of movement, and deny them the 
right to negotiate the terms of their employment. Employers coerce 
such workers into servitude through physical abuse, forced confine-
ment, and debt-bondage. The state offers these workers no effective 
protection from this exploitation. Although slavery is unconstitutional 
in Pakistan and violates various national and international laws, state 
practices support its existence. The state rarely prosecutes or punishes 
employers who hold workers in servitude. Moreover, workers who con-
test their exploitation are invariably confronted with police harassment, 
often leading to imprisonment under false charges. 
The situation has not improved much since then. On the contrary, 
the Global Slavery Index 2013 commented on the widespread prac-
tice of bonded labour in the country and ranked Pakistan as the third 
worst place in the world for forced labour. This situation is connect-
ed to the inequalities between religious minorities and the Muslim 
majority. It could be mentioned here that a large number of religious 
minorities constitute bonded labour in the country (MRG, 2014: 21). 
In the absence of official data, one has to rely on different sources 
that point out the number of bonded labour in Pakistan: ‘There is no 
exact calculation of the number of bonded labourers. 
Research by the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and 
Research (PILER) in 2000 estimated that the total number of 
sharecroppers (haris) in debt bondage across the whole of Pakistan 
was over 1.8 million people. Furthermore, surveys showed that more 
... contd. ...
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engaged as street sweepers (Minority Rights Group International, 2014: 21). 
A blog suggests the prevalence of minorities doing menial work in cities 
(see Pakistansuntouchables.blogspot). Another survey among the Chris-
tians of Lahore reported that about 71 per cent of the Christian population 
in the city was a part of the labour force. Out of this, the employment rate 
for Christians in Lahore was 37.1 per cent. The remaining 62.9 per cent were 
unemployed. The report added that 93.93 per cent of the employed Chris-
tians worked in the private sector, while only 6.07 per cent were engaged in 
public sector jobs (Minority Voices).
The problem of employment for minorities is not only confined to the 
vast uneducated sections of the communities. It has been widely reported 
that even the educated Christian population finds it difficult to find employ-
ment. This is particularly true in Punjab where Christians are categorically 
marginalized to the extent that the educated lot feels discriminated against 
in accessing the employment sector (the Jinnah Institute, 2011: 51). 
Denial of relief during disasters/natural calamities
Denial of basic services for Dalits, who are also a part of the Hindu minority 
in Pakistan, is a common practice in the country. The Pakistan Dalit Soli-
darity Network reported that Dalits were denied access to flood relief camps 
because of their caste identity and were forced to live under the open sky in 
2010-11 (IDSN, 2011). When it comes to access to rehabilitation schemes 
during floods, the Dalits are the worst affected in different parts. In its 2010 
report IDSN said: ‘thousands of Dalit families faced caste discrimination in 
relief efforts, hampering their access to necessary help. There is only limited 
disaggregated data available about the affected population. The estimated 
number of dalits affected is 500,000, mostly in the Sindh province. The in-
formation collected by PDSN and its member organisations suggests there 
was severe discrimination against dalits during emergency rescue and relief 
work. Media, both printed and electronic, have also reported that scheduled 
caste Hindus were discriminated in distribution of food and denied shelter.’
Education
Pakistan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. Only 52 per cent 
of its population can read and write. A survey conducted in 2008 noted that 
‘vulnerable and marginalized groups of the population such as women, chil-
dren, religious minorities, low caste, and bonded labourers make the major-
ity of illiterate population’ (IDSN, 2008: 28). Another report, prepared by 
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than 6.7 million people were involved in the practice of begar, which 
refers to a traditional system of family labour which is unpaid, com-
pulsory, and amounts to debt bondage. Hence the calculated num-
ber of people kept in bondage based on the PILER study amounts 
to comes more than 8.6 million. The Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan in 1994 estimated that approximately 20 million were kept 
in forced labour (International Dalit Solidarity Network, 2014c,d). 
In the absence of any official data, the same source continues to note: 
‘Dalits and other low caste Hindus bear the brunt of these abuses 
because of their minority status. The multiple disempowerment of 
being poor, low caste or Dalit as well as non-Muslim are the main 
contributing factors to the oppressive conditions of bonded labour in 
Pakistan claims a PILER report’ (See International Dalit Solidarity 
Network, 2014c,d). The issue of bonded labour with reference to the 
employment of minorities in the country is a growing concern. 
It has been estimated that there are several hundred thousand Dal-
its working as bonded labour across the country. In a 2014 seminar 
on bonded labour experts claimed the existence of 3 to 8 million 
bonded labourers in the country (Dawn, 2014). The practice of 
bonded labour can be seen in big and petty productive activities 
that typically include brick kilns, agriculture, carpet weaving, min-
ing, tanning, cotton seed production, handicraft production, pro-
duction of glass bangles and domestic work (IDSN, 2014). Out of 
these sectors brick kilns and agriculture are the areas where the 
problem of bonded labour is the highest (HRCP, 2015: 251). This 
position seemed to have taken a turn for the better in 2014 as Pa-
kistan ranked sixth in the Global Slavery Index 2014. According to 
the Index’s estimates, there were approximately 2,058,200 people 
in Pakistan living a life of slavery. It could well be mentioned at the 
outset that marginal differences might exist in the different data-
sets that estimate the number of bonded labourers. In the absence 
of any government data, there is always the possibility of different 
civil society organizations working on the same theme to come up 
with slightly different sets of data, owing primarily to the different 
methodological approaches that they follow.
... contd. ...
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the National Commission on Justice and Peace estimated that only 47 per 
cent of the minority women interviewed were educated; this was much low-
er than the national average of 57 per cent and far behind the urban literacy 
rate for women at 65 per cent (Dawn, 2012). Another study on the Christian 
community in Lahore reported literacy rates of 69.80 per cent. These fell 
to 28.7 per cent if one considered that an individual can read and write af-
ter passing the 10th standard (http://www.minorityvoices.org/news.php/
en/1081/pakistan-study-shows-christians-in-lahore-lag-behind-in-educa-
tion-employment). 
The issue of poverty and illiteracy among large sections of religious mi-
norities is organically connected as people are illiterate because they are 
poor and they are poor because they have failed to receive any education or 
they could not send their children to school. 
It should also be noted that widespread discrimination is an everyday 
phenomenon in the admission process in the educational sector. Hisam and 
Qureshi’s 2013 study pointed out that in institutions of higher and profes-
sional education, minorities were denied admissions on the basis of merit 
after the filling of reserved seats was completed. A survey by the Jinnah In-
stitute (2011: 51) pointed out cases of young Christian students who, despite 
obtaining high grades, were refused admission in colleges.
Reports also point to Ahmadi students being routinely ostracized by 
both teachers and students in colleges. The infamous Punjab Medical Col-
lege case shows systematic discrimination against Ahmadi students in the 
college. Twenty-three students from the community, 15 female and eight 
male, across the five years of medical school were expelled by college au-
thorities, ‘accused’ of preaching their religious beliefs. Interestingly, the col-
lege authority did practically nothing to prevent continuous discrimination 
of the Ahmadi student community (the Jinnah Institute, 2011: 53-54).
Health
Health is another important social indicator which shows the level of de-
velopment of any nation or a group of the population. Dalits and religious 
minorities in Pakistan face poor health outcomes (Indian Institute of Dalit 
Studies, 2008: 31). Associated with this is chronic malnutrition and hunger, 
particularly among Dalits. A recent report points out that ‘starvation and 
hunger is a real threat to many dalits in Pakistan, particularly those in the 
Thar desert, which is often hit by droughts.’ In March 2014, the Pakistan 
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Brick kilns
One of the prominent sectors characterized by the use of bonded la-
bour are brick kilns. It is estimated that nearly 90 per cent of brick 
kiln workers in Pakistan are bonded, facing extremely harsh work 
conditions. According to ILO, in 2001 the estimated population in the 
brick kilns industry was approximately 1,000,000 (Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 2013: 13). A survey by the Jinnah Institute pointed out the 
case of insecure working conditions with a higher level of oppression 
for bonded labour in brick kilns most of whom were Christians. 
There are five categories of brick kiln labourers. One such category 
is called patheras. They are the main brick makers as their work in-
volves excavating the clay, making the mixture and moulding lumps 
of clay into bricks. Some 65 per cent of the patheras belong to the 
Christian community (Walbridge, 2003, 120-121). The International 
Religious Freedom report 2011 states that Christians are the victims 
of bonded labour in brick-making industries (Immigration and Ref-
ugee Board of Canada). 
A Human Rights Watch report confirms this when it comments 
that ‘relative to their percentage of the total population, a high 
proportion of bonded brick-kiln workers in Punjab are Christians: 
thirteen out of nineteen brickkiln workers interviewed individual-
ly in Punjab by HRW/Asia were Christian’ (Human Rights Watch, 
1995: 41). 
A majority of the brick kilns are located in Punjab, which is interest-
ingly home to a good majority of Pakistani Christians – 52 per cent 
of the Pakistani Christians live in cities in the Punjab region, while 
the remaining 48 per cent belong to rural areas (Europe External 
Policy Advisors). The largest number of brick kilns is in the state of 
Punjab. This was even reported in one of the local English periodi-
cals (see The Friday Times, 2015). It is interesting to note that while 
Punjab is one of the richest provinces in the country it still continues 
to engage in bonded labour.       
In 2012 the Punjab government fixed a minimum wage of Rs 0788 
per 1,000 bricks for special bricklayers. However, a recent survey 
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Dalit Solidarity Network reported starvation deaths of more than 100 chil-
dren, a majority of whom belonged to Dalit families in the region. More 
deaths of Dalit children in the same area were reported again in September 
of the same year (IDSN, 2014).
Right to effective participation
A key minority right is effective participation of persons belonging to mi-
norities in public affairs and in all aspects of life to ensure that the diversity 
of society with regard to minority groups is reflected in public institutions 
and that minorities have a voice in taking decisions. If these are the stan-
dards, Pakistan’s minorities enjoy very limited participation in elected bod-
ies, in civil service and in general in the private sector. 
The separate electorate system
During Zia ul Haq’s time, the system of a separate electorate for minorities 
came into play. Let us take a quick look at the history of this system in Pa-
kistan. The very idea of a separate electorate came into play in British India 
and it was voiced, among others, by the Muslim community led by the Mus-
lim League. They feared that they would not get their due share in elected 
bodies and hence they called for separate electorates. Separate electorates 
were introduced in 1909 in central and provincial assemblies. The system of 
separate electorates continued after the formation of Pakistan. No general 
election was held in Pakistan under the Government of India Act 1935 that 
served as the country’s provisional constitution. It was only in March 1956 
that the first indigenous Constitution was enforced. Thus, the provincial as-
sembly elections in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunwala and East Bengal, 
held between 1951 and 1956, that is, after the formation of Pakistan till the 
adoption of the first Constitution, continued to have the system of separate 
electorates.
During the discussion that took place on having an indigenous constitu-
tion for the country after the formation of Pakistan, elected members from 
East Bengal put forth the idea of joint electorates. But no action was taken to 
translate this demand into reality. It was at the time of the general elections 
in 1958 that the separate electorate system was changed to joint elector-
ates. The Constitution Commission was set up under the chairmanship of 
Shahabuddin and tasked with examining the system of electorates, among 
other issues, as its main terms of reference. The commission favoured 
a joint electorate. However, Ayub Khan disregarded the commission’s 
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points out that the owners of the brick kiln industry do not neces-
sarily follow the government’s directives. One worker is reported to 
have received less than Rs 100 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013: 13-
14). According to rough estimates, each kiln has an average of 25 
families working on the site. Most families are indebted to the owner 
of the brick kiln as they are tied in a system called paishgi, accord-
ing to which labourers borrow money from the owner to meet their 
needs. During the period of paishgi repayment (loan payback), the 
entire family becomes a prisoner of the kiln owner. After subtracting 
the ‘loan payment’, the workers receive a wage much below the gov-
ernment directive and not adequate enough to fulfil material needs 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013: 14). Paishgi continues and is trans-
ferred from one generation to the next. Thus, a bonded labour family 
does not find any avenue to come out of this situation. There is no 
implementation of the Bonded Labour System Abolition Act.
The working conditions of brick kiln workers entail cruel and inhu-
man treatment, which facilitates increased bondage. The workers 
have a shift of 14 hours of work. A limited number of the workers 
have a written contract, while most of them are merely reduced to an 
unorganized working class with an informal ‘verbal understanding’ 
of an abysmally low wage, thus forcing them to live below the pov-
erty line (the Jinnah Institute, 2011: 52). A huge number of children 
are forced to work as bonded labourers and needless to say they are 
the worst affected by this inhuman practice. In an interview, 12-year-
old Jheeni said that she dreamt of becoming a teacher but his dream 
is very distant as he is forced to spend long hours in the brick kiln. 
Said he, ‘I accompany my family to the workplace at six o’clock in the 
morning and we work all day, ending late when it is dark…During 
summer, it becomes hard to sustain the heat and work pressure. 
Often my hands are burnt while carrying baked bricks’ (Al Jazeera, 
2014).  
Once disadvantaged people, especially Christian minorities take up 
jobs in brick kilns in the local area possibly because of dire economic 
needs, they are almost permanently trapped in the work. In some 
desperate situations, these people take very small loans in exchange 
for work for a few weeks in the brick kilns. But when this period is 
over and when they want to go back, the owner of the brick kiln uses 
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recommendation and favoured separate electorates over joint electorates. 
The system of joint electorates continued even in the general elections in 
1977. General Zia ul Haq reversed this from joint to separate electorates as 
it was an essential part of a larger political plan to promote Islamization in 
Pakistan’s politics. In order to reverse the process of joint electorates, Zia 
amended the basic laws in 1985 (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan: 
3-9). He chose to divide the Pakistani electorate into Muslim and non-Mus-
lim entities. Under this new system, non-Muslims would have their own 
constituencies and separate representatives. Thus, the constituency of 
non-Muslim voters would not be decided by his/her locality. They would 
not share the same constituency with another Muslim, despite living in the 
same vicinity. One particular reserved constituency for the minorities might 
be shared by different people living across the country, thus going beyond 
the spatial/territorial limit of the constituencies. As a result, a minority rep-
resentative might be a complete stranger to a non-Muslim voter residing in 
a completely different space (Malik, 2002: 19-20).
In the system put in place during Zia’s rule, ten seats in the National As-
sembly were reserved for non-Muslims – four for Christians, four for Hin-
dus, one for Sikhs and Parsis together and one for the Ahmadi community. 
There were also reservations for non-Muslims in the four provincial assem-
blies. Thus, for instance, nine seats were reserved in Sindh (five for Hindus, 
two for Christians, one for Sikhs and one for the Ahmadi community). Ba-
lochistan had two seats reserved for non-Muslims (one for Christians and 
one for Hindus, Sikhs and Parsis combined) (Malik, 2002: 19-20). There 
was opposition to the separate electorate system. A minority candidate in 
the Punjab assembly, Naeem Shakir, challenged the separate electorate sys-
tem in an application before the Supreme Court in 1993. The court allowed 
Muslim and non-Muslim voters to cast their votes interchangeably across 
religious boundaries. However, the verdict was confined to the particular 
constituency and was not given general applicability. More importantly, this 
verdict proved to be temporary as the Supreme Court reversed its earlier 
verdict on 4 October 1993. The verdict did not allow Naeem Shakir to con-
test an election from a Muslim constituency (Malik, 2002: 19-20). However, 
much later, in early January 2002 the system of separate electorates was 
finally abolished by Musharraf.
Both the 1956 and 1962 constitutions do not have any provisions for 
reserved seats for minorities. The 1973 Constitution made provisions for 
reserved seats for religious minorities in provincial assemblies. Nine seats 
were reserved for different minority communities in the four provincial as-
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different tricks to not let them leave work. One of the most recur-
rent clauses that the owners come up with is: ‘No, you’ve lived in our 
house, you’ve eaten our food. Now you owe us twice as much, get 
back to work’ (Whiteman, 2015).    
A 2014 report suggests the continuing deplorable conditions of brick 
workers who are even denied the status of industrial workers even 
when brick kiln production has been declared an industry (Interna-
tional Dalit Solidarity Network, 2014c,d). One can possibly imagine 
a situation where a mass body of the ‘industrial’ workers, primarily 
Christians and other minorities, are robbed off their rights of social 
security, a clear breach of labour laws.   
The agriculture sector
Another important area of bonded labour is the agriculture sector. 
The Sindh area is the largest for Hindu Dalit bonded labourers in 
agricultural production. A vast proportion of the Hindu population 
is concentrated in a few districts in the Sindh area. A majority of the 
Scheduled Caste population in Pakistan belongs to rural areas (93 
per cent of the total Dalit population).  Eighty-nine per cent of the 
Dalit population lives in six districts – Tharparkar, Umerkot, Mirpur 
Khas and Hyderabad in the Sindh area and Rahimyar Khan and Ba-
hawalpur districts in the Punjab area (Indian Institute of Dalit Stud-
ies, 2008: 23-24). 
This vast majority of Dalits does not have access to land and capital 
and is very often reduced to bonded labour in agriculture. Sindh also 
has the highest incidence of poverty (Arif : 5). Thus, the largest sec-
tion of the Hindus is in a region that is marked by chronic poverty. 
The total estimated number of bonded labour employed in the agri-
cultural sector is roughly 1,800,000 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013: 
12). Dalits in Pakistan are the poorest and do not own any land as 
farmers. This situation leads them to bonded labour (International 
Dalit Solidarity Network, 2014c,d: 2-3). 
Bonded labour is the most oppressing result of an inequitable land 
tenure system. Landholding patterns in the interior of Sindh are one 
of the most unjust systems that the country has witnessed. It is in 
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semblies. Through the 4th amendment to the Constitution in 1975, provi-
sions were made for reserved seats in the National Assembly. Six additional 
seats were created in the National Assembly to realize the policy of reserved 
seats for religious minorities. In 1985, Zia increased the number of reserved 
seats from six to 10 in the National Assembly. Reserved seats for religious 
minorities in the same amendment were increased from nine to 23 (Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan: 3-9). After revocation of the system of sep-
arate electorates, the minorities were granted reserved seats in Pakistan’s 
National Assembly –10 out of the 342 seats were reserved for them in the 
national Parliament. Clearly, this is too little. All these reserved seats are 
usually filled on the basis of proportional representation. Therefore, rather 
than being directly elected, minority legislatures are nominated by political 
parties. In the general elections in 2013 held under this system of nomina-
tion, five Hindus, three Christians and one Parsi made it to the Parliament. 
The five Hindus and one Parsi selected to the National Assembly are from 
Punjab and Sindh provinces. Two Christians are from Balochistan province 
and one is from Punjab province (Pakistan Christian Post, 2016). 
There is no denying that the dynamics of separate electorates and re-
served seats imply different manners of representation. What should be 
noted is that these two ideas are not opposed to one another. In fact, re-
served seats for minorities were increased under Zia at a time when he 
revived the old trend of separate electorates. Although reserved seats for 
religious minorities with separate electorate mechanisms ensures that they 
find a place in elected assemblies, it ends up separating minorities from the 
majority population even in the same area. Majority Muslim political lead-
ers representing different parties do not necessarily come in contact with 
members of local religious minorities. On the other hand, members of reli-
gious minorities can become aware of their potential role in the electorate 
process only when they are included in the larger whole of joint electorates. 
Reserved seats for religious minorities in the system of joint electorates not 
only secure their representation in the democratic process, but also ensure 
them greater bargaining power at least theoretically. Restoration of joint 
electorates in 2002 also had a decisive effect on the nature of minority rep-
resentation. Except for the Ahmadis, it became possible for members of 
religious minorities to contest on general seats, which were formerly iden-
tified as Muslim seats. As a result of the change in policy, in many plac-
es non-Muslim candidates started participating in larger numbers in the 
elections and contesting from general seats (Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan: 10-11).
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this area where bonded labour is extensive;  landowners use coer-
cion for more profits (Human Rights Watch, 1995: 84). 
Dalits and other low caste Hindus constitute a majority of the bonded 
labourers in the Sindh area (http://www.antislavery.org/includes/
documents/cm_docs/2009/g/goonesekere.pdf). Dalit and poor 
Hindus are doubly affected as besides being poor they are also low 
caste or Dalit as well as non-Muslim (International Dalit Solidarity 
Network, 2014c,d). The prevalence of the lower caste or religious 
minorities in bonded labour is a well-accepted fact in Pakistan, with 
special reference to agriculture in certain parts (Dawn, 2015; ILO, 
2005: 31). The working conditions for bonded labour in agriculture 
are extreme and many cases of non-payment of dues, harassment 
and violence against the labourers were reported from different dis-
tricts in Sindh province in 2014 (HRCP, 2015: 253).
Pakistan’s major parties have not ensured adequate representation of 
minorities in Parliament. In the 2013 elections, major parties like the Pa-
kistan People’s Party (PPP) and its rival the Pakistan Muslim League did 
give national parliamentary tickets to non-Muslims. Ironically the country’s 
largest religious party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, which is considered to be far 
more conservative, had one non-Muslim candidate. Pakistan Tehrik-e-In-
saf had one Christian candidate from Karachi. Karachi-centred Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement party nominated non-Muslims for 26 national and pro-
vincial legislature seats (United Press International, 2013). 
However, in 2012 the government decided to introduce a new bill to in-
crease the number of seats for minorities in Parliament, proportionate to 
their population (The Tribune, 2012). If this 23rd Constitutional Amend-
ment is passed, then minorities’ seats will increase from 33 to around 44 
in the national and provincial assemblies (Speroforum, 2012). The number 
of reserved seats in the national assembly alone will increase from 10 to 
15 (UCAnews, 2016). At the moment, the bill relating to an increase in the 
number of seats for minorities in the national assembly is pending before 
both houses of Parliament (Dawn, 2016).
Minorities in armed forces and civil service
The position and extent of participation of the non-Muslim population in 
the armed forces has been very low. For instance, Hindus were not allowed 
...Profile of a vulnerable minority continued ...
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to join the armed forces until 2000 (Dawn, 2015a). A process of Islamiza-
tion also started in the late 1970s, when the last batch of Anglo-Indians was 
about to retire. During Pervez Musharraf’s time Hindus were allowed to join 
the army. Again in the 2000s, the Pakistan Army opened its platform in a 
limited way. One Sikh and two Hindu officers in the army and a few Hindu 
sailors in the Pak Navy were enrolled (Riaz, 2015).  However, the represen-
tation of the Christian population in the army has always been there. We 
have not come across any concrete data to get an idea about the number of 
Christians in the Pakistan Army. But the following lines from an indepen-
dent blog seem interesting in understanding the extent of their represen-
tation: ‘according to the “Shuhada Cell” of GHQ, so far 52 Christians have 
sacrificed their lives for Pakistan from Pakistan Army alone excluding PAF 
and Pak Navy. It is also encouraging to know that out of 70 Sitara-i-Jur’at 
of PAF, seven are Christians and, out of seven, two embraced martyrdom’ 
(https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-article&id=106). In the ab-
sence of any current overall data on the representation of minorities in civil 
and army services, we quote an estimate of 1983 that was later referred to in 
Human Rights in Pakistan: from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Musharraf (2007). 
According to this estimate, Hindus were 0.2 per cent and Christians were 
1.15 per cent of the total strength of the civil and armed services (Singh, 
2007: 113).
Right to culture and identity
The United Nations Declaration on Minorities (1992) recognizes that na-
tional or ethnic and religious and linguistic minorities have the right to en-
joy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use 
their own language in private and in public freely and without interference 
or any form of discrimination. Pakistan’s legislative framework outlined 
earlier shows quite clearly that minorities in Pakistan do not enjoy religious 
and cultural autonomy. The Constitution fails to recognize cultural and lin-
guistic plurality and citizens’ religious diversity, while it seeks to differenti-
ate Pakistan’s citizens on the basis of religion – Article 260 defines Muslim 
and non-Muslim faiths. Islam is the state religion and the Constitution pro-
vides for establishing a Council for Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat 
Court. Both the bodies (that have no minority representation) are charged 
with Islamizing laws and policies. These restrict cultural and religious free-
doms of minorities and seek to promote a homogenous Islamic identity. 
Constitutional provisions and laws impose limits on the right of freedom of 
religion (Article 20); especially discriminatory is the case of Ahmadis who 
are prohibited from calling themselves Muslims or their belief Islam, as well 
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National Commission 
for Justice and Peace
The National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) is a human 
rights body, established by the Pakistan Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
in 1985. In a country that has periodically witnessed large-scale vi-
olence against different minority groups including Christians, the 
emergence of NCJP as an advocacy organization braving the odds to 
safeguard minority rights, deserves credit.  NCJP’s aim is to strength-
en the human rights of marginalized communities in Pakistan, espe-
cially religious minorities, women, children and bonded labour. NC-
JP’s focus is on discriminatory laws and policies of the state in relation 
to minorities. It is involved in interventions regarding awareness, 
opinion building about law and policy reforms. NCJP launched its 
campaign against the inhuman practice of bonded labour in 1987. In 
1988, another campaign for joint electorate systems gained momen-
tum. NCJP has also been campaigning on the issue of biased curricu-
lum in schools that teaches hatred against religious minorities. 
Based out of Lahore, NCJP is a Pakistan-wide organization with a 
regional presence in all its provinces. Its strength is its cadre of over 
500 human rights activists (volunteers) belonging to different reli-
gions, cultures and administrative regions of Pakistan. These enable 
NCJP to carry out its activities and campaigns. In recognition of its 
good work in the field of human and minority rights, NCJP received 
an International Human Rights Award by the Tji-Hak- Soon (Tulip) 
Foundation of South Korea in 2001 (http://www.ncjp-pk.org/ ).
NCJP’s work 
Of its many campaigns one of the most successful ones has been 
against inclusion of a column on religion in national identity cards. 
Without doubt this campaign gave NCJP a wider currency across the 
country. 
On 21 May 1992 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan made a promise 
during a meeting with Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the then Jamaat -i-Is-
lami chief, to include a column on religion in the identity card (Paki-
stan Christian Congress, 2009; UCAnews.com, 1992a).  Finally the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, headed by Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, 
announced on 13 October that the national identity cards would be 
amended to include one column for religion. 
Good practice case study:
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as from preaching or propagating their religious beliefs, proselytizing or 
insulting the religious feelings of Muslims. 
Discriminatory laws and policies
The Constitution does not provide an institutional mechanism for imple-
mentation of standards of non-discrimination nor does it bar legislation 
based on discrimination (The Choice of Reforms: 14). This has led to the 
creation of many discriminatory laws made through ordinances and enact-
ments. Table 7 provides examples of these discriminatory instruments and 
policies that violate the Constitution and international instruments.
Religious practices and personal law
Discrimination against religious minorities takes various forms – a very 
direct one is restrictions placed on minorities’ practicing their faith. As a 
recent MRG report (2014: 22) notes, minority religious communities face 
enormous challenges in practicing their faith because of a range of factors 
including lack of access to places of worship as well as the threat of violence. 
A March 2014 survey conducted by the All Pakistan Hindu Rights Move-
ment and reproduced in the MRG report, reported that of the 428 places of 
worship for Hindus in the country, only 20 were functional. The remaining 
95 per cent had reportedly been leased for residential and commercial pur-
poses by the Evacuee Trust Properties Board, an entity set up to manage 
and look after these properties. Similar problems beset the Sikh community 
and also Ahmadis who cannot even call their place of worship a mosque. 
Minorities have also often been prevented from burying their dead and per-
forming other rites. The MRG report (2014: 23) concludes, ‘the restrictions 
on religious practice and burial can together be seen as part of a broader pic-
ture in which customs and traditions that deviate from those of the Muslim 
majority in Pakistan are being systematically denied.’
Personal laws and their application is another area of discrimination 
against minorities’ cultural practices. There is no system of civil or common 
law marriages or marriages being performed and registered according to in-
dividuals’ religions. The government also does not have a legal mechanism 
to register the marriages of Hindus and Sikhs causing women from these 
religious groups difficulties in inheritance, accessing health services, vot-
ing, obtaining passports and buying or selling property as they do not have 
any legal document to prove their marriage (US State Department, 2014: 
3). The main impediment, as a recent report on the matter published by 
the Community World Service noted, was the difference of opinion between 
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The then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan announced that the ministry 
will introduce a column on religion in the identity cards on the pre-
text of this being a genuine demand and because religion is part of a 
citizen’s identity. Taking a thread from this argument, Jammat-e-Is-
lami demanded a separate colour for identity cards for non-Mus-
lims. There is no denying the fact that the government bowed to 
pressure from religious fundamentalists, opening itself to charges of 
suppressing minorities and dividing the nation. However, a larger 
public debate on this issue was largely missed from the ambit of Pa-
kistani social and political life.
The national identity card was first introduced in Pakistan in 1974 
during the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. There was no column for re-
ligion in the cards at that time. When the changes were introduced 
the minorities were not even consulted in this regard. Its easy target 
was religious minorities in the country as many members who would 
prefer to maintain a silence over their religious practice/preference 
in the public space, possibly out of concern for security and discrim-
ination. The fear of exclusion for religious minorities became appar-
ent in the protests and newspaper articles that appeared. 
Martin Aslam, coordinator of the ecumenical Institute for Justice 
and Peace commented: ‘Now the truth has dawned on us – we are 
aliens in our own country’ (UCAnews.com, 1992b). Father Peter 
John of the same institute added: ‘I have always been a Pakistani 
first. But now they tell me that I am a Christian and have no rights 
in Pakistan, because it was made for the Muslims’ (UCAnews.com, 
1992b). In August 1992, the Human Rights Commission of Paki-
stan launched a signature campaign against the government’s move 
of introducing a column on religion in the identity cards. Bishop 
John Joseph, who was later martyred, and founder and Chairper-
son of NCJP assigned Peter Jacob and Aftab Alexander Mughal to 
launch a campaign against the government’s decision. The campaign 
was started in September 1992 from the city of Multan in Punjab 
province.
The campaign soon gained momentum. NCJP organized protests 
against the decision in different cities in Punjab and Bishop John 
Joseph condemned the government’s move in a press conference in 
Faisalabad on 17 October 1992. In Toba Tek Singh (a rural habita-
tion 480 km south of Islamabad) Father Boniface Mendes, NCJP’s 
Executive Secretary and members of the local legislature led more 
than 200 people in a procession wearing black bands and carrying 
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community members and religious leaders of the communities – there is 
provision for a divorce in Catholicism and Hinduism, thus religious circles 
are not supportive of the state legislating on the matter. But the state too has 
not taken action to solve this issue (Dawn, 2014b, 2015b). The irony as the 
PILER (2013: 21) report on minorities notes, is that the state has effectively 
put the onus of reforming personal laws of minorities (that use colonial era 
laws) on minority Members of Parliament but they are too few to be able 
to carry the day. Adding to the problem, the report says, ‘is the absence of 
voice and agency of women – facing a condition of double jeopardy, minori-
ty women are marginalized as minority in the wider domain, and kept in the 
fringe as a weaker sex within the private domain.’ 
Consequently, whilst for the Muslims there is a marriage registration 
system at the local level and there is also a system for adjudication of mar-
riage disputes, this is not the case for non-Muslims. Lately, steps have been 
taken to undo this anomaly by introducing the Hindu Marriage Bill 2014 
and the Punjab Registration of Hindu Marriage Bill 2014 (MRG, 2014: 15). 
These have recently been passed in the national assembly and in the Sindh 
provincial assembly. Since 1947, members of minority groups have been un-
able to register their marriages in the absence of a state law. One of the me-
dia houses reported: ‘However, in recent years, the problem has stretched 
beyond national boundaries and developed an extraterritorial focus. The 
desire to migrate to other countries from Pakistan has made it fundamen-
tally important for Hindus to hold legal documents to prove their marriage. 
Strict visa regimes and immigration rules have also strengthened the case 
for a separate law to register Hindu marriage’ (see http://tribune.com.pk/
story/1049971/hindu-marriage-customs-and-the-law/, news about the bill 
can also be found at: http://courtingthelaw.com/2016/06/07/commen-
tary/the-sindh-hindu-marriage-bill-2016-what-about-hindu-pakistanis-
of-other-provinces/). 
Education and school textbooks
The extent of damage done to pluralism and diversity in Pakistan is best 
seen and understood by examining school textbooks which show how the 
education policy has been used as a tool to encourage, indeed push, through 
a homogenized national identity. A look at the education policy provides a 
snapshot of the extent to which majoritarian messages have been pushed 
at the expense of pluralism, many through the enactment of discriminatory 
laws and poor practices. In February 1979 the New Education Policy (NEP) 
was launched under Zia ul Haq as a project to manufacture ‘Good Muslims 
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placards. The group staged a sit-in at the local administrative chiefs 
office, which was to continue till the column on religion was removed 
from the identity cards (UCAnews.com, 1992b). Slowly the move-
ment gained currency as it started spreading to different cities. The 
movement was spontaneous as members of different minority com-
munities joined it. The presence of Hindus alongside Christians was 
high in Pakistan’s southern Sindh province in opposing the govern-
ment’s decision (UCAnews.com, 1992b).
During the campaign different opposition political parties had also 
come forward to criticize the government’s decision. Thus, for in-
stance, Pakistan People’s Party leader Benazir Bhutto commented: 
‘Pakistan is a democracy, not the personal property of religious lob-
bies’ (Baweja, 2013). 
The movement by different civil society groups on the issue resulted 
in positive changes. On 2 November 1992, the provincial assembly 
of Sindh unanimously passed a resolution opposing the inclusion of 
a column on religion and declared that such a move would promote 
sectarianism. A Christian member Saleem Khokhar introduced this 
motion.  Bishop John Joseph registered his protest through a hunger 
strike. On 8 November 1992, due to the worsening health condition 
of Bishop John Joseph the government sent the Minister for Mi-
nority Affairs, Peter John Sahotra to persuade him to call off his fast 
unto death. Violence erupted during the minister’s visit to the camp 
where John Joseph was on a hunger strike and he was physically as-
saulted by protesters enraged over his perceived weak stance against 
the federal government. However, after several hours of discussions 
with protesting leaders, Bishop John Joseph agreed to call off his 
fast. The government reportedly sent a message to Bishop John Jo-
seph that the government would not include a column on religion as 
demanded by the community. 
However, the pressure was still kept on as protesters remained ac-
tive right till December 1992, when the then Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif at a Christmas dinner assured the Christian leadership that 
his government would not include a column on religion in national 
identity cards. It was through the leadership of the Christian com-
munity along with support from other religious minority communi-
ties and civil society that this campaign was able to achieve success 
in such a short time.  
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Discrimination Violation of
Religion, other than Islam, when 
mentioned,  is done in contempt. 
-  Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of         
religion.
-  Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Article 26).
-  Declaration on Elimination of all Kinds of Intolerance and 
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (Article 1).
A hafiz e Quran (one that has put 
the Quran to memory) is eligible for 
10-20 marks extra for admission 
to professional courses and in jobs 
with the Public Service Commission 
since 1992. 
-  Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees equality to citizens.
-  Declaration on Elimination of All (Article 26) 
-  Kinds of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or 
Belief (Article 2).
Islamic studies (Islamiyat) is compul-
sory for Muslim students from pri-
mary to college; and non-Muslims, 
though in theory, offered ‘ethics’, 
practical considerations and the 
bias against the study of anything 
but Islamic Studies, means most 
non-Muslims succumb and take up 
Islamic Studies. 
Article 22 of the Constitution – ‘no person attending any 
educational institution shall be required to receive religious in-
struction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend any 
religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship, 
relates to a religion other than his own.’ 
Declaration on the Rights of Person belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities (Articles 4 and 5). 
Subjects other than Islamiyat such 
as social studies and languages are 
compulsory for all. They too have 
20-40 per cent of their content 
inspired by Islam.  
Article 22(1) guarantees no compulsion to study a religion 
other than one’s own. 
Table 7. Violations of rights 
(collated from a survey of textbooks/education policies) 
Source: National Commission for Justice and Peace (2013:10).
and Good Pakistanis’. NEP stated ‘the highest priority would be given to the 
revision of school curricula with a view to reorganizing the entire content 
around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation, so 
that Islamic theology permeates the thinking of the younger generation, and 
helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society ac-
cording to Islamic tenet’ (NCJP, 2013: 5). NEP sought ‘to rear a new genera-
tion wedded to the ideology of Pakistan and Islam’ (Zia, 2010: 17). Ispahani 
(2016: 117) says, ‘this decision had far reaching consequences: it quashed 
the potential for critical thinking in the next generation; encouraged a false 
narrative of history, and introduced religious bigotry to students at an 
early age.’ 
This was followed by a directive by the University Grants Commission to 
prospective authors in 1981 to ‘demonstrate through writing that the basis 
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Lessons to be learnt
During its successful campaign, NCJP as an organization too learnt 
a few things. At the beginning of its activities, NCJP had understood 
minorities solely in terms of the Christian population in the coun-
try. But through constant engagement with the minorities it came 
to realize the necessity of engaging with other religious minorities 
like Hindus and Ahmadis. With its continuous movement and active 
engagement with all minority groups, the church leadership also en-
gaged with civil society and led a people’s protest against the inhu-
man act of the then government. This collective movement, taking 
other civil society organizations on board, gave strength to NCJP to 
further work in society as a major stakeholder in terms of advocacy 
and lobbying for the rights of religious minorities. This transforma-
tion from a religious organization to a leader of civil society based 
organizations is something that one should be able to practice in dif-
ferent country contexts.
... Good practice case study continuied ...
of Pakistan is not founded in racial, linguistic or geographical factors, but 
rather in the shared experience of a common religion’ (Ispahani 2016: 130). 
This shut out non-Muslims from citizenship and created an adverse climate 
against them for generations to come. A.H. Nayyar, notes, ‘the redesigned 
curricula created a monolithic image of Pakistan as a Islamic state, and 
taught students to view only Muslims as Pakistani citizens’ (Ispahani, 2016: 
131). Then the National Education Policy 1992-2002 enacted during the 
current government’s time made ‘teaching of Islam’ the primary objective 
and universal primary education a secondary objective (NCJP, 2013). Later, 
the 12-year New Education Policy (1998-2014) made education and training 
citizens to be good practicing Muslims as the main objective of the policy. 
In 2006, ‘Education in Pakistan: A white paper’ was introduced which pro-
posed that the major objective of education was ‘to inculcate in the child the 
Muslim value system’ (NCJP, 2013: 6).
Islamiyat (Islamic studies) was made compulsory from primary to Class 
12 across the country. Children from minority communities do not have the 
freedom to study their own religion. Although ‘ethics’ is provided to them 
as an alternative Islamiyat, it is a poor alternative as it uses an Islamic per-
spective (NCJP, 2013: 9) and study of Arabic is compulsory for all includ-
ing non-Muslims in schools. The consequence of these policies as Rubina 
Saigol notes, has been that ‘all official sites for the production of knowl-
edge (have been) put to the service of re-imagining an Islamic nation, in an 
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exclusionary exercise, which involved the diminution of citizenship of 
non-Muslims and women citizens’ (NCJP, 2013: 7). History writing has also 
been added to the project of nation building; this is based on seeing Pa-
kistan’s identity as ideological Islam. Indophobia was a significant driver 
behind rewriting of textbooks (Vali Nasr in NCJP, 2013: 6). The uncom-
fortable presence of ‘others’ in the country – minorities – has been dealt 
with by turning them into cameos – the inherently evil Hindu, the trickster 
and cheat Englishman, the knife wielding butchering Sikh, the moneylender 
Jew and the back stabbing Bengali (Saigol, 2010:207).
Conclusion and recommendations
Clearly, minorities in Pakistan face multiple deprivations on a range of mi-
nority rights. It is notable that these are both in terms of poor implemen-
tation of laws and rules defending rights, and also alarmingly, due to the 
discriminatory laws themselves. The task of protecting minority rights in 
Pakistan therefore becomes acute and all the more challenging. The role 
of civil society groups and of the minority groups led by them and of wider 
liberal and progressive civil society space to influence state actions to re-
craft minority rights protection instruments and also to advocate for their 
better implementation becomes significant. Of course, the state’s own weak-
nesses/omissions resulting in failures to defend minorities – in the face of 
the rising authority of non-state actors that target minorities both for ideo-
logical reasons as well as a political stratagem to widen their constituency 
among the majority population – means a great deal of the challenge for 
civil society is in creating an alternative discourse against extremism and for 
minority, indeed human rights.
Recommendations 
Some of our specific recommendations for improving minorityrights are: 
For state actors 
Reforms which enable improved minority rights in Pakistan must work at 
various levels: 
-  Changes are required in the laws to make them less discriminatory. The 
most obvious here is the one that denies Ahmadis the freedom of reli-
gion and effective participation, but there are others too, such as those 
that privilege Islam over other faiths in blasphemy laws and Muslims 
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Good practice case study:
Women in Struggle 
 for Empowerment
Women in Struggle for Empowerment (WISE) is a women-led organi-
zation, determined in its own words to ‘bring about a social change in 
how women and girls are valued in their communities’ (http://www.
wise.pk/index.php?menuid=33&pageid=2). Set up in 2011, WISE is 
dedicated to protecting and promoting social, political and econom-
ic rights for women with a focus on gender, labour, governance and 
human rights in Pakistan. WISE’s aim is to establish a just and vio-
lence-free society where women enjoy equity and equal rights along 
with economic, social and political opportunities. WISE also does 
work in the field of minority rights. Amplifying minority voices and 
advocating their human rights is an important part of WISE’s work. 
Being staunch believers in the protection and promotion of rights of 
religious minorities, WISE has been extending its support to minority 
communities and individuals in cases of violation of their rights. This 
makes WISE a rare civil society organization that combines the issues 
of women’s rights along with minority rights advocacy. 
Some important work/activities
WISE has been successful in leading several campaigns like creating 
awareness and providing training for compliance of the law against 
sexual harassment at the work place. One of its achievements is that 
since 2011 WISE has been able to create awareness among more than 
7,000 people. WISE has conducted seminars and training and ca-
tered to people from more than 40 civil society organizations to cre-
ate awareness about the law against sexual harassment at the work 
place. Another important area that WISE has engaged in is its con-
tinuous movement to ensure women’s political representation in the 
democratic set-up in the country: ‘WISE believes that women political 
empowerment leads to their social and economic uplift’ (http://www.
wise.pk/index.php?menuid=33&pageid=2). 
Taking up minority issues
Apart from periodically taking up issues related to women, WISE 
has been part of larger civil society campaigns for the protection of 
religious minorities in Pakistan. These include campaigns for sepa-
ration of religion from state, repeal of blasphemy laws, abolition of 
... contd. ...
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over minorities in personal laws and in the working of the criminal 
justice system. 
- Related to this is the need for laws and a criminal justice system to be 
enforced without regard for the actors’ religious or ethnic affiliations. 
This is really about the rule of law, including that perpetrators of vi-
olence against minorities are acted against and justice is served. This 
will require law enforcement agencies strengthening themselves against 
extremist armed groups. A related point is checking the misuse of laws 
such as blasphemy laws that provide a handy tool for vested interests 
to target minorities and weaker sections, often in collusion with state 
actors. 
-  Equally, it is important for vulnerable minorities to be provided security 
against attacks and intimidation, including the confidence that they will 
be given security. 
- Need for opening up the state to all so that the minorities have a sense of 
belonging and being a part of the state. This will require effective partic-
ipation of minorities in public life. 
- A stronger regime for protecting and promoting minorities’ socioeco-
nomic interests through programmes and projects for affirmative action 
(in jobs) and equalizing opportunities in markets. 
- Programmes for promoting and valuing greater diversity in public life in 
school curricula, in state practices and in society. This is to counter the 
majoritarian imbalance on the lines of religion, culture or language. 
-  As important as the ‘what’ to do for minority rights, is the ‘how to’ part 
of it. Hence, there is a need for a clear policy focus on the subject; setting 
up of public institutions (at federal and provincial levels) that promote 
diversity and minority rights; and a system of concurrent monitoring, 
documenting and tracking minority rights’ performance, including 
through collecting and reporting data on various counts, disaggregated 
by religion. 
For civil society actors
Apart from state actors and institutions, civil society organizations with an 
interest in minority rights, need to: 
- Establish solidarities across religious and sectarian divides for protect-
ing and promoting minority rights to amplify their voice and spread it 
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discriminatory provisions against minorities in the Constitution of 
Pakistan, measures against forced conversion of non-Muslim wom-
en to Islam, removal of hate speeches and hate material from text-
books and extending legal support to victims of religious intolerance 
and blasphemy laws. As a consequence, we can see WISE collaborat-
ing with others to register the demands of the minority population 
in the country. Thus, for instance, WISE was part of the civil society 
fact-finding mission in the 2009 Gojra attacks targeting Christians. 
Similarly, in 2012 WISE organized a press conference from the plat-
form of ATA-Pakistan to condemn the murder of an Ahmedi teacher 
in police custody in Chenabnager. In 2014 WISE also facilitated the 
case of  two Christian brothers accused of blasphemy and provided 
them psycho-social assistance. It linked the accused with lawyers and 
the Ministry of Human Rights. WISE has also published articles re-
lated to the growing Islamization where on the one hand minorities 
are being accused and killed and on the other hand, ‘the Taliban-types 
want a full cultural revolution: beards, burqas, 5 daily prayers, no mu-
sic, no art, no entertainment, and no contact with modernity except 
for getting its weapons’ (Khaliq, 2011). 
As part of its campaign against atrocities on minorities, WISE is also 
working to create awareness among the common people on minori-
ty issues. For instance, WISE periodically organizes sessions and 
provides training to people related to issues faced by minorities like 
state oppression or negligence in their protection. Generally speaking 
WISE takes up the question of minorities in the larger civil society 
movement. Through its continuous participation with large civil soci-
ety organizations, WISE strengthens the people’s movement through 
demonstrations, rallies and seminars.  
Lesson to be learnt
WISE is predominantly a women-led organization that takes up the 
issue of gender justice. Different struggles are carried out to fight in-
justices that women face in Pakistan. However, WISE has always seen 
working on women and gender issues as a part of its larger struggle 
for oppressed people. This is probably the reason why WISE has ac-
tively contributed to the work of different civil society organizations 
that deal with issues of minorities. WISE shows that   it is significant 
for any civil society organization to go beyond the strictly delineated 
boundaries of its own activity and be a part of the larger civil society 
movement. 
... Good practice case study continuied ...
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wide thus strengthening the cause. This is being done by many plat-
forms and networks but needs to be strengthened. 
- Solidarities on the ground – grassroots CSOs working on minority and 
associated rights – especially need to collaborate and establish partner-
ships for a more direct impact on the ground. 
- This grassroots focus will also provide a better voice to minority com-
munities through organizing, networking and advocacy support to en-
able the groups to build the capacity of minorities and also effectively 
advocate for improved rights for them. 
- Crucially, better documenting and tracking of outcomes for minorities 
to fill the gap in data and documentation disaggregated by religious 
groups and to enable baselines to be established that will allow for out-
comes to be tracked over time and evidence gathered for improved ad-
vocacy. 
- Better media engagement to put out the evidence and news on minority 
rights in the public domain enabling debates and discussions.
- More proactive engagement with international (global such as UN, as 
well as regional such as SAARC) networks and actors, to create condi-
tions for improved results – capacity, good practice cases, networks and 
resources. 
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This chapter examines the status of ethnic and religious minority rights in 
Sri Lanka. This introductory section is followed by three parts, with the first 
discussing the legal framework and the efficacy of its implementation. The 
second part provides an analysis of the current status of minorities’ right to 
life and security, right to non-discrimination and equality, right to partic-
ipation and right to culture and identity. The third part focuses on recom-
mendations and next steps.
A nation with a rich heritage, history and the cultural inheritance of 
several communities, Sri Lanka has been described as an ‘ethno-religious 
mosaic’ (Perera, 2011: 11). Over time, however, instead of unity in diversity, 
many tensions and conflicts have arisen that have culminated in violence 
and war, driving deep wedges between ethno-religious groups.
Statistics from the 2012 Census demonstrate that 74.9 per cent of Sri 
Lanka’s population was Sinhala and approximately 15.2 per cent was Tamil 
(including around 4 per cent Indian Tamils in the estate plantation sector). 
Moors constituted about 9.2 per cent of the population and Buddhists over 
70 per cent while 12.6 per cent were Hindus, 9.7 per cent were Muslims and 
Christians constituted about 7.4 per cent of the population (Department of 
Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2012). Due to assimilation with Sinhala 
and Tamil communities, the Adivasi (Veddah community) is now very small 
in number and is limited to only a few thousand (Stageborn, 2004).
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Given that they trace their descent to the distant past, Sri Lankan Tamils 
are a native minority. Indian Tamils were brought to Sri Lanka during the 
British colonial era to work on estate plantations in the central highlands 
and a majority of them are members of castes considered low in the Indi-
an caste system.  It is important to note that Tamils are largely Hindus or 
Christians by way of religious affiliations (Ross and Savada, 1988). 
The Muslim community is divided into three main sections-- Sri Lankan 
Moors, Indian Moors and Malays. Sri Lankan Moors trace their ancestry to 
the time between the 8th and 15th centuries when Arab traders migrated 
to southern India and Sri Lanka. Indian Moors trace their origins to the 
colonial period. Malays were originally from South East Asia and came to 
Sri Lanka during the time of Dutch colonization. In addition, the Bohra and 
the Khoja migrated from north-western India after 1880 and are very few in 
number (Ross and Savada, 1988). 
Burghers, who make up a very small percentage of the population, are 
permanent residents who can trace their ancestry back to Europeans. The 
term was initially used to refer to European nationals living in Sri Lanka 
during Dutch rule, but subsequently included Portuguese Burghers too 
(Ross and Savada, 1988).
Sinhala Buddhists are a majority in most parts of the island except for 
the northern and eastern provinces whereas Muslims are scattered through-
out the country with a heavy presence in the east. Tamil Hindus have their 
largest concentration in the northern province with significant numbers in 
the eastern province and in Colombo. Sinhalese too are found in signifi-
cant numbers in the east. Indian Tamils are mostly in the plantation sector 
and based in the central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa provinces with significant 
numbers in Colombo too. Christians are concentrated mainly in the coastal 
belt but are scattered throughout the country.
Sri Lanka is in fact not casteless in that approximately 20 to 30 per cent 
of its people are victims of caste-based discrimination. The caste-blind poli-
cies of the state and all other stakeholders, however, do not effectively deal 
with discrimination in this sphere. Underprivileged caste groups in minority 
ethnicities are generally victims of double discrimination (Silva et al., 2009).
Among the Sinhalese, drummers from Welivita, Kinnara from Hen-
awala and Rodi from Kuragala are subject to some forms of discrimination. 
The Nalavar and Pallar castes of Sri Lankan Tamils in the Jaffna area and 
325
Chakkiliyars and Parayars of the Indian Tamil community are particularly 
subjected to discrimination (Silva et al., 2009).
According to Jayawardena: 
The history of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is the history of emergence 
of consciousness among the majority community, the Sinhala, which 
defined the Sri Lanka society as Sinhala-Buddhist, thus denying its 
multi-ethnic character. The growth of this consciousness impinged on 
the minorities in Sri Lanka to the extent that internal resolution of the 
problems became impossible… (Jayawardena, 1987).
The end of the three-decade long armed conflict between the state and 
the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 should have 
ushered in a new era of peace. While the absence of war laid to rest many 
anxieties and fears that had ravaged the nation, many of the cracks and crev-
ices in the social fabric remained and newer ones have further aggravated 
the situation. In fact, even after 2009, there was a brutal crackdown on free 
expression and/or dissent, particularly by minorities, impugning the very 
foundations of democracy. 
Even five years after the end of the war, in 2014 there was a heavy mil-
itary presence in the north. In January 2104, President Rajapakse claimed 
that there were 12,000 military personnel in the north, but only two days 
thereafter the Secretary to the President Lalith Weeratunga claimed the 
presence of 80,000 military personnel. Further, the then government ad-
opted a practice of acquiring swathes of private land in the northern and 
eastern provinces for military use under the guise of ‘public purpose’. There 
was also evidence that such acquired property was given out for commer-
cial ventures (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015a). Under the new regime, 
however, a few steps have been taken in the right direction by returning 
land to its original owners (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015b). However, 
these steps are too few and overdue.
Post-war triumphalism has also prompted a reawakening of ethno-na-
tionalism and identity politics (Keerawella, 2013). There has been a radical 
increase in anti-Muslim sentiments due to the emergence of certain fascist 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) 
(Gunatilleke, 2015a). The Secretariat for Muslims recorded 284 incidents 
of threats, attempted attacks, harassment, incitement and provocations di-
rected at Muslims in 2013 (INFOGRAPHIC, 2014). 
Sri Lanka 
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From about the mid-13th century, Muslims have had a recorded pres-
ence in Sri Lanka and the bond between the Muslims and Sinhalese was 
quite strong at the time of the Portuguese invasion (Haniffa, 2010). When 
the Portuguese violently expelled Muslims in the coastal areas in order to 
take over their trade, they were compelled to migrate inland and appeal to 
the Sinhala kings of the time for protection; they were given land to settle 
on. Subsequently, at the time of the Dutch invasion, there were well-estab-
lished coastal and inland Muslim communities in Sri Lanka. Thus, even 
though the Muslims had been provided protection by the Sinhalese during 
Portuguese and Dutch rule, during the 1915 riots the entire Muslim commu-
nity felt threatened by Sinhalese rioters. The foundation for the 1915 riots 
was primarily based on the construction of a mosque in Gampola in 1907 
along the route of a much venerated Buddhist procession. The Muslims in 
the north and east were badly affected due to the ethnic conflict between 
the Sinhalese and Tamils as well, with the most affected being northern 
Muslims. They were ethnically cleansed from LTTE controlled areas as 
the terrorists ordered them out in October 1990. This resulted in 15,000 
Muslims fleeing within the 48-hour deadline. These Muslims are now scat-
tered throughout the island with a heavy concentration in Puttalam district 
(Haniffa, 2010).
The domestic legal framework
The Second Republican Constitution (1978) 
and a judicial interpretation of its provisions
The chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Sri Lanka Constitution does not 
explicitly confer a right to life. However, this has been implicitly recognized 
by the Supreme Court.1 
Article 10 of the Constitution says that ‘every person is entitled to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or 
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.’ Article 12(1) provides that all per-
sons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection by law. Ar-
ticle 12(2) specifically provides that no citizen shall be discriminated against 
on grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of 
birth or on any such ground. Article 12(3) further states that ‘no person…on 
the grounds of…be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition 
1. Sriyani Silva v. Iddamalgoda 2 Sri. L. R. 63 (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 2003).
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2. Prohibition of Forceful Conversion, S.C. Special Determination No. 4/2004 (Supreme Court 
of Sri Lanka, 2004).
with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public 
entertainment and places of public worship of his own religion.’
Article 14(1)(e) states that ‘every citizen is entitled to the freedom, ei-
ther by himself or in association with others and either in public or in pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.’
Articles 10, 12 and 14 of the Constitution are justiciable. Further, Arti-
cles 10 and 12 confer absolute rights. However, Article 14(1)(e) can be re-
stricted by Article 15(7) on the basis of ‘national security, public order and 
the protection of public health and morality, or for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedom of others, or of meet-
ing the just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society.’
Article 9 of the Constitution states that ‘the Republic of Sri Lanka shall 
give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of 
the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all re-
ligions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).’ As such, even though 
parity among all religions is technically protected under Article 9, a judicial 
interpretation of the article has rendered such safeguards almost nugatory 
as far as the manifestation of minority religious beliefs is concerned.2  
 In ‘Provincial of the Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third 
Order of Saint Francis in Menzingen of Sri Lanka Incorporation,’ the pe-
titioners challenged a bill which sought to incorporate an order of nuns of 
the Roman Catholic church on the grounds that the incorporation of such a 
body would lead to unethical conversions or proselytism.
In this case the Supreme Court said that  (interpreting Articles 10 and 
14(1)e of the Constitution) although the Constitution allowed a person the 
right   to manifest, observe or practice one’s religion, it did not ensure a 
fundamental right to propagate religion.
The determination of the Supreme Court in this case (incorporation) 
was based on the Preamble and Clauses 3 and 5 of the bill. The Preamble 
states that the organization would provide shelter to orphans, children and 
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the aged. Spreading knowledge about Catholic religion was one of the ob-
jects set out in Clause 3, and Clause 5 sought to give authority to the incor-
porated body to hold and transfer property. 
The Supreme Court determined that the bill was inconsistent with Arti-
cle 9 of the Constitution, which gave Buddhism the foremost place and thus 
placed limitations on  minority religions ‘propagating’ their faith to mem-
bers outside their religious communities.
Consequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Menzingen, there was a 
government-led effort to introduce an anti-conversion legislation. After the 
Jathika Hela Urumaya bill was tabled in Parliament, the constitutionality 
of the bill was challenged in the Supreme Court which held that the term 
‘allurement’ in the bill needed to be narrowed in its scope to explicitly in-
clude the words ‘for the purpose of converting a person from one religion 
to another’. 
The Constitution of Sri Lanka, through the Directive Principles of State 
Policy in Article 27(5) provides that the ‘state shall strengthen national unity 
by promoting co-operation and mutual confidence among all sections of the 
people of Sri Lanka, including racial, religious, linguistic and other groups…’ 
Article 27(6) mandates that ‘the State shall ensure equality of opportunity to 
citizens, so that no citizen shall suffer any disability on the ground of race, 
religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion or occupation.’ It is notewor-
thy that even though Article 27 is not justiciable, the Supreme Court in Bu-
lankulama and Others v. Minister of Industrial Development and Others3 
held that the Directive Principles of State Policy placed an obligation on the 
state to ensure the progressive realization of the relevant right. As such, it 
can be argued that the state is duty-bound to create an environment con-
ducive for empowering those of all faiths to effectively practice their beliefs 
(National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka 2016: 5).
Chapter 4 of the Constitution read with the 13th and 16th amendments 
to the Constitution recognizes Sinhala and Tamil as the official languages 
and English as the link language (Constitution of Sri Lanka, Article 18). 
Article 19 recognizes Sinhala and Tamil both as national languages. Fur-
ther, Article 21 entitles a person to be educated through the medium of 
either of the national languages. Sinhala is the language of administration 
3.  Bulankulama and Others v. Minister of Industrial Development and Others, 3 Sri. L. R. 243 
(Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 2000).
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SCM1S.09.2006; Tissainayagam case High Court case 2009 – discussed in Kishali Pinto Jay-
awardena in focus on rights. Retrieved from  http://www.sundaytimes.lk/090913/Columns/
focus.html.
in all provinces other than in the northern and eastern provinces in which 
Tamil is the language of administration (Constitution of Sri Lanka, Article 
22). Similarly, Sinhala and Tamil are the languages of the courts (Constitu-
tion of Sri Lanka, Article 24). All laws and subordinate legislations, orders, 
proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications (other than by 
a Provincial Council or local authority) are in Sinhala and Tamil (Constitu-
tion of Sri Lanka, Article 23). Article 25 states that ‘the State shall provide 
adequate facilities for the use of the languages provided for in this Chapter.’
The Penal Code
Chapter 15  of the Penal Code (No.2 of 1883) deals with offences relating 
to religion and specifically provides, inter alia, in Section 290 that whoever 
destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship with the intent to insult 
the religion of any class of persons is guilty of an offence under Section 290. 
Section 291A provides that whoever utters any word or sound, or makes a 
gesture in the hearing of a person with the intention of ‘wounding the reli-
gious feelings’ of that person is guilty of an offence.
Recently, in an attempt to include a ‘hate speech’ provision in the Penal 
Code, a bill titled the ‘Penal Code (Amendment) Bill’ was placed on the Or-
der Paper of the Parliament on 11 December 2015 (Sri Lanka Brief, 2015a). 
This bill sought to insert a new Section 291C in the Penal Code. The le-
gal effect of the section was purportedly to make provisions to convict and 
punish persons who caused or instigated acts of violence or hostility which 
led to religious, racial or communal disharmony between different racial or 
religious groups. The section sought to be inserted was almost identical to 
Section 2(1)(h) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
which had been invoked previously on several occasions targeting members 
of Tamil and Muslim communities.4 The Human Rights Commission of Sri 
Lanka too advised the government to withdraw the proposed amendment 
and to replace it with a relevant provision of the ICCPR Act (Sri Lanka Brief, 
2015b). The editor of a Tamil language newspaper filed a petition in the 
Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the proposed amend-
ment apprehending that it would serve to infringe freedom of speech and 
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expression, including publication, particularly by members of minority 
communities (Selvanayagam, 2015). Consequent to this case being filed 
and the concerns raised by civil society, the government withdrew the 
amendment.
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act 
Section 3(1) of the act provides that ‘no person shall propagate war or ad-
vocate national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence.’ The trial of a person accused of com-
mitting an offence under Section 3 is to be taken up as a matter of highest 
priority by the relevant High Court (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Act, Sec. 3 [No. 56 of 2007]).
The Prevention of Terrorism Act
Section 2(1)(h) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Section 2(1)(h) (No.48 
of 1979) provides that ‘any person by words either spoken or intended to be 
read or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise causes or intends 
to cause commission of acts of violence or religious, racial or communal 
disharmony or feelings of ill-will or hostility between different communities 
of racial or religious groups…shall be guilty of an offence.’
However, this section has been used to target those critical of govern-
ment policies, particularly its treatment of minorities.5 
Thus, the constitutional and legal framework that is in place, at least 
normatively, appears to foster the rights and freedoms of ethnic and reli-
gious minorities. Nevertheless, much uncertainty remains about the mani-
festation of this freedom.
The right to life and security
The general trajectory
The Constitution of Sri Lanka does not explicitly recognize right to life. 
However, in 2003 the Supreme Court  inferred an implied right to life in lim-
ited circumstances as gleaned from Article 13(4) of the Constitution which 
provides that ‘no person shall be punished with death or imprisonment 
except by order of a competent court made in accordance with procedure 
5. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka v. J.S. Tissainayagam (H.C., 2008).
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Offences, Seeduwa Police Station and others, 1 Sri. L. R. 40 (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 
2005); Kanapathipillai Machchavallan v. OIC, Army Camp, Plantain Point, Trincomalee and 
others, 1 Sri. L. R. 341, (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 2005).
established by law’ (Silva et al., 2009). Such a position was subsequently 
affirmed by three judgments.6  However, construed in such a manner, right 
to life is limited only to the physical right to life and does not encapsulate 
other aspects of liberty and due process (Guneratne et al., 2014).
As mentioned earlier, the legal and constitutional framework in Sri Lan-
ka is conducive for the protection of minorities from inter alia ethnic and re-
ligious violence. However, the trajectory has been one of increasing attacks 
and threats, especially after the end of the war.
In 2013, there were 241 recorded anti-Muslim attacks. Figure 1 gives 
the distribution of 166 location-specific anti-Muslim attacks during 2013. 
Figure 2 gives details of the 69 location-specific anti-Christian attacks re-
corded in 2013. The trend in violence continued with 2014 seeing at least 
200 anti-Muslim attacks  (Figure 3). Location-specific attacks on Christians 
increased to 88 in 2014 (Figure 4). 
An analysis of the data from 2013 and 2014 reveals that more than 50 
per cent of the attacks on Muslims were non-physical and related to hate 
speeches and propaganda and more than 50 per cent of the attacks were in 
fact perpetrated by political actors or political and social movements. More 
than 25 per cent of the attacks were attributed to the Bodu Bala Sena (Gu-
natilleke, 2015a: 29).
On the other hand, almost 50 per cent of the attacks on Christians were 
by unidentified individuals and groups. Buddhist clergy from the locality 
was thought to be behind most of the intimidation, physical violence and 
destruction of property. Public officials too, often directly or indirectly, per-
petrated attacks against Christians (Gunatilleke, 2015a).
The attacks on Hindu places of worship have not been systematically 
quantified. R. Sampanthan, the leader of the Tamil National Alliance has, 
however, repeatedly referred to continuing violations of Hindu places of 
worship (See Parliamentary Debates, 2013: 325).
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Out of the 328 Divisional Secretary’s divisions (DS divisions) in the 
country, religious violence was recorded in 88 out of which 45 were char-
acterized by low religious diversity and a low concentration of religious mi-
norities (Gunatilleke, 2015a: 34). Nineteen DS divisions were typified by 
medium religious diversity and a low concentration of religious minorities. 
Therefore, 72 per cent of the DS divisions in which attacks took place typified 
these two demographic profiles. Further, violence was apparently less preva-
lent in DS divisions with a high concentration of a particular ethnic minority 
but low diversity. Over two-third of the recorded violence in 2013 and 2014 
took place in majority Sinhala-Buddhist divisions with either a low concen-
tration of minorities and either low or medium diversity (Gunatilleke, 2015a).
Specific incidents of violence
Grandpass Mosque incident
Background 
The Masjidul Deenul Islam mosque in   Colombo’s Grandpass area had 
reached capacity, but due to a Bo tree sacred to the Buddhists having its 
roots in the adjoining property, it could not be expanded (Wijedasa, 2013). 
The Urban Development Authority had made plans to acquire the area for 
development and since the mosque would have to be removed eventually, 
the Muslims in the area began worshipping in another building that had 
been converted into a prayer centre.
Violence
A group from the Sinhala community in the area and some of the Buddhist 
clergy protested the establishment of the alternative prayer site. The issue 
was aggravated by fascist groups such as Sinhala Ravaya. Extremist group 
Ravana Balaya staged two protests against the prayer centre on 9 June and 
5 July 2013 (Gunatilleke, 2015a). However, the Ministry of Buddha Sasana 
and Religious Affairs extended the permit for use of the alternative site. The 
majority community in the area was  mobilized into reacting to   such an 
extension and on 11 August 2013, protestors supposedly linked to the Sin-
hala Ravaya attacked the prayer centre alleging that it had no authority to 
function as a place of worship (Farook, 2013). This resulted in communal 
clashes between the Muslim community and the majority Sinhala-Buddhist 
community.
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Figure 1.  Location-specific 
Anti-Muslim attacks in 2013
Figure 3. Location-specific 
anti-Muslim attacks in 2014 
Figure 4. Location-specific 
anti-Christian attacks in 2014 
Figure 2. Location-specific 
anti-Christian attacks in 2013
Source:  Gunatilleke (2015a).
Source:  Secretariat for Muslims (2015). Gunatilleke (2015a: 28).
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Law enforcement
The authorities did little to prevent the violence and destruction of prop-
erty. The situation was eventually settled by stopping the UDA acquisition, 
the Muslims returning to the original mosque and the Bo tree being up-
rooted to permit expansion (Farook, 2013). The permit for the new prayer 
centre, however, was revoked (Gunatilleke, 2015a: 30).
The Aluthgama riots 
Background 
Ethnic violence targeting Muslims took place on 15 June 2014 in Aluth-
gama, Dharga town, Valipanna and Beruwela in the south of Sri Lanka. The 
area  has large Muslim and Sinhala communities. This was not the first time 
that such violence took place in the area as in 2006 also a seemingly trivial 
dispute over a mobile phone between a Sinhalese and a Muslim had led 
to violence that resulted in a number of shops in the area being destroyed 
(Gunatilleke, 2015b: 3; Haniffa et al., 2015). 
Violence
The  violence in 2014 was apparently triggered by a dispute between a Bud-
dhist monk and three Muslims in the area. On the day after the violence, a 
large rally was organized condemning the alleged attack on the Buddhist 
monk and the General Secretary of BBS made racist remarks against Mus-
lims (Gunatilleke, 2015b: 3; Haniffa et al., 2015). Subsequently   large mobs 
attacked Muslim-owned businesses and homes which resulted in the   kill-
ing of four persons including three Muslims and  over 100 Muslim homes 
and businesses being destroyed. This riot was described by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014) as ‘one of the worst incidents 
of sectarian violence in Sri Lanka’s recent history.’
Law Enforcement
Law enforcement agents failed to prevent or control the violence. Some wit-
nesses claimed that many of the attackers wore boots and helmets which 
is suggestive that some of the attackers had access to military equipment 
(Haniffa et al., 2015: 31-32).
Anti-Christian attacks in the Southern province
Twenty-seven attacks against Christians in 2013 and 2014 took place in 
Galle and Hambantota districts and the police or some public official was 
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involved either actively or tacitly in as many as 13 of them (Gunatilleke, 
2015a: 31-32). 
Walasmulla, Hambantota
The police ordered the Assemblies of God church to discontinue all prayer 
meetings on 19 March and 6 April 2013. On 10 May 2013 the Hambantota 
District Secretariat conducted a meeting of religious leaders at which Bud-
dhist monks demanded that all local churches that had not obtained prior 
state approval  be shut down.
Hikkaduwa, Galle
 Five police officers and an officer from the Divisional Secretary’s De-
partment went to a building used by the Assemblies of God church and de-
manded that prayer meetings held at the premises be discontinued imme-
diately. Subsequently, the pastor of the church was summoned to the police 
station for an inquiry and was verbally abused by two Buddhist monks in 
the presence of the officer-in-charge who did nothing to reprimand them.
Ratgama, Galle
 Eight police officers and a Buddhist monk entered the Calvary Free church 
on 26 January 2014 while a prayer meeting was in progress, halted the 
meeting and directed all participants to report to the police station for 
an inquiry. Subsequently, the police filed a case against the pastor of the 
church for breach of peace.
Mamadalla, Hambantota 
The pastor of the Assemblies of God church was requested to appear at the 
police station for an inquiry on 24 February 2014. At the inquiry, the offi-
cer-in-charge of the police station and two Buddhist monks demanded that 
all religious activities conducted by the church cease as prior approval of the 
Ministry of Buddha Sasana and Religious Affairs was required to conduct 
such activities.
Angunukolapalassa, Hambantota
On 6 June 2014 the pastor of the Assemblies of God church was verbally 
abused by the officer-in-charge from a nearby police station for conducting 
prayer meetings on private premises. The officer demanded that the pas-
tor leave the village if he was not willing to discontinue all such religious 
activities.
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Characteristics of violence against Christians
Thus, an analysis of violence against Christians in recent years demon-
strates that it is often low-intensity and continuous to the point of being 
systemic (Gunatilleke, 2015a). 
As such, it is evident that in Sri Lanka, even though the existing legal and 
policy framework is sufficient to ensure the protection of minority rights, 
the issue is primarily one of enforcement. Inaction by the police in some 
cases and the direct and indirect involvement of police and public officials 
in other cases have been necessary components in the creation of an era 
where the freedoms of the minorities are impugned. In fact, the state’s tacit 
approval of extremist groups such as the BBS, Sinhala Ravaya and Ravana 
Balaya is perhaps one of the main reasons why religious attacks have con-
tinued in recent years. 
Further, the courts too have adopted a rather conservative approach. 
The lower courts have rarely intervened to protect minorities when there is 
a violation of their religious freedoms. Often they also fail to acknowledge 
the religious motivation behind such attacks. Therefore, even though phys-
ical violence may be condemned at times, the intolerance of minorities has 
been tacitly condoned (National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka, 
2016: 8).
Developments after January 2015 
In January 2015, Maithripala Sirisena was elected as the President of Sri 
Lanka. Under his leadership, the impunity of extremist groups such as the 
BBS has reduced.
However, religious intolerance still persists. According to the Secretariat 
for Muslims, at least 37 religious attacks against the Muslim community 
took place from January to April 2015 (Secretariat for Muslims, 2015). On 
4 April 2015 there was an attempted demolition of a mosque in Kuragala, 
Ratnapura, which was eventually prevented through the intervention of the 
police which dealt with a mob of over 100 people supposedly a part of Sin-
hala Ravaya (Gunatilleke, 2015a: 49).
There has been no  progress in the prosecution of offenders of past re-
ligious violence, including the perpetrators of the Aluthgama attacks (Gu-
natilleke, 2015a). However, an arrest warrant was issued in October 2015 
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against Ven. Galaboda Atta Gnanasara Thera, General Secretary of the BBS 
for not being present in court in connection with two cases filed against him 
(Daily News, 2015).
The re-establishment of the Constitutional Council (which was abol-
ished by the previous regime) too is a positive step in the right direction 
given that it is a mechanism for ensuring independence in key appoint-
ments. The Constitutional Council has since appointed members to the 
bribery, police, public service and human rights commissions (News 
First, 2015).
In October 2015 UNHRC adopted Resolution 30/1 titled ‘Promoting 
reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.’ This resolu-
tion was co-sponsored by the Government of Sri Lanka.
The government is accordingly committed to holding nationwide public 
consultations on transitional justice mechanisms and for establishing 
an Office of Missing Persons. However, on 24 May 2016, the Cabinet 
without consulting the families concerned approved the new Office of 
Missing Persons. The international Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance was ratified on 25 May 2016 in 
fulfilment of another key promise. 
The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
ranks Sri Lanka as having the second highest number of disappearances.
 (Sri Lanka Brief, 2016). 
In October 2015 Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera elaborated on 
the government’s plans to create separate institutions to address the griev-
ances of all stakeholders: a Commission for Truth Justice Reconciliation 
and Non-recurrence, a judicial mechanism with a special counsel and an 
Office of Reparations (Tami Guardian, 2015).
Member of Parliament Dr Jayampathy Wickramaratne when address-
ing Parliament on a resolution for setting up a Constitutional Assembly on 
23 February 2016 stated, ‘we cannot go back to a situation of conflict. We 
need to find a solution to the national question. We must get the acceptance 
of all political parties and the Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim, Hill-country Tamil 
and other communities for a long-lasting solution’ (Wickramaratne, 2016).
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Accordingly, on 5 April 2016, Sri Lanka’s Parliament converted into a 
Constitutional Assembly for the first time with the aim of enacting a new 
constitution (LBO, 2016).
As such, progressive measures are being taken in the right direction but 
they are very slow.
Right to non-discrimination and equality
Articles 12(1) and 12(2) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka explicitly recog-
nize the right to equality and non-discrimination. Inasmuch as Article 12(1) 
confers equality on all persons, the right to non-discrimination is conferred 
only on citizens of the country as per Article 12(2).
The following section deals with some of the economic, social and cul-
tural rights of minorities in Sri Lanka.
The right to education
Since the 1940s, the government’s policy on education has sought to elim-
inate linguistic and socioeconomic inequalities, particularly with the intro-
duction of free primary, secondary and tertiary education (Free Education 
Act 1945), scholarship programmes, establishing central schools in rural ar-
eas and initiating the use of either of the two national languages as the me-
dium of instruction (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 2013). As such, there is relatively 
high participation in education countrywide and Sri Lanka boasted of a very 
high literacy rate of 95.6 per cent in 2012 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2014).
The nation’s education system is primarily supported by two policies: 
the Education Sector Development Framework and Programme (ESD-
FP) 2006-10 and Transforming School Education as the Foundation of a 
Knowledge Hub 2011-15. The barriers to education and the inequalities in 
its provision are dealt with to a large extent by these two policies and are 
supported by the Ministry of Education and the ministries of other related 
sectors (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 2013). 
ESDFP specifically states that ‘schools will promote gender integra-
tion and mutual respect for boys and girls and emphasize equal rights and 
equality in all aspects of life and mutual respect for each other.’ Issues of 
gender are addressed through an amendment to the legislation concern-
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ing early marriages and the provision of adequate sanitation facilities for 
girls in programmes on enhancing school infrastructure. Social protection 
programmes, particularly the Samurdhi Poverty Alleviation programme 
provides scholarships for the education of eligible children from very poor 
families (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 2013).
The issues created by conflict which are affecting the education sys-
tem are also being addressed by the Ministry of Education by repairing 
infrastructure and establishing psychosocial care units and psychosocial 
resource centres in all provinces. In addition, assistance is also being pro-
vided by the Ministry of Social Services to victims of disasters (UNICEF Sri 
Lanka, 2013).
Another major ESDFP theme is ‘increasing equity in the distribution 
of resources.’ It thus seeks to modify the criteria for allocations so as to 
provide more resources to districts with greater need (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 
2013).
The estate plantation sector, however, has been disadvantaged educa-
tionally over the years as it was provided with minimal primary education 
facilities. Approximately 830 plantation schools were integrated into the 
national education system consequent to the nationalization of estates in 
the 1970s. There is continuing dearth of proper infrastructure in secondary 
schools in the plantation areas, though the Plantation Unit of the Ministry 
of Education has formulated an action plan to deal with the inequities in 
education in the sector (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 2013). Dr Devanesan Nesiah, 
a former government agent of Jaffna Mannar, Batticaloa (North East of Sri 
Lanka) who has also served as the Head of the Policy Analysis Unit of the 
Sri Lanka Institute for Development Administration (SLIDA) and Chair of 
the Human Rights Commission, Committee of Inquiry into disappearances 
was of the view that as in other fields, in education too most of those who 
served the plantation sector were from other sectors and some of them may 
lack motivation to serve with dedication (personal communication). A vari-
ety of scholarships for high-school students from the plantation sector in a 
range of tertiary disciplines at least for a prescribed period would help rem-
edy the lack of professional skills in the sector in due course.  He was of the 
opinion that since this community has suffered acute discrimination ever 
since it entered Sri Lanka in the early British period nearly two centuries 
ago, sustained corrective action by way of reverse discrimination (affirma-
tive action) over several years may be warranted.
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Children belonging to the Chakkiliyar and Pallayar castes in the Mahai-
yawa area in Kandy too are severely disadvantaged as more often than not 
they are not admitted to good schools due to prejudices by school author-
ities, lack of Tamil medium of instruction in most of the good schools in 
the area and lack of networking capacity and funds (Silva et al., 2009). It is 
believed that caste has had an impact on access to education in the majority 
ethnic group as well. The children of Kinnara caste particularly are not tak-
en into schools in the area and in any event much emphasis is not placed on 
education within the caste as they believe that they will never have a chance 
at a good job (International Dalit Solidarity Network, 2008). Dr Nesiah was 
of the view that in these cases too, affirmative action by way of a range of 
scholarships for a prescribed period may be needed in addition to other 
corrective measures.
The Veddah community is perhaps among the most disadvantaged giv-
en that its children are compelled to learn a history, language and culture 
that are alien to them. They may be numerically too small to warrant devis-
ing special curricula, but extending the proposed affirmative action to them 
will surely help at least for a limited period. 
The higher education system in Sri Lanka has been ethnicized even 
though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifically provides for 
education based on merit (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arti-
cle 16 [1], 1948). From 1971 a policy of standardization has been  adopted 
ensuring that the number of students qualifying for entrance to university 
from each language was proportionate to the number of students who sat 
for the university entrance examination in that language When it was intro-
duced, a Tamil student had to obtain an aggregate of 250 marks to get into 
the medical or dental faculties while a Sinhala student would get into the 
same faculty with 229 marks (Chandraprema, 2012).
It is noteworthy that the proposed budget for 2016 recognizes that 
there are about 1,360 schools which have been neglected in the recent past 
without any assistance from the government. The budget  seeks to allocate 
Rs 30,000 million to improve the facilities and quality of such neglected 
schools. Rs 250 million is proposed to be allocated for upgrading 25 schools 
in the plantation sector to secondary level (Daily FT, 2015).
Figure 5 gives details about the  participation of ethnic minorities in the 
public and private sectors.
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Profile of a vulnerable minority:
The Wanniyalaeto community
The concept of human rights should not only be confined to words and 
discussions, but it should be practiced and implemented. However, 
the rights of the Adivasi community in Sri Lanka have been severe-
ly  eroded due to many reasons including the fact that they are not a 
proper ‘ethnic’ group. In fact, Adivasis have been  excluded from the 
debate on human rights and ignored from the paradigm of develop-
ment. This case study maps the situation of Adivasis in Sri Lanka. This 
profile addresses the historical background of the Wanniyalaeto com-
munity, the distinctive features of their culture and identity and how 
they have been discriminated against throughout history. 
Historical background
The beginning of Sri Lankan history is intrinsically bound with the 
Wanniyalaeto (Vedda) community (forest people). They were the first 
dwellers of the island; they came with prince Vijaya who was expelled 
from India and was the first king in the island. The Veddas are said to 
be the descendants of Prince Viyaya and his wife Kuweni, who hailed 
from the indigenous Yakka group (Keerthisinghe, 2011):
Prince Vijaya and yakkini Kuveni became friends and later they got 
married. They had a son and a daughter. Years later Prince Vijaya 
was able to subdue all the yakkas in the country with the help of 
Kuveni. Even though, Kuveni did not do any evil deeds, Prince Vi-
jaya’s friends never forgot what Kuveni did to them and they were 
ever fearful of Kuveni. They thought that non-human Kuveni could 
not be trusted. Due to this reason, Prince Vijaya was forced to ask 
Kuveni to leave. Kuveni left with her two children to Malaya coun-
try. (Central mountain part of Sri Lanka). Kuveni’s children gave 
rise to the Vedda community in Lanka.
It is believed that the Wanniyalaeto (‘forest-dwellers’) can be traced 
back to Sri Lanka’s original Neolithic community, and thus can be dat-
ed back to approximately 14,000 BC (http://www.vedda.org/wanni-
yalaeto.htm).
The identity and culture of the Wanniyalaeto Community (headline B)
The identity of this indigenous group is intrinsically linked to who they 
are and where they come from. They call themselves Wanniyalaetos 
or forest dwellers. The word ‘Vedda’ on the other hand, comes from 
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Civil Service Tier 2
Civil Service Tier 1
Top 100 CEOs (Listed Companies) 
University Admissions (2010)
Population
Sinhales Tamil Muslim Other
Figure 5. Minorities in Sri Lanka facing the glass ceiling in 
employment 
Source:  Verite Research (2013).
Tamil representation in university admissions and in CEOs of the top 
100 private firms is similar to the population (about 18 per cent). However, 
in Tier 2 in the public sector this falls to under 6 per cent (with a 16: 1 ratio 
in favour of Sinhalese over Tamils), and in Tier 1 it is 3 per cent (with an al-
most 32: 1 ratio in favour of Sinhalese over Tamils) (Verite Research, 2013).
As such, Tamil employees in the public sector are four times as unlike-
ly to climb to Tier 2 and eight times as unlikely to climb to Tier 1 as their 
Sinhala counterparts (Verite Research, 2013).
With regard to Muslim representation, a 10:1 population ratio between 
Sinhalese and Muslims, reduces to a 8: 1 ratio in university admissions. 
However, this becomes a ratio of 16:1 against the Muslims when we look at 
the CEOs of the top 100 private firms. Therefore, the data poses a challenge 
to the standard stereotyping of the Muslim population as being more suc-
cessful in business than in education, a notion which has given rise to many 
conflicts in recent times (Verite Research, 2013).
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the Sinhala word vidina which means one who shoots and is not the 
identity that this community is desirous of bearing (Leonard, 2015). 
Whilst outsiders have portrayed the Veddas as a primitive group 
which is rough and uncivilized in appearance and language, living pri-
marily in the wild, the Veddas themselves do not choose to identify 
themselves in this manner (http://vedda.org/3-identity.htm).
Modern ideas of real estate are not known to the Wanniyalaetos who 
believe that they and their ancestor-spirits belong to the Wanni forest 
which they inhabit and are called on to protect. They only recognize 
natural landmarks and therefore the concept of acreage is not known 
to them (http://vedda.org/3-identity.htm). The people do not own 
any possessions nor seek to acquire any.
In Vedda culture, the wife is considered the most valuable possession. 
Monogamous unions are the norm. This ensures gender equality in 
the community. Fidelity between the spouses is strictly upheld and 
infidelity could result in being sentenced to death (Leonard, 2015). 
Following the death of the husband, the husband’s brother can marry 
the widow (Veddas of Sri Lanka). 
The original language spoken by these people does not exist now and 
only a few words have survived which are used in everyday conversa-
tions. Their dialect constitutes a combination of old and modern Sin-
hala as well as non-Aryan speech (Veddas of Sri Lanka). 
Discrimination of the Wanniyalaeto Community
As per Census reports, the Wanniyalaeto population was about 4,510 
in 1921 which dropped to 2,361 in 1946. Though a separate count has 
not been made since 1963, a 1978 study identified about 6,000 Wanni-
yalaetos in Anuradhapura district alone (http://vedda.org/3-identity.
htm).
Even though initially the Sinhalese considered the Wanniyalaeto com-
munity as equal to the dominant Govigama caste, subsequently this 
perception changed due to Buddhism playing a pivotal role in the lives 
of a majority of the Sinhalese who censured the Veddas community 
for hunting animals.
For centuries this indigenous community was discriminated 
against due to successive immigration and colonization. Thus, the 
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The right to employment
Protection from discrimination in employment is guaranteed in the pub-
lic sector through the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 
which is against executive and administrative action. There are no laws 
dealing with discrimination in employment and occupation in the private 
sector. Further, the legislative framework does not envisage equal pay for 
equal work across public and private sectors (LST Review, 2011).
Even though employment laws are not discriminatory, the ground reali-
ty is that given the highly politicized nature of society often the youth rely on 
political favours and influential contacts rather than merit alone (Ministry 
of Youth Affairs, 2007). Youth unrest in the north and south is primarily due 
to frustrations and disappointment with policies and programmes that they 
perceive as discriminatory (Mayer, 2004; Thangarajah, 2002). Further, ob-
taining jobs in the public sector is often arduous for ethnic minorities as the 
primary language in this sector is Sinhala. Tamils of Indian origin and Mus-
lims too are not well-represented in the public sector even in areas in which 
they are concentrated (LST Review, 2011). Further exclusion and margin-
alization take place in estate and rural areas due to a dearth of qualified 
teachers, educational institutions and poor infrastructure. As such, given 
their need for some form of income, the youth in these areas have a tenden-
cy to take any job that they find but there is a significant gap between their 
aspirations and the work that they are compelled to engage in (Ministry of 
Youth Affairs, 2007). 
The people of the Mahaiyawa caste in Kandy have had limited access 
to education and capital. Hence, they have had very limited success in se-
curing proper employment or establishing businesses in towns. They have 
been compelled to continue working for generations in the Kandy Munici-
pal Council as sanitary workers or have the option of carrying heavy loads 
(natami), repair shoes, drive three-wheelers and sometimes get involved in 
prostitution. Women in these groups are particularly vulnerable to double 
and treble discrimination based on ethnicity, caste and gender and are of-
ten compelled to seek employment as maids in the Middle East (Silva et al., 
2009).
Influential positions in Jaffna are held by the land-owning Vellâlar 
caste. The lowest strata of the Jaffna caste system is referred to as ‘Pan-
chamar’, consisting of Vannâr (dhobi or washerman), Ampattar (barber), 
Pallar (leather workers and landless labourers), Nalavar (toddy tappers) 
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Wanniyalaetos have been faced with the dilemma of either merging 
with other cultures and losing their unique identity, or returning to 
the forest environment. Over the years, many have integrated into 
Sinhala and Tamil societies in Sri Lanka’s north-central, Uva and east-
ern areas (http://www.vedda.org/wanniyalaeto.htm).
The Wanniyalaeto community has been denied respect, dignity, hu-
man rights and cultural uniqueness, primarily due to the sentiments 
of the migrants as far back as 5th century BC; they viewed the Vedda 
community as untamed spirits of the wild disguised as human beings 
(http://www.vedda.org/wanniyalaeto.htm). Their collective custodi-
anship of hunting grounds has not been recognized and neither have 
they been consulted on matters pertaining to their daily existence 
http://www.vedda.org/wanniyalaeto.htm)
making them perhaps the most marginalized group in Sri Lanka.
The failure to recognize their own criteria for self-determination has 
accelerated their disappearance as a distinct culture and denied them 
participation in the democratic decision-making process (http://ved-
da.org/3-identity.htm).
Prior to colonial rule the Vedda community was the main supplier of 
honey and cotton to the nation. However, this practice was destroyed 
through colonization (Obeyesekere, 2002). Hunting too was restrict-
ed through mainstream laws which has kept the Veddas in a precar-
ious situation. This discourages education of Vedda children as well.  
Being one of the main cultural marker of any community, a particu-
lar community has to have the ability to use its language. However, 
Veddas’ use of their language has been discouraged due to essential 
interaction with the state and other surrounding Sinhala and Tam-
il communities. Most of the Veddas have converted to Sinhalese and 
Tamils by taking Sinhala and Tamil names (http://www.vedda.org/
wanniyalaeto.htm).
Since 1931 the Adivasis have not been able to manage their own af-
fairs in their areas of historic habitation (https://www.hitpages.com/
doc/5403041645723648/4/). Instead they have fallen under the state 
administrative structure which has resulted in their rights being se-
verely infringed upon. During the 1930s and 1940s, irrigation and 
farming colonies were launched in Polonnaruwa and Mahiyangana 
regions (https://www.hitpages.com/doc/5403041645723648/4/). 
These projects led to a large exodus of Sinhala and Tamil people to 
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and Parayar (sanitary labourers and funeral drummers)  who are accorded 
untouchable status in Jaffna’s caste hierarchy (Silva et al., 2009).
The right to health
The right to  health is not recognized explicitly by the Constitution of Sri 
Lanka either as a Fundamental Right or as a Directive Principle of State Pol-
icy.  In the landmark case of Sanjeewa, Attorney-at-Law (on Behalf of Ger-
ald Mervin Perera) v. Suraweera, Officer-in-Charge, Police Station, Wattala 
and Others the court made a reference to the right to health. However, there 
has been no explicit recognition of the right either as an international law 
obligation or as a domestic legal requirement.
As per estimates of the World Health Organization, the country’s expen-
diture on health was approximately 3.2 per cent of GDP (US$ 89 per head) 
in 2012. Despite such relatively low investments, the people’s health status 
has improved with the mortality rate for children under-5 falling from 98 
per 1,000 live births to 9.6 per 1,000 live births and life expectancy increas-
ing from about 60 years in 1960 to 74 years in 2012. These figures are sim-
ilar to the more developed countries in Asia who in fact spend more than 
twice as much on healthcare (The Economist, 2014).
The reason for such success is attributed to the free government-pro-
vided healthcare for all citizens of the country (The Economist, 2014). As in 
the case of free education, free healthcare has a long history dating back to 
pre-independence years. The credit for this mostly goes to left and liberal 
minded social and political activists in the first half of the 20th century.
As per the statistics for 2011, Sri Lanka had 7.8 physicians for 10,000 
population and 33 beds for every 10,000 people (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
2014: Table 14:12). Even though such figures are among the best in South 
Asia, there is ample room for improvement. The public health sector affords 
limited access to specialist treatment and has inadequate capacity. The 
more complex surgical procedures can only be done at the national hospital 
of Sri Lanka in Colombo, and very few other hospitals in key cities and the 
waiting lists for such services are usually very long. Even though there is no 
overt discrimination in the provision of healthcare, there is a huge disparity 
in the facilities available in urban and rural areas and the infrastructure in 
the north and east of the country is heavily affected by the extended civil 
war (The Economist, 2014). 
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the area, thus shutting out the Veddas from their ancestral land. As 
hunting is the most preferred means of livelihood of the Veddas, the 
shrinking of land has kept them in a precarious position. Hunting was 
not only their livelihood but was bound with their identity as well. 
Thus, restricting them access to their land for hunting severely dam-
aged their identity and livelihood options (https://www.hitpages.
com/doc/5403041645723648/4/). 
Gal Oya and Mahaweli projects further restricted Veddas’ access 
to their ancestral land. The Accelerated Mahaweli Development 
scheme was launched in 1977 under which vast tracts of tradition-
al Wanniyalaeto hunting land was identified for proposed benefits 
for other communities. Equitable compensation was not handed 
out to the displaced indigenous inhabitants; in fact compensation 
for them was not even considered (https://www.hitpages.com/
doc/5403041645723648/4/). 
The Mahaweli Development scheme forced the Wanniyalaetos to 
leave their homes and forsake their lifestyle of hunting and gathering 
food. Those who continued to hunt were considered poachers or tres-
passers. The Madura Oya National Park was guarded to prevent the 
Wanniyalaetos from returning to their homes. Instead, they were ex-
pected to assume the role of rice-cultivators overnight (http://www.
vedda.org/wanniyalaeto.htm).
In 2007, the Wild Life Department arrested four Veddas who had en-
tered into the Maduraoya forest reserve to collect honey from bees. 
They were released on bail after being produced before the Mahiyan-
ganaya court (Hettiarachchi, 2007). 
Since the creation of this park, the overall living standards of the 
Wanniyalaeto community have deteriorated dramatically. The park 
is open to tourists but not to the indigenous population of the area. 
Sometimes tourists are brought to the doorstep of the Wanniyalaeto 
community, only to exhibit them as the last of the Veddas.
The obstructions in livelihood and lifestyle severely affected the Ved-
da community and discouraged their identity and culture. 
While they have been uprooted from their ancestral land and identi-
ties, Adivasi children have been discriminated in schools, which forces 
them to drop out and give up their education (https://www.hitpages.
com/doc/5403041645723648/4/).
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National health services in the plantation sector are very difficult to ac-
cess and on-estate health services are not up to national standards. Patients 
often die on the way to hospital as the distance is  very long. Pregnant wom-
en are at times compelled to travel in lorries used to transport tea leaves in 
order to get to the nearest hospital; they sometimes give birth while in the 
lorries, endangering their lives and those of the new-born babies. There is 
also a severe dearth of qualified personnel and effective drugs. The repro-
ductive health rights of women are a matter of concern given that there are 
credible allegations of involuntary sterilization of women in the estate sec-
tor (LST Review, 2011).
In a study undertaken by the Ministry of Healthcare in 2007 in three 
national hospitals -- Anuradhapura, Nuwara Eliya and Hambantota -- it 
was found that no significant discrimination had been reported in terms of 
ethnicity, religion, social class, age, political beliefs etc., each demonstrating 
a satisfactory ratio above 95 per cent. Yet  7.4 per cent and 12.9 per cent of 
those studied reported that the discrimination was on the basis  of  a lan-
guage barrier and lack of a relationship with the health staff respectively 
(Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition, 2008).
Discrimination on grounds of language was primarily seen in the Nu-
wara Eliya district where 19.7 per cent of the patients shared the same ex-
perience. Most of the complaints of this nature were made by the Tamil 
speaking estate plantation community; 2.7 per cent of those who got treated 
in Hambantota too shared the same experiences and most complaints were 
made by the Tamil speaking Muslim community. Among the factors com-
plained of, the rudeness of nurses and minor staff and passing of hints due 
to ethnicity, took precedence (Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition, 2008). 
It is noteworthy that there is a clear shift in policy with the new govern-
ment proposing a spend of Rs 210 billion on education and health, primar-
ily towards capital expenditure, which is an increase of over 120 per cent 
over the expenditure in the previous year (Verite Research, 2015) (also see 
Figure 6).
The right to secure land tenure
Most Sinhalese are governed by the general law except those who come 
under the Kandyan law. The minorities in the country too come under the 
general law but they are also governed by their personal laws, that is, The-
sawalamai law for Tamils living in the northern province and Muslim law 
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While ethnic assimilation exists with regard to every minority group 
in the country, the Veddas are the most vulnerable as their capacity 
to survive in the modern world is very low as compared to the other 
minority ethnic groups. 
Their inferior social positioning has led the Veddas to a position which 
prevents them from participating in  representative democracy. Since 
this community does not have any representatives in the Sri Lankan 
Parliament, which is basically built on an ethno-religious vote base, 
the Veddas do not have any voice in decision making. Thus, these peo-
ple have been completely  excluded from the decision making process 
in Sri Lanka. When competing interests arose between the Wanniya-
laetos and mainstream farming and trading communities in the area, 
the Wanniyalaetos were left voiceless in the decision of the main-
stream communities (http://vedda.org/2-causes.htm).
The International Labour Organization concluded a study in 1992, 
which stated that a large number of those belonging to the resettled 
Wanniyalaeto community were economically, socially and politically 
underprivileged. Further, this community lacked the requisite skills 
to assimilate themselves with the other settlers and to take up other 
means of earning a livelihood. Thus, the other settlers monopolized 
political and economic decision making and opportunities while the 
Wanniyalaeto community was discriminated against (http://www.
vedda.org/wanniyalaeto.htm).
In fact, since 1974 successive governments have pledged to allocate a 
sanctuary of 1,800 acres to them to pursue their traditional way of life 
but this has not been implemented. This area is only about 1 per cent 
of the area of the park (http://www.vedda.org/wanniyalaeto.htm).
It is important to note that there is no dialogue between Wanniyalaeto 
leaders and government officials. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has not rat-
ified conventions such as the ILO Convention No.169 on Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples. This minimizes the possibility of intervention in 
recognizing the Wanniyalaeto community as a distinct group of peo-
ple to be protected.
Conclusion
The Wanniyalaeto community has been alienated from its language, 
land, culture and livelihood options. Hence, it has been indirectly 
forced to assimilate into the mainstream by adopting a culture, lan-
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Figure 6. Promised and actual spend on education and health in 
Sri Lanka 
Source:  Budget speeches - various years (P-provisional, B- budgeted).
for Muslims. However, during the years of conflict, neither the general nor 
the personal laws were sufficient to safeguard the property rights of the mi-
norities. Both the state and the LTTE forcibly acquired private land for their 
purposes while some in the minority groups lost their land through aban-
donment as they were compelled to flee to safety.
The patriarchal Thesawalamai law recognizes the need for women’s 
ownership of land (mostly inherited via dowry) for the security of their fu-
ture. This law was initially considered advantageous for women as wom-
en were not gainfully employed at the time when it was codified. However, 
this law prevents women from having free control over their own property. 
While a married woman can sell or mortgage movable property, immovable 
property can only be mortgaged or sold with the consent of her husband, 
even though the husband need not consult his wife when selling or mortgag-
ing his inheritance or acquired property. As such, regardless of how educat-
ed and qualified a woman may be and no matter how many investments she 
deals with at a professional level, she is unable to do so with her personal 
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guage, law and education which is alien to them.  By preventing access 
to their ancestral land thanks to development projects which do not 
consider culture and people, the Wanniyalaetos have been left in a 
vulnerable situation where they do not have livelihood options. For 
a particular community land is not only material existence but also 
a subjective link to their lives and lifestyles. The Wanniyalaetos have 
thus not only lost their land but they have also lost their culture and 
identity. 
There is a need for an Island-wide Census of Wanniyalaetos. They also 
need to be helped to convene a national gathering and to form a so-
cio-political organization that can be consulted on matters pertaining 
to their current and future welfare. They should collectively decide 
for themselves if they wish to sustain a distinctive identity or whether 
they wish to progressively merge with Sinhalese and Tamil commu-
nities. Whatever their decision, they should be consulted in formu-
lating an affirmative action programme to stop their further isolation 
and descent into becoming a depressed underclass of the Sri Lankan 
population.
investments in immovable property without the written consent of her hus-
band (Thambiah, 2009).
In the case of Muslim law, in general circumstances (though not all) 
women are allotted half the share of inheritance available to men who have 
the same relationship to the deceased (Hussain).
Discrimination is also suffered by the Kinnara caste, even though they 
belong to the majority Sinhala ethnicity as their rights and access to land are 
limited (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 2013).
One of the primary issues with land rights of minorities in Sri Lanka has 
been the seizure of land in the north and east of the country designated high 
security zones, the existence of which has continued despite heavy criticism 
even after the conclusion of the war. The acquisition of this land has result-
ed in the army engaging in several business ventures such as restaurants, 
hotels, airline services, power plants, agriculture and selling produce, neg-
atively affecting the economy of several Tamils who have lost their prop-
erties. A UN survey demonstrates that out of 138,651 families that were 
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resettled in the north, only 9 per cent had found permanent employment. 
Further, it is also reported that land seizures have been affected in fishing 
areas by removing the names of residents from government records such 
as voters’ registries and using other such coercive measures against resi-
dents who are not able to provide titles to the land occupied by them. Such 
land grab has particularly disadvantaged women who lack documentation 
to prove the title of property in the names of their dead or missing male rela-
tives (Williams, 2014). As per the North East Secretariat for Human Rights, 
about 70,000 people have been displaced as approximately one-third of the 
total area of the Jaffna district has been taken over for high security zones. 
In Trincomalee, 102 sq. km of land was taken over for a high security zone 
in 2006 displacing around 15,000 people (Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional, 2011).
During the tenure of the previous government, 818 acres of land in Sam-
pur was sought to be vested with the Board of Investments by using a special 
gazette notification, but this land has now been taken back by the govern-
ment and returned to the original owners (Lankasri News, 2015). President 
Maithripala Sirisena also recently distributed ownership deeds for 613 acres 
of land in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts to their original owners and 
to the relevant institutions; this land was previously utilized by the military 
(Wimalaweera, 2015). A further 1,013 acres of land in Jaffna in the northern 
province  has also been released (Sri Lanka Brief, 2015c).
The new government’s approach to the resettlement of communities 
with low incomes in Colombo too is noteworthy as communities will be relo-
cated only if acquiring the land that they are living on is absolutely essential 
and the practice of issuing an agreement which is only in Sinhala is rescind-
ed. The Urban Development Authority is now also taking steps to address 
the concerns of those relocated to high-rise apartments under the previous 
regime (CPA Lanka, 2015). 
Right to participation
Minority parties have played a key role in Sri Lankan politics, particularly 
in the last two decades with the doing away of the first-past-the-post system 
and the introduction of the proportional representation electoral system. 
The Ceylon Workers Congress, which is a representative of the Indian Tamil 
community and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress have, to an extent, been in 
a position to make and break governments in the recent past by enabling 
the formation of coalition governments. The leaderships of the parties have 
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been in a position to negotiate with the ruling party on policies of concern 
to them and also secure key ministerial portfolios (Minority Rights Group, 
2011). But this does not mean that the minority communities enjoy more 
protection.
The first-past-the-post system was disadvantageous to non-territorial 
minorities because there was no way they could secure a seat by winning 
a particular electorate. Therefore, the proportional representation system 
along with preferential voting enabled voters from dispersed minorities to 
maximize the chances of a few candidates from minority political parties 
winning (Uyangoda, 2015).
Even though Sri Lanka was the first country in Asia to afford women the 
right to franchise in 1931 and then elected the first female Prime Minister in 
the world in 1960, several decades later she is still struggling to garner an 
equal or even numerically significant representation for women in politics. 
The percentage of women in Parliament has not gone above 6.5 per cent 
since independence in 1948 and is currently only 5.8 per cent (Daily FT, 
2015; Jayasinghe, 2015). This is largely on account of the patriarchal nature 
of Sri Lankan politics.
Women’s representation in provincial councils too has not exceeded 6 
per cent, with it being even worse in local authorities  (in the range of about 
1-2 per cent) (Daily FT, 2015 ; Jayasinghe, 2015). The approval of cabinet 
ministers, however, has been obtained to amend the Local Authorities (Spe-
cial Provisions) Act No. 21 of 2012 to allocate 25 per cent representation to 
women in provincial councils and local governments (Colombo Page, 2015). 
However, this would potentially yield feasible results only in the event 
that both the first-past-the-post and proportional representation systems 
are adopted, the specific modalities of which would have to be carefully 
worked out.
Currently, Sri Lanka is in the process of introducing further electoral 
reforms after considering the interests of all stakeholders.
The 13th Amendment 
The 13th amendment to the Constitution was made in 1987 with a view to 
devolving some powers vested in the centre among the nine provinces, thus 
purporting to increase the avenues for participation.
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During the peak of the ethnic conflict, India and Sri Lanka came to an 
agreement under which the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to devolve a 
certain degree of political power to the provinces in the country. This was 
done to undermine the movement for secession while providing an avenue 
of power sharing taking into account the needs of minority communities.
The members of the Council and the Chief Minister are elected by the 
people of the province and the Council can legislate over matters set out 
in the provincial list. Each province has a Governor appointed by the Pres-
ident, holding office in accordance with Article 4(b) during the pleasure of 
the President.
Under Article 154G, the Provincial Council can make statutes according 
to the special procedure laid out with respect to matters on the Provincial 
Council list. Parliament has exclusive powers to legislate over matters in 
the reserved list. The subject matter in the concurrent list can be legislated 
upon by both Parliament and provincial councils, but in practice it is the will 
of the Parliament that prevails.
It is important to note that a Provincial Council can make a statute which 
applies only within its provincial limits.  Moreover, the power to make stat-
utes is subject to other provisions in the Constitution.  When making a stat-
ute on a matter in the concurrent list, the Provincial Council is expected to 
carry out such consultations with Parliament as it may consider necessary 
in the circumstances of each case. However, with regard to the Parliament 
legislating on matters in the concurrent list, there is no express requirement 
that these should be subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. But 
it is provided that the Parliament may carry out such consultations with all 
provincial councils as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of 
each case.
Further, as per Article 154G(6), a statute made by a Provincial Council 
may be void if it is inconsistent with a law passed by Parliament which was 
enacted following the provisions of paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 
154G.
A Provincial Council is also entitled to legislate on a matter on the Pro-
vincial Council list even though there may be a law enacted by Parliament 
prior to the commencement of the 13th amendment. In such a situation, the 
statute in its long title must describe that it is inconsistent with that law. If 
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Good practice case study:
Civil society activism for the 
minority rights of the estate 
plantation community
During the early part of the 19th century, the British brought upcoun-
try Tamil estate workers from South India to Sri Lanka to work on 
British tea plantations. They make up 4.2 per cent of the current Sri 
Lankan population (CPA, 2015). Even though the community has 
been living in the country for about 200 years it has been neglected in 
policies. Though the estate workers play a pivotal role in contributing 
towards the national economy, their living conditions are deplorable 
and they have a very low standard of living. According to Oldenziel, 
‘in Sri Lanka, the vast majority of tea estate workers are “Tea Tamils” 
who are isolated even within their own community as the indigenous 
Sri Lankan Tamils consider them to be second class citizens’ ( SOMO, 
ProFound, Indian Committee of the Netherlands, 2006). Initially 
when this community was brought to Sri Lanka its members were not 
granted citizenship and the subsequent nationalist movement pre-
vented the governments that were in power from changing the situ-
ation. A clear example of this is the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, 
which did not recognize upcountry Tamil estate workers as Sri Lankan 
citizens despite the fact that they had lived in the country for so long 
(CPA, 2015). On the introduction of the first Citizenship Act in 1948, 
a person could claim citizenship if he/she had two out of three imme-
diate ancestors in the immediate paternal line born in the country or 
in case of birth after a fixed date such a person would be eligible if the 
father was a citizen at the time of the applicant’s birth. Such criteria 
almost automatically excluded the eligibility of this community from 
applying for citizenship (Jayawardena, 2015).
The issue of citizenship was shelved for years, which led to rising rest-
lessness among the youth in the plantation community. In response a 
three-month prayer campaign was organized by the Ceylon Workers 
Congress on 12 January 1986 where workers prayed from 7.00 am to 
12 noon and then returned to work with the hope that their workload 
would be reduced. It was not a strike and neither was it to be viewed as 
such, but rather a non-violent intervention to seek spiritual guidance 
for facing their hardships. Consequent to this campaign, the govern-
ment passed the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act 1986 
(Jayawardena, 2015).
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such a statute is passed by the Provincial Council and receives the assent of 
the Governor, the statute will be in force in the province and the parliamen-
tary law which was passed before the commencement of the 13th amend-
ment will be suspended in that province. However, the situation is different 
when it comes to laws passed by Parliament after the commencement of the 
13th amendment.
Therefore, the 13th amendment to the Constitution at least notional-
ly confers some degree of participation to the minorities in matters which 
concern them but is far from ideal given the degree of power retained by the 
centre.
Right to culture and identity
Article 14(1)(f) of the Constitution confers on every citizen the freedom 
by himself or in association with others to enjoy and promote his own cul-
ture and to use his own language. Article 27(10) further provides that the 
‘State shall assist the development of the cultures and the languages of the 
people.’
A recognition of the language and culture of a particular group is a first 
step in validating its identity. 
Consequent to the growing support for the swabasha movement in the 
1940s, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party manifesto claimed ‘...it is most essential 
that Sinhalese and Tamil be adopted as Official Languages immediately so 
that the people of this country may cease to be aliens in their own land…’
However, in 1956 with the passage of the Official Languages Act No. 33 
of 1956, Sinhala was established as the official language island-wide, replac-
ing English and giving no status of parity to Tamil. Consequently, with an 
increase in political pressure, the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act 
No. 28 of 1958 was passed and in or around 1966, the act was implemented 
when Tamil came to be used as the language of administration in the north-
ern and eastern provinces.
Thereafter, in 1987, with the passing of the 13th amendment to the Con-
stitution, a legal basis for parity between Sinhala and Tamil was established 
at least notionally as Tamil was also declared an official language. English 
was declared to be the link language.
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... Good practice case study continued ...
This community lived for decades without state provision of social 
services, until this issue was addressed to a very limited extent under 
the government of J.R. Jayawardana. Nevertheless, large inequalities 
exist in their access to and utilization of basic human needs such as 
health services, as these workers are largely dependent on the estate’s 
management for their basic needs – housing, health, and education 
(Jayawardena, 2013). They also receive poor pay as compared to la-
bourers in other sectors and the labour laws prevalent in the country 
are not helpful in enhancing their living conditions. This has led to 
dilapidated housing with limited access to utilities, alcoholism, high 
incidence of illnesses, low spending on education and high levels of 
indebtedness. Further, though it is evident that the housing, health 
and transportation facilities have significantly improved over the past 
decade these estate worker communities have not been able to benefit 
from these developments. 
Further, these estate workers are not the owners of the small, dilap-
idated houses built in rows in uncomfortably close quarters on the 
estates that they work in as housing is under the control of the man-
agement. These line-rooms, which were supposed to be temporary 
shelters, have now become their permanent abode. The estate man-
agement has not taken measures to rectify this situation (CPA, 2015). 
Individual houses do not have their own addresses. As a result, im-
portant correspondence is not delivered to those who ought to receive 
it. The mail is sent to the estate head office and the management dis-
tributes it at its own convenience. This land does not come under the 
purview of the Pradeshiya Sabha Act, as the estates are private land. 
Further, as an estate also owns the roads, addresses cannot be provid-
ed by the local authorities (CPA, 2015).
Funded by the Australian High Commission, the Centre for Policy 
Alternatives (CPA) in partnership with the Uva Shakthi Foundation 
ventured to address some of the pressing issues that these communi-
ties face. According to Lionel Guruge, Senior Researcher attached to 
CPA, CPA had been 100 per cent successful in obtaining valid postal 
addresses for most of the estate workers residing within the Passara 
region in Uva province (about 3,500 families) and for about 1,500 
families in Maskeliya (personal communication).  A unique feature of 
this programme in Mocawatte is the support and collaboration of the 
estate management, which enabled CPA to complete the work within 
just 3 months whereas in other areas it took around at least 6 or 7 
months. 
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Article 22 of the Constitution, through the 16th amendment, introduced 
provisions relating to the language of administration being available in both 
Sinhala and Tamil.
As such, recognizing previous discriminatory language policies, Chapter 
4 of the Constitution and the 13th and 16th amendments provide for exten-
sive solutions.
As per Articles 18 and 19 of the Constitution, both Sinhala and Tamil are 
the official and national languages of Sri Lanka. Further, Article 22 specifi-
cally stipulates that in the northern and eastern provinces Tamil shall be the 
language of administration.
The Constitution of Sri Lanka of 1978 provides that all laws and subor-
dinate legislation shall be enacted or made and published in Sinhala and 
Tamil, together with a translation thereof in English and the Parliament 
is to determine at the stage of enactment as to which text shall prevail in 
the event of any inconsistency between the texts (Constitution of Sri Lanka, 
Article 23[1]).
In practice, it is usually the Sinhala version that prevails. Even though 
such a provision has been complied with in respect of the laws enacted after 
1978 the status remains the same as far as the legislations prior to that are 
concerned.
Even though provided for by both the Republican constitutions, such 
provisions have not been practically implemented with the entire gamut of 
more than 250 laws passed before the 1972 Constitution including the Penal 
Code, Civil Procedure Code, Evidence Ordinance, Motor Traffic Act and In-
dustrial Disputes Act not having been published as stipulated by law, even 
more than 30 years after being provided for.
Even though some of the legislations enacted before 1972 have been 
translated into Sinhala and/or Tamil, since the translations have not been 
published in the gazette, they remain unofficial and without any force or 
effect in law.
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Thus the right to safely receive one’s correspondence, a basic living 
condition taken for granted by most in the rest of the country, has 
now been ensured to estate workers. Secure mail collection boxes have 
also been set up in 20 localities. Further, working with the Passara 
Pradeshiya Sabhawa, the road names were chosen and bi-lingual sig-
nage provided for 40 of the estate by-roads. Mobile clinics were also 
set up to facilitate the application process for about 300 national iden-
tity cards; most of the applicants were students who were due to sit 
for government exams (Citizens Lanka, 2014). Language societies too 
have been established in several estates and about 30 villages in the 
DS Divisions of Lunugala and Passara. 
The success of this project has inspired the Uva Shakthi Foundation 
to commence another project in order to serve approximately 15,000 
families and other civil society organizations such as the World Vision 
Sri Lanka (which extended support to CPA) have expressed an interest 
in launching a much broader project targeting 35,000 families of the 
plantation community. 
Lionel Guruge elaborated on some of the strategies adopted by CPA 
in this effort:
- A detailed analysis of the hardships faced by the estate plantation 
community was obtained at the grassroots level by speaking to in-
dividuals, families and representatives of the community.
- Having identified some of the key issues as not having street 
names, house addresses and national identity cards, the commu-
nity was educated on the importance of having these for their em-
powerment and were made to understand that it was a basic right 
that they were entitled to and that these would also help in uphold-
ing their dignity.
- Necessary information including details of the area and families 
was collated.
- All necessary stakeholders including the estate management, vil-
lage heads, post office, police and local authorities were consulted.
- They understood that communication was key as it was imperative 
that none of the stakeholders erroneously feel they that would lose 
out.
... Good practice case study continued ...
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In 1991, the Official Languages Commission was set up to advise the gov-
ernment on matters of language policy, to monitor compliance particularly 
of public authorities, to educate state officials and to investigate complaints 
arising from alleged violations of the law.
The Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration was estab-
lished in 2010 to address matters relating to the formation and implemen-
tation of the national languages policy and to promote social integration 
and ethnic affairs. In 2014, the ministry undertook several activities includ-
ing conversational workshops to educate police officers and members of the 
local and provincial administration on the importance of implementing the 
official language policy, investigation programmes regarding the implemen-
tation of the official language policy in  bilingual divisional secretariats and 
other divisional secretariats, establishing bilingual facilitation cells in dis-
trict secretariats and divisional secretariats, the bilingualization of the pub-
lic service and the establishment of provincial centres (Ministry of National 
Languages and Social Integration, 2014).
The ministry has also engaged in the provision of mobile services for 
civic documentation to provide equal opportunities for vulnerable groups 
as citizens of the country by fulfilling its requirements of civic documen-
tation. A wide range of free services were provided at a one stop shop and 
at ease (for example, stamps which are needed to obtain national identity 
cards and the fees for birth, marriage and death certificates are provided 
free of charge). These mobile services were mainly available in the northern, 
eastern and estate plantation sectors (Ministry of National Languages and 
Social Integration, 2014). However, a lot more needs to be done by way of 
creating parity in terms of language rights.
Identity: Examples of severely marginalized groups 
The Wanniyalaeto Community 
The identity of this indigenous people’s group is intrinsically linked with 
who they are and where they come from.
Due to assimilation into Sinhala and Tamil communities for the sake 
of survival, the Wanniyalaeto have not been able to preserve their original 
language except for only a few words (Veddas of Sri Lanka). 
As per Census reports, Wanniyalaeto population was about 4,510 in 
1921 which dropped to 2,361 in 1946. Though a separate count has not 
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- The community was then involved in formulating names for the 
streets in order to facilitate a sense of ownership.
- Thereafter, particular addresses for each family were formulated 
and taken to the  Grama Niladhari for the necessary stamp of ap-
proval. This was undertaken together with the post office. Further, 
CBOs and CSOs in the area were also involved in the process.
- Once all approvals had been obtained, the information was pub-
lished in the gazette and all relevant stakeholders informed.
Some of the challenges faced in the implementation of the project:
- Resistance from estate management – It preferred the old system 
as this was a way in which it exercised more control over the work-
ers. The estate management was also fearful that with time the line 
room families would claim legal ownership to the houses. Howev-
er, the CPA team managed to explain the ground reality and per-
suade the management that it was in the interests of all concerned.
- As new names of roads/villages were formulated in Tamil, the 
adjoining Sinhala villagers were uneasy as the villagers feared the 
word ‘puram’ (which is a Tamil word for place or area).  The CPA 
team allayed such fears by convincing them that the word merely 
meant ‘area or place’ and nothing more. The team also visited the 
nearby temples and explained the real purpose of the project, that 
is, it was not for creating a type of Tamil dominance over the area.  
- Ignorance and lack of knowledge among the estate community re-
garding the basic right of having a permanent, separate address 
for each family. The CPA team educated and motivated them on 
the value of having such an address. This was vital as without their 
active participation and interest in the project it could not have 
become a reality.
been made since 1963, a 1978 study identified about 6,000 Wanniyalae-
tos in the Anuradhapura district alone (For details see http://www.vedda.
org/3-identity.htm).
Their collective custodianship over hunting and gathering ranges have 
not been taken cognizance of and this community is usually not consulted 
... Good practice case study continued ...
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in matters pertaining to decisions that affect their day-to-day existence (For 
details see http://www.vedda.org/3-identity.htm), making them perhaps 
the most marginalized group in Sri Lanka.
The perceived inferior social status of the Wanniyalaeto and the fail-
ure to recognize their own criteria of self-determination has caused their 
extinction as a distinct culture and denied them participation in the demo-
cratic decision-making process.
Since this community is numerically insignificant in every parliamenta-
ry electorate, it does not have any representatives in Parliament and does 
not have any voice in decision making.
The Estate Plantation Community 
Hill-country Tamils were brought by the British at the beginning of the 20th 
century from south India to work on British plantations; they now form 
about 4.2 per cent of Sri Lanka’s population (www.mysrilanka.com).
 These people have suffered discrimination by the Sinhala majority as 
well as Sri Lankan Tamils. The Census identifies them as a different ethnic 
group termed Indian Tamil, even though most of them were not born in In-
dia nor have they ever been to India. Due to their origin as indented labour, 
long period of statelessness and continued depressed socioeconomic status, 
the term Indian Tamil has acquired a derogatory connotation and by and 
large the community prefers to be referred to as Hill-country Tamils. More-
over, many former estate workers and their descendants who have moved 
out of the plantation areas have classified themselves as Sri Lankan Tamils 
in their Census classifications. 
As a majority of them descended from indentured labour brought from 
India in the early 1900s and they were not granted citizenship status, for de-
cades they lived without state provision of social services. On the introduction 
of the first Citizenship Act in 1948, a person could claim citizenship if he had 
two out of three immediate ancestors in the immediate paternal line born in 
the country or in case of a birth after the fixed date such a person would be 
eligible if the father was a citizen at the time of the applicant’s birth. Such 
criteria almost automatically excluded the eligibility of this community from 
applying for citizenship. Eventually as a result of a campaign by the commu-
nity, particularly the April 1984 strike action and the January 1986 prayer 
campaign, the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act 1986 was passed 
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and Sri Lankan citizenship was granted to 469,000 persons and any other 
persons of Indian origin who were stateless but legally resident in the coun-
try (Jayawardena and Kurian, 2015). However, P.P. Deveraj argues that even 
though de jure citizenship was granted, several in the community continued 
not to enjoy de facto citizenship, with difficulty in even obtaining national 
identity cards, resulting in being excluded from voters’ lists.
Dr Devanesan Nesiah (personal communication) was of the opinion that 
an affirmative action programme sustained over several years was needed 
including improved education, health, housing and other facilities in the 
plantation areas, as well as a guaranteed minimum quota in at least public 
sector employment, public sector training institutions and admissions to 
state universities. Unlike the Wanniyalaeto, the Indian/Hill-country Tamils 
are already politically organized and their leaders could further engage in 
designing appropriate affirmative action programmes. 
Conclusion
Among the key findings that emerge from this discussion is the notion that 
even though there are no major impediments in the legal and constitutional 
frameworks for the protection of ethnic and religious minority rights in Sri 
Lanka, there appears to be a fundamental issue in the practical implemen-
tation of the laws, which are already in place.
On the conclusion of the three-decade long ethnic conflict and the re-
sulting triumphalism, there has been a resurgence of ethno-nationalism 
and identity politics giving rise to the empowerment of fascist movements, 
which have attacked both the Muslim and Christian communities. Sri Lanka 
has demonstrated an increase in hostility towards some minorities, though 
in 2015 there appeared to have been some improvements.
Recommendations for State actors
In as much as it is evident that the primary concern is one of implementa-
tion, it is of essence that proper mechanisms are in place in order to monitor 
the progress of the various international treaties that have been ratified by 
Sri Lanka. Law enforcement agencies too must be empowered to act in ac-
cordance with the law and to bring offenders to task without exception. It 
is essential that the government formulates an objective plan to reform the 
incapacity and apathy of the police and other state officials. Further, devel-
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opment initiatives must create and empower grassroots level employment, 
particularly in the north and the east.
Formulating programmes to deal with judicial sensitization towards is-
sues that concern minorities must be made after discussions with the Ju-
dicial Service Commission and the Judges Training Institute (Gunatilleke, 
2015a: 56). Steps must also be taken to take positive affirmative action for 
the empowerment of ethnic and religious minorities who have been margin-
alized in terms of access to their rights.
Speedy action in terms of Constitution making and accountability, in 
accordance with international obligations, particularly the latest UN resolu-
tion which Sri Lanka co-sponsored is also recommended.
The government must also take steps to repeal the draconian Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act and introduce an act bearing in mind its internation-
al treaty obligations. Steps must be taken immediately to release political 
prisoners and detainees. Transparent principles, processes and time tables 
need to be formulated for the return of military-occupied land or payment 
of compensation.
It is imperative that the government adopts a policy of affirmative ac-
tion, particularly in the areas of university admissions, political representa-
tion and public and private sector employment with a view to empowering 
the minorities. The specific modalities may vary but ought to be considered 
and implemented.
Local authorities must be encouraged to improve the living and working 
conditions of labourers and sanitary workers by adopting improved technol-
ogies, safety measures and developing career paths which go beyond caste 
and ethnic factors.
Recommendations for Civil Society
Given the almost alarming increase in the social hostility index, it is imper-
ative that civil society works towards an attitudinal shift in society, partic-
ularly in areas with low ethnic and religious diversity and low concentra-
tions of minorities, which are perhaps more prone to violence. Working with 
government institutions and monitoring the provisions and progress of the 
rights of minorities too must be a key focus.
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It is also important that awareness is created about the importance of 
power sharing and the link between accountability and true reconciliation.
Civil society organizations working with ‘lower caste’ communities 
should share their experiences across the ethnic divide. It may also be use-
ful to share experiences with Dalit activists in the rest of South Asia.
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Annexure 1 
The Question of Data on 
Minorities in South Asia
Any serious attempt to document and track performance for minorities - and 
provide a ‘report card’ on how states perform on the count - must be able to mea-
sure outcomes for minorities and state ‘efforts’ for the group, year on year, using 
standardized tables, for the range of minority rights. These include life and security, 
socio-economic rights, participation and identity and culture. 
A survey of the different countries (See Table: The Question of Data on Minori-
ties in South Asia) reveals, data availability throughout the region, is a serious prob-
lem. And where data is available, that disaggregated by minority groups is even more 
scarce, thus stymying any attempt at producing comparative tables.  Most official 
data, even where they are available, is not on a yearly basis. Most countries have 
decennial Census – Afghanistan is the exception. And some other data on ‘socio-eco-
nomic’ outcomes – incomes, poverty, employment, education, health, and such like 
- are usually available. But these are not available on a year on year basis (or peri-
odically), nor disaggregated by minority groups. And if official data disaggregated 
by minority groups is scanty for socio-economic rights, that on life and security, 
participation and identity and culture is even more so. 
The challenge is further compounded for us, given our framework using minori-
ty rights, is premised on the notion that states are duty bearers, hence it is wholly 
the state’s task to provide for minorities. To be able to capture how states perform, 
we want to report not only thematic outcomes (the goals), but also state’s efforts at 
providing the rights equitably to all minorities. Effort could take many form – laws 
and institutions put in place; programmes and schemes devised; resources set aside 
and used up; human resource deployed; reform measures implemented, and so on. 
Not all are amenable to capture as yearly outputs, but an effective minority rights 
tracking system, must be able to capture some of these elements of state effort, be-
sides the resultant outcomes. 
This is something we want to be able to do, given the potential spin offs of sys-
tematic documentation and reporting to advocacy for minority rights protection and 
promotion. In the absence of strong evidence and objective data, governments often 
easily shrug off accusations, when they are made. This hard data aspect of the report, 
is important to any enterprise of minority rights. Over time, and across the South 
Asia region, we want to be able to access and systematically collate data where they 
are available, and contribute to creating datasets, where they aren’t.
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Annexure 2 
Data on Minorities in Nepal
Nepal’s is a model case, where a great deal of data, especially on socio-economic 
rights, is available officially, and that disaggregated by minority groups. In the case 
of Nepal, these include religious and ethnic minorities, as well as dalits and janjatis. 
We hope to facilitate the creation, in the rest of the region, of this degree of data 
sophistication. Here we present some data tables on socio-economic outcomes, by 
different groups for Nepal.
Table series 1: Socio-Economic Status of minority groups (Janajatis/Dalits/Madhe-
sis/Muslims) 
Table 2: Percentage of usually active population for more than six months in the past 
year, Census 2011
Table 3: State of Participation of the Broader Social Groups in Judiciary in 2013
Table 4: Caste/Ethnic Representation in the Army (January 2016) 
Table 5: Public Service Commission Data: 2009/10-2010/11 and 2011/12*
Table 6: International Conventions Signed, Ratified and Acceded by Nepal
Table 7: International Conventions Signed, Ratified and Acceded by Nepal
Table 8: Agreements between the Government of Nepal and the agitating Janajatis 
and Madhesis
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Caste/Ethnicity Representation (in 
percentage)
Remarks
Mountain Janajati 0.13
Hill Janajati 26.89 Largest group is Magar (7.65 per cent) followed by Newar (6.07 per 
cent) while the smallest is Thami (0.01 per cent).
Tarai Janajati 4.95 Largest group is Tharu with 3.23 per cent
Hill Dalit 4.81
Tarai Caste 1.07 Caste categorisation not clear
Tarai Dalit 0.16
Muslim 0.03
Chhetri 43.12
Bahun 8.72
Thakuri 3.52
Table 4. Caste/Ethnic Representation in the 
Army1 (January 2016)
Note: The caste categorisation used is from Sharma, Pitamber, Some Aspects of Social 
Demography: Census 2011 update 
(Social Science Baha and Himal Books, Kathmandu, 2014). 
The caste categorisation provided by the Nepal Army in many cases is not clear. For example, 
it lumps Mandal and Gangai together. However, Gangai fall under Tarai Janajati while 
Mandal is not given in Sharma’s categorisation. Similarly, Lohar is a caste group in Tarai 
while Tatma is Tarai Dalit. Tatma is not listed in Sharma’s work.
Footnote
1  Retrieved from: http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/inclusiveness.php on 27th January 2016
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at
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The South Asia Collective
South Asia’s minorities – religious, ethnic, linguistic and gender are among the 
poorest and most vulnerable sections in the region; they are also victims of most 
conflicts and violence and atrocities by state and non-state actors. And yet, 
there is no South Asia regional instrument for minority rights’ protection, and no 
effective forum for peaceful dialogue on minority rights between countries.
South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016: Mapping the Terrain seeks to 
provide a regional overview on minority rights’ precepts and practices in the 
region, offering a set of country-specific and region-wide recommendations. The 
report presents six country chapters – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka (dealing with Bhutan and Maldives in the Introduction) 
reporting on the condition of minorities, profiles of select marginalized groups and 
good practice case studies to profile successful campaigns and interventions for 
rights’ protection and promotion. 
The South Asia State of Minorities Report is planned as a tool for advocacy. It 
is hoped that the periodic reports on outcomes for minorities and the quality of 
state provisioning for them, will spur public debate on the subject in the region 
and create the conditions for state parties and the SAARC to agree to give serious 
consideration to issues of minorities and how to deliver for them. The purpose 
of the project is really about promoting citizenship, a central challenge of the 
‘deepening democracy’ agenda in the region.
The idea of Report was born with the South Asia State of Minorities Report 
Collective, a small group of minority and human rights researchers and activists 
from across South Asia, deciding to come together to produce a periodic people’s 
report, to systematically document and track the condition of minorities in the 
region and their access to rights guaranteed by international minority and human 
rights instruments. The Collective hopes to carry on the work, drawing more 
allies in, to expand the circle seeking to promote peace and justice in South Asia.
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